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PRECIS
Since the eastern conflict was essentially part of a 
wider contest to unseat the British from their position of 
commercial and maritime preponderance throughout the world, the 
problem of Anglo-French rivalry in India in the late eighteenth 
century will be introduced within its global setting. As a 
consequence of the French threat and French ambitions, most 
nearly realised during the American War, the defence of the 
Company’ s possessions in India became closely linked with an 
imperial maritime strategy embracing the Cape, Trincomalee and 
naval bases to the east of the Bay of Bengal# Accordingly, this 
study will be concerned with metropolitan and imperial factors 
as well as local conditions in the expansion of European influence 
throughout Asia, An important task will be to determine how far 
the fear of the French precipitated British involvement in 
Indian politics, and whether that intervention was conditioned 
more by local, on the spot considerations than by European 
reactions and policies#
British responses to the French are examined closely 
within three different types of situation# First, in Bengal where 
the British had acquired a large measure of control over the 
local ruler# Secondly, in the Carnatic and the South of India 
where the French were still political rivals with the English
iii
for control over the Nawabs, and thirdly, in the Eastern Seas and 
countries beyond India, areas where the factor of sea-power rather 
than military might or diplomatic skill was crucial*
These case-studies demonstrate that the French continued 
to exert a significant influence on British policies in India 
after 1763, the date of the Peace of Paris which is usually chosen 
as the end of the French chapter in the East# Fears of a French 
invasion of the sub-continent, exacerbated by various crises in 
Europe and India, ensured that the British would be as concerned 
with matters of security and defence as they were with trade, the 
original raison d’etre of the Company# Furthermore, the intrigues 
of the French at the courts of the Indian princes encouraged the 
British to take a more active interest in native diplomacy# The 
Subsidiary Alliance system, for instance, was primarily devised 
to eradicate clandestine French influence from Hyderabad and 
Mysore. Finally, the decision to establish bases outside India 
was not unaffected by French activity elsewhere in Asia# For 
throughout this period the British were eager to anticipate or 
counter French moves#
iv
GLOSSARY OF INDIAN V/ORDS
Aumil - a farmer of the revenue, invested with chief authority 
in his district,
Aurung - place or district where native piecegoods were
manufactured and purchased on advances from the Company's 
agents#
Diwani - the right of receiving as Diwan the revenue of Bengal, 
Bihar and Orissa, conferred upon the East India Company by 
the Moghul Emperor, Shah Alam II , in 1765#
Diwani Adalat - civil court of justice.
Durbar - court,
Dustuck - a pass or permit which exempted goods of the Company's 
servants or agents from duties.
Firman - diploma, patent, or deed of grant by the government 
(usually the Moghul Emperor) of office, privilege, or right#
Fouzdar - a governor of a district,
Fouzdar of Hooghly - the governor in whose territories the Dutch 
and French settlements at Chinsurah and Chandernagore 
respectively were situated. Hence, he was responsible for 
deciding 'complaints in which the foreign companies or the 
subjects of their nations' were concerned.
Fouzdari Adalat - criminal court of justice,
Gomastah - a native agent or factor.
Havildar - a sepoy non-commissioned officer corresponding to a 
sergeant*
Hircarrah - messenger, courier, an emissary.
Jemitdar - leader of a body of individuals.
Lac, Lakh - one hundred thousand.
Mofussil - rural localities as opposed to presidencies#
VMoonshee - a secretary, a reader, an interpreter, a writer,
Naib Diwan - the head financial minister, charged with the 
collection of the revenue, the remittance of it to the 
imperial treasury, and invested with extensive judicial 
powers in all civil and financial causes# The Naib Diwan 
for Bengal resided at Murshidabad until 1772, while the 
Naib Diwan for Bihar resided at Patna#
Naib Nazim - an officer, subordinate to the Nawab, responsible 
for the executive and military authority of the Nawab, and 
the administration of criminal justice*
Nawab - the chief governor of a province under the Moghul 
Empe ror#
Perwannah - decree or permit,
Rowannah - pass or permit#
Sanad, Sunnud - patent, charter, or written authority for holding 
either land or office#
Talook - tract of proprietary land, sometimes not easily
distinguished from zemindaries, and sometimes subordinate to 
or dependent on zemindars#
Talookdar - the holder of a talook#
Vakeel - an attorney, an authorised representative.
Zemindar - one holding land on which he pays revenue to the 
government direct, and not to any intermediate superior.
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CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM
During the latter part of the eighteenth and the early 
part of the nineteenth centuries the most striking development 
in the relationship between Europe and the East was the extension 
of British control over large tracts of the Indian sub-continent*
An Asian territorial empire was acquired before the age of 
imperialism, even before the passing of the First Reform Bill*
Such a development was not only unprecedented in the experience 
of eighteenth century Englishmen; it was equally foreign and novel 
to the experience of all Europeans. The East India Company's 
original intrusion in the Carnatic wars of the 1740's and 1750's 
initiated this process of expansion, which gained added impetus 
from Robert Clive's defeat of Siraj-ud-Daula at the battle of 
Plassey. British supremacy over the provinces of Bengal, Bihar 
and Orissa was further confirmed and strengthened in 1764 by 
Munro's victory at Buxar over the combined forces of the erstwhile 
Nawab, Mir Kasim, the Nawab of Oudh and the Moghul Emperor*
Soon after, Clive, now a newly-arrived reforming governor from
1
2home, extorted the maximum political advantages from this success 
by acquiring from Shah Alam II the diwani of the three provinces,^ 
With control of this fertile and productive area secured, one 
might have expected the rise to Raj to be short, sharp and 
decisive*
And yet the thirty years intervening between these 
events in Bengal and the capture of the French Indian establish­
ments in 1793 witnessed surprisingly few cessions of territory to 
the East India Company* In fact, the meteoric rise of the British 
power in India occurred later, during the vice-regal tenures of 
Wellesley and the Marquess of Hastings, For only then did the 
Company become the principal power in the Indian state-system and 
not simply one of the many contending powers. Consolidation and 
maintenance of rule rather than expansion was the dominant theme 
for the British in the East between the Peace of Paris and the 
outbreak of the French Revolutionary wars. Nevertheless, British 
influence continued to spread, if only slowly and indirectly? 
witness, for example, the occupation of the Northern Circars, 
Tanjore and parts of Mysore by the Madras Council and its
1
H.H. Dodwell (ed#), The Cambridge History of India« vol,V, 
'British India 1497-18581, second Indian reprint (Delhi, 1963)* 
pp,175-6, For a more detailed treatment of these changes in 
Bengal see chapter 3, pp*84-6.
3rol faineant, the Nawab Walajah#^ v/arren Hastings, too, was
instrumental in establishing a real measure of control over the
buffer states to the north-west of Bengal - Oudh and Rohillakhand -
while the Bombay Council after a protracted struggle with the
2
Marathas secured Bassein and Salsette Island, In spite of this, 
however, it remains broadly true that the period 1763 - 1793 was 
a relatively tranquil one in which the only open struggle against 
the French and their Indian allies was waged to preserve and not 
to extend the Company's dominion#
Historians who have dealt with the question of Anglo- 
French rivalry in the East have taken this lull in the military 
activities of the British as evidence for the disappearance of 
the French as a military and political threat from the area.
The machinations and intrigues of Dumas and Dupleix first com­
pelled the British to enter the labyrinthine maze of Indian
1
These extensions of British control are dealt with in Chapter 5> 
PP. 203-9, 242-3*
2
See Chapter 5j pp*230-5.
4politics*^- But with the brilliant generalship of Clive, which 
effectively thwarted French schemes in the South, and later with 
the defeat of Lally at Wandewash and the capture of Pondicherry, 
the influence of the French rapidly declined* The Peace of Paris 
recognised this situation and with the one exception of the abort­
ive Bussy expedition of 1782 the French acquiesced in the triumph 
of British arms in the East, Thus, according to one recent
historian, the defeat at Wandewash in January 1760 destroyed ’ the
2
dream of a French empire in India*«*as it proved for ever'.
This view, although a simple one, is not entirely without merit; 
its prevalence, especially amongst the general historians of the 
British in India, helps to explain why so little detailed work has 
been done on French activities in the East after 1763*
1
Some of the standard works on French policy in this earlier period 
are: A. Martineau, 'Dupleix and Bussy', in The Cambridge History of 
India« vol. V, pp.125-40; H.H. Dodwell, Dupleix and Clive : The 
Beginning of Empire (London, 1920), which presents Dupleix as a 
pragmatist exploiting political opportunities as they arose; and 
G. Jouveau-Dubreuil, Dupleix ou L'Inde Conquise (Paris, 1942), 
which argues that Dupleix conceived the idea of expansion - 
'nababisme' - before the crucial events in the Carnatic.
2
M.S. Anderson, Eighteenth Century Europe 1713-1789 (London, 1966), 
p .37. Broadly speaking, this is the view presented in Dodwell's 
articles in The Cambridge History of India« first published in 1929, 
and in P.E. Roberts' History of British India under the Company and 
the Crown (London, 1921), pp*1 2 2 - 7 .More recently, it is the view 
developed in P.E. Spear, A History of India (London, 1965), vol.2. 
p*79, and in The Oxford History of India, third ed. (Oxford, 196l), 
PP«455-64.
5Certainly the French were nover again in as militarily 
advantageous a situation as they had been in 1746, v/hen a shrewd 
use of military and naval power gave Dupleix mastery over the 
defenceless factory of Madras. Since then the British had made 
some memorable gains which greatly enhanced their strength. But 
the assumption that the French abjured their political ambitions, 
considerable and varied as they were, after 1763 is hardly borne 
out by a scrutiny of the evidence - the activities and corres­
pondence of the French governors and administrators in India and 
at the lie de France, General studies of Anglo-French diplomacy 
in the latter half of the eighteenth century, such as that of 
Vincent Harlow, suggest that there was no abatement in the world­
wide rivalry between the English and the Bourbon powers, 1 The
1
See, for example, D.B. Horn, Great Britain and Europe in the 
Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1967), who argues on pp,382-3 that 
'the nearest approach to a single dominant idea running right 
through the century would probably be found in hostility to 
France, which was detested by the average Englishman equally in 
1701 and in 1 80 0 ,•• .Only in the days of the Spanish Armada did 
internal security, religious zeal, political prejudice, and 
economic advantage designate so clearly a natural and national 
enemy', See also V.T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British 
Empire 1763-1793 (voi,I , London, 1952; voi,I I , London, 1964);
G. Williams, The Expansion of Europe in the Eighteenth Century 
(London, 19667} M.S. Anderson's article 'European Diplomatic 
Relations 1763-1790' in The New Cambridge Modern History (vol,VIII, 
Cambridge, 1965), pp,252-78; and D.K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial 
Empires : A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century 
(London, 1966), —
6foreign policies of Choiseul and Vergennes marked a renewal and 
not a renunciation of colonial and maritime ambitions. On 
prima facie grounds at least, then, one would expect the fear of 
the French to remain a continuing and significant influence on 
British policy, for the French were the natural enemies of the 
British, As blunt General Smith confided to Robert Orme 5 'I  
hate Frenchmen from the same reason that they don’t love us. Our 
interests are incompatible, and i t ’s as much impossible for a 
Monsieur to have views of Honor towards the English nation as it 
is for a Dutchman to give up the Spice Islands’ . 1 And with such 
able and seasoned administrater-diplomats as Jean Law de Lauriston 
and the marquis de Bussy there was considerable justification for 
these fears of the British,
Moreover, there are anomalies which the accepted view - 
that French interest and activity in the East virtually disappeared 
after 1763 - does nothing, or very little, to explain. The 
annexationist policies of iVellesley, for instance, were inspired 
by a phobia of the French, Yet if the French had ceased to be an 
active political force in India after 1763 these fears were
1
Letter dated camp near Ouscotah, in the Mysore Country, 8 August 
1768, from General Joseph Smith to Robert Orme, From S.C. Hill, 
Catalogue of the Orme MSS, in the India Office Library (l916),
7essentially chimerical. In order to account for this discrepancy 
historians have either explained i/ellesley’s fears as a response 
to Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign, or they have dismissed them out 
of hand as figments of his imagination, 1 The former view recog­
nises the existence of a real, if generalised, French threat to 
the Company’s possessions, but the latter assumes with the complac­
ent assurance of hindsight that, since the French failed to achieve 
any of their ambitions in the East, they must have been throughout 
of negligible importance, God may well be on the side of the big 
battalions, to use the dictum of Voltaire, but this of course 
should not deter the historian from inspecting the lesser companies 
and platoons, who often determine the tactics and the strategy of 
the larger force# To under-rate the French is also to under-rate 
the precariousness of the British position in India and the East# 
Wellesley believed quite simply, as had Warren Hastings and 
Cornwallis before him, that the Company's possessions were acutely 
vulnerable to French attack, and his anxieties were immediately 
aroused by Tipu Sultan’ s flagrant association with the revolution­
ary government at Port Louis#
At least one eminent nineteenth century historian argued
1
See G.S. Misra, British Foreign Policy and Indian Affairs 1783- 
1815 (New York, 1963) for a recent attempt to relate l/ellesley’ s 
Indian policies to British foreign policy. In fact, Misra con­
siders that Wellesley’s fear of the French was justified.
8that the French continued to influence the growth of the British 
Raj after the Peace of Paris and that the fears of V/e lies ley were 
real enough* Sir John Seeley, in a course of lectures which he 
delivered at the University of Cambridge and which he later pub­
lished in 1883 as The Expansion of England, developed one of the 
first general explanations for the rise of British power in India*1 
To some extent Seeley was reacting against the then prevalent view 
that the British empire in India was 'a  standing miracle in
politics, only to be explained by the heroic qualities of the
2
English race and their natural genius for government'. By con­
trast, Seeley, who was something of an iconoclast, asserted that 
the growth of the Indian empire was an accidental development, the 
result of the endeavours of ambitious Company men on the spot, and 
largely caused by the need to anticipate or counter French moves 
in the region. Relying on the standard Company histories of the 
time, Seeley presented a number of valuable insights as to how the
1
Sir J.R. Seeley, The Expansion of England : Two Courses of 
Lectures (London, 1931)•
2
Seeley, p*252.
aBritish had acquired India,1
In the Carnatic and later in Bengal the British found 
it necessary to intervene in the affairs of the Nawabs through 
fear of French designs and activities. Such fears, Seeley
believed, were characteristic of ’ an age of gigantic rivalry bet-
2
ween England and France, a kind of second Hundred Years’ War', 
During this conflict, which logically extended from the wars 
against Louis XIV until the defeat of Napoleon, the British were 
able to exploit the unique possibilities thrown up in eighteenth 
century India by the dissolution of the Moghul empire,
Seeley perceived that the fundamental weakness of the 
Indian political system was the absence of any clear idea of 
national unity. The term ’Hindostán’ was little more than a 
geographical expression in the eighteenth century, a euphemism 
that concealed intractable political problems. For the sub­
continent was simply a congeries of competing regional and cultur­
al groups. The most recent experience of political unity which 
India had enjoyed had been imposed from above by a foreign dynasty
1
Seeley appears to have made only the most cursory survey of the 
documentary evidence then available, though he does refer to the 
work of James Mill, Lord Macaulay and Colonel G.B, Malleson whose 
History of the French in India first appeared in 1869, and his 
Final French Struggles in India and on the Indian Seas in 1878.
2
Seeley, pp. 28-9.
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committed with increasing intransigence to an alien religion and 
culture. Even this domination by the Moghuls was less than a 
century and a half old, during which time its authority had been 
constantly disputed at the periphery by the recalcitrant and 
infidel Marathas among others. V/ith the death of Aurangzebe in 
1707 the authority of the Moghuls seriously declined, while rival 
claimants fought for the spoils of empire,1 To the French, more 
adept at the wiles of native diplomacy than the British, it soon 
became apparent that the European companies could extract with 
ease lavish trading concessions and territorial revenues from the 
local rulers in return for military and diplomatic assistance. 
Benefiting from this lesson, the British soon emulated the French 
in their manipulation of local politics in the South, and in time 
learnt how to exploit the political and cultural divisions endemic 
within India to their own advantage. Seeley noticed, moreover, 
that the resources of both these European powers were greatly 
strengthened by the availability and relative cheapness of large
1
The olassic political study of India in the eighteenth century 
is Sir J. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire (4 vols. - I , 1739-54 
(Calcutta, 1932); I I ,  1754-71 (Calcutta, 1934); I I I ,  1771-88 
(Calcutta, 1938); IV, 1789-1803 (Calcutta, 1950)). See also 
K.A. Nilakanta Sastri, History of India : Part III  - Modern India, 
second ed. (Madras, 1964), and Chapter XXIII, ''Rivalries in India", 
by C.C. Davies, in The New Cambridge Modern Historyt (vol.VII, 
Cambridge, 1963)* pp,541-65#
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sepoy armies.1
Conseauantly the British had not conquered India. By
chance they found themselves thrown into positions of power by
internal revolutions which they had assisted in fomenting. Seeley
described the process of expansion thus:
certain traders inhabiting certain seaport towns in 
India, were induced, almost forced, in the anarchy 
caused by the fall of the Mogul Empire, to give them­
selves a military character and employ troops, that 
by means of these troops they acquired territory and 
at last almost all the territory of India, and that 
these traders happened to be Englishmen, and to employ 
a certain, though not a large, proportion of English 
troops in their army,2
Such a view held that there was nothing inexorable or manifest
about the destiny of the British in the East. Expansion was
simply one adventitious thing after another. In fact, Seeley
went so far as to suggest that if a similar group of Indian
merchants, for example the Parsees of Bombay, had been endowed
with the resources of the English company, they would have been
able to accomplish the same ends. Seeley's wildly idiosyncratic
1
'Observe that Mill's summary explanation of the conquest of India 
says nothing of any natural superiority on the part of the English. 
"The two important discoveries for conquering India were: 1st, the 
weakness of the native armies against European discipline; 2ndly, 
the facility of imparting that discipline to natives in the 
European service". He adds: "Both discoveries were made by the 
French11 *. Seeley, p .233.
2
Seeley, pp,240-1.
Seeley, p .244
3
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views about the extension of British power in India were directed
at the ’bombastic1 imperialists, who were ’ lost in wonder and
ecstasy’ at the empire’ s ’ immense dimensions, and at the energy
and heroism which presumably have gone to the making of it ’ , 1
Because Seeley believed that the main strength of Greater Britain
lay in its connection with the colonies of settlement in the new
worlds of North America and Australasia, he felt that the Indian
adventure had been a highly expensive and unnecessary diversion
from the task of extending the English nation-state overseas.
Although he recognised that the British government could not now
abdicate its Indian responsibilities, he certainly deprecated
his countrymen’s excessive concern with the tropical dependencies
2
of the empire.
The English merchants in India were able to draw freely
1
Seeley, p .340, For a fuller discussion of Seeley’s contribution 
to the late nineteenth century debate about the empire see
C.A. Bodelsen, Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism (London, I960), 
pp*149-76*
2
’And thus we founded our Empire, partly it may be out of an empty 
ambition of conquest and partly out of a philanthropic desire to 
put an end to enormous evils. But, whatever our motives might be, 
we incurred vast responsibilities; which were compensated by no 
advantages.*.*Thu6 a review of the history of British India leaves 
on the mind an impression quite different from that which our 
Colonial Empire produces. The latter has grown up naturally, out 
of the operation of the plainest causes; the former seems to have 
sprung from a romantic adventurej,,,We may hope that it will lead 
to good, but hitherto we have not ourselves reaped directly much 
good from it# ’ Seeley, p*353*
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on the resouroes of the English state because the wars fought in 
India ’wore the appearance b e fo re  the English public of a war 
between England and France’ #1 Seeley tended to discount the 
factor of European support and control in his explanation of the 
British successes in India# He recognised, nonetheless, that 
Britain could concentrate all her efforts on the maritime and 
commercial struggle whereas the French were divided between a 
policy of colonial expansion and one of continental aggrandise­
ment# Except for the American War, France chose to fight her 
wars primarily in Europe rather than on the seas, or in the 
colonies, so that British naval superiority enabled resources of 
man-power and armaments to flow without interruption between 
England and India# Thus the French position in the East during 
war-time was a great deal more precarious than the British#
Paradoxically, in spite of the many victories won by 
the British in India, the territorial revenues obtained by the 
Company hardly repaid the expenses incurred in war and in the ad­
ministration of a vast new empire. The acquisition of these terri­
tories, according to Seeley, was made in a 'fit  of absence of 
mind’ , and though the need to protect the eastern trade was the 
principal justification offered it was soon clouded over by the
Seeley, pp#245-6*
1
14
more general issues of imperial defence and security*
Seeley's explanation is probably one of the most com­
prehensive and illuminating ever offered since it incorporates 
explanations of eighteenth century imperialism at the local and 
metropolitan level, and emphasises as v/ell the disintegration of 
the indigenous political system# The conflict in Europe provoked 
the companies in India to take up arms against one another and in 
so doing they became inextricably involved in the politics of the 
sub-continent» In time the victors of the Anglo-French contest 
found themselves, almost unwittingly, occupying the power vacuum 
left by the Moghuls.
The real initiatives in this expansionist process were 
taken by the enterprising men on the spot - the Clives and the 
Wellesleys, untrammelled by external authority. The controls 
exerted by the metropolitan government were seriously limited by 
a cumbersome and decentralised administrative system, and by a 
lengthy communication delay with Europe# Ambitious governors at 
Madras, Bombay, or Calcutta found themselves with the time in 
which to promote their own particular policies, which they prose­
cuted even when they had received no clear endorsement from the
Seeley, p .10#
1
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Court of Directors or the India Board. If the particular venture 
they were engaged in were successful it was invariably sanctioned 
by the Company and the state, but if the difficulties encountered 
were of too formidable a nature the Company's servants could 
withdraw their support without committing their government to any 
one course of action* Seeley believed that expansion, which, in 
his view, was a blind process, resulted from pressures at the 
periphery of control. It was not a process initiated and directed 
by European governments*
Two recent writers who reveal a considerable debt to 
these Seeleyite arguments have claimed that it was the man on the 
spot who made the Indian empire. The authorities in London frown­
ed on the acquisitions made in India and gently admonished the 
Governor Generals when they embarked on forward policies* But the 
proconsuls at the frontier were
beguiled by the old dream of Indian conquerors, an 
India under one sovereign* The Governor General 
conquered India as Ashoka had, or Akbar, as the most 
powerful of Indian princes before whom no rival 
could stand. His masters in London might exhort 
and forbid; he had no need to worry; it took them 
two years to disagree with him, and in two years 
much could be settled* He needed them to guarantee 
his debts and to hold off the French**., but it was 
he, not they, who made India the brightest jewel in 
the British Crown*^
1
M. and T. Zinkin, Britain and India : Requiem for Empire (London, 
1964), pp .21-2*
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The thesis thnt expansion arose from pressures at the 
frontier, and not from the conscious selection and pursuit of a 
global strategy by a central government, stressed the fortuitous 
nature of the rise of British power in India. ’Nothing great’ , 
Seeley declared, 'that has ever been done by Englishmen was done 
so unintentionally, so accidentally, as the conquest of In d ia '.1 
Englishmen first sailed to the East for profits and trade, and for 
almost a century and a half were content with maintaining their 
footholds on the coast. When at last they became entangled in 
wars with the native states, their intention was to protect and 
further their trade, not to establish a political preponderance. 
Only in the time of Wellesley did the English deliberately choose 
to establish a paramountcy over the other Indian states and this 
policy was dictated as much by fear of their European rivals as 
by mercenary considerations of trade.
However brilliant this view of expansion, it did not 
long remain unchallenged. It was after all an age of great 
enthusiasm for empire. In 1894 Sir Alfred Lyall, an administrator- 
historian who had spent many years in India, set out to rebuff 
Seeley's arguments in The Rise and Expansion of the British
Seeley, p .207.
1
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Dominion in India. 1 Unlike Seeley, Lyall did not produce a 
coherent theory of expansion. Instead he wrote a detailed 
narrative of British activities in India, embellished here and 
there with reflections on the process of empire-building.
Since the arrival of the European powers in Asia, 
late in the fifteenth century, a protracted and hazardous strug­
gle had been waged for mastery of the extremely lucrative eastern 
trade. The English triumphed over their rivals, the Dutch and 
the French, because England’s whole policy was ’directed towards
the increase of her sea-power and the enlargement of her foreign
2
commerce'. Expansion, according to this view, was not the fruit 
of accidental developments - of limited battles fought and won in 
the Carnatic and Bengal - but the inexorable outcome of maritime 
and military supremacy. The imperial successes of the British, 
therefore, were the natural result of the Englishman's concern 
with sea-power and colonial aggrandisement.
From their fortified factory-settlements along the 
Indian coast, the various European companies finally and irrevo­
cably embroiled themselves and their respective countries in the
1
Sir A. Lyall, The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in 
India (London, 1 9 1 4 ) • For details about Lyallfs career in India 
see P. V/oodruff, The Men V/ho Ruled India : The Guardians (London, 
1963), vo l.II, pp#64-74#
2
Lyall, p#l.
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political vicissitudes of the sub-continent, Lyall claimed that 
the English East India Company foresaw its role as the successor 
to the Moghul empire quite early in its trading career. Comment­
ing on the policies adopted during Aurangzebe's reign by the 
Company's servants in India, Lyall wrote; 'Their purpose was 
now«..to establish "such a Politie of civil and military power, 
and create and secure such a large revenue, as may be the found­
ation of a large, well-grounded, sure English dominion in India 
for all time to come" ' , 1 However, such ambitions in the late 
seventeenth century v/ere inevitably doomed to failure because 
local conditions were not yet ripe for the overthrow of the 
Moghul and Maratha powers.
Thus the emergence of the British as the unrivalled 
masters of India was due to the overall co-ordination by the 
government in London. Although Lyall recognised that Dupleix's 
brilliant diplomatic gambits v/ere important in revealing to the 
British the path to dominion, he considered that the Carnatic 
wars with their limited effects had been over-estimated by other 
historians. He did not believe 'that extensive political 
changes may hang on the event of a small battle, or on the 
behaviour at some critical moment of a provincial general or
1
Lyall, p,49. In this connection the unsuccessful policies of 
the two Childs, John at Bombay and Josia at Leadenhall Street, 
are discussed in The Cambridge History of India, vol, V, 
pp.102-3#
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governor1, 1 The early suecesses of Dupleix, which enabled the
French temporarily to establish satrap states and spheres of
influence in the South and the Deccan, were made possible by the
British failure to mobilise and exploit their overwhelming naval
superiority. When the British were in a position to do this
effectively during the Seven Years' War, the French were defeated
in India since their lines of supply with Europe were quickly
and easily cut. The 'sure and swift support, in times of need,
from the mother country' was an indispensable condition for
2
success in the eastern theatre of war. Believing that the 
struggle with the French in India came to a close after the cap­
ture of Pondicherry in January 1761, Lyall focussed most of his 
attention on the conflict in the Carnatic, In this region, the 
British had the inestimable advantages of 'strong points d'appui 
on the coast' and a powerful naval force that could keep open 
communications with Europe, The French failure was not due to 
'the ill-luck or incapacity of individuals,, , but in the wider 
combination of circumstances that decided against France her
3
greatest contest with England at that period',
1
Lyall, pp.99-100,
2
Lyall, p,117.
Lyall, p ,116.
3
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In Europe the Compagnie des Indes Orientales was in­
solvent and maladministered while colonial and mercantile inter­
ests were continually sacrificed by the French government 'to a 
disastrous war-policy on the continent',1 Above all, the naval 
strength of France was exhausted so that all the transmarine 
possessions of France were left defenceless against the over­
whelming superiority of England whereas the
English nation was deeply and ardently interested in 
the struggle; the lead and direction was in supremely 
able hands. The whole unfettered energy of a free and 
fierce people had been wielded by Pitt, the ablest 
war-minister that England has ever seen, against the 
careless incapacity of courtiers and the ill-supported 
efforts of one or two able but irresponsible officials, 
under such an autocrat as Louis XV.2
The French were not able to provide their settlements in India
with the sustained support and direction which Lyall considered
such a valuable and necessary factor in the triumph of the British*
Lyall, therefore, specifically attacked Seeley's view 
that the British empire in India was an accidental and unpremedi­
tated development. Rather he asserted that the 'idea that India 
might be easily conquered and governed, with a very small force, 
by a race superior in warlike capacity or in civilisation, was no
3
novelty at all'« The opinions of travellers to Moghul India, in
1
Lyall, p .118.
2
Lyall, p*118.
Lyall, p .125
3
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particular Bernier and Tavernier, were quoted to demonstrate that
the conquest of India was recognised as a practicable possibility
long before the involvement of the French and the English in the
Carnatic wars, Bernier had discerned with characteristic
perception the prime cause of India’s permanent weakness - ’her
political instability within, and her sea-coast exposed and
undefended externally'.1 To the individual on the spot, intimately
acquainted with Indian politics and society, the growth of
European hegemony over the Indian states was not a fortuitous
development, but the inevitable outcome of power at sea. The
victories at Plassey and Buxar and the defeat of the French in
the South meant that it was only a matter of time before the
British, by a policy of relentless expansion, would extend their
sway over the moribund Indian states from Cape Comorin to the
2
Himalayas.
1
Lyall, p .127.
2
Lyall, of course, made much of Clive's famous despatch of 1765 
in which he stated: 'We have at last arrived at that critical 
period which I have long foreseen, that period which renders it 
necessary to determine whether we can or shall take the whole 
to ourselves,• • it is scarcely hyperbole to say that tomorrow 
the v/hole Moghul empire is in our power'. Lyall took this 'to 
show how accurately the possibilities of expansion had been 
calculated by cool and intelligent observers'« Lyall, pp.159-60,
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Both the panache and span of Lyall’ s explanation were 
characteristic of the late nineteenth century imperialist. The 
British Raj was seen as the culmination of powerful historic 
forces palpably anticipated by the Company long before the first 
steps to empire were taken. In stately periods Lyall traced the 
rise and fall of the great eastern empires and suggested, further­
more, that the history of Europe ought to be examined in the 
light of its changing and multifarious relationships with Asia*1 
Conflict rather than harmony had been the outstanding character­
istic of this relationship since the expansion of Hellenistic 
culture in the wake of Alexander’s whirlwind conquests. The 
spread of Islam marked a further stage in this confrontation, 
the resurgence of the East after the decline of Graeco-Roman 
civilisation. It is not surprising that Lyall should see the 
British dominion in India as ’ the latest and most powerful wave 
in the tide of European expansion v/hich since the sixteenth 
century had been steadily overwhelming Asia, by sea-power in the
1
Lyall's work is restricted to his collected magazine articles, 
Asiatic Studies (first series 1882, second series 1889), The 
Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India, and a chap­
ter ’The Moghul Empire’ in The Cambridge Modern History (vol.VI, 
Cambridge, 1909), Chapter XV, pp.506-29, It is in the latter 
two works that he examines the rise of British power as a 
function of a more general tendency - the resurgence and expan­
sion of Europe and the decay of the indigenous political systems 
of Asia. See E .T . Stokes, ’The Administrators and Historical 
Writing on India’ in C.H. Philips (ed .) , Historians of India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon (London, 1962), pp.385-403.
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South and by Russian land-power in the North'.1 No doubt Lyall's 
faith in the inevitability of empire was confirmed and sanction­
ed by the steady and persistent growth of British control over 
the entire sub-continent during the nineteenth century. More­
over, the tightening of control by the London authorities over 
their subordinate governments in the East, a development immens­
ely facilitated in the late nineteenth century by the opening of 
the Suez Canal and the establishment of telegraphic communicat­
ions with India, certainly predisposed Lyall to stress the 
factor of metropolitan direction and support in the rise of the 
British empire in the East.
These two kinds of interpretation have had a signif­
icant influence on the study of Anglo-French rivalry in the East 
and the consolidation of British power in India. Seeley's view 
that expansion was essentially a blind process, not chosen by 
the authorities in Europe but willed and executed by ambitious 
men on the spot, has been described as a 'peripheral' explana­
tion of imperialism. This explanation places primary emphasis 
on developments at the frontier, and it claims that the distant 
metropolitan authorities remained throughout distrustful, and 
indeed critical, of the forward policies prosecuted by their
Philips, Historians of India, p*399*
1
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over-enthusiastic appointees. On the other hand, Lyall's argu­
ment made much more of the element of European co-ordination of 
effort in the growth of the Indian empire, though he did attri­
bute a marginal importance to local events* Such a view has 
been classified as a 1eurocentric* view of expansion in the 
sense that Europe was the power-house behind the imperial 
activity*1 It goes without saying, of course, that neither view 
is a mutually exclusive description of the process. In fact, 
the most accurate and satisfying explanation would link insights 
from both schools, the ’peripheral' and the 'eurocentric1. 
Attention would be focussed on both local and metropolitan 
factors in the development of British influence and power in the 
East,
It is undisputed that the competition between the 
English and the French in India emerged within the context of 
global rivalry. Nevertheless, with the outstanding exception 
of Vincent Harlow, virtually all historians who have examined 
Anglo-French rivalry in India - from Dodwell to the most recent 
French historian, Hoger Glachant - have treated the eastern
1
The term has been used in yet another sense by the Dutch 
historian, J.C. Van Leur, to denote the writing of Southeast 
Asian history in European terms* For a discussion of this usage 
see J.D . Legge, Indonesia (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964)* 
pp*20-3, 63-6*
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struggle in isolation from other areas of commercial and mari­
time competition*1 Harlow goes so far as to argue that Britain*s 
'drang nach Osten’ was largely a response to the frustrations 
arising from the loss of the American colonies# Irritation and
disillusionment with a formal empire of settlement led to a new
2
enthusiasm for an informal empire of trade* However this may 
be, it is certain that Anglo-French tensions in the East must be 
examined within a geo-political framework of European and 
imperial rivalries. Throughout this study of Anglo-French 
relations in the East, therefore, a consistent effort will be 
made to relate British and French disagreements and crises on 
the spot to the changing policies of their governments in 
Europe,
But while this study will be concerned with mother 
countries as well as with colonial possessions, any realistic
1
R* Glachant, Histoire de L'Inde des Français (Paris, 1965),
2 3
’ The post-1783 generation was not anti-imperialist* If they 
were disappointed imperialists, it was that one particular pat­
tern of empire - that of settlement - had proved inconvenient.
The denouement of a colonial empire at Yorktown might indeed be 
inevitable; but, whether it were so or not, it liberated them 
to pursue, with relief perhaps and certainly with more single- 
minded enthusiasm, that alternate pattern which had been develop­
ing, with such rich variety of expedient, and opportunity, 
during the previous decades: the empire of commerce in Indian 
and Pacific Oceans’ . V.T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second 
British Empire 1763-1793 (vol*II, London, 1964), p,786. For a 
critical treatment of Harlow's main arguments see Peter Marshall, 
'The First and Second British Empires: A Question of Demarcation’ , 
History, XLIX (1964), pp.13-23.
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assessment of the activities of Europeans in the East must also 
recognise that the problem of control by a metropolitan govern­
ment was crucial. Men on the spot did have quite unprecedented 
opportunities to initiate policies even though the distant 
authorities tried assiduously to restrain them. In this sit­
uation an obvious response to the intractable problem of 
distance - 1opposuit natura' Burke termed it - was the concent­
ration of authority in one regional government: a local 
government would be endowed with powers of control over lesser 
centres in India and the East, During the thirty years after 
the Peace of Paris this administrative expedient was adopted by 
both the French and the British governments, but in the case of 
the British the constitutional settlement was greatly complic­
ated by the permanent vested interest of the East India Company, 
All the same, Calcutta or Fort William became the undisputed 
capital of British India while Port Louis in the lie de France 
became the capital of French India. The establishment of the 
Fort William Council as the supreme government, together with 
the further centralising of power in the office of the Governor 
General, was the indispensable basis for rapid expansion in the 
age of Wellesley and Hastings, Relationships between the 
English and the French naturally were affected by the devolution 
of power and responsibility to local centres in the East, and 
the repercussions of disputes in Bengal, the Carnatic and the
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Eastern Seas need to be closely studied at the regional level, 
the wider Asian level and the metropolitan level*
In spite of the varying emphases which Seeley and 
Lyall placed on metropolitan and local conditions in the emerg­
ence of the Indian empire, both were agreed that the spectre of 
French schemes and activity had precipitated the Company's 
entanglement in Indian politics# Lyall turned his attention to 
the early struggles in the South, believing that the French 
threat dissipated itself after the Peace of Paris, He conceded 
that the French made a bold effort to recoup their losses during 
the American War and that they continued to enter into al3iances 
with the larger Indian states; but to all intents and purposes 
their strength in the East quickly withered away after 1761, 
Thereafter, the French threat became a convenient political 
fiction to vindicate the wars fought against the Indian states 
themselves. In this view Lyall has had a considerable influence. 
The standard works of reference on the British in India, The 
Cambridge History of the British Empire and P.E. Roberts'
History of British India, clearly dismiss the French as a threat 
to the Company's power after the Peace of Paris, French histor­
ians, too, have concentrated on the earlier, more colourful 
struggle in the Carnatic,
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Seeley, however, was more perceptive in noting that
the French government and. French officials did not give up their
schemes for the overthrow of British rule immediately after the
1763 peace. Until the end of the Napoleonic wars at least, the
British remained obsessed with the threat posed by the French*
Seeley affirmed that
I find, when I study the English conquest of India, 
that we were actuated neither by ambition nor yet by 
mere desire to advance our trade, but that from first 
to last - that is, from the first efforts of Clive to 
the time v/hen Lord v/ellesley, Lord Minto and Lord 
Hastings established our authority over the whole 
vast peninsula - we were actuated by fear of the French, 
Behind every movement of the native Powers we saw 
French intrigue, French gold, French ambition, and 
never, until we were masters of the whole country, got 
rid of that feeling that the French were driving us 
out of it, which had descended from the days of 
Dupleix and Labourdonnais. ^
How, then, did the French threat operate to cause 
this train of events? Assuming that the fear of the French was 
one of the fundamental attitudes of the eighteenth century 
Englishman, derived as it was from persistent French efforts to 
upset the delicate equipoise of the European balance of power, 
it is not surprising that these alarms should be transferred to 
the East, where for a time the French did constitute an effective 
menace. In order to counter French moves the Indian presidenc­
ies usually felt compelled to respond in certain ways, either to
Seeley, pp.35-6*
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form subsidiary alliances with the native states, or to inter­
vene directly in establishing ’ points d'appui1 and spheres of 
influence. Alternatively, on the basis of rumours of intended 
French moves the British were occasionally panicked into taking 
action so as to anticipate French expansion. There is need to 
concentrate on this much neglected period when Anglo-French 
rivalry in the East was supposed to be at a minimum, even non­
existent - the period between the Peace of Paris and the out­
break of the Revolutionary wars. The central hypothesis of this 
study is that the fear of the French remained to affect British 
policy throughout this period*
On the other hand, there are interpretations which 
explain the expansionist policies of the British in terms other 
than the French threat. According to such a view, Britain would 
have acquired India without the goad of rival French ambitions 
because the amorphous and disorderly mass of Indian states that 
battened on the declining Moghul empire were no match for the 
East India Company, whose resources by contrast were 'concent­
rated, relatively well-organised and expansive'.1 The idea of 
the balance of power was alien to the experience of the Indian 
polity. Instead, the warring and divided powers of India
P. Spear, A History of India (London, 1965) ,  p.109#
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naturally gravitated towards a strong central power which could 
establish by force its claim to supremacy,1 Until the disastrous 
defeat at Panipat it seemed as if the Marathas might emerge as 
the dominant political force in India, but in the latter half of 
the eighteenth century this role passed to the East India Company 
and since there were no counterweights the Company's authority 
proved irresistible. In spite of the attractions of this 
explanation, it is not altogether convincing, for without French 
efforts at 'nababisme' - the vying with native princes for control 
of extensive territories - it is difficult to imagine the British 
entering with such enthusiasm the contest for power and profits,
Jouveau-Dubreuil, for instance, argues that it was the French who
2
first adapted themselves to the milieu of Indian politics* The 
mastery of the arts of war and diplomacy that they as a nation had
1
cf. 'It  is necessary to understand that there were no restraints 
or self-limitations in the Indian political system which might 
have served as a basis for order and balance. There was no 
common code of behaviour or international law. There was no 
alternative, for pausing on middle ground, between complete sup­
remacy and utter subjugation', R.E. Frykenberg, Guntur District 
1788-1848: A History of Local Influence and Central Authority in 
South India (O x fo rd ,1965), P* 29*
2
'Les Européens n'ont conquis ni la Perse, ni la Chine, ni le 
Japon; mais ils ont conquis l'Inde; pourquoi? Parce que dans 
l'Inde, il y a eu Dupleix, L'Inde fut conquise non point par les 
armes mais par le 'Nababisme' c 'est-à-dire par le genie d'un 
homme. La conquete de l'Inde, evenement d'importance mondiale, 
s'explique par l'étude d'un caractère'* G. Jouveau-Dubreuil,
Dupleix ou L'Inde Conquise (Paris, 1942), p .132,
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acquired in Europe since the intervention of Charles VIII and 
Francis I in the Italian v/ars was of considerable value in en­
abling them to outwit local Indian rulers. Company historians 
like Mill also emphasised that the British first learnt from the 
French the military advantages of large European-trained sepoy 
forces,1 And it was only with the greatest reluctance that gov­
ernments in Europe sanctioned the actions of their servants in 
India primarily, as Seeley claimed, because the wars fought in 
India appeared to be wars against French power#
In explaining why governments in Europe came to endorse, 
no matter how reluctantly, the actions of their agents in remote 
and distant areas, Robinson and Gallagher in another context and 
a later period have stressed 'the official mind of imperialism* 
as a determinant of empire-building. 'England's rulers had 
inherited not only a world empire but the experience gained in 
bringing it together, and the assumptions and prejudices accumu­
lated from past successes and failures inevitably influenced their
2
behaviour..'. In all probability this development was well under 
way by the late eighteenth century, when considerations of defence
1
J. Mill, The History of British India, fourth ed. (London, 1848), 
vo l.Ill, pp.136-7#
2
R. Robinson, J. Gallagher, with A. Benny, Africa and the 
Victorians : The Official Mind of Imperialism (London, 1963), 
p. 21.
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and security began to dominate imperial thinking*1 It is at 
least certain that the need to forestall or counter French moves 
was genuinely felt, and used time and again to justify British 
actions* And there was substance to this threat, for the French 
had come near to dislodging the British from their eastern trade 
in the 1740’s and the 1750’s, while the schemes of successive 
French governments in Europe - whether Bourbon or Jacobin - did 
little to allay the suspicions of the home government. It would 
appear, then, that the phobia of the French was an active force 
in promoting the growth of the Indian empire, as well as cement­
ing the alliance between the British cabinet and the Company’s 
servants in India, Successive British ministries became convinced 
that any threat to the Company's trade or to the defences of 
India would ipso facto imperil the prestige and influence of 
Great Britain herself,
However, in order to establish in detail that the 
French continued to exert a significant influence on British 
policies in the East after 1763 it is, of course, necessary to 
investigate the complex pattern of Anglo-French relationships in 
India as they developed over the last thirty or so years of the
1
For a recent discussion of the relative importance of ’ trade’ 
and ’ defence’ in British imperial policy at this time see
D.K. Fieldhouse, ’British imperialism in the late eighteenth 
century’ , in K. Robinson and F* Madden (ed*), Essays in Imperial 
Government (Oxford, 1963), pp*23-45.
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eighteenth century*
In India after 1765 the French found themselves in 
broadly two situations - either in areas such as Bengal, Bihar 
and Orissa where the British had established a large measure of 
political control over the native state, or in areas like the 
Carnatic and the Deccan where the question of European political 
control was still unresolved* In both cases the major factor in 
the rivalry between the English and the French was military 
strength or land-power* But Anglo-French rivalry was not solely 
limited to the sub-continent, and during the second half of the 
century the rivalry grew to embrace a third type of situation 
involving the factor of sea-power* Commercial and strategic 
pressures resulted in the spread of British, and to a lesser 
extent French, power around the littoral of the Indian Ocean 
from the Cape to Penang* In this third situation naval supremacy 
was clearly of major importance. It is hoped, therefore, that a 
careful and systematic examination of relations between the 
English and the French in these three situations will reveal the 
nature, extent and impact of the French threat, if such a thing 
existed at all. The conclusions of this study may well cast 
doubts on the prevalent view that the French virtually disappear­
ed from India and the East after 1763, and may suggest instead 
a real and important thread of continuity between the eastern
34
ambitions of Choiseul and the oriental schemes of Napoleon, 
between the anxieties and fears of Robert Clive and those of the 
Marquess Wellesley.
The early chapters will examine in considerable detail 
Anglo-French dealings in Bengal, the most striking example of 
the first type of situation. By skilfully manipulating a number 
of palace revolutions the Fort William Council was able to es­
tablish its right to the territorial revenues and the inland 
trade of Bengal, together with a preponderant influence over the 
local ruler. The French were almost eliminated as a direct pol­
itical threat from the region by the terms of the Peace of Paris 
which forbade them to erect fortifications, or introduce troops 
into the Soubah's territories. Hence the central problem of 
Anglo-French relations in Bengal was the reconciliation of the 
French claim to a freedom of trade with the Calcutta Council's 
fears for its future profits and safety. By contrast, the 
Company's other great commercial rivals, the Dutch, were treated 
much more sympathetically, because, with the exception of Vernet's 
abortive expedition of 1759, they had never constituted a polit­
ical and military threat to the East India Company's prodigious 
power,1 They v/ere content v/ith retaining control over their
1
For a more detailed treatment of the projected Dutch invasion 
see The Cambridge History of India, vol. V, pp,154-5*
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extensive holdings in the East Indian Archipelago and cherished 
no designs for dominion in India.
In the South, the next case-study as it were, the 
French were still a political threat* Unlike their colleagues 
in Bengal, the Company's servants in Madras refused to take 
charge of the revenues or the administration of the Nawab of the 
Carnatic* Moreover, the Madras Council was confronted with a 
greatly more complicated political system than existed in Bengal, 
and this provided the French at Pondicherry with countless opp­
ortunities for intrigue with the native princes* Commercial 
competition between the two powers was less acute than in Bengal 
partly because the trading operations of each company were not so 
lucrative or as extensive, and partly because the British were 
not in the invidious position of being rulers as well as merchants. 
Nonetheless, the very precariousness of the British foothold at 
Madras made the fear of the French a more active force in the 
policies of the Madras Council than elsewhere* And since the 
Fort William Council became in time responsible for the safety 
of the Madras and Bombay Councils, it eventually drew the more 
secure northern presidency into expansionist wars against Mysore 
and the Marathas*
British military and commercial supremacy in Bengal,
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the South and the West ensured that the French threat would 
never reach serious proportions* Frustrated in their Indian 
ambitions, the French hoped to compensate for their losses by 
extending their influence elsewhere in Asia, especially in 
Cochin China where their missionary orders had been active for 
well over a century. Commercially, the region was of great 
value not least because of its proximity to Canton, but any 
French incursions there immediately aroused the suspicions of 
the British. For the rapidly growing trade with China, now dom­
inated by British country traders, would be threatened by fort­
ified French settlements in Cochin China or Annam#
Thus the corollary of British naval power - control of 
the keys to India and the Eastern Seas - was rendered indispens­
able by this potential threat in Southeast Asia and by the chal­
lenge of French corsairs based on the lie de France, strateg­
ically located half-way between the Cape and India* The Dutch 
with their valuable possessions in the East Indies were also an 
uncertain ally, wavering in their loyalties between the English 
and the French# Britain emerged from this lengthy period of 
Anglo-French and Anglo-Dutch conflict with the Cape, Trincomalee, 
Penang and Singapore, while yet a further outcome of this 
struggle was the recognition on the part of the British govern­
ment of the strategic needs of the newly acquired Eastern empire.
37
Thereafter the securing of the oceanic and land defences of 
India became a dominant consideration in British foreign and 
imperial policy.
Indeed, some historians have seen in this spread of 
maritime power the most distinctive and important characteristic 
of Western dominance in the East. As K.M. Panikkar says, 'the 
control of the sea made it possible for the European nations to 
bring their strengths to bear on any point in Asia, especially 
after the economic and political strength of the great empires 
had been undermined by the European monopoly of the maritime 
trade'*1 Certainly the influence of the Europeans in Asia was 
quite unique in its dependence on sea-power. India was now to 
be invaded from the sea and not as before from distant lands to 
the north and the west of the Himalayas.
While our study of Anglo-French relations may reveal 
that for a variety of reasons the French were rarely a serious 
direct threat to British power in India, it may suggest that the 
British remained preoccupied with the activities of the French* 
To a considerable extent the threat posed by the French depended 
on the type of situation in which the two competing powers found
1
K.M. Panikkar, Asia and Western Dominance : A Survey of the 
Vasco da Gama epoch of Asian History 1498-1945. second e d ., 
(London, 1961), p#14#
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themselves. In Bengal, for example, the French were essentially 
trading competitors with the result that the British carefully 
controlled their trading activities. But for much of the time 
the British also feared that French agents might stir up trouble 
in the northern areas - in Bihar, Oudh and Rohillakhand - where 
British influence was still indirect and tenuous# Together with 
their colleagues on the Coromandel, they seriously anticipated 
an invasion from the French Islands, In the South and in the 
West the French intrigued directly with the native powers inde­
pendent of the Madras and Bombay Councils# In order to thwart 
these efforts the councils sent their own emissaries to the 
durbars of the princes, where, if successful, they concluded 
subsidiary alliances.
However, in the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal and 
the Eastern Seas the faintest hint of a French move was usually 
sufficient to spark off a British response# Naval expeditions 
were despatched to investigate French activity at the Seychelles 
in the 1770's and at Diego Garcia in the 1780's, and these 
islands were occupied for short periods of time in order to 
forestall or counter French claims# Various missions were also 
sent to examine the extent of French activities in Cochin China, 
while the Company's agents at Basra and Suez anxiously watched 
French manoeuvres.
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And yet the threat provided by the French in the East 
was also affected by changing developments in Europe. This 
study, therefore, will not only be concerned with the relations 
between the English and the French in the three types of sit­
uation already outlined, but with the relationships between the 
men on the spot, the councils and governments in India, and the 
more remote metropolitan authorities. An examination of these 
connections should indicate the relative importance of local 
and metropolitan factors in policy making in the East and reveal 
how European crises and diplomacy affected, or failed to affect, 
changes in British and French policies in the East, The standard 
works which have dealt with this phase of Anglo-French rivalry 
in the East, the most notable and recent being S.P. Sen's The 
French in India 1763-1815« have concentrated on the military and 
naval campaigns of Bussy and Suffren in India during the American 
War, and the political designs which the French harboured for the 
area.1 Professor Sen has studied with meticulous attention the 
schemes advocated by French administrators and mercenaries in 
India for the subversion of British rule, but valuable though 
this work is, he has not seriously attempted to assess the res­
ponse they provoked from the French government# Nor has he 
assessed the repercussions of French activity on British policy
S.P. Sen, The French in India 1763-1816 (Calcutta, 1958),
1
40
in India and at home* Almost invariably historians of eighteenth 
century French and British activity in Asia have treated the 
French and the British in isolation; they have rarely attempted 
to relate the activities and interests of these two European 
powers in the East except in the most general way* Although it 
is true that the scholars of Anglo-French rivalry at the time of 
the Carnatic wars have attempted to link up policies, for the 
most part they have been mesmerised by the figures of Clive and 
Dupleix*1 The focus of these studies has also been restricted to 
the struggle in India and the Indian Ocean despite the fact that 
the ramifications of the global struggle extended throughout the 
Asian region from the east coast of Africa to the China Sea* An 
important theme, examined in Vincent Harlow's impressive study of 
the rise of the Second British Empire, concerns the inter­
relation betv/een English and French policies both in India and
Europe and the widening of the rivalry to areas east of the Bay
2
of Bengal. Some of his arguments and theories will be assessed
1
This is largely true of Dodwell's work as it is of French writing 
from the eulogistic biographies of Tibulle Hamont and A. Deloffre, 
published in the 1880's, to the more perceptive study of Jouveau- 
Dubreuil, Alfred Martineau's Dupleix et L'Inde Française (5 vols., 
Paris, 1920-30) is perhaps an exception in its comprehensive 
treatment of French policy in India during the earlier half of the 
century. See S.P. Sen, 'French Historical Writing on European 
Activities in India, in Philips ^ed. ) , Historians of India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon, pp*183-208.
2
V.T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire 1763-1793 
(voi, I , London, 1952; vo1* 11# London, 1964)#
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and further elaborated in this thesis.
The classic studies of European trade with Asia in the 
late eighteenth century, Holden Furber’s John Company at Work 
and Louis Dermigny^ La Chine et L'Qccident, have concerned them­
selves with the intricate and multifarious trading operations of 
the companies and the private merchants or the interlopers#1 They 
have not been greatly interested in the foreign and military poli­
cies of the European governments and companies, and perhaps as a 
consequence have overlooked the factors of defence and security 
in the growth of British commercial preponderance in the East# 
While any treatment of European commercial and maritime expansion 
in the eighteenth century must recognise the interlocking nature 
of trade and politics, this study will be mainly concerned with 
the political objectives of the French and the British,
To complete the introduction to the detailed examina­
tion of Anglo-French relations in the three situations already 
outlined over the period from 1763 to 1793 the next chapter will 
consider the means by which Anglo-French dealings were regulated 
in India and at home, and examine the general diplomatic back­
ground to the struggle in the East#
1
H. Furber, John Company at Work : A Study of European Expansion 
in India in the late Eighteenth Century (Cambridge. Mass», 1951), 
L# Dermigny, La Chine et L'Occident : Le Commerce a Canton au 
XVIII6 Silcle 1719-1833 (3 vols,. Paris. 1964)«
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CHAPTER 2: THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND DIPLOMATIC CONTEXT
i. THE FRAMEWORK OF CONTROL
How, then, were Anglo-French relations conducted in the 
East in the latter half of the eighteenth century? The answer to 
this question ought to suggest whether policy was in some sense 
co-ordinated and planned, or simply a drifting from one expedient 
to another? it should also cast some light on the processes by 
which the Company gradually extended its control over Indian 
territories.
In India relations between the English and the French 
were regulated through the administration of the companies# Until 
the passing of the Regulating Act in 1773 the presidencies of the 
East India Company - Bombay, Madras or Fort St George, and Calcutta 
or Fort William - conducted their foreign policies through their 
councils meeting as select or secret committees. In 1756, for 
instance, a Select Committee was constituted at Fort William 
comprising the President, the Commander-in-Chief and three senior
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members of the Council
to transact affairs with the Country Government and 
Neighbouring Powers, also with ye French, Dutch and 
other Europeans, and in general to take such measures 
as shall best conduce to the Protection and Preserva­
tion of the Company's Estate, Rights and Privileges in 
Bengal, ^
The Select or the Secret Committee at Fort William corresponded 
directly with the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 
who in turn kept in close touch with the Secretary of State for 
the Southern Department,
The administrative links between the Compagnie des 
Indes Orientales and the French state were more close-knit than 
those between the powerful and relatively autonomous East India 
Company and the British Crown, In 1770, soon after the abolition 
of the Compagnie's 'exclusif', the administration of the 
Compagnie's establishments was assumed by the French government. 
The Governor at Pondicherry, who until then had been responsible 
to the syndics of the Compagnie although appointed by the King,
1
Despatch from Court of Directors, 11 February 1756, In a further 
letter of 24 January 1767 the Board delineated the responsibilities 
of the Council and the Select Committee. The Select Committee was 
empowered to carry on 'whatever business may affect the Government 
or the Political and Military Interest of our Honourable Employers', 
The Select Committee, suspended from May until August 1768, was 
dissolved in 1774 when the Regulating Act became operative. For 
further details see introduction to the Index to the Foreign and 
Political Department Records (New Delhi, 1957), vol. 1# — —
44
became in 1773 directly responsible to the Ministry of Marine for 
the conduct of political and military matters*,1 By legislation
/>
enacted in 1773 the powers of the Conseil Supérieur were 
substantially reduced in order that the Governors at Pondicherry 
and Chandernagore might have complete and unfettered control over 
political and diplomatic affairs. While Pondicherry continued as 
the capital of the French possessions in India, at least until 
1785, its precise relationship with the subordinate settlement 
of Chandernagore remained ambiguous.
At the same time as the French government was remoulding
its colonial administrations the British government strove, and
not without considerable opposition from the ’Bengal squad1, to
introduce reforms in the administration of the Company’ s settle-
2
ments. The Regulating Act increased, if only nominally, the 
powers of supervision of the Fort William Council over the
1
After 1773 the French government divided the functions of 
government in the Indian settlements between the Governor and the 
Intendant, 'each supreme in his own sphere and not dependent on 
the other. The former was entrusted with political and military 
affairs#. . . .  The Intendant was entrusted with the whole civil j 
administration, including finance, police, justice, shipping and 
commerce'. This brought the government of the Indian settlements 
in line with the traditional form of administration in the other 
colonies. Sen, The French in India, p. 67#
2 "
The intervention of parliament into the affairs of the Company is 
examined in exhaustive detail in L.S. Sutherland, The East India 
Company in Eighteenth-Century Politics (Oxford, 1952), particularly 
Chapters VI-IX,
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subordinate settlements in the matters of war and peace# In 
spite of this, the Governor General was given no pov/ers to over­
ride his council of four with the inevitable result that these 
reforming measures were vitiated by factional strife and in­
fighting# The Company's government in India, unlike that of the 
French, remained of a conciliar and civilian form until Pitt's 
famous legislation of 1784 and 1786#
The bitter and humbling experience of the American War 
and the loss of the First British Empire resulted in a further 
tightening of the Company's administration both in India and at 
home# Pitt's India Act was one of the many measures intended to 
cleanse the state and prepare it for a national revival, but for 
the moment let us consider the Act's provisions for the govern­
ment of the settlements in India# It extended and defined the 
powers of the Fort William Council, which was now reduced in size 
to include the Governor General and three Councillors, one of 
whom was to be the Commander-in-Chief# While the Governor 
General was given a casting vote his powers were yet further in­
creased by the Amending Act of 1786, the terms of which empowered 
him to 'override the decision of his Council and act without its 
concurrence in extraordinary cases involving in his judgement the
1
For the provisions of this Act see The Cambridge History of 
India, vol.V, pp.188-90,
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interests of the Company or the safety and tranquility of British 
possessions in India1, Furthermore, the Supreme Government at 
Fort V/illiam was endowed by the India Act with ’power and 
authority to superintend, control and direct the several Presi­
dencies and governments’ in the East Indies 'in all such points
as relate to any transactions with the country powers, or to war,
2
or peace .,,' As suggested before, the British government sought 
to control the actions of its soldiers, administrators and 
merchants in India by concentrating authority and power in a 
central government which, in principle, would act as a restraint 
on the lesser centres and councils. Another method, rendered 
possible by these constitutional changes, was the appointment to 
positions of high importance in India by the British cabinet of 
officials from the ruling elite who would presumably act by and 
large as the government itself wished them to act, Cornwallis, 
Wellesley and the Marquess of Hastings were all men with consid­
erable administrative experience who had not come up through the
t
ranks of the Company's service. Nonetheless, the traditional and 
ingrained suspicion for the man on the spot still continued to 
plague relations between the Imperial parliament and the Supreme 
Government of India, ’
1
B.B. Misra, The Central Administration of the East India Company 
1773-1834 (Manchester, 1959), p .33. —
2
Misra, p. 31#
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Such attempts to consolidate and centralise control at 
Fort William were paralleled in the administration of the French 
settlements by the royal edict of May 1785 which united all the 
French possessions east of the Cape of Good Hope under the 
Governor General at Port Louis in the lie de France. Two depend­
ent administrations were created, one at the lie de Bourbon and 
the other at Pondicherry, and the three Governors, appointed by 
the Ministry of Marine, were held responsible to the Crown.1 
To reinforce this change in 1789 almost all the military forces 
were evacuated from India to Port Louis#
Consequently disputes and contretemps between the 
servants of the two companies in India usually involved the 
higher officials at Chandernagore or Pondicherry, such men as 
Chevalier and de Lauriston, and the Company's officials at
2
Madras or Calcutta, Verelst, Cartier and Hastings for instance*
In time, of course, complaints would reach the ears of the 
Ministry in Paris and the Court of Directors in London, who were 
quick to inform the Secretary of State of the particular griev­
ance, If a crisis developed in India or Europe, all these 
channels were employed so that in spite of the unconscionable 
delay in communications there developed over the thirty year
1
Sen, French in India, p»430#
2 ~
These disputes will be dealt with in Chapters 3-5#
48
period a considerable interaction between Anglo-French frictions 
in India and in Europe*
Relations between the two powers in Europe were simpli­
fied during the latter half of the eighteenth century by the 
successful efforts of the French and British governments to exert 
greater supervisory control over the affairs of the companies. 
However, because of the historically close liaison between the 
Compagnie and the state there was no parallel in France to the 
involved and tortuous attempts to bring the East India Company 
within the ambit of the British parliament. Indeed, it is a 
mark of the tenacious strength of chartered rights in the eight­
eenth century that even after the passing of the India Act the 
Company retained control over its patronage and commercial opera­
tions, Though the British cabinet appointed the Governor General 
and the Governors of Madras and Bombay, it normally preferred to 
work with the Company through the Secret Committee of the Court 
of Directors, The French state, on the other hand, appointed its 
administrators to the East Indies, subsidised the Compagnie when 
it was in financial straits, and negotiated on its behalf with 
other European governments.
On matters of foreign policy, therefore, the Governors 
at Pondicherry and Chandernagore corresponded directly with the
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Ministries of Marine, War and Foreign Affairs, Naturally 
friction between the ministries could and on occasions did 
impede the formulation and execution of foreign policy in Paris, 
While a Choiseul or a Vergennes presided as ’ first minister’ over 
the government of France inter-ministerial tensions were held in 
check, but in the periods when the Bourbon monarchs preferred to 
dispense with their more energetic and able ministers administra­
tive stagnation followed»1 Without the controlling guidance of 
a senior minister each department of state became intent on 
promoting its own set of interests to the detriment of any wider 
’national interest’ , and a state of great confusion and disorder 
invariably prevailed. Historians of the ancien regime have 
usually stressed these conditions of government, but it is import­
ant to note that changes in administration were also reflected
2
in French policies in the East, Whereas Louis XV’s replacement 
of Choiseul by d ’ Aiguillon in 1770 signified the triumph of one 
court faction over another, it also implied the King’s renunciation
1
The official title ’ first minister’ lapsed after the Regency 
crisis until it was revived in 1787-8, Nonetheless, Cardinal 
Fleury, Choiseul and Vergennes exercised many of the supervisory 
functions of a chief minister, though they were, of course, 
directly and personally responsible to the King, See M, Beloff, 
The Age of Absolutism 1660-1815 (London, 1963), pp,63-71»
2
See J.F. Bosher, ’French Administration and Public Finance in 
their European Setting’ , ch,XX, The New Cambridge Modern History 
(vol.VIII, Cambridge, 1965), especially pp,568-71#
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of a vigorous and co-ordinated revangist policy in favour of the 
safer system of European alliances - the traditional diplomacy 
of the Bourbons#1 And such an upheaval had serious repercussions 
in the East Indies, as we shall later see. The French were most 
feared in the East when they had a formidable and efficient 
go ve rnme n t at ho me ,
The intrigues and faction-fighting of the politicians,
though hardly negligible in the England of George I I I ,  had a
less perceptible effect on the everyday affairs of Englishmen
in the East, *or the officials and servants of the various
presidencies corresponded with the Company and not with the
state5 despatches were sent from India to the Secret Committee
of the Court of Directors, Although the origins of this
committee go back to the seventeenth century, as Professor
Philips has shown, its importance increased greatly in the second
2
half of the eighteenth century.
1
Louis XV promoted his own foreign policy, known as le secret du 
roi. which was aimed at consolidating the traditional alliances 
with Poland, Turkey, Sweden and Prussia. For details surrounding 
the dismissal of Choiseul see M.S. Anderson, ’European Diplomatic 
Relations, 1763-1790, in The New Cambridge Modern History, 
v o l .V III , particularly pp«256-7.
2
For details about the origin and workings of the Secret Committee 
see C.H. Philips, The East India Company 1784-1834 (Manchester, 
196l), pp ,9-11*
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Between 1754 and 1781 the Secret Committee exercised 
various powers; in time of war it directed the 
Company's naval and military operations, conducted 
negotiations with the Indian powers, and represented 
the Court of Directors in its dealings with Ministers; 
for example, it took charge of the negotiations for 
the Treaty of Paris, 1763, in so far as the Company 
was concerned.
Throughout the 1770's fairly intimate relations developed between 
the Committee, usually composed of three Directors, and the 
Ministry. In fact, by the terms of the Regulating Act the 
Secret Committee was obliged to place before the Secretary of 
State all correspondence from the presidencies that related to 
civil and military affairs in India, The great crisis of the 
American War, which also imperilled the Company's possessions 
in the East, further reinforced this association and the relation­
ship was formalised in the India Act. The Secret Committee 
became the channel through which secret despatches passed 
between the Board of Control and the presidencies in India.
Until 1782 the Secretary of State for the Southern
Department was the minister responsible for East Indian affairs
as well as for the conduct of external relations with France,
2
Spain, Italy, Turkey and the Barbary States. Thus, by way of 
the Secret Committee, the formation of foreign policy in Europe
1
Philips, The East India Company, p . 10,
2
Horn, Great Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth Century. pp .12- 
13.
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might also involve the Company in India, In 1782, however, the
Northern Department was converted into the Foreign O ffice , 1 and
two years later the Company was brought into a much closer
relationship with the state, P itt ’s legislation ’empowered a
Board of Commissioners, appointed by the King and consisting of
one of the Secretaries of State, the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
and four other members of the Privy Council, to supervise the
2
civil and military government of the Company’ , V/ith the
ascendancy of Henry Dundas, who virtually became a Secretary of
State for India, a close bond was cemented between the Company
3
and cabinet.
Hence the relationship between the East India Company 
and the state was of a subtler and less direct kind than the 
administrative subordination of France Outre-Mer to the French 
state. This rather cumbersome system of supervision, which was 
evolved during the eighteenth century, was rendered necessary 
by the intransigence of the Company, intent on the preservation 
of its traditional rights and liberties, and the exigencies of
1
Sir A.W. Ward and G .P. Gooch (e d ,) The Cambridge History of 
British Foreign Policy 1783-1919 (vo1, 111, Cambridges 1923), 
pp, 541-2.
2
Philips, The East India Company, p ,33#
3 ’ “  ........ ...........
See H, Furber, Henry Dundas, First Viscount Melville 1742-1811: 
Political Manager of Scotland, Statesman, Administrator of British 
India (London, 1931), and more recently, Harlow, The Founding of 
the Second British Empire, v o l ,I I , pp ,112-224#
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the situation confronting its servants in India, It is salutary 
to remember that, in spite of the attempts by the French and 
British governments to impose more stringent controls, both 
powers were faced with the enormous problem of distance and 
they were usually forced to concur in arrangements made on the 
spot. Communications with Europe still remained fragmentary and 
spasmodic so that despatches from England might, and often did, 
take anything up to a year to reach India, As Burke appreciated, 
’ no contrivance can prevent the effect of this distance in 
weakening government* Seas roll and months pass between the 
order and the execution’ , 1 And as late as 1829 the Board 
defended its complex Indian administration in almost identical 
terms :
In the ordinary course of Indian administration much 
must always be left to the discretion of the local 
governments a n d ,,.i t  rarely occurs that instructions 
from hence can reach India before the time for acting 
upon them is gone by. This is a necessary consequence 
of the great distance between the two countries, the 
rapid succession of events in India which are seldom 
long foreseen even by those who are on the spot, and 
the importance of the ruling authorities there acting 
with promptitude and decision and adapting their 
measures on their own responsibility to the varying 
emergencies of the hour, 2
1
Quoted in Robinson and Madden, Essays in Imperial Government« 
P* 2,
2
A despatch from the Chairmeji to Ellenborough, 27 August 1829, 
quoted from Philips, The East India Company, p , 22,
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ii , THE WIDER CONTEXT: EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL RIVALRY 1765-1793
Although the next four chapters will be primarily- 
focussed on the operation of Anglo-French relations at the local 
level in the East, some more general assessment of the policies 
of the French and British governments towards India is necessary 
since the struggle in India and the Eastern Seas was manifestly 
part of a wider global contest. One of the paradoxes v/hich soon 
emerges from a study of Anglo-French rivalry in late eighteenth 
century India is the considerable disparity between the alarm 
felt by the British about the French menace, and the vulnerabil­
ity of the French establishments in the East* In no way could 
the Compagnie des Indes compare with the East India Company, 
certainly not in the number, extent and wealth of its possessions. 
While the French were restricted to some half-dozen factories 
and Pondicherry, the British held the seemingly inexhaustible 
revenues of Bengal, In peace time the Compagnie depended 
increasingly on British credit, insurance, and shipping facilit­
ies , 1 and in war time the settlements were indefensible* And 
yet the administrators of British policy in India revealed, on 
occasions, an almost pathological dread of the French, Assuming 
the sincerity of these fears, any evaluation of this phase of
See Furber, John Company at Work, p p ,32-65#
1
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Anglo-French rivalry must offer some adequate explanation for 
the discrepancy between the threat and the alarms aroused by 
the threat*
British fears about the French in India, as has already 
been suggested, were compounded of disparate elements* Their 
origins are to be located in the earlier fierce trading struggles 
along the Coromandel coast* Later they grew as a consequence 
of the hard-fought campaigns against Lally and de Bussy, and the 
ease with which French military agents could insinuate them­
selves into the confidence of the Indian princes. Undoubtedly 
these fears were exaggerated because of their association in 
the minds of the British with anxieties produced by the precar­
ious and turbulent political situation in the sub-continent, but 
the fear of the French was only conditioned in part by the 
Indian situation* The dread of a French invasion of the Carnatic 
or Bengal was, at times, a simple transposition of the basic 
European threat. These factors have been usually emphasised 
in explanations of Anglo-French conflict in India* The commerc­
ial and strategic threat which took on a global dimension in the 
1760 ’ s, the 1770’ s and the 1780 ' s has been least emphasised 
although it was woven into the entire diplomacy of Choiseul and 
Vergennes* Vincent Harlow has cogently argued that the concerted 
efforts of the Bourbon powers to dislodge the British from their
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pre-eminent position in global trade does much to explain the 
strategy of the Second British Empire. 1 Choiseul and Vergennes 
hoped to compensate for earlier French losses by building up 
French trade and power overseas. French commerce was to be 
rehabilitated partly by means of a sweeping commercial alliance 
with the sister power of Spain, and partly through trade with 
the Americas, the West Indies and the East.
Although chastened by the experience of the Seven
Years' War, France emerged from the Peace of Paris with the most
commercially valuable of her overseas possessions intact. Under
the able leadership of the due de Choiseul, who succeeded Bernis
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1758, France disentangled
herself from the traditional continental diplomacy of her rulers
and began to concentrate her attention on the colonial and
2
maritime struggle with Britain, The Family Compact, concluded 
with Spain in August 1761, was one of the earliest fruits of this
1
See, for example, Chapter IV, 'Commercial Strategy in the 
Eastern Seas 1780-83', in The Founding of the Second British 
Empire. v o l .I , pp .103-45, and Harlow's detailed exposition of the 
Falkland Islands' crisis in the same volume, p p ,22-32,
Etienne Francois de Choiseul-Stainville, due de Choiseul (1719- 
1785) occupied the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the periods 
1758-61 and 1766-70 , relinquishing control of the office to his 
cousin, Choiseul-Praslin, from October 1761 until 1766, He also 
held the War Ministry from 1761 to 1770, and the Naval Ministry 
between 1761 and 1766,
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'revanche’ policy and the alliance was consummated by Spain’ s
entry into the war in the following year. For the next thirty
years the Franco-Spanish alliance was to be the pivot of French
foreign policy. Its raison d'etre was clearly expressed in a
letter written by Ossun, the French ambassador at Madrid, to
Choiseul in 1765#
England is the common enemy of both crowns; she derives 
her forces and the means of her grov/th from her commerce, 
and from the advantages which she has been able to 
procure over the other nations, from Spain, and in other 
lands; it is, then, of pressing importance to the two 
crowns to attack the source and riches of the English 
power as aggressively as possible, and at the same time 
to obtain reciprocally from each other all possible 
advantages. The diminution of the enemy power and the 
augmentation of the allies must necessarily result.^-
The most substantial of Choiseul's achievements,
however, was the re-invigoration of the French navy. This was
the corollary of Choiseul's new found faith in maritime and
commercial expansion, and though the navy languished for a time
after Choiseul*s fall in 1770 his policies were continued by
2
Sartine and de Castries under the guidance of Vergennes#
Intended to destroy the British mastery of the seas and open the
1
Ossun to Choiseul, 20 June 1765# Quoted in J .F . Ramsey, Anglo- 
French Relations 1763-1770: A Study of Choiseul*s Foreign Policy 
(Califo rnia, 1939).
2
Charles Gravier comte de Vergennes (1717-1787) acquired his dip­
lomatic experience as ambassador at Constantinople and later as 
ambassador to Sweden; he became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
1774, soon after the accession of Louis XVI, and retained that 
post until his death early in 1787«
sea routes to the Americas and the Indies, the French navy almost 
succeeded in these aims during the American War.
Strategies emerge out of the struggle for some piece 
of territory which takes on importance because of its contribution 
to a wider pattern of trade and security. The logical and 
necessary steps in a strategy of empire, therefore, are perceived 
in the attempt to exclude rivals and establish control over such 
areas. In response to French schemes, which were clearly exposed 
during the American War, the British developed an alternate 
maritime strategy. As a consequence the defence of India became 
linked to an imperial system of defence. By the early 1780's 
the British government had become convinced that the Company's 
position in India depended as much on the possession of the Cape, 
Trincomalee and bases to the east of the Bay of Bengal as it did 
on the defeat of Tipu Sultan of Mysore.
Moreover, the conscious selection and pursuit of a 
global defence plan by a sovereign government in accord with its 
beliefs about national security is implicit in the notion of an 
imperial strategy. Co-ordinated direction from a centre of 
government, as distinct from piecemeal acquisitions by men on the 
spot, is an essential condition for the development of regional 
and global strategies. In the twenty-five years or so after the 
Peace of Paris, as we have seen, the settlements in India came
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increasingly under the supervision of European governments# The 
Regulating and India Acts brought the administration of the 
Company under the indirect control of parliament and in spite 
of the caution of the Board of Control these changes provided 
the British with more room for initiative in the East, Fort 
William pursued a policy responsive to the needs of defence and 
security at the periphery of British power; Whitehall, on the 
other hand, advised caution until it was convinced that the 
strategic or commercial need was imperative*
A more detailed study of French and British objectives 
in the East during the critical years of the American War is 
useful in showing these various tendencies at work# It was not 
until the entry of the Bourbon powers into the war that the 
British cabinet first seriously turned its attention to the 
eastern theatre* 1 In June 1780 Lord North outlined before 
cabinet a plan to foment insurrection in the Spanish American 
colonies in order to divert the efforts of France and Spain from 
North America* North’ s ploy was a simple one, A force of 1,500 
British troops and 2,000 sepoys would sail from Madras in May 
1781 for the Pacific coast of South America, where they would
1
Hostilities commenced between England and France in June 1778, 
and between England and Spain one year later* S .F . Bemis, The 
Diplomacy of the American Revolution (Bloomington, Indiana, 1957), 
pp* 61-7, and p .87*
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encourage the spread of revolution in the Spanish colonies.
The British could also call in the New V/orld to redress the 
balance of the Old, or so hoped the prime minister. But for 
success in this venture the advice and support of the Company 
was essential, and the negotiations which followed between the 
Secret Committee of the Court of Directors and the cabinet marked 
a further stage in the growing partnership between the Company 
and the state.
When Devaynes and Sulivan, the Chairman and Deputy
Chairman of the Court who also constituted the Secret
Committee ’with powers to give Orders and Instructions for
2
conducting the Company's Military and Naval A ffa irs ', were 
informed of this scheme they were reluctant to embroil the 
Company, They believed that it would be a very difficult task 
'to sustain, direct and control' upheavals in 'Peru, Mexico, or 
C h ili ,, , , against the forces of Spain ', and expressed their fear 
that the Company's support of the venture might entail an
1
Minutes of 18 July 1780, No,7 Proposal of an Expedition to 
South America by India, dated June 3rd 1780, laid before the 
Cabinet by Lord North, Minutes of the Secret Committee, v o l ,3*
P* 23# — —  • - - - —  -
2
The resolution to appoint the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman 
a Secret Committee was taken on 31 May 1780, Minutes of the 
Secret Committee, 31 May 1780, v o l .3#
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infringement of the South Seas Company’ s charter. 1 Instead they 
pressed on the government a scheme much closer to their hearts, 
an expedition against Mindanao and the Celebes. The prospects 
of trade and plunder v/ere more enticing to the Company than the 
geo-political reflections of the politicians.
Further discussions ensued betv/een Lord Hillsborough,
the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, and the
Secret Committee. Although the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman
duly acquiesced in the ’Proposition that the Company should aid
Government in an Expedition to the South Seas’ , they showed much
greater enthusiasm for the plan of attacking the settlements of
the Dutch and the Spanish in the East ’ and ruining their
Commerce’ . They contended that establishments at Mindanao and
the Celebes would enable the British ’ to obstruct the Spanish
commerce’ , as well as eliminate the threat to British shipping
2
from the French and Spanish privateers in the China Sea. The 
settlement at the Celebes, they also argued, would be of ’great 
and permanent’ commercial advantage. On 19 August 1780 the 
Directors expressed their alarm lest the Dutch ’ join the French
1
Minutes of 18 July 1780, N o .9 Sketch of an Expedition to the 
South Seas, Minutes of the Secret Committee, v o l .3* p .30.
2
Minute of 8 August 1780, Minutes of the Secret Committee, v o l .3, 
p. 43. —  .. ......
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and Spaniards in In d ia '. I f , as they feared, the Dutch were 
’ sending a considerable Force thither’ , and should the 
'Presidencies find themselves justified in attacking the Dutch’ , 
the Directors entreated that the Dutch ’ Capital Spice Settle­
ments may be the first object of this intended Armament’ . 1
The Secret Committee further commended this enterprise
by producing the offers of assistance given by the Sultan of
Mindanao to Captain Thomas Forrest in 1775 and by the King of
2
the Bugis to Captain Carteret in 1767- At first Hillsborough 
was cautious in his reaction to the Celebes proposal because the 
States General were still at peace with Britain. However, the 
Chairmen felt that the commercial benefits accruing from a 
settlement in the Celebes would more than compensate for the 
expense and risk of an establishment at Mindanao, which naturally 
would be more vulnerable to attack from Manila; and permission 
to found a settlement at the Celebes became the sine qua non 
for the Company’ s participation in the South Seas expedition.
The Company readily offered the services of Forrest, who had 
’ explored New Guinea’ and was ’ perfectly acquainted with the
1
The Directors to Lord Hillsborough, 19 August 1780, Proposed 
expedition to the South Seas and formation of Establishments in 
Mindanao and Celebes, Home Miscellaneous Series, vol.146, p#134*
2
See Chapter 6 for the background to these ventures.
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customs, manners, and Language of the Malays’ , as an intermediary 
with the native powers»1
The agreement finally concluded between the Company,
represented by Devaynes and Sulivan, and Hillsborough on
30 September 1780 bore witness to the new relationship between
the Company and the state, and to the commercial and strategic
2
pressures which were moulding the Second British Empire. The 
formation of establishments at Mindanao and the Celebes and the 
securing of the Indian presidencies from French attack were to be 
the principal objectives of the expedition, and not the liberation 
of the Spanish American colonies. The Company promised to convey 
800 men in their own ships to Madras at the expense of the govern­
ment while in India the Company agreed to furnish the expedition
1
Confidential letter from the Committee of Secrecy to the Gover­
nor General and Council of Bengal, and to the Presidents and 
Select Committees at Fort St George and Bombay dated 2 October
1780, with a Postscript dated the same day, Minutes of the 
Secret Committee, v o l .3, p»124* For details about the career of 
Forrest see D .K. Bassett, ’ Thomas Forrest, An Eighteenth Century 
Mariner', in Journal, Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, 
vol.XXXIV, part 2 (l9 6 l ) , p p .106-21.
2
Agreement between the Right Honorable the Earl of Hillsborough, 
One of His Majesty’ s Principal Secretaries of State, on the part 
of the Crown, and William Devaynes, Esquire, Chairman, and 
Laurence Sulivan, Esquire, Deputy Chairman of the Court of 
Directors of the East India Company, on the part of the said 
Company, relative to an Expedition to the South Seas, 30 Septem­
ber 1780, Minutes of the Secret Committee, v o l .3, pp .94-9.
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with 2, 000 ' ·disciplined Sepoys 1 and t·;~ o ships of forty guns and 
one of twenty i if possible 1 • Although the Company was to 1 make 
all the advances required in India during this Expedition 1 , the 
government arranged to defray all expenses with the exception of 
the proposed establishment at the Celebes. It was also agreed 
1 that if any new Settlement or Settlements shall be made and 
given to the Company, a sufficient Military Force shall be left' 
for their protection, and to facilitate the extension of British 
influence and trade throughout the East Indies 1His Majesty's 
Commanding Officer' was 'at liberty to open an intercourse on the 
part of the Company, and in their name, with the King of the 
Bugguese 1 • Finally, it was decided that in case of 'an actual 
attack from any European Enemy whatever' the expedition would 
supplement the defence forces of the Company in India 'until all 
dangers from such attacks shall be removed'. 
Two days later the Secret Committee described in a 
confidential letter to the councils in India the 'motives and 
views' that had persuaded them to support the expedition. The 
increase in the Company's force in India by 'two thousand Infantry, 
with a Ship of the Line, Frigates, and several Armed Transports' 
was a major consideration in their decision, especially at a time 
when the Madras and Bombay Councils were fully committed in an 
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arduous struggle with Mysore and the Marathas, 1 But ‘Another
important benefit* they expected from the expedition was the
safeguarding of the China trade,
an object of the first magnitude to the Company} for 
as we have too much reason to fear, that both French and 
Spaniards will endeavour to block up every avenue from 
the China Seas, few of our Ships might escape the 
vigilance of their Cruizers; and if  assisted by the 
Dutch, it would be almost impossible* 2
They hoped that the new 'Armament* would ’obviate the imminent
danger, and force our Enemies to attend to their own safety’ *
Furthermore, the Directors dwelt at length on the 
extension of the Company’ s commerce and influence throughout the 
Eastern Seas, Despite the earlier and costly failures at est- 
ablishing entrepots in Borneo, the Sulu Sea, Northern Sumatra and 
Malaya, they were now convinced that the presence of military 
support from the Crown would 'render an Establishment for the 
Company at Mindanao rather advantageous than burthensome' ,  They
1
'and if  upon their arrival in India, any of our Settlements 
should be found in danger, the Expedition was to be suspended, 
and this powerful Armament to be added to our present strength, 
and employed in our defence and protection, until all dangers 
were removed'# Confidential letter from the Committee of Secrecy 
to the Governor General and Council of Bengal, and to the Presi­
dents and Select Committees at Fort St George and Bombay, dated
2 October 1780, with a Postscript dated the same day, Minutes 
of the Secret Committee, vol#3, p .116. For details about the 
political situation in the South and the V/est at this time see 
Chapter 5*
2
Letter from the Committee of Secrecy, 2 October 1780, Minutes of 
the Secret Committee, vol#3> pp .116-17#
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declared:
Our ideas respecting Mindanao.. .  are, that i t fs situation 
is favorable for obtaining the produce of Borneo; that 
it 's  distance from the Spice Islands is not so great, 
but that we might have reasonable hopes of procuring 
Cloves and Nutmegs; that the shortness of the passage 
from China, might tempt the Junks to visit Mindanao; 
and which we think very probable, especially if Com­
modities proper for Exchange be regularly provided and 
lodged in Warehouses for that purpose. That when the 
Monsoon hinders our Ships, or in case of War, if an 
Enemy render it unsafe and imprudent to pursue the usual 
track to China, we might always have a passage open by 
way of Mindanao, which would be a convenient Port for 
shelter and refreshment; and should it become a 
respectable Settlement, it 's  vicinity to Manilha, might 
also, in time of War, be a severe check upon Spain, 
and greatly facilitate Attacks planned for the South - 
Seas.l
In this way the Directors frankly acknowledged those 
basic pressures which were to determine the Company's policies 
in the East for the next half-century. The quest for commercial 
establishments in the Eastern Seas resulted from both the 
Company's desire to participate more fully in the growing China 
trade and its realisation, sharpened by the experience of war, 
that its eastern possessions were vulnerable to French naval 
attack. A naval base to the east of the Bay of Bengal was essent­
ial if the French were not to dominate the Madras and Balasore 
roadsteads during the winter monsoon, Alexander Dalrymple had
1
Letter from the Committee of Secrecy, 2 October 1780, Minutes 
of the Secret Committee, v o l .3, pp .119-20.
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ably expounded the commercial arguments in the 1760's but it was 
the threat to the Company's eastern trade which had goaded the
North Ministry to support the Company in these efforts to form
*  1
entrepot-bases in the Eastern Seas,
On 20 December 1780, however, Britain declared war 
against Holland and the preparations for the South Seas expedi­
tion were hastily dropped in favour of an expedition to take the 
Cape, The war was fast approaching its most critical stage; in 
the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War 
Britain had been able, through a skilful use of European 
alliances, to concentrate her main efforts on the colonial front 
while France had been tied up in the continental struggles, but now 
Britain stood weakened and alone, confounded by the intractable 
opposition of her former subjects in America, against the com­
bined might of France, Spain and Holland, And France was pre­
pared to take the offensive on the high seas and in the colonies*
It is hardly surprising, then, that in a crisis of these global 
dimensions the protection of the Indian settlements should become 
an important part of an imperial defence system, and that the 
Ministry should assume a more active role in the direction of 
Indian affairs*
See Chapter 6,
1
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Cabinet decided on 29 December to send Commodore 
Johnstone with a force of 3,000 troops as a garrison to occupy 
the Cape*1 If  the attack proved successful, Johnstone was in­
structed to despatch the East India ships and a large part of 
his naval force to assist Admiral Sir Edward Hughes in the 
Indian Ocean*
The crucial significance of the Cape as a naval base
in the struggle between England and France was clearly revealed
in the plans which each power devised early in 1781* French
strategy was conditioned by the dependence of their islands in
the Indian Ocean on the Cape for provisions and naval supplies.
According to de Lozier Bouvet, who had been the Governor at the
Ile de France and the Ile de Bourbon (at different times) from
1754 to 1764, the Cape was 'le magazin de nos îles de France et
de Bourbon, et il nous serait bien difficile de les conserver
2
sans le secours qu'elles en tirent '. The speedy despatch of 
Bailli de Suffren's squadron with 1,200 soldiers to race the 
English to the Cape reflected a renev/al of interest by the French 
government in the Indian theatre of war. De Castries, the 
energetic Minister of Marine, explained to Hamilton in January
1
Harlow, Founding of the Second British Empire, vol#I , p .Ill*
2 ~~ ”  ........... ..........
De Lozier Bouvet to de Castries, 9 January 1781. Quoted in 
Admiral Sir H. Richmond, The Navy in India 1763-1783 (London, 
1931), P .131. .........  '
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1781 that the French hoped to take both the Cape and St Helena, 
and thereby ’ intercept the English ships' and ’ cut the neck of 
their India trade and expeditions' , 1 From the Cape the French 
would extend their influence to Ceylon and Java, where they 
intended to despoil the Company's trade with China,
Although Commodore Johnstone sailed from Spithead on 
13 March 1781, nine days before Suffren's departure from Brest, 
he lost the race to the Cape, Suffren surprised and attacked 
the English squadron at Porto Praya in the Cape Verde Islands 
and then proceeded to the Cape and the Ile de France to menace 
British sea power in the Indian Ocean.
When the Chairmen of the Court of Directors who con­
stituted the Secret Committee were informed in October 1781 of 
the failure of the Johnstone-Medows expedition, they re-doubled 
their efforts to persuade the government to send a further 
expedition to capture the Cape. They were painfully aware that 
the French might easily sever Britain's tenuous connection with 
India by capturing St Helena, And even if  the Company remained
1
De Castries to Hamilton, January 1781, Mesures que nous avons a 
prendre de concert avec la hollande contre les Anglais dans 
l'Inde et en Europe, Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, 
v o l .534, p .20. 'La Declaration de Guerre faite par l'Angleterre 
à la Hollande, si celle-cy la soutient avec vigueur et veut unir 
ses efforts k ceux de la France est un Evénement qui doit entraîn­
er la ruine entière des Anglais dans l 'I n d e '.  Mémoires et 
Documents, Asie, vol#7, p ,2 6 l#
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in possession of this island-base they knew that it was 'not 
capable of affording supplies of provisions to the Company's 
homeward bound Ships, much less to His Majesty's Fleets ' , 1 The 
Chairmen suggested that the 5 ,000 men already under orders for 
India should attempt to take the Cape, and in case of success, 
they urged that 2,500 to 3*000 men should 'be spared to garrison 
the place'.
If  the measure succeed, the obvious consequences must 
be, the cutting off from the French and Dutch those 
resources of supply, without which they must be re­
duced to the utmost distress for the means of support 
to their Islands, and for the maintenance of their 
Fleets in India; and the certain acquisition to 
Britain, and consequently to the East India Company 
of every requisite furnished at present from the Cape 
of Good Hope to our Enemies. 2
Hillsborough was concerned lest the French from the 
lie de France and the Dutch from Batavia counter-attack the 
British force at the Cape, but the Chairmen were confident that 
'a  Garrison of 3,000 men will be fully sufficient to keep poss­
ession of the Cape'. They also offered the assistance of a sepoy 
force from India and reaffirmed their original argument that the 
Cape was indispensable to the British as a 'place of refreshment
1
Laurence Sulivan and William James to the Earl of Hillsborough,
18 October 1781, Home Miscellaneous Series, v o l .154, p«229*
2
Laurence Sulivan and William James to Hillsborough, 18 October 
1781, Home Miscellaneous Series, v o l .154, p p .231-2«
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and supply for the King’s and Company's homeward-bound Ships’ , 
V/hile such an active and enterprising enemy as the French held 
the Cape the route to and from India would remain in extreme 
danger*
That the Power possessing the Cape of Good Hope has 
the Key to and from the East-Indies, appears to us 
self-evident and unquestionable; Indeed we must 
consider the Cape of Good Hope, as the Gibralter of 
India* This circumstance, My Lord, has not been 
felt during the long peace subsisting between Great 
Britain and the States General; but the present 
rupture with the Dutch, has totally changed the 
scene, and rendered the possession of the Cape of 
the last importance.^
They pointed out that Madagascar and St Helena were quite inade­
quate as supply bases; Madagascar was ’uncertain and dangerous, 
from Storms, climate and the disposition of the Natives’ , and 
St Helena was too small and not self-sufficient.
The darkest fears of the Company appeared to material­
ise when the Directors were informed on 31 October 1781 that the
2
old Indian veteran, de Bussy, had been commissioned to return
1
Laurence Sulivan and William James to Hillsborough, 25 October 
1781, Home Miscellaneous Series, vol*154, p#280,
2
Charles Patissier, marquis de Bussy (1720-1785) first went to 
India in 1741# Dupleix commissioned him in 1751 to accompany 
Muzaffar Jang back to Hyderabad and from this time until his 
recall to the Carnatic by Lally-Tollendal in 1758 he was the 
effective power behind Salabat Jang, the Soubah of the Deccan* 
Eventually he was captured by the British in 1760, returning to 
France soon after.
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to India 'with a great Naval and Military Force', 'This infor­
mation', asserted the Chairmen, 'renders the proposed Expedition 
for attacking the Cape of Good Hope,, , infinitely more necessary' , 1
For Cornwallis' dramatic surrender at Yorktown in 
October virtually closed hostilities in America itself and 
signified a resurgence of the Anglo-French struggle in the East, 
Both powers were now able to concentrate their unfettered attent­
ion on the naval and military campaigns in India, The French 
government realised that the attainment of its political and 
commercial ambitions in India, which were still considerable, 
depended upon some striking military success# A number of 
victories there would enable Vergennes to negotiate from a posi­
tion of strength and induce the humiliated British to sue for 
peace, Bussy and Chevalier had repeatedly stressed the import­
ance India played in providing the British with wealth and trade, 
and they warned that British efforts would be increasingly 
directed towards the preservation and defence of their possessions 
in India, Despite these cautionary words, they both agreed that 
the time was ripe for a widespread Indian revolt against the 
oppressive rule of the Company, 'Tous les princes de L'Inde ont 
les regards tournes du cote de la France, dont la cause est
1
Laurence Sulivan and William James to Hillsborough, 31 October
1781, Home Miscellaneous Series, vol#154, p#287.
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commune avec la leur.. . . Jamais il n 'y  eut d'occasion plus
favorable que celle qui se pr/sente aujourd'hui, si nous savons
en profiter ' . 1 Hopefully, then, the French government decided
to sponsor an expeditionary force to the East, de Bussy receiving
2
his commission and instructions on 11 November.
In the same month Hillsborough held discussions with 
the Directors personally to consider once more the future of the 
Cape, The Directors were anxious that Bussy's expedition should 
not render French occupation of the Cape permanent since there 
were no alternatives to the Cape as a half-way provisioning base 
on the route to India. 'I f  the french are suffered to hold 
possession of the Cape of Good Hope, they will thereby most cert­
ainly acquire the means of possessing the territorial revenues in 
India; and cannot fail to become the controlling European Power
3
in that part of the World'. Although the Ministry had come to 
appreciate the overwhelming importance of the Cape, they were
Memoire remis, le 1 février 1780, par M. Chevalier, ex- 
gouverneur de Chandernagore, a M. de Sartine, Ministre de la 
Marine, Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, vo l.551, p .47*
2 " ...........
For a detailed discussion of these instructions in the context 
of South India see Chapter 5, p p .236-9.
3
Chairman and Deputy Chairman to the Earl of Hillsborough,
8 November 1781, Home Miscellaneous Series, vol#155, p .121,
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able to do very little , and the Cape remained in enemy hands 
until the end of the war. 1
The granting of independence to the thirteen American
colonies freed the British government from the distraction of a
formal empire of settlement* It could now direct its efforts
to the matter of domestic reform and the development of an
2
'empire of commerce in Indian and Pacific Oceans', a trend in 
imperial interest and organisation that has been explored in 
enormous detail by Vincent Harlow* In fact, he has discerned in 
the dynamic expansion of British trade and influence eastwards 
the major feature of the Second British Empire, and while some 
doubts have been raised as to the overall economic importance of 
this swing, few historians would question the growing political 
strength of the settlements established in India*
Notwithstanding, the fear of the French still lingered 
on in the minds of the British, who were increasingly concerned 
about the future of the strategically important Dutch possessions 
in the East Indies, The Dutch entry into the American War had
1
Nevertheless, the search for an alternate naval base in South 
Africa continued throughout the 1780 's. See Harlow, The Found­
ing of the Second British Empire, v o l ,I , pp#125-32 and 
L .C .F . Turner, 'The Cape of Good Hope and Anglo-French Rivalry, 
1778-1796', in Historical Studies, Australia and New Zealand, 
v o l .12, no*46 (April 1966), pp*166-85*
2
Harlow, Founding of the Second British Empire, vol#II , p*786.
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seriously jeopardised the security of British interests in India 
and from the Peace of Versailles until the war against Revolut­
ionary France the British tried desperately to bring Holland 
back within the fold of the traditional Anglo-Dutch alliance . 1 
Underlying all such efforts was the belief that an accommodation 
of interests between the two powers in the Fast could be 
managed. According to the British point of view:
The two Countries have each one original great object 
in view, and which do not clash in the smallest 
degree: That of Great Britain is to maintain and 
preserve the Empire which she has acquired, in com­
parison of which even trade is a subordinate or 
collateral consideration.
The great object of Holland is , in the first 
instance, to secure to herself the monopoly of the 
Spice Islands; and secondly, to extend her general 
trade by every means in her power. 2
Britain, of course, was particularly anxious to secure the
neutrality of the Cape in time of war and to exchange Negapatam,
which she had gained at the peace, for Trincomalee.
Conversely France wanted the Dutch possessions left
1
In his study Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World 1780-1824 
(Brisbane, 1962), Nicholas Tarling has treated the problem of 
Dutch power in the East after 1780 in close relation to the 
problem of the Dutch in Europe. The repercussions of the 
Stadholderate crisis will also be examined in Chapter 7*
2
Considerations on the subject of a Treaty between Great Britain 
and Holland, relative to their Interests in India, P .R .O . 30 /8 , 
360 part 2, p .179*
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intact so that she could take advantage of them in case of 
another global war. Until the Prussian crisis of 1787 the 
French were assisted in their aims by the success of the patriot 
party within the United Provinces, But the crisis was averted 
by Prussian intervention whereupon the strengthened Stadholderate 
formed a defensive alliance with Britain and Prussia, In spite 
of this volte face, the Dutch Company was quite unprepared to 
make any concessions to the British in the East Indies, and v/ith 
the flight of the Prince of Orange to England in 1795 the British 
government declared war on the francophile Batavian Republic and 
took the Cape and Trincomalee, The ramifications of this crisis 
will be examined in Chapter 7#
Hence the French strategic threat which grew out of 
the European diplomacy of Choiseul and Vergennes contributed to 
that general suspicion and fear of French intentions in India 
and the Eastern Seas, probably the outstanding characteristic 
of relations betv/een the English and the French during this 
thirty year period# In turn it provoked the emergence of a 
competing strategy - ’of ocean trade routes, protected by naval 
bases and nourished by commercial depots or factories ’ *1 This 
fear, of course, did not abate until the defeat of Napoleonic 
France, While French diplomacy was not unimpressive in the
Harlow, Founding of the Second British Empire, vol#II, p ,l #
1
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latter half of the eighteenth century, the actual performance of 
the French in the East fluctuated considerably.
Throughout this study, therefore, a sustained attempt 
will be made to relate the eastern conflict to the manoeuvres 
and counter-manoeuvres of the diplomats in Europe. A later 
chapter will examine the extent to which the English and French 
governments overcame the problem of control in India and were 
able to exert a guiding influence over their affairs in the East. 
It will also examine the impact of local Asian disputes on 
the pattern of Anglo-French diplomacy in Europe. However, the 
earlier chapters which follow will investigate the nature, 
growth and outcome of Anglo-French relations in the three types 
of situation already outlined over the period from 1763 to 1793s 
in Bengal, where the British were effectively established as the 
ruling power; in the South, where the question of supremacy was 
still undecided; and in the Eastern Seas, where British commerce 
and influence were steadily expanding but where a French and a 
Dutch challenge still  existed. In what ways did the French 
affect the consolidation and extension of British influence in 
these three areas? And did the pressures for expansion originate 
at the metropolitan centre, or at the periphery of empire?
These two questions and their answers comprise the core of this 
thesis.
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CHAPTER 3: ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS IN BENGAL 1763-1778
i , THE BENGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
In March 1763 the Court of Directors despatched to the 
presidencies in India copies of the definitive treaty of peace 
concluded at Paris on 10 February* Accordingly the Presidents 
and Councils at Fort William and Fort St George v/ere directed to 
restore to the French, ’ pursuant to the true intention and 
spirit of the 11th article1, the comptoirs which the French King 
possessed at the beginning of 1749, ’ in the condition in which 
these factories respectively were at the time of signing the 
said treaty1, 1 More detailed instructions were issued on
1
These details are given in a letter from the Court of Directors 
to the Presidents and Councils at Fort William, Fort St George 
and Bombay, dated 23 March 176A# Fort William - India House' 
Correspondence (Delhi, 1962), (vol.IV. (Public Series}, p .36)
The eleventh article of the Peace of Paris prescribed that Britain 
would ’ restore to France, in the condition they are now in, the 
different factories which that Crown possessed’ in Bengal, Orissa, 
Malabar and along the Coromandel coast ’ at the beginning of the 
year 1749’ . France also agreed ’ not to erect fortifications, or 
to keep troops in any part of the dominions of the Subah of 
Bengal’ * During these negotiations the British government accept­
ed responsibility for the first time for concluding an East Indian 
settlement. See L, Sutherland, ’ The East India Company and the 
Peace of Paris’ , English Historical Review LXII (1947), p ,179, and 
for a more general treatment of the role of East Indian affairs in 
the peace, Z .E . Rashed, The Peace of Paris 1763 (Liverpool, 195l)#
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23 March 1764* The Councils were urged to deliver up to the 
French commissary ’ all the papers, letters, documents and archi­
ves’ in their custody, and the Fort William Council was further 
requested to oblige in the return of the Compagnie’ s *phirmaunds 
from the Nabob’ , v/hich the French alleged had been seized by the 
English at Murshidabad. 1
Jean Law de Lauriston, the commissary appointed by the
French government, had earlier played an important role in the
2
French resistance to Clive's intrigues in Bengal# Until Clive's 
capture of Chandernagore in 1757 de Lauriston had been the chief 
of the French factory at Kasimbazar, situated close to the 
Nawab's capital of Murshidabad. During the next four years he 
had schemed assiduously with Shuja-ud-Daula, the Nawab of Oudh, 
and Prince Ali Gauhar, later to become Shah Alam I I ,  In 1761 he 
was captured by the British and in the next year repatriated to 
France, where he was created a Chevalier of St Louis and a 
colonel# His familiarity with the politics of Bengal and North
1
Court of Directors to the Councils at Fort William, Fort St 
George and Bombay, 23 March 1764# Fort William - India House 
Correspondence, vo l.IV , p. 36.
2
De Lauriston was incidentally a nephew of the famous Regency 
financier. See S .C . H ill , Three Frenchmen in Bengal or The 
Commercial Ruin of the French Settlements in 1757 (London. 1903), 
and de Lauriston’ s own interesting Memoire sur quelques affaires 
de L ’Empire Mogol, published by Alfred Martineau at Paris in 
1913.
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India was no doubt a major asset in the eyes of his government 
and in 1764 he was appointed Governor of the French settlements 
in India. De Lauriston stepped ashore to face once again the 
steamy and enervating heat of Madras in January 1765#
The new governor soon visited and reclaimed Karikal 
and Pondicherry, and sent deputies to take possession of Mahe 
on the Malabar coast, Yanam and the factory at Masulipatam# 
Anticipating de Lauriston*s early arrival in Bengal, the Fort 
William Council ’ procured from the Nabob the necessary orders’ 
for the restitution of the comptoirs at Chandernagore, Patna, 
Sydabad, Dacca and Jugdea. But the Council had to inform the 
Court that the search for the French papers and firmans had been 
’ entirely ineffectual’ , and though the Councillors protested 
their good intentions to live ’ in future harmony’ with the 
French, they were quite determined to prevent the French 'obtain­
ing any undue influence in the country’ ,^-
After receiving back the principal French settlements 
on the Coromandel, de Lauriston proceeded to Bengal, where on 
15 June 1765 he took possession of Chandernagore from George 
Vansittart, the British commissary. The subordinate factories
1
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and settlements were restored soon after. On surveying the once 
prosperous centre of French trade and influence in Bengal, 
de Lauriston must have been sorely distressed* He had known 
Chandernagore in the palmy days when Dupleix had been the chief, 
but now the fortifications were crumbling and grown over by the 
prolific, lush vegetation of Bengal while the warehouses stood 
abandoned and disused. He had often witnessed the depredations 
of roving Maratha bands and Bengali thugs, and now he clearly 
appreciated how vulnerable the settlement would be to native 
attack, V/ith that mixture of charm and tenacity so characteristic 
of his nation de Lauriston pleaded v/ith the Fort William Council 
that the French be permitted *a small number of Armed Europeans 
and Seapoys with a few Pieces of Cannon and a proper Lodgement 
to which they might retire in case of any surprize from the 
Country People’ *1 Although the peace treaty forbade the French 
to erect fortifications or keep troops in Bengal, de Lauriston 
assured the Fort William Council that 'he meant not to elude in 
the least, by this application, the effect of the Conditions of 
the Treaty',
The Council were moved, or so it seemed* After due 
consideration the Council agreed to de Lauriston*s request 'with
1
Extract of the General Letter from the President and Council at 
Bengal to the Court of Directors, 30 September 1765, Home 
Miscellaneous Series, vol#98, p .135*
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a right of withdrawing the Terms’ if  ever they should ’have
reason to apprehend an improper use of them'* The French were
permitted ’One officer and twenty European Infantry, with one
hundred Seapoys’ at Chandernagore, and fifty sepoys at each of
the subordinate factories. Furthermore, they were allowed a
Wall at Chandernagore, such as they formerly had at 
Cossimbuzar, and twenty pieces of Cannon, not of a 
heavier Weight than six Pounders, for the purpose of 
Salutes on the usual Occasions, which would at the 
same time fully answer the end of imposing a proper 
Respect on the Country People,.
As a final mark of beneficence, the Council conceded them ’Five
Artillery men for working these Guns’ , 1 The French were duly
grateful#
But when the Court of Directors received news of these 
gentlemanly transactions in April 1766 they reacted with surprise 
and mild irritation. They desired that ’ the concession with 
respect to the Artillery could have been avoided’ because ’past 
Experience has too sensibly evinced the little dépendance (sic) 
there can be had upon their Moderation’ , Consequently the Council 
were urged to maintain a close surveillance over ’ the proceedings 
of the French Agents, to prevent their extending the Liberty you 
have granted them, and to remind them,, , that they are to look
1
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upon it as a meer matter of Favour conferred on them* * , * 1 It was 
not until 20 November 1767, however, that the Earl of Shelburne, 
His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Southern Department, was 
informed of these novel arrangements with the French in Bengal# 
His tart reply of 27 January 1768 to the Court's appeal for the 
King's instructions in the matter showed even more surprise and 
irritation at the independent and unauthorised action of the 
Fort William Council# 'To soften the strong prohibitory Letter 
and Spirit of a Treaty', he wrote, 'and to carry Indulgence so 
very far as to allow them 20 Pieces of Cannon, were Measures so 
important in their Consequences, both to the Company and to the 
Publick, as to require not only the Wisdom of His Majesty to con­
sider, but also the Power of the Crown to confirm'. He now felt 
that the matter was of too great a delicacy to permit the with­
drawal of the privileges, though he expressed His Majesty's 
command that the Company
shall keep a most watchful Eye on the Conduct and 
Proceedings of the French in Bengal, so that, upon the 
slightest Appearance of any Insidious Machination in 
Consequence of the Permission granted to them, you and 
your Servants in Bengal shall be ready to assert your 
Right of withdrawing it .2
1
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Almost immediately these instructions were despatched to the 
Presidency at Fort William and doubtless they played no small 
part in the change of heart of that council.
These early manoeuvres soon showed the French, if they 
had ever doubted it , that they were only allowed to return to 
Bengal on sufferance. The victories at Plassey and Buxar had 
guaranteed for the East India Company a position of overwhelming 
commercial and political predominance in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, 
provinces which Robert Orme effusively described as ’ the most 
fertile of any in the universe, more so than Egypt, and with 
greater certainty’ . '1' Content to play the ’nice and important 
game’ of extracting trading concessions and lavish douceurs from 
the Nawabs of Bengal until Mir Kasim began to promote policies 
of his own inimical to its interest, the Company accepted from 
its servant, Robert Clive, in 1765 the diwani of the three 
provinces. By this arrangement the Moghul Emperor ’ divested the 
nawab of his pov/ers as diwan, and conferred that office on the 
British East India Company to hold as a free gift and royal grant
1
From Robert Orme’ s Historical Fragments of Indostan (1753)- 
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Plassey and the Conquest of Bengal (London, 1963).
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in perpetuity' . 1 In this way the Company acquired control over
the collection and disposal of the revenues of Bengal although
the territorial jurisdiction continued to be exercised through
the zemindars and the 'chiefs of the country', responsible to
both the Nawab and the Presidency* The resident of the Company
at the court of the Nawab at Murshidabad was assisted in the
supervision of the revenue collections by 'Muhammad Reza Khan
who exercised as naib diwan the Company's civil jurisdiction and
represented as naib nazim the Nawab's executive and military
2
authority** This dual system of control was chosen by the 
Company because its agents were ignorant of the intricacies of 
Moghul law and administration and hopeful that the Bengal reven­
ues would immediately offset their needs, Clive confided to the 
Court that
We were under the necessity of drawing the earliest 
advantages from our acquisition of the Duannee* Our 
army was to be paid, our investment to be made, and 
the China market to be supplied* To trust these 
collections therefore, upon which our credit and 
security depended, to the management of the Company’ s 
servants, totally unacquainted with the business, 
would have been a dangerous, and at this time would 
have been termed a criminal, experiment*5
1
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But the Council's reluctance to assume completely the 
administration of the revenue collection was also due to its 
fears that the foreign companies would appeal to their govern­
ments in Europe with consequences unfavourable to the East India 
Company, Clive advised
The power of supervising the provinces though lodged 
in us, should n o t ,.,„ in  my opinion be exerted,, . ,By 
this means also, the abuses inevitably springing from 
the exercise of territorial authority, will be effect­
ually obviated; there will still  be a Nabob with an 
allowance suitable to his dignity, and the territorial 
jurisdiction will still be in the chiefs of the 
country acting under him and the Presidency in con­
junction, though the revenues will belong to the 
Company, Besides, were the Company's officers to be 
the collectors, foreign nations would immediately take 
umbrage, and complaints preferred to the British 
Court might be attended with very embarrassing con­
sequences, Nor can it be supposed, that either the 
French, Dutch or Danes will acknowledge the English 
Company - Nabob of Bengal, and pay into the hands of 
their servants the duties upon trade, or the quit 
rents of those districts which they have for many years 
possessed by virtue of the royal phirmaunds or by 
grants from former Nabobs,
On the face of it , then, the French were at an enormous 
disadvantage in Bengal since political power had been virtually 
transferred into the hands of the British, The French were only 
permitted to return for purposes of trade. And yet they had 
certain advantages which enhanced their bargaining position, not 
the least of which was the sheer defencelessness of their
1
Clive to the Court of Directors, 30 September 1765, Fort William - 
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comptoirs, Though their usual role was that of humble suppliants 
for the favours of the Company, they could occasionally embarrass 
the Fort William Council in its dealings with the Nawab, the 
Court of Directors and the Crown* At first the Council hoped 
that the French would oblige in a policy of peaceful co-existence 
and it hesitated to embroil itself in disputes with French agents 
and officials# Clearly this was a policy of expediency, since 
the Council believed that, if  the Company did not intervene too 
directly in the native administration, the foreign companies 
would continue to pay their land rents and customs duties to the 
Nawab1s officials#
In spite of these hopes, however, the traditional 
mistrust between the two nations was too deep seated for this 
modus vivendi to last, especially after the aged Renault de Saint- 
Germain relinquished the Governorship of Chandernagore to the 
younger and more ambitious Jean-Baptiste Chevalier in July 1767# 
Chevalier, who had served at the factory of Dacca before the 
onset of the Seven Years' War, was a man after de Lauriston's 
own heart. His intricate understanding of the political situation 
in northern India, together with his passionate attachment to 
France^made him an opponent worthy of a Clive or a Hastings.
Apart from this new and unpredictable element, the Fort
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William Council inclined to a tougher line with the French after 
1767 because it saw the Company's economic interests threatened# 
Verelst, the President at Calcutta, believed that the French were 
profiting from the clandestine trade carried on by the Company's 
agents in the interior. Since the regulations of May 1765 the 
Company's servants - both civil and military - were proscribed
from accepting any presents or gifts of land, rent, or revenue
\
without the consent of the Court of Directors# No longer could 
illegally acquired fortunes and profits be remitted through the 
official channels# Instead, they swelled 'the Treasuries of 
Foreign Nations, in exchange for Bills on their respective 
Companies'#1 It was at this time, therefore, that the Fort 
William Council became alarmed about the rumoured drain of bullion 
from Bengal# Remittances of private fortunes through the foreign 
companies, it was claimed, greatly facilitated this drain and the 
not unexpected solution advocated was the opening of official 
channels to these financial transactions#
Verelst further alleged that the weavers in the outlying 
districts were fleeing to the service of the French or Dutch 
Companies 'who leave no means untried to seduce the weavers from
1
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our Service1 This practice had depleted the ranks of the 
weavers ’ at all the factories and Aurungs’ .
Such acrimonious disputes increasingly characterised 
the trading relations between the English, the French and the 
Dutch after 1767. In large measure they flowed from the Company’ s 
assumption of the diwani and they showed that commercial interests 
by themselves were sufficient to turn the English against both the 
Dutch and the French* After 1765 the influence of the Company 
over the Nawab and his administration was clear and undisputed$ 
Chevalier and de Lauriston, for example, often referred to the 
Nawab as a ’ phantome’ and a ’veritable esclave’ of the British, 
Whereas the Company refused to interfere with the civil administ­
ration of the Naib Diwan or the criminal jurisdiction of the 
Naib Nazim until 1772, the agents of the Company and private 
merchants in the ’mofussil’ exerted to the uttermost their 
influence and privileges. They were particularly ruthless in
their exploitation of the trade in commodities produced and con-
2
sumed within Bengal - salt, bete1-nut, tobacco and grain# And
1
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they did not scruple to abuse the Company’ s dustuck privileges, 
which were originally granted for imported and exported goods 
only, to exempt the inland trade from local imposts and duties*
The French quite naturally resented these injustices and corres­
ponded bitterly and at length with their authorities at home.
Critical of the widespread abuse of dustuck and inland 
trade privileges, the Court of Directors sought to bring their 
servants under the control of the Calcutta authorities* On this 
question the native officials supported the Court since they were 
eager to exclude European merchants from a lucrative trade that 
had once been the preserve of Indian traders* Clive had attempted 
in 1765 to prevent the exploitation of the inland trade by making 
it a monopoly of the senior servants of the Company in Bengal,
Later in 1767, on the instructions of the Court of Directors, the 
Select Committee at Fort William, the inner cabinet of the Council, 
recommended that 'a ll  the Company's Servants and other Europeans 
residing under Protection of the British Flag1 be excluded from 
’ all share and Participation in the Trade of Salt, Beetlenut and 
Tobacco’ *1 The resident at Murshidabad was accordingly instructed 
to reassure the Nawab that the Company aimed ’ at diffusing this 
Traffic in the most extensive and equitable Manner amongst the
1
Bengal Select Proceedings. 1767* Neither the date of the pro­
ceedings nor the page is indicated.
91
Natives themselves, so as to prevent a Monopoly of it in the Hands 
of Ministers, Favorites and Dependants (sic) of the Government, 
to the Injury and Oppression of the industrious Merchant Labourers1. 
He was also encouraged to persuade the Nawab to exclude ’ the 
French, Dutch and Danes equally with the English, from all share 
and Concern in the Trade of Salt, Betlenut and Tobacco' . 1 The 
Nawab was only too anxious to oblige and on 7 October the chiefs 
of the French, Dutch and Danish factories were informed in a
perwannah ’ that none but Natives and Merchants of this Country
2
shall be permitted in future to traffic in those Articles’ .
For the most part, however, the attempts to regulate 
the inland trade by the Calcutta Council and the Nawab’ s chief 
minister, Muhammad Reza Khan, were ineffectual# Sykes, the 
Company's resident at the durbar, complained continually of 
Chevalier's clandestine trading activities throughout Bengal# He 
claimed, for instance, that Chevalier had 'established Gomastahs 
at many Places for the Purchase of Rice, Grain and other Articles, 
which they never before dealt in ',  and Sykes encouraged the
3
Nawab's officials to obstruct the French trade. On 10 November
1
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the Nawab to the aumils and zemindars of Bengal is also included 
in this minute, and strongly suggests the subordinate and depend­
ent status of the Nawab after 1765.
3
Sykes to Fort V/illiam Council, 9 November 1767, Bengal Select 
Proceedings. 17 November 1767*
92
he cited the dealings of Chevalier at Benares as evidence of the 
’ encroaching Disposition of the French’ , and argued prophetically 
that ’ these Practices if  put a Stop to at first may be quelled 
with little noise or Difficulty, but if  once they are established 
into a Custom, the French will be too ready to found Pretensions 
which may bring on troublesome and disagreeable Disputes’ , 1
Distrust stemming from half a century of conflict
marred Anglo-French relations in Bengal almost from the return
of the French settlements in 1765. Relations with the Dutch
were more amicable even though similar disagreements and disputes
2
arose. They engendered considerably less acerbity because the 
Dutch were not political rivals with the British in Bengal. For 
always the Company feared that any augmentation in French trade 
would ultimately be used to undermine its influence and in spite 
of the private merchant's willingness to use French channels for 
remittances home, this overriding political concern remained to
1
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remark from de Lauriston shows. 'Le but des anglais est 
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93
distort and embitter the Council’ s dealings with the French, And 
with as wily and tenacious an enemy as Chevalier these alarms 
were not entirely imaginary.
Throughout 1768 a steady stream of complaints about the 
French continued to reach the Fort William Council, In its 
letter to the Court of Directors of 14 March 1768, the Council 
expressed alarm at French interference with the purchase of 
cloths at Dacca, 1 It was the practice of the companies to 
advance the weavers in the aurungs, or the districts where 
cloths were commissioned, sums for the payment of their labour 
and equipment, English agents claimed that v/hen the cloths 
were woven the French and the Dutch secretly purchased them from 
weavers already commissioned by the East India Company, Not 
surprisingly, the French made similar allegations about the 
Company’s agents.
On 28 March 1768 Verelst bitterly complained of the 
flow of specie to the foreign companies, a development which 
enabled them to compete with the English in the salt and inland 
trade. Three days later he placed before the Select Committee 
intelligence ’ that the French at Chandernagore have taken up
1
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large sums of Money in Silver Specie; and transmitted the same
to Pondicherry, for the service of that Presidency1. 1 The
Committee was seriously concerned and ordered 'that an effectual
stop be put to such a growing Evil'# It proposed that the
Nawab’ s government 'prohibit all Exportation of Silver from these
Provinces, and issue the necessary Orders to all the European
Nations, as well as others trading in Bengal imposing such a
2
Penalty on Disobedience, as they may think proper'. On 23 July
the Secret Committee drafted a firman which it fervently urged
the Nawab to issue# In this order the Committee alleged that
the French, Dutch and other European nations had brought little
silver into the country and had carried on their trade by
remitting home the illegally acquired private fortunes of
English merchants, 'By this means the Country has been greatly
impoverished, and the Circulation of Cash is at present almost
entirely stagnated'. To prevent this harmful practice the
Council insisted that the French and other foreign companies
should only be permitted to export goods to the value of the
3
merchandise and bullion they imported.
Towards the end of the 1760’ s the great concern of the
1
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Bengal Council was for the diminution of the Bengal revenues and 
it quite naturally sought to control the exportation of bullion#
A further and related anxiety of the English was that the profits 
that the French derived from the Indian trade would be employed 
eventually to undermine the Company's political influence in 
Bengal, They suspected that the 'very large sums of Money' 
supplied to the French at Chandernagore and Pondicherry were 
being reserved in India 'for some future occasion1. Although the 
French at this stage were hardly a military threat in Bengal, the 
Council believed that the French might soon be in a position to 
launch an invasion from the Islands against the Company's 
possessions#
Recently the Fort William Council had been informed
that ten French ships had sailed for India 'this Season1 and
that the French 'have already about four thousand of his Christian
Majesty's troops at the Island1, meaning of course the lie de
France# The Council continued:
It requires no great depth of Judgement to foresee that 
the assembling such a number of Forces at the French 
Islands can bode no good to your Settlements in India - 
nor are we without our Apprehensions that whenever the 
French are in a condition to cope with our Nation in 
Europe they will make some attempt in India: & even this 
may happen previous to a declaration of War - And as from 
the situation of the Islands, they are Sole Masters of 
their own time and operations, it is more than probable
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that the first intelligence of their intention, will 
be the appearance of a French Fleet in Ballasore Road,■*
Hence the Council’ s fears arose out of a generalised threat which
clearly emerged towards the end of the decade. This extended
crisis in Anglo-French relations, lasting from the annexation of
Corsica early in 1768 until the resolution of the Falkland
Islands' affair in January 1771* was mainly a product of Choiseul's
revenge policy. Its ramifications, however, were felt in India,
Reports of the massing of French forces, though for the most part
exaggerated, were common and the Fort William Council took the
necessary precaution of putting the 'new Fort in a posture of
Defence as expeditiously as possible1.
But Anglo-French tensions in India were to have their 
effect, too, on the manoeuvres of statesmen in Europe. A serious 
crisis arose in Bengal and the French attempted to use it to bring 
the East India Company and its servants to heel. In this endeavour 
Choiseul initially  met with some sympathy from the British govern­
ment, anxious now to impose restraints on the Company’ s political 
and diplomatic activities in India, Nevertheless, when confronted 
by French machinations and intrigue the Company and the state 
closed ranks and consolidated their naval and military position 
in the East. The Chandernagore ditch affair, while inconsequential
1
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enough in its details, is worthy of close attention since it was 
the first really serious breach in Anglo-French relations in the 
East after the peace. It began essentially as a local dispute 
but it emerged by May 1770 into a European issue involving the 
entire question of British power in India# Its importance grew 
from the context of Franco-Spanish attempts to rehabilitate their 
commercial and political influence overseas, and it contributed 
to that crisis of confidence which so affected relations between 
the Company and parliament between 1766 and 1773. Its reper­
cussions were not inconsiderable. The dual threat posed by a 
French inspired native revolution and an invasion from the Indian 
Ocean islands goaded the British, both at home and in India, into 
a greater appreciation of the strategic problems involved in the 
defence of their Indian empire# It also contributed to the drawing 
together of the separate presidencies in order to evolve a more 
consistent and reasoned policy towards the Indian states. It 
forced the British Crown to intervene more energetically, if not 
at first successfully, in the affairs of the Company, and it 
effectively defined the French response to British power in the 
East until the final eclipse of Napoleon#
ii# THE DITCH INCIDENT 1767-1769
In November 1767, soon after his arrival at Chandernagore 
as Governor of the French possessions in Bengal, Chevalier
98
approached Verelst for permission to build a drain to carry off 
the stagnant waters from the little Ganges (apparently a contem­
porary name for the Hooghly). In his letter to Verelst Chevalier 
contended that large pools of water remained about Chandernagore 
after the inundations of the monsoon and contributed greatly to 
the unhealthiness of the comptoir. 1 Later Chevalier claimed that
Verelst gave his verbal consent to the proposal although Verelst
2
did not consult the Council* The work was begun on 26 November 
but soon afterwards the suspicions of the Nawab were aroused. 
While the Nawab informed the authorities at Calcutta of his 
doubts concerning the ditch, the Fouzdar of Hooghly's coolies 
obstructed the French in their efforts. Chevalier then appealed 
to Verelst to use his influence with the Nawab to allow the work 
to continue. In his reply of 27 December Verelst assured 
Chevalier that he was satisfied that the work was 'only a drain 
to carry the waters off from the town, and thereby preserve the 
health of the inhabitants' ;  and he hurriedly proposed that the
3
Chief Engineer of Calcutta should examine the work. His report, 
presumably, would propitiate the Nawab. Chevalier eagerly
1
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concurred in this arrangement.
Captain Fleming Martin, the Chief Engineer, concluded 
his report on 28 January 1768 and gave as his opinion that the 
ditch was not a fortification* There were no flanks and so, 
according to the tenets of the great Vauban, 'no Defence can be 
proposed in the Construction*
On 27 April 1769, more than a year later, Colonel
Campbell, Martin's successor, informed John Cartier and the
Bengal Council of certain alarming developments. Three thousand
five hundred coolies were busily at work on the excavation the
size and character of which were such as to render the French
position in Bengal quite 'formidable'. Campbell was convinced
that the ditch was 'capable of being made a good Field Work in
a very few days' and, moreover, he believed that it constituted
2
a clear infraction of 'the last Articles of Peace', Impressed 
indeed with the duty it owed 'to the Nation in general, and the 
Company in particular', the Board decided on 2 May 'to put a stop 
to a V/ork of so insiduous (sic) and hostile an Appearance as this 
is reported to be, carried on in violation of the Eleventh Article 
of the Treaty of Peace', and it immediately despatched Campbell
1
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to make a thorough survey of the ominous ditch at Chsndernagore.
Campbell visited Chandernagore on 15 May and completed 
his report on 26 May. In its conclusions it differed radically 
from the earlier report by Martin. Campbell argued that the 
ditch failed in its original purpose to carry off surplus waters.
It seemed to him 'extremely unreasonable, and absolutely unnecess­
ary, to cut a deep wide Drain across the top of a rising Ground to 
carry off Water which from the Nature of the Country can never 
lodge thereon1. 1 Furthermore, he noticed that the drain made 
'many extraordinary Angles and windings' and these, he had reason 
to suspect, were nothing more than redans, bastions and 
crenailliere works* Finally, the engineer cited the construction 
of earthen ramparts and the planting of bamboos on the exterior 
talus as evidence of its defensive nature. He concluded: ' I  am 
of opinion it may one day or other be render'd a very formidable 
work to the Field if  these Bamboes are cut and pointed in the 
Stile of Pallisades'*
Since he predicted that the ditch would be ready by late 
June he urged the Council to take immediate action to prevent its 
completion. Its destruction would be a necessary safeguard against 
any French naval or military threat. He feared that in case of a
1
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rupture with France ’ the French Fleet might pass our Fort, their 
troops sack Calcutta, and easily retreat to their Works at 
Chandernagore from which it would, in his Opinion, be a very 
serious affair to dislodge them’ . 1
On 6 June the Secret Committee, stirred by the report,
unanimously agreed to put into execution their resolution to
2
destroy the work at Chandernagore. Saved the embarrassment of
Verelst’ s presence, the Board also rescinded those privileges
which had earlier been granted to Law de Lauriston. The alarms
of the Board were further aroused by intelligence that the French
at Chandernagore were engaged in making gun carriages and
3
thatched sheds within the old fort. The latter were presumed 
to be for the accommodation of troops.
At first Chevalier threatened to resist by force any 
attempt to f ill  in the ditch, but on 11 June Campbell began the 
demolition of the works at Chandernagore unopposed. On 23 June 
Campbell submitted to the Council a revised plan of the ditch 
which was intended to serve the original purpose of discharging 
floodwaters into the little Ganges, and by 27 June the ditch had
1
’ Abstract of Proceedings relative to a Ditch dug by the French 
at Chandernagore and destroyed by order of the Governor and Council 
of Bengal’ , Home Miscellaneous Series, vol,102, p«421,
2
Bengal Secret Proceedings. 6 June 1769#
Bengal Select Proceedings, 8 June 1769#
3
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been rendered defenceless* Campbell remained at Chandernagore 
during early July to ensure the effective destruction of the work 
so that 'the French may not be able to convert it into a state 
of defence on any future occasion when it may not possibly be so 
much in our pov/er to prevent them1»1
In January 1768, when Martin visited Chandernagore, 
only 500 yards of the ditch had been excavated, while in May 1769 
Campbell found the circuit of the ditch, 'including its project- 
ions and turnings', was 6-f miles# Martin discovered no ramparts 
and was assured by Chevalier that the earth removed from the ditch 
would be used for a road to encircle the settlement; Campbell 
encountered formidable earthen ramparts which in the finished 
parts were from 40 to 67 feet in breadth, six to eight feet above 
the level of the country, and from 16 to 23 feet above the bottom 
of the ditch. Campbell also reported that bamboos were planted 
around the walls and believed they were almost certainly intended 
as palisades. Clearly the size of the ditch changed considerably
1
Bengal Secret Proceedings. 3 July 1769#
2
Martin had informed the Council that the proposed length of the 
ditch was 'about three french leagues' (six to eight miles). A 
memoire, submitted to the British ambassador in June 1770, claimed 
that the ditch was over a mile in length (^,00 toises)^when Martin 
examined it* 'L'ouvrage aiant ete continue sur les memes plans, 
sur les m£mes devis et les memes conditions dont le marchi existe, 
n 'avoit pas pu changer de nature'. S .P . 78 /281 , pp#46-7*
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within the 15 months which elapsed after Martin’ s tour of inspec­
tion although the French persisted in denying this, Martin found 
that the width of the ditch at the base was 18 feet while Campbell 
measured the breadth of the excavation as between 40 and 50 feet. 
Because there were no flanks, an essential condition for forti­
fications in the eighteenth century, Martin concluded that the 
ditch was harmless. But Campbell encountered an extraordinary 
number of angles in the walls which he believed could be employed 
for defensive purposes. By May 1769, according to Campbell, the 
French had completed four of the proposed six bridges across the 
ditch,
On the other hand, the French contended that there had 
been no great changes in the construction or the design of the 
ditch since Martin's report and with this, interestingly enough, 
Martin later agreed. 1 However, Martin’ s claims can be largely 
disregarded because he was at this time living in London, The 
French insisted on an adequate explanation for the apparent 
arbitrariness of the Council’ s decision. They asserted that the 
breaks and retreats in the walls were made necessary by the 
Fouzdar's refusal to sell lands surrounding Chandernagore, Because 
the comptoir was still left exposed for three miles along the 
Hooghly and since there were no arms or artillery to defend the
1
Martin’ s reply to Campbell’ s report, written on 10 May 1770, is 
in the Home Miscellaneous Series, v o l .102, p p .317-22*
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old fort, the French concluded that the ditch would be quite 
useless as a fortification. Martin reiterated these sentiments 
when he claimed that ’ nothing less than the most sinister Motives' 
could have influenced the Company's agents in Bengal#1
In spite of the vehement and continued protestations by 
the French that the sole purpose of the ditch was to carry off 
stagnant waters, it is abundantly clear that they intended event­
ually to employ it for defensive purposes as well# Whether it was 
intended to defend them against native attacks or against the 
British remains an open question, but considering the highly un­
stable nature of Anglo-French relations in Bengal in this decade 
it does appear probable that the Fort William Council was justified 
in its anxiety# In the consultations of the Chandernagore Council 
of 23 November 1767 mention is made of 'un fo ss / qui doit enclose 
l'Aldee de Chandernagor1, which, significantly, would be employed
'pour la mettre a couvers des incursions des Maures et Marattes,
2
et pour la garantir des Inondations' .  Ditches and tanks were a 
common means of fortification in eighteenth century India and it 
appears obvious that Chevalier hoped he would be able to use the 
ditch as such a fortification in case of attack from the country
1
Home Miscellaneous Series, vol#102, p#317#
2 ^ ^
Extrait de la Deliberation du Conseil Superieur de Chandernagor 
du 23 9bre 1767, F .O . 148/6#
/
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powers. Furthermore, there are details in the consultation about
the construction and size of the raised walls which coincide with
Campbell's specifications* De Lauriston mentioned the ditch in
a despatch from Pondicherry in February 1768. He stressed its
defensive possibilities: 'c 'e st  la seule surete qu'elle puisse
avoir contre les incursions dans un pays aussi sujet a des
✓ , 1
revolutions’ . He also mentioned that bamboos would be planted
on the side of the ditch and de Lauriston suspected that the
English might hinder the work because it 'n 'entre point dans
l'esprit du traité de p aix '. In such an exigency he felt it
would be advisable to discontinue the work. He then confided to
the Minister his basic reason for sanctioning the scheme:
Je vous avouerai cependant, Monseigneur, jue ma 
principale idee en y donnant la main a ete d'en tirer 
parti dans la suite, en cas qu'on voulut executer 
quelque enterprise dans le Bengale, les terres du 
fosse fournisaient un rempart qui moyennant cette haie 
epaisse de bambous nous mettraient en état de nous 
defendre même contre une attaque Europeene,^
Such comments take on a wider and more sinister signi­
ficance when they are examined against the background of French 
plans for the destruction of British power in Bengal and India# 
Throughout 1768 and 1769 Chevalier complained to de Lauriston at
1
Law de Lauriston to the Minister of Marine, 29 February 1768, 
Françaises Nouvelles Acquisitions, vol#9365, p .120.
2 5
Françaises Nouvelles Acquisitions, vol#9365, p .121#
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Pondicherry and Choiseul at Paris of the innumerable insults and 
humiliations heaped on the French name and honour by the East 
India Company. He attacked the specious legality of the Company*s 
regime in Bengal, which was provided by the 'phantom Nawab1, 
believing that the English intended to deprive his countrymen of 
their commerce and drive them from the country. To the Governor 
at Pondicherry and the Minister at Paris he despatched a number 
of elaborately devised plans of attack against Calcutta. The 
French were to land a large force at Chatigan, a mountainous and 
inaccessible spot in eastern Bengal, and from this stronghold the 
French would extend their trade and influence and recruit a large 
sepoy army, 1 In a further and more detailed plan of 15 March 1769 
he argued that a surprise attack by 5,000 men against Calcutta 
would be sufficient to spark off a general native revolution 
against the power of the British, The Marathas, the Emperor and 
the Nawab of Oudh, he noted, 'n'attendent qu'une occasion favorable 
pour faire eclater leurs sentiments et c'est dans les français 
seuls qu 'ils  mettent toute leur principale confiance pour leur
1
This plan was included in Chevalier's despatch to Choiseul- 
Praslin of 10 January 1769: Chevalier believed that 1,200 - 
1 ,500 men would be sufficient to establish French influence in 
the eastern part of Bengal as a precursor to the final assault 
against British power at Calcutta. 'Chatigan' probably refers 
to present day Chittagong, Françaises Nouvelles Acquisitions, 
v o l .9366, pp .1-10.
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delivrance' . 1 Chevalier was convinced, and with good reason, of 
the inevitability of a native revolution to overthrow British 
rule, and he urged the French Government to exploit such an 
opportunity once it arose.
The Fort William Council evidently suspected the
intentions and activities of the French, Campbell's report
bluntly stated the French threat to Calcutta and Bengal, 'Let it
be supposed', Campbell argued,
that a French Army of 3 or 4,000 Men embraces the 
earliest part of the Season and arrives at the Mouth 
of the Ganges unexpected, and there is no manner of 
doubt, if  they are properly equipped with Pilots they 
may proceed immediately up the river and that when the 
Tide of Flood sets in, their Shipping may even pass 
Fort William in its present State without much Risk or 
damage, particularly if their Troops are landed below 
the Town, and a brisk attempt practised against the 
Fort itself,^
1
Apart from this scheme, Chevalier outlined a less ambitious 
strategy which involved the despatch of 1 ,500 Frenchmen and 1,000 
Caffres from the Ile de France to attack the Company's settlements 
in Bengal, In both cases Chevalier stressed the need for a French 
leader familiar with the intricacies of Bengal politics and above 
all the Indian languages, 'Plan d 'attaque dans l 'Inde , en cas 
d'une guerre offensive1, 15 March 1769, Françaises Nouvelles 
Acquisitions, vol#9366, p p ,10-24* Further plans are included in 
Chevalier's despatch to the Ministry of Marine, 6 January 1771, 
pp .77-118; 'Mémoires et reflexions sur l 'etat  present du 
Royaume de Bengale et les moyens d'operer une revolution',
25 April 1772, pp .118-37; and Chevalier's despatch to de Boynes, 
28 February 1773, p p .138-49«
2
Bengal Secret Proceedings. 30 May 1769,
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Many of the Councillors must have anxiously recalled 
the capture and sack of Calcutta in 1756 by Siraj-ud-Daula's 
forces, who were greatly assisted by a French artillery company. 
They must also have recalled the difficult siege of Chandernagore 
in March 1757, when Clive was forced to call on Admiral Watson to 
bombard Fort d'Orleans from the river«1 Without the assistance
2
of the navy and the King’ s troops, many, including Sir Eyre Coote, 
felt that the French would have withstood the siege. After these 
transactions the French continued to be a thorn in the side of 
the British until de Lauriston's capture in 1761« Such fears, 
derived as they were from a decade of bitter fighting, were 
exacerbated by news of the arrival of considerable reinforcements 
at the French Islands and the precariousness of the Company's
3
balance of power in the north and north-west of Bengal. The
1
These important military transactions in Bengal are dealt with in 
Michael Edwardes, The Battle of Plassey and the Conquest of Bengal 
(London, 1963), S .C . H ill , Three Frenchmen in Bengal (London, 1903) 
and Eugene Guenin, 'Chute de Chandernagore et Perte du Bengale*, 
in the Revue de l'Histoire des Colonies Françaises, v o l .2 (1914 ;, 
pp«291-352. J
2
Sir Eyre Coote's opinion is given in the report of the Committee 
of the House of Commons appointed to enquire into the nature, state 
and condition of the East India Company and of the British affairs 
in the East Indies. Coote also stated that losses were greater at 
the siege of Chandernagore, when the Company's forces were of course 
acting against European troops, than at the more famous and spect­
acular battle of Plassey. The report, dated 26 May 1772, is in­
cluded in vol.4 of the Reports from Committees of the House of 
Commons.
3
Letter from Brigadier General Richard Smith to the Select Commit­
tee, sent 14 June 1769, Bengal Select Proceedings, 20 June 1769.
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Marathas were once more a disruptive and menacing force in the 
north-west, and the French might easily upset the game which the 
British had played so successfully with the Nawabs of Bengal and 
Oudh. fTo avoid a blow levelled against the very Root of the 
Honble Company’ s power in Asia, and which one day or other might 
even affect the British Constitution itse lf ’ , the Council chose 
to demolish the ditch.
i i i ,  THE REACTION IN EUROPE 1769-1771
However, statesmen and diplomats in Europe were less 
inclined to view the incident in such dramatic terms. Viscount 
Weymouth, the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, 
first received news about the ditch incident in December 1769 
when Anglo-French relations were in a perilous state largely as 
a result of the recent annexation of Corsica by the French. On
19 December he instructed Harcourt, the British ambassador in 
Paris, to lay the entire circumstances of the ditch affair before 
the due de Choiseul ’ in full Confidence that He will disavow the 
Fact and give an Order for erasing any Fortifications which may 
have been erected at Chandernagore contrary to Treaty’ . 1 Weymouth 
agreed with the Fort William Council that the ditch, if it were 
of the nature and specifications the Council alleged, would be a
Weymouth to Harcourt, 19 December 1769, S .P . 78 /279 , p .206#
1
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flagrant breach of the eleventh article. And he added that ’ to
support or not to disavow a direct Infraction of Treaty would be
so little short of a Declaration of War that We will not suppose
1
there can be Hesitation on this Head1.
On 26 December Harcourt told Choiseul that his govern­
ment
had received undoubted Intelligence, that the French 
had not only begun to erect Fortifications at Chander- 
nagore, but that they were actually going on with 
their Works, notwithstanding the strongest Remonstrances 
had been made to such Proceedings, on the Part of the 
English East India Company. ^
In turn Choiseul vigorously denied that any such orders had been
sent and evinced considerable surprise that there could be any
/  /  /
fortifications in Bengal, ’ car il  est constate qu’ il  n ’ a ete 
ordonne  aucune somme d’ argent pour des fortifications dans ce 
comptoir et de plus qu’ il  n ’ existe ni troupes ni artillerie dans
Weymouth to Harcourt, 19 December 1769, S ,P . 78/279, p*207. 
Weymouth's suspicions about French activity in India were strength­
ened by Harcourt’ s intelligence that some 900 soldiers were being 
sent to the H e  de France, ’From the large and frequent Reinforce­
ments that have, within these few years, been sent to Mauritius, and 
from the great Attention which the French Ministry have lately paid 
to that Island, ever since the Dissolution of their India Company,
1 am inclined to think, that, whenever we have the Misfortune to 
see a new war rekindled between the two Nations, the first and most 
vigorous Efforts of this Country will be made in India’ . Harcourt 
to Weymouth, 13 December 1769, S .P . 78/279, p#202-3.
2
Harcourt to Weymouth, 26 December 1769, S .P . 78/279, p«222. It is 
significant in the light of the communications time-lag and the 
difficulties in controlling the man on the spot that this exchange, 
occurring almost six months after the demolition of the ditch, 
revealed no knowledge of that event.
Ill
le Bengale. Certainement sans ces deux moyens de deffense, des
V , i
fortifications seroient asses inutiles’ . While conceding that 
he knew of a ditch to carry off surplus waters which Chevalier 
was supervising, Choiseul remained throughout sceptical of British 
claims that this was a defence work. Instead he protested about 
the East India Company's numerous violations of French trading 
privileges and raised the very same objections which Chevalier 
had made to the Calcutta Council's decision to demolish the 
ditch.^
On 5 January 1770 the French ambassador in London, 
Chatelet, suggested that the commissioners who had been sent to 
India by the Court of Directors in October 1769 to reform the
3
Company's administration there, be authorised to terminate with 
de Lauriston at Pondicherry the many disputes that had arisen 
between the English and the French in Bengal# The French govern­
ment desired a general settlement of outstanding commercial 
disputes in Bengal in accordance with the stipulations of the 
peace treaty. 'Sa  Mte. a p en se  que ce mo yen etoit en effet, le
1
Choiseul to Harcourt, 28 December 1769, S .P . 78 /279, p#230»
2
The main objections were, of course, that neither orders nor funds 
had been sent to build a fortification; that the French had no 
troops or artillery in Bengal; and that the English, who were 
situated only twenty miles away, waited eighteen months before 
denouncing the ditch#
3
The details surrounding the appointment of the commission are 
discussed in chapter 5 , pp#209-11*
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plus propre à faire cesser les plaintes m u l t i p l i e r s , .et  \  
établir d ’ après les stipulations du dernier Traite* de Paix, des 
Regies qui puissent maintenir l ’union entre les deux n a t io n s ... ’ 1 
This was the first occasion on which the French claimed officially 
the right to a freedom of trade and their insistence on its 
application to individual private merchants resulted from the 
suspension of the ’ exclusif' in the preceding year.
Later, in March, Chatelet passed on to the British 
ministry a long list of grievances which the French alleged had 
been inflicted upon them in Bengal by the Company, Again the
1
Copie de la lettre de Mr le Duc de Praslin a Mr le Duc de Choiseul 
du 19 février, 1770, SMP. 78/280, p .117«
An interesting mémoire in the Asie series suggests the likely 
views of the French government on a general agreement in the East. 
The author was highly critical of the East India Company, whose 
officials and merchants, ’ revetus d'une authorite despotique, ont 
cause la perte de plus de vingt milles sujets de leurs rois, ont 
ruine une multitude de leurs compatriotes, ont fait périr plus 
d'un million d 'ind iens '. The memorialist advised a treaty between 
the two Crowns which would incorporate a partition of revenues and 
territory between the English and French in India, a treaty of 
perpetual peace to include all territories east of the Cape, an 
offensive and defensive league of the two European powers against 
the Indian princes, involving an equal division of the number of 
troops in India (5-6,000 European troops and 10,000 Sepoys), In 
fact, this was a revival of earlier schemes to de-militarise the 
eastern sphere in case of a war in Europe, and closely paralleled 
the Godeheu-Saunders Convention of 1754# See 'Projet Politique 
d ’ arrangement dans l ’ Inde entre la française et la Anglois 
avantageux aux deux Nations', 1770, Mémoires et Documents. Asie. 
voLVil, p p ,22-43, and also 'Projet d'une Ligue Offensive et 
Deffensive, entre les francois et les Anglais, au de la Cap de 
Bonne Esperance et d'un traité de partage entre les deux Nations, 
pour les Cotes Coromandel, D 'Orixa, et le Bengal’ , Janvier, 1773, 
Asie, vol,IV, p ,82 .
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French ambassador disavowed the construction of fortifications
in the province and charged that these accusations were a veil to
conceal the Company’ s numerous infringements of the treaty. He
urged that de Lauriston and the commissioners, ’ avec une entiW e
connaissance de cause’ , settle the outstanding disputes and he
required the prompt appointment of a suitable counterpart to the
French commissary*1 Weymouth, however, was reluctant to grant
these plenipotentiary powers to the commissioners* Rather he
confided to the ambassador that Admiral Sir John Lindsay, the
Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies fleet, who had sailed for
India in September 1769, had been instructed to examine closely
2
into the conduct of the Company’ s employees in Bengal* The 
French, however, were not placated*
On 13 April Weymouth informed Harcourt that the King 
had selected Colonel Monson to proceed to India to settle any 
matters of dispute with de Lauriston. It was suggested to Choiseul 
that Monson call at Port Louis and allay any fears the Company had 
about French naval and military activities at the lie de France, 
but Choiseul, peppery as ever, rejected this idea out of hand*
The matter was further complicated by Monson’ s declining the
1
Chatelet to Weymouth, 15 March 1770, S .P . 78 /280 , pp*131-6*
Chatelet included in this correspondence the commission proposed 
for Law de Lauriston* See Appendix A for a copy of this commission.
2
See chapter 5, pp*213-18*
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commission on 29 April because he was refused the command of the 
royal troops in India, and on 11 June Sir John Lindsay was 
appointed plenipotentiary to negotiate with the French governor# 
Accordingly the Fort William Council was instructed to provide 
the admiral with ’ the necessary information and assistance for the 
discussion of the points in dispute between our servants and the 
subjects of the Crown of France in India, whereby he may be enabled 
to answer the complaints of the French plenipotentiary1. 1
By June, when both governments had acquired more detail­
ed information about the circumstances of the ’ ditch a ffair ’ , 
Choiseul’ s resistance to the British demands had stiffened con­
siderably. On 27 June Choiseul submitted a substantial mémoire 
to the British ambassador in which he condemned the Calcutta 
Council’ s action as arbitrary and unjustified. He further claimed 
that the councils in India had no power to interpret the treaty 
of peace. ’ Ce conseil n ’est pas le juge des traités entre les deux 
nations. Les Rois ont t r a it /  seuls, et eux seuls doivent maintenir
les loix qu’ ils se sont imposées. Il  n ’ est pas permis aux sujets
2
de se faire justice’ . If  the Company’ s servants were given these 
powers, he feared the result would be perpetual anarchy. Choiseul
1
Court of Directors to Fort William Council, 27 June 1770, Fort 
William - India House Correspondence, vol.VI^ p#56*
2
Mémoire presented in June 1770, S .P . 78/281, p .50#
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demanded financial compensation for the damage inflicted on the 
comptoir at Chandernagore and the right to build a new ditch 
according to Chevalier’ s original plan* Discussions ensued 
during which the long-standing matter of the costs of the French 
prisoners of war was raised, but no satisfactory settlement was 
re ached.
It was during this month that Choiseul, in accord with
the stipulations of the Pacte Famille, enquired about the Spanish
attitude to the crisis. He hoped, of course, that France’ s
traditional and dynastic ally would stand by her in this crisis.
On 6 August, however, Grimaldi communicated Charles I l l 's  refusal
to assist the French in case of war,1 By September the Falkland
Islands' crisis had emerged to consume the interests of the
2
courts of London, Paris and Madrid, whereas the Chandernagore 
affair receded into the general background of Anglo-French 
suspicion and mistrust. Nevertheless, the French threat still 
remained in the East and naval and military measures and counter­
measures continued long after the Spanish disavowal of their 
expedition from Buenos Aires,
1
This date is given in J , Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland 
Islands : A Study in Legal and Diplomatic History (London. 1927), 
p ,281,
2
For the details of this crisis see Goebel, The Struggle for the 
Falkland Islands, especially chapters 6-8, and Harlow, The Founding 
of the Second British Empire. v o l ,I , p p ,22-32,
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Although Choiseul's tactics during the Chandernagore 
crisis were part of a wider strategy to reverse the terms of the 
Peace of Paris, it is abundantly clear that he was not ready for 
war in the summer of 1770. There can be no doubt that the Spanish 
refusal to support France over the affair was an important factor 
in the Foreign Minister's decision, but the notable victory of 
the Russians over the Turkish fleet in July 1770 ended any hopes 
he might still  have had for a Franco-Turkish alliance and made 
him genuinely reluctant to embroil himself in a new war with 
Britain. Moreover, his position at court was under attack from 
the now influential faction identified with Madame du Barry, and 
his involvement in the Anglo-Spanish crisis became the occasion 
for, if not the cause of, his downfall. In spite of these 
domestic upheavals, it was principally because of his moderation 
during the Falkland Islands' crisis that the Spanish were event­
ually prepared to accommodate themselves to the British demands* 
All the same most governments anticipated war throughout 1770 
and the Indian settlements were encouraged to make every prepara­
tion for it*
iv. THE NATURE OF THE CRISIS
As this crisis developed and reached its climax it was 
compounded of both Indian and European tensions. In Bengal, 
where the French particularly resented the privileged and powerful
117
position of the East India Company, there was a complicated back­
ground of disputes and disturbances between the two European 
powers. Chevalier, for one, firmly believed that the British 
were continually exploiting their special relationship with the 
Nawab to humble the Compagnie and its servants, and in vivid
terms he described the liabilities inflicted on the French trade:
/  > /
nos vaisseaux sont attaques a main armee, notre pavillon 
insulte^ sur tout le gange, déchiré par morceaux et foule 
aux pieds. Voilà les excès horribles auxquels les 
anglais ne craignent plus de se porter sous le nom du 
Nabab qu 'ils  prennent toujours pour le voile de leur 
tyrannie et de leurs violences.^
If  he acquiesced in these measures he felt the French name in
India would be degraded, and yet if he protested the trade of the
French would be ruined.
Les anglais non contents d’ etre les souverains du pays, 
de jouir de tous ses immenses revenus qui se montent a 
75 millions par an a Bengale seulement sans comprendre 
le Decan, et le C$te Coromandel voyant encore avec peine 
des nations Européenes associes a en partager le 
commerce, ils visent en consequence à leur tirer 
d'abord tous leurs privilèges et leurs franchises pour 
ensuite les accabler de tant de chaines que d'elles- 
m£mes voyant q u 'il  leur est impossible de continuer xa 
exister dans un pays ou il  ne resterait que de la honte 
et de la perte en partage, elles prennent le parti 
d 'y  renoncer et de l'abandonner tout k fait aux Anglais 
qui veulent parvenir a en jouir eux seuls et sans 
concurrent.2
1
Chevalier to duc de ChoiseUl-Praslin, 10 January 1769, Françaises 
Nouvelles Acquisitions, vol*9366, p.l#
2
Chevalier to Praslin, 10 January 1769, Françaises Nouvelles
Acquisitions. vol*9366, p#6*
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Chevalier appreciated that the Bengal revenues provided 
the British with the source of their strength in the East ('En 
effet c'est Bengale qui est le métropole, c 'est la mière nourrice, 
c'est la source des trésors, et des ressources e n f in ')1 and 
clearly realised the importance that Indian revenues might play 
in expanding the French country trade if once the British could 
be ousted from Bengal, As a consequence various stratagems 
were devised to drive the British from these provinces, or at 
the very least, seriously to disrupt their commercial and 
political influence. The most ambitious of Chevalier's plans 
advocated the sending of a force of 4,000 to 5 ,000  men to invest 
Calcutta, The French would proclaim themselves as liberators 
sent to deliver the native population from the English tyranny. 
Other schemes envisaged a smaller force of 1,000 to 1,500 French­
men, supplemented with caffre regiments from the Ile de France* 
Chevalier stressed the overriding importance of intrigue with the 
native princes as a means to divide the efforts of the Fort 
William Council* The Nawabs, he believed, would seize upon any 
opportunity to rid themselves of the British yoke, while the 
Marathas, who had only just recovered from the unmitigated disaster 
of Panipat, and the northern princes should be encouraged to drain 
the British forces from Calcutta, The Moghul Emperor, at this
1
Chevalier to Praslin, 10 January 1769, Françaises Nouvelles
Acquisitions. vol*9366, p«7* ^
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time wavering in his loyalty between the Marathas and the Company, 
figured prominently in all such plans for a widespread native 
revolution*
L 'empereur même, ce Prince du Rang duquel l 'on  abuse 
si indignement, ne prononce le nom des francois qu'avec 
respect et admiration, en même temps q u 'il  les plaint 
dé toute son âme, il les regard comme devant être les 
rédempteurs de sa captivité et sous les Princes de 
l'Indoustan font les memes voeux que lui. Je puis vous 
assurer, Monseigneur, avec toute la vérité que je dois \  
tant ce que je vous écris, q u 'il  n 'y  en a pas un seul 
d'eux q u 'il  ne soit prêt a Employer ses forces et son 
argent en notre faveur du moment qu 'ils  nous verront 
déclarer, je n'en excepte pas même ceux qui sont les 
allies des anglais*^
Choiseul was, of course, keenly interested in these 
schemes* In his efforts to re-establish French commerce and 
influence in the East he encouraged the Crown to assume the ad­
ministration of the French Islands in 1767 and to reinforce the 
detachments at Port Louis* Under the dual control of the Ministry 
of Marine and the enlightened governor, Pierre Poivre, 'the
Mascarenes experienced a genuine renaissance between the years 
2
1767 and 1778 ', so that the islands were able to support over 
one thousand French troops during 1769 and 1770#
In an exchange with Harcourt, the British ambassador, 
on 18 January 1769 Choiseul expressed his impatience with the
1
A* Toussaint, History of the Indian Ocean (London, 1966), p*158*
Chevalier to Praslin, 10 January 1769, Françaises Nouvelles
Acquisitions. vol*9366, p*6*
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clandestine support given by the British to the Corsican rebels,
and blandly stated that 'he would open a Subscription in Favour
of the People of New Y o r k ',1 meaning the troublesome Bostonians,
or so supposed the ambassador. When Harcourt, on instructions from
the Secretary of State, protested Choiseul stung the ambassador
by retorting that he would retract his support for 'the King my
Master's Refractory subjects in America,».«in favour of the
2
Prince who is now at War with our East India Company1 - a pointed 
reference to the Madras Council's embarrassments in its war with 
Hyder Ali* Such a contretemps indicates the strained relations 
between the English and the French at the end of the decade and 
the warm determination of the French to rattle their national 
enemies wherever they could#
Fearing a French invasion from the lie de France in 
conjunction with yet another native revolution, the Calcutta 
Council had become seriously alarmed by Chevalier's activities 
early in 1769# These fears were heightened by reports of the 
growing concentration of French forces at the Islands and the 
changing political situation in the north-west of Bengal. The 
Emperor, to all intents and purposes a vassal of the Company since 
his humiliating defeat at Buxar, joined with the Marathas after
1
Harcourt to Weymouth, 18 January 1769, S .P . 78/277, p#67#
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their offer to restore him to the Peacock Throne at Delhi* The 
threats posed by the resurgent Marathas and the envious and 
embittered French were also magnified by the fragmentary and 
uncertain nature of communications with Europe, Despairingly the 
Council believed that their first intimation of the outbreak of 
hostilities in Europe would be the appearance of a French expedi­
tionary force off the Balasore roads# On 1 April 1769 the Secret 
Committee of the Court of Directors despatched to the Governor 
and the Select Committee
undoubted Intelligence, that in addition to the Strength 
the French already have at their Islands and Settlements 
in the East Indies, they are now sending out a very 
large Body of Troops consisting of near Two Thousand 
Men well Officered, and that they have other Measures 
in agitation, from whence it may be apprehended they 
have Designs inconsistent with the Tranquility We wish 
to maintain in India, ^
The Select Committee was recommended 'to be most vigilantly on 
your guard, against any Designs the French may have in Contempla­
tion against Our Possessions, and to take every possible Precaut­
ion to render them ineffectual'. Such admonitions were common 
between 1768 and 1773.
When the Council was apprised of the defensive possibi­
lities of the ditch early in May 1769 it instructed Lieutenant 
Colonel Grant at Monghyr 'to hold the Troops under his Command.
1
Secret Despatch from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors 
to the President and Select Committee at Fort William, 1 April 
1769, Secret Despatches to Bengal 1756-1771#
122
in readiness to march at a moment’ s warning* and Mr* Grahame, the
resident at Burdwan, to provide 'one Battalion of the best Sepoys
under his Command’ in case the French resisted*1 As an indication
of the seriousness with which the Council viewed the crisis the
third brigade was also recalled from Allahabad, the base for the
Company’ s operations in the north against the Marathas and the 
2
Rohillas* Various other manoeuvres were made throughout May and 
June.
In this case, however, the communication lag with 
Europe worked to the advantage of the Fort William Council#
Largely freed from outside control it was able to present the 
Court of Directors and the British government with a fait accompli* 
But the Council’ s actions also entailed that an atmosphere of 
tension continued to characterise relations between the English 
and the French in Bengal long after this particular incident*
The demolition of the ditch did nothing to resolve the wider 
issues of friction and discord which carried on into the 1770’ s* 
When Sir John Lindsay arrived at Madras in August 1770 the Council
3
refused to recognise his special plenipotentiary powers# In 
March 1771 Sir Robert Harland was chosen to succeed Lindsay and
1
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2
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although empowered to treat with de Lauriston over the Chanderna-
gore affair, he was advised not ’ to take any Steps to enter into
a Discussion with Mr, Law, till  called upon by H im '.1 A year
later, on 7 April 1772, Lord Rochford, the new Secretary of State,
suggested ’ that as the french Ministry in Europe seem in a manner
to have forgot that Affair and look upon it as concluded, it is
2
by no means desireable to renew the subject in India ’ # The 
French did not forget the incident, however, and when the peace 
negotiations opened at Versailles after the American War they 
persistently demanded 'the restitution of Chandernagore with an 
acknowledgement of their right to fortify that settlement as they 
shall think f i t ' .^
Certain conditions underlying the relationship between 
the English and the French in Bengal are revealed by this 
incident. One of the most significant is that the fundamental 
suspicion and mistrust between the representatives of the two 
powers in the East were still too acute to permit a mutual 
accommodation of commercial interests. The Dutch, by contrast, 
could be accommodated to the Company's Bengal system because they
1
Additional Instructions for Sir Robert Harland with regard to 
Chandernagore, 19 March 1771, C .O . 77 /53 , p#17,
2
Rochford to Harland, 7 April 1772, Home Miscellaneous Series. 
vol#109, p#143#
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harboured no overweening political ambitions. But the French
under the guise of preserving their time-honoured rights and
privileges were busily at v/ork eroding the power of the Company,
Henceforth the French were to be treated not simply as commercial
competitors, but as political rivals too, and the spectre of a
French inspired native uprising lingered on to poison Anglo-
French relations in Bengal for the next decade. On 27 June 1770,
not long after the crisis, General Robert Barker presented a
detailed set of regulations for the defence of Calcutta against
an expected French attack,1 while Lockhart Russell was commissioned
by the Fort William Council to investigate the strength of the
French at the lie de France, After his visit Russell contended
that the lie de France, capable of producing *20 thousand men fit
to bear arms including Blacks and Whites', constituted a mortal
threat to the British in Bengal and India, He then proceeded to
expound Choiseul's 'deep laid Schemes for wresting' from the
British their possessions in the East.
The General rendezvous was Port Louis upon the Island 
of Mauritius from thence to have proceeded to Pondicherry.
The objects of Attack were Madras and Bengal. The Troops 
were to have been Commanded by a Lieutenant General from 
France., , ,The Marine was to have been commanded by the 
Chevalier de Roche Governor of the French Is lan d s ,,,.
France was to have sent 7 Ships of the Line Spain 5 or
3 in addition. Each Nation was to have sent several 
Frigates and not less than Ten Thousand as good Militia
1
These regulations are located in the Bengal Select Proceedings.
27 June 1770,
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as any in the World was to have been added to the 
Armament.», .The V/hole Armament would have consisted 
of 17 Ships of the Line 12 or 14 Frigates, besides 
Transports the Land Forces would have been nearly 
Twenty to Twenty five thousand Regular Troops besides 
the Militia from the Islands and their Country Aliys.
Was there any substance to these charges? There is 
little doubt that Frenchmen like Chevalier and de Lauriston were 
intriguing for a revival of French power in India and that they 
received ample encouragement from the ministry at Paris* Through­
out this period the French authorities corresponded with numerous 
mercenaries and agents who were a veritable hornets' nest at the 
courts of the Indian princes. Most of these condottieri-diplomats 
had originally fought under Dupleix, de Bussy and Lally against 
the English in the Seven Years1 War, and after the peace dispersed 
themselves all over the sub-continent, Renee Madec, to take one, 
arrived in India during the time of Dupleix and fought in the 
Carnatic wars, after which he joined the Nawab of Oudh's forces 
at the battle of Buxar, Later he took service with the Rohillas 
and Jats and in 1772 entered the army of Shah Alam I I , Until his 
departure for France in 1777 he acted as an intermediary in 
Chevalier's various schemes to form an alliance with the Moghul
1
Report of Captain Lockhart Russell to the Court of Directors of 
the East India Company, 24 July 1772, Home Miscellaneous Series« 
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Emperor,1 The activities of Madec and Gentil at the durbars of
the northern princes, which are described in detail in Professor
Sen’ s study, were paralleled in the South by the missions of
Saint Lubin and Montigny to the Marathas, and Modave to
2
Hyderabad,
It is , I think, also certain that if  Chevalier had been 
able to complete the notorious ditch, and if  he had received 
assistance from Pondicherry, the Ile de France, or metropolitan 
France, the French would have greatly enhanced their military 
position in Bengal, Almost certainly they could have withstood 
a long siege, held up large British forces and incited troubles 
along the exposed north-western frontier. But Choiseul's govern­
ment was not yet determined on a global war of revenge so that 
Frenchmen in India had to wait another ten years before a sub­
stantial expeditionary force was despatched to India,
Despite the protests and posturings of European govern­
ments, the decisive action in this crisis was taken in India* 
Perhaps the most significant fact revealed by the ditch incident
1
The fascinating details of Madec,'s career and his correspondence 
with Chevalier are located in 'Memoire de Mons Madec, Nabob dans 
l'Empire du Mogol, commandant d'un parti français au Service de 
l'Empereur', Françaises Nouvelles Acquisitions, vol*9368, pp ,1-127#
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See S .P . Sen, The French in India, particularly chapters 5,6 and 7 
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was the enormous power held by the authorities at the periphery, 
largely unhampered by external control. Although this situation 
was to change in the next few years, the initiatives in future 
crises were still to be taken in India. The widening rift in 
Anglo-French relations in Europe predisposed European governments 
to support their nationals in India; European tensions also 
inclined the councils to take the French threat more seriously. 
But it was after all a local and immediate threat to their self- 
interest, profits and security that steeled them into acting.
This sequence of French challenge, whether imaginary or real, 
and British response was to repeat itself many times before the 
century had ebbed and the British had established themselves as 
the paramount power in India. Such fears and reactions were not 
derived from a belief in the providential destiny of British rule 
in India, or from a belief in the inexorability of territorial 
expansion, but from the salutary realisation that the basis of 
British power in the East was acutely vulnerable to native 
revolution, particularly when sponsored by a rival European 
power, A sense of the transience and the precariousness of their 
rule was only gradually being supplanted by a mood of greater 
confidence and assurance. For the most part a garrison mentality 
characterised the psychology of the British outposts in India 
during this period.
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y, THE FRENCH UNDER SIEGE: THE WORKING OUT OF BRITISH 
POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL SUPREMACY 1770-1776
The Chandernagore ditch incident, which was protracted 
by Chevalier's protests well into 1772, acted as a climacteric 
in Anglo-French relations in Bengal* The British became in­
creasingly distrustful of French intentions both in India and 
Europe after 1769* News of the successful conclusion of the 
Falkland Islands' crisis did not reach Fort William until 
mid-1771 with the result that war was anticipated during most of 
1770 and 1771# Apart from its concern with a French invasion 
from the Islands, the Council also sought to eliminate the 
threat from French agents provocateurs and mercenaries in the 
'mofussil*. On 29 October 1770 the Council was directed by the 
Court of Directors 'to suffer no Persons of any Nations whatso­
ever to trespass upon the rights and Dominion of the Country, of 
which we declare ourselves the guardians and Conservators1. 1 The 
attempts to regulate and supervise the movements of French 
merchants by the Council's agents provided the occasion for a 
great variety of disputes during the next five years. While the 
details of this skirmishing are seemingly trivial, they are 
presented here as illustrations of the mounting friction and
1
Extract of a General Letter to Bengal, 29 October 1770, French 
in India* vol*IY#
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suspicion between the two European powers in Bengal#
Chevalier complained on 13 May 1771 of the extortionate 
duties imposed on cloths purchased by the French at Balasore. He 
further protested on 20 May that the Company was using the Nawab’ s 
authority to vex and injure the French. For the Nawab had 
objected to the action of the French in obtaining land at 
Chandelah (in eastern Bengal) as a substitute for their factory 
at Jugdea, which, they claimed, ’was on the Eve of being led into 
the waters of the sea’ /  The Calcutta Council refused to inter­
cede with the Nawab, disclaiming any special rights or ’ power
2
over the Country Government*. In this case it does appear that 
the Nawab acted independently of the Council ’ in return for the 
indignity offered to him’ .
In July of that year, Chevalier claimed the right to 
deal with the Compagnie’ s debtors ’ according to the custom of 
the Country’ , and in a series of letters to the Fort William 
Council accused the Company’ s servants at ’Keepoy, Midnapour, 
Carricola and in Beelbook’ of thwarting French attempts to recover 
their debts. His legalistic defence of French rights became
1
Bengal Secret Proceedings. 23 May 1771.
2
Fort William Council to Chevalier, 9 May 1771, Bengal Secret 
Proceedings.
3
Council to Lindsay, 25 May 1771, Bengal Secret Proceedings,
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something of a stock manoeuvre. He appealed to the privileges
’ accorded to the French in their Firmauns and Perwannahs to
pursue their Debtors, to seize and oblige them to pay without the
Government having the power to oppose i t 1. 1 A speedy resolution
of the Chandelah dispute was also insisted upon by the French,
and though the Nawab eventually agreed to provide an exchange
for the factory at Jugdea, he demanded that the French select a
2
site closer to the original factory. This, however, proved an 
unsatisfactory arrangement, and the issue remained unsettled 
until after the American War.
On 11 December the commanding officer at Budge Budge, 
a fort on the Hooghly some fifteen miles below Calcutta, ordered 
that a French sloop be fired at after it refused to move from its 
mooring position 'immediately before1 the fortifications.
Earlier, in November, the Bengal Council had referred the question 
of the examination of French ships to the newly arrived Sir Robert 
Harland, the successor to Lindsay as naval Commander-in-Chief and 
special plenipotentiary to settle disputes with the French# The 
Council asked him 'how far we could have a right to send on board 
of and examine any foreign, particularly French, ships which
1
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2
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should pass by our forts and b a t t e r ie s .. . '1 The Councillors 
feared that a relaxation of the practice might enable the French 
to bring in 'any number of troops without our being able to 
detect them'.
By contrast, the French claimed the right to anchor
their vessels in any part of the river, even below the batteries
at Budge Budge, and strenuously resisted the efforts of the
Company's officials to board and search their vessels. Harland's
considered opinion was that the Council had no'right to stop or
to require the ships of France or any other nation to give an
account of themselves in passing our forts or batteries' since
the 'navigation of the Ganges was as free to them as to us, and
that until troops were actually landed it could not be said that
2
there was any breach of the treaty in that respect'. An officer 
of the Crown was attempting to restrain the Council from actions 
which might further provoke the French and the other companies.
But the Council was dissatisfied with the admiral's answer and 
informed the Court of Directors of the dangerous consequences
1
Secret letter from Fort William to the Court of Directors,
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which would arise ’ if  the French have the right of anchoring
their vessels in what part of the river they may think proper'.
By this means the French would acquire 'a  perfect knowledge of
the nature of' the fortifications at Budge Budge.
If  also their ships are to pass without any inquiry 
or hindrance on our part and the opinion of Admiral 
Harland is literally to be followed, the consequence 
must be that we can have no power of opposing a French 
fleet until it has passed all our forts and batteries, 
and we should thereby lose the advantage which the 
dangerous navigation of the river gives us, as well 
as the benefit expected from our fortifications in 
annoying and stopping an enemy in his passage up to 
Calcutta. 1
To preserve its possessions from the twin perils of insurrection 
and invasion was the basic concern of the Fort William Council, 
and it would brook no interference from royal officials in this 
matter.
In the dispute between Chambon and Cotes, which flared 
up in March 1772, Chevalier formulated the classic arguments he 
was to employ on this and subsequent occasions to try and establish 
French immunity from English control. The French agents at 
Keerpoye, Chambon and Delozier, complained of the protection 
afforded by the English agents to the native merchants and agents 
indebted to the French. Chevalier also claimed that the country 
court was gin agency manipulated by the Company’ s resident, Cotes,
1
Secret letter from Fort William to the Court of Directors,
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against the French and their native servants. The French agents 
had advised Chevalier 'that under the name of the Raja of Burdewan 
there has been lately erected a Tribunal at the head of which 
there is a sort of Peon dressed up to be Judge without appeal in 
all the Affairs of our N a t io n ',1 Attacking all such spurious 
innovations, Chevalier appealed to privileges sanctioned by usage 
and custom and claimed 'in  all times the different Nations have 
enjoyed the right of prosecuting their Debtors and of putting 
Peons upon them and even of imprisoning them in their own Factor­
ie s ',  The French stated their conviction that 'the veil is long 
ago fallen off, that we acknowledge no Nabob of Bengal, no 
particular Government, or Fouzdar, but in short the English
Nation ', and they were afraid lest the Company's regime degenerate
2
into a rapacious tyranny,
Chevalier then proceeded to describe the many and 
flourishing rights the French enjoyed 'under the Moorish govern­
ment* before the ascendancy of the English Company, It was truly 
a golden age*
We sent our Money into the Aurungs with security* It was 
distributed among the Pykars, Dulolls and Weavers who 
gave us a good Account of it* They did not oppose our 
pursuing Dulol's Debtors of bad Credit nor our forcing
1
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them to pay them. They did not prevent the V/eavers 
from furnishing Cloths to our Gomastahs and Agents#.**
They did not take from us by a despotic Authority 
our Silk V/inders at Cossambuzar. • #• *
All abuses of dustuck privileges, all extortionate duties and
regulations governing the export of bullion were innovations
imposed on the French by the Company. Once the French flag was
respected by the Nawab's government - fIt is only latterly that
it has been seen to be treated with the utmost indignity - torn
to pieces and trampled underfoot*.
The Council, of course, repudiated these claims and
defended the Company's recently acquired powers as beneficial to
all the foreign companies trading in Bengal. The revolutions
that unseated Siraj-ud-Daula and Mir Kasim, it assured the French,
had enabled the other companies 'under our protection to carry on
their commerce in peace and Security unencumbered with high
2
expenses and Military Establishments'* Historically at least, 
the French claims were exaggerated. Surman's embassy to the 
Emperor Farrukhsiyar in 1717 had secured for the East India 
Company in Bengal a general exemption from customs duties in return 
for an annual sum of 3,000 rupees, and after this concession the
1
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French were unable to compete effectively with the Company's 
trade.1 Their somewhat idealised portrait of early eighteenth 
century trade in Bengal distorted both the conditions of commerce 
as well as the mildness of the Nawab's regime.
One of the results of the disastrous famine which
ravaged Bengal during 1770 was a growing dissatisfaction with the
revenue administration of the Naib Diwan. Muhammad Reza Khan.
On 28 August 1771 the Court of Directors decided that the Company's
servants in Bengal should 'stand forth as Duan' and take upon
2
themselves 'the entire care and management of the revenues'.
On receipt of these instructions in May 1772, the Fort William 
Council abolished the office of the Naib Diwan. while in a general 
proclamation the Council announced its determination to bring the 
territorial revenues under the direct management of its own 
servants. These important changes involved the Company more 
deeply in the civil and criminal jurisdiction of Bengal together 
with the administration of the revenue collection. And from this 
time on disputes involving the question of legal rights became as 
prolific as the earlier trading disputes with the French.
It was at this time that an incident occurred at
1
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Courygong in northern Bengal, where Speke, a junior official of 
the Company, intercepted some boats that had been hired by a 
French merchant.1 Finally the matter was referred to the 
Fouzdari Adalat. the country court of justice, which Chevalier 
was later to disparage as a ’ form of inquisitorial control over 
our book keeping, and which thereby would have been at the Dis­
cretion and Mercy of the first Blackman which you might think fit
2
to clothe with Authority and choose for the Judge between Nations’ .
The Calcutta Council further enraged the French by 
supporting the action of the Fouzdar of Hooghly in detaining some 
French boats until Chevalier paid the rents of the land occupied 
by the French merchants at Chandernagore, Usually the Fouzdar, 
who was the zemindar of the lands adjoining Chandernagore, acted 
on the instructions received from the English resident at Hooghly, 
William Lushington, though the Bengal Council was at pains to deny 
the existence of any such relationship» On occasions, however, the 
Fouzdar acted independently of the English as in this case when 
he released the French boats 'without having previously obtained 
the Payment of the Demands of Government',
1
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Tho spate of disputes with the French at Chandernagore
and throughout the outlying districts forced the Council to define
more precisely the powers it now exercised as Naib Diwan# In
January 1773 the Council raised the 'General Point' of 'how far
in quality of Dewan our Government is entitled to Control the
Commercial operations of the foreign Companies in the Internal
parts of the C o u n t r y ' A f t e r  careful consideration, the Board
decided that the French 'have no Right by treaty to send
European Agents or appoint Residents to any part of the three
Provinces exclusive of the Factories specified in the article1
of the peace treaty 'without Authority from the Government of the
Country unless such a priviledge (sic) should have been specially
2
granted them by Firmauns from the Court of Delhi'* Therefore, 
all relations with the foreign companies should be exercised 
'through the channel of the Nazim and his Ministers in conformity 
to the Company orders'.
Such general powers of supervision were almost immediat­
ely challenged by the French, The Council complained to Chevalier 
on 8 April 1773 of 'the independant (sic) Authority claimed and 
exercised by your European Agents#*, against the Authorized Courts
1
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of Justice1. 1 In his reply of 6 May, Chevalier justified the
French refusal 'to acknowledge the authority of the Courts of
Justice* by asserting that ’ contrary to our rights and privi-
ledges (sic) as well as to custom' the English had employed the
country courts ’ for taking cognizance of our affairs, for exam-
2
ining our books and accounts’ . To emphasise his point he
declared the French would never acknowledge those 
Tribunals# That they knew of no Jurisdiction or Power 
to tyrannise or impose Laws on the French Nation in 
Bengal or elsewhere, that France was, and would remain 
independent, in every quarter of the Globe, That she 
would reject all Innovations contrary to her liberties, 
and to the Emperor's Phirmaunds, and That, being 
Independent, as well as the English, in Bengal, her 
Subjects did not reside there under their protection, 
but under that of their own Sovereign, and only Master, 
and that in respect of their Jurisdiction to arrest the 
Natives in their Debt, and to take cognizance of 
Matters in their own Settlements, he said they had 
ever done it , as we likewise had, by virtue of Grants 
and Sunnuds,*
The Board replied on 21 June to these claims, which, 
it believed, could only contribute to ’ Anarchy and Confusion’ * 
It countered the French propositions by stressing that ’ the
1
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English East India Company have at all times possessed greater 
Priviledges (sic) than the French or any other Commercial People 
in Bengal: yet even they had no such Right as you Assert1. 1 The 
Board insisted that the firmans cited by the French failed to 
establish their claims since the appeal to custom or prescription 
was now irrelevant.
Chevalier's next move was to state as precisely as 
possible the chief rights he believed his countrymen entitled to 
in Bengal. In essentials the French insisted upon a complete 
and unimpeded freedom to trade, and by this Chevalier meant a 
number of specific conditions and rights - the right to establish 
factories and to send agents wherever the French chose 'throughout 
the Provinces'; a complete immunity for 'their European Resi­
dents, Agents and Servants from the Jurisdiction of the Country 
Courts of Justice ', together with their own jurisdiction over 
French nationals and natives 'under their employment or protect­
io n '; an exemption from all duties after the payment of 2^% 
ad valorem on 'Articles of Commerce only '; 'the privilege of 
issuing Dustucks' to cover their merchandise from 'a ll  Duties and 
Impediments'; a free and uninterrupted trade in 'Cloth, Sugar, 
Wax, Raw Silk , S a lt ', Saltpetre and Opium; 'a  free Navigation
1
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of the Ganges’ so that their boats would not be stopped and 
searched; ’ a Privilege of anchoring their Vessels in any Part of 
the Ganges between Pipley and Houghley'; and ’ the Assistance of 
Government in the recovery of their just debts '*1
Meanwhile the British were taking up a definite posi­
tion* A dispute involving Hastings' personal friend and prote'ge'", 
Richard Barwell, provided the Council with the opportunity to 
answer the French pretensions. In October 1773, Desgranges, the 
French chief at Dacca, protested against Barwell's action in
forcing the French to pay duties at Dacca ' contre les usages 
✓ 2
etablies depuis un terme immemorial'. The French could hardly 
have been surprised when the Council endorsed the action of its 
agent at Dacca and justified this power in terms of 'the first 
principles of Government, which authorise us the representatives 
of the English East India Company, the Dewan of these Provinces', 
to require a 'literal Obedience* to ordinances and general
3
regulations* The Council, in a provocative gesture, invited the 
French to send it their authorities - 'formal and authentic 
Sunnuds, Perwannahs or other Charters' - for inspection*
1
From 'Reports by Francis Russell Esq* Solicitor to the Rt* Hon* 
The Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India on the Claims 
of the French, Dutch and Danes to exclusive Privileges in the 
East In d ies ', French in India . vol,VI, pp#3-5#
2
Letter from Desgranges, 12 October 1773, Fort William Revenue 
Consultations (19 October 1773), French in India« vo l.V II, p*142*
3
Fort William Council to Chevalier, 26 November 1773, French in 
India« vol»VII, pp .156-7#
141
Barwell was involved in yet another dispute at Dacca 
towards the end of October. Desgranges alleged that a .iemitdar 
of his factory, whose son had been 'cruelly beaten by an unknown 
Native ', turned on the offender 'with a little Rattan', This 
man, a bricklayer in the service of Barwell, took out a summons 
for the .iemitdar's arrest# V/hen 'Six  Hircarrahs with an Order 
from Mr, Barwell,,,appeared at the Gate of our Factory',
Desgranges wrote, 'they attempted to enter by force in order to 
sieze (sic) our Jemidar'*1 Madame Desgranges valiantly inter­
posed and refused to surrender the native whereupon the hircarrahs 
retired and reported to Barwell. 'Shortly a fter ', according to 
Desgranges, 'four Sepoys and a Havildar appeared at the Gate of
our Factory Armed with Musquets and Bayonets, ready to Seize the
2
Jemidar, but without any order in Writing'« Desgranges then 
deputed the aged Renault de Saint-Germain to complain to Barwell 
of this 'extreme outrage', and to his protests Barwell explained 
that 'there were now two Courts Established - The one called 
Fouzdarry - the other Dewanny, where every Native was obliged to 
appear at the first Summons he received in the Bengal Language', 
and that the .iemitdar must immediately be delivered up by the
1
Desgrange's letter to Chevalier, 10 November 1773, French in 
India . v o l ,V II , p ,169.
2
French in India . v o l,V II, p p ,171-2,
French in India. v o l,V II, p ,175 .
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French, Eventually this unfortunate native was arrested, tried 
and punished, but to compound error with insult the French 
asserted that
on the 21 November he was led with great Ceremony, and 
under an Escort of fifty armed Sepoys thro1 all the 
Streets of the Town, in which he was whipt at different 
Places, and during the continuation of this dreadful 
Ceremony, a Man proclaimed with a loud Voice, that 
every Person who should enter into Disputes with the 
People attached to the Service of the English Company, 
and should take Advantage of the Protection of the 
French Nation, should receive the like treatment,1
Naturally Barwell explained his action to the Fort 
William Council as a defence of the civil order against unwarrant­
ed and 'improper1 encroachments on the part of the French, After 
an involved discussion of the dispute on 21 December 1773, the 
Council issued more specific instructions to Barwell, The 
practice of issuing summonses from the Fouzdari Adalat was to be 
discontinued, and 'Sepoys, Peons or Burgundasses' were not to be 
employed 'in  executing the Summonses', Barwell was also cautioned 
'not to publish any proclamations,, .which may in any Shape affect 
our Intercourse with Foreign Nations', He was to avoid in future 
'every Subject which may cause disputes with the Foreign Nations, 
leaving them suspended untill you have informed us of the Nature
1
Chevalier to the Bengal Council, 9 February 1774, Bengal Secret 
Proceedings« 14 February 1774,
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of such disputes** * 11
Chevalier had long claimed the authority of the firmans
and sunnuds. originally conferred on the Compagnie des Indes by
the Nawabs of Bengal and the Moghuls, to support his opposition
to the 'innovations1 of the East India Company, and on 9 December
2
1773 he forwarded copies of them to the Fort William Council*
The Board informed Chevalier of its reception of the copies on 
21 January 1774, but it requested permission from the Chandernagore 
Council 'to examine and scrutinise the originals'. To this 
proposal the French agreed and on 9 May John Stewart and a 
Persian translator, William Redfearn, were deputed to inspect the 
originals* In their report of 22 May, Stewart and Redfearn
1
Fort William Council to Barwell, 21 December 1773, French in 
India . vol*VII, pp*253-5* This affair was once again raised by 
Chevalier during February 1774; he insisted that Barwell's 
proclamation should be repealed and that Barwell should be re­
called from Dacca* Eventually the French themselves decided to 
abandon their factory at Dacca on 25 March 1774. See Bengal 
Secret Proceedings. 7, 14 and 17 February, 18 April 1774, and 
French in India. v o l .V II , pp*457-9*
2
Chevalier to Calcutta, 9 December 1773, French in India . vol,IV , 
p*3* The following sunnuds were transcribed by the French and 
sent to Calcutta: sunnud under the seal of Nabob Sharaf-ud-din 
Husain; sunnud under the seal of Sayyid Izzat Khan; perwannah 
from Mirza Kershabit; perwannah under the seal of Nabob Millumen- 
ul-Mulk, Sujah-ul-Dowlah, Sujah-ul-Din, Mahomed Khan, Bahadur 
Asad Jang; sunnud under Ibrahim Khan and Kifayat Khan; dustuck 
under Mahomed Khan; sunnud under Nabob Muhammed Askar; firman 
under the seal of the Emperor Aurangzebe; and firman granted 
under the seal of the Emperor Farrukhsiyar* See French in India. 
vol*IV, pp#4-44*
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concluded that 'the papers appeared to us as far as we can rely 
upon our own Judgement and that of the Mounshees to carry every 
mark of being Genuine and Original as far as is expressed in the 
Titles to them. How far they may be valid in substance and 
effect is in Judgement with y o u '.1 The Board did not immediately 
take up this question, and when it did its views were somewhat 
affected by intervening disputes.
In March 1775 Chevalier laid claim to participate with
the East India Company 'and the other European nations in the
saltpetre and ophium trade'. Since the acquisition of the diwani
the Company's servants had virtually monopolised the trade in
these two profitable commodities at Patna, and this arrangement
was systematised by Hastings' reforms of 1773. As a placatory
gesture, the French were conceded 18,000 maunds of saltpetre and
2
100 chests of opium annually. The Dutch, however, were treated 
much more liberally in the matter of opium contracts.
The Fort William Council replied in full to the issues 
raised by the French firmans on 16 June. First, it denied the 
right claimed by the French to establish new factories, or to
1
Bengal Secret Proceedings, 3 June 1774, French in India, vol.IV , 
p. 84.
2
Bengal Secret Proceedings. 8 May 1775. For a discussion of the 
opium policy of the Company see P .J . Marshall, The Impeachment of 
Warren Hastings (Oxford, 1965), pp .166-68,
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possess any land in the provinces apart from 'places specifically 
restored to the late French Company under the 11th Article of the 
Treaty of 1763'- The gomastahs and agents of the French were 
responsible to the 'Government and Courts of Ju stice ', while the 
trade they were granted in saltpetre and opium was no more than 
an 'indulgence'# Finally, the Council was unanimous that it 
'could not admit the validity of their Firmaund and sunnuds to 
entitle them to any further rights or privileges than those which 
they derived and actually possessed' from the English in 1749*1
The last important incident to occur before the outbreak 
of the American War involved the firing on French ships at Budge 
Budge on 4 August 1776, Three French ships 'attempted to pass our 
Forts without answering the Enquiries which we had ordered to be
made concerning their Forces, Burthen, Number of Men, and
2
Destination'# Although de Lauriston supported the stand taken 
by Chevalier, and claimed that 'the Ganges is a River whose
3
Navigation is free to all Nations established in In d ia ', his 
protests were to no avail# Less than two years later, all the 
French factories in Bengal were captured by the Company's forces#
1
Fort William Council to Chevalier, 16 June 1775, French in India« 
vo l.V I, pp#156-8#
2
Fort William Council to Chevalier, 7 August 1776, French in 
India . vol#V II , p#13#
3
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During the 1770's the French in Bengal under the able 
and vigorous leadership of Chevalier sustained an involved and 
bitter diplomatic struggle to ascertain and safeguard their cust­
omary rights. In this contest the French displayed many of the 
characteristics of a beleaguered minority, notably a vivid sense 
of oppression and acute vulnerability, and they appealed to a 
past golden age when their privileges were securely established. 
Moreover, they attributed to their views a certain historical 
authenticity, a claim which, in fact, was quite unfounded. Where­
as the French laid claim to ancient and extensive liberties, 
reminiscent in some ways of the conservative appeals of the common 
lawyers to Magna Carta and the ancient Anglo-Saxon constitution 
in the early seventeenth century, their freedoms were whittled 
away by the Company Diwan. After the granting of the diwani to 
the Company, the Fort William Council was anxious to regulate 
relations with the foreign companies through the offices of the 
Naib Diwan and the Fouzdar of Hooghly. In most cases, as we have 
seen, the Naib Diwan and the Fouzdar complied with the requests 
made by the Company's residents at the durbar of the Nawab and at 
Hooghly, but these native officials could, and on occasions did, 
assert their independence to the embarrassed consternation of the 
Calcutta authorities. V/hen the Court of Directors decided that 
their servants should 'stand forth as Duan1 in 1771» the fiction 
of the Nawab's government was exposed with the result that French
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resistance hardened# 'Who is this Nazim?’ , de Lauriston con­
jectured in 1776, and answered# ’ It is a Native of the Country- 
placed by yourselves, who is without Forces who has no others 
than those which you are pleased to lend him, whom you can kick 
down whenever you please from the high Rank to which you have 
raised him*«1 Chevalier refused to reoagnise the native courts 
and was opposed to all efforts to settle disputes there# The 
Company’ s officials were nq less obdurate in their refusal to 
concede to individual Frenoh merchants those rights which the 
Compagnie claimed to have enjoyed before its suspension in 1770#
In retrospect, then, the conflict of the 1760’ s and the 1770’ s 
appears as a desperate rear-guard action on the part of the 
French to retain the vestiges of their national self-respect#
Their intransigence, however, remained and after the American War 
they attempted to induce the Company to recognise their special 
legal and trading rights#
The inveterate opponents of the French on the Calcutta 
Council were opposed to surrendering any concessions to Chevalier 
because they were firmly convinced that any benefit to French 
trade would inevitably be used to subvert the Company’ s own trade 
and influence. The Chandernagore ditch affair appeared to confirm 
their fears# Other members of the Council distinguished between
1
Law de Lauriston to the Bengal Council, 6 May 1776, French in 
India. vo l.V I, p«94#
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simple trading concessions which would in no way endanger the 
Company's position, and rights such as the exportation of salt­
petre, an essential commodity in the manufacture of gunpowder, 
which would provide the French with the sinews of war. Neverthe­
less, most Councillors were convinced that sooner or later the 
French would attempt to re-establish their influence and trade, 
and when war seemed imminent in Europe, as it did throughout 1769 
and 1770, they favoured a general tightening of controls over the 
French. The visiting and searching of French ships at Budge 
Budge, for example, was intended as much to prevent the French 
smuggling arms and men into the provinces as to limit the import 
of salt, while the Council's refusal to permit the French to 
establish factories and agents indiscriminately throughout Bengal 
was prompted more by considerations of defence than by the profit 
motive. By the mid-1770 's the Council was unanimous 'that it is 
no longer in our power to temporize, or veil the real Power of 
this Government by the Assumed Authority of the N abob '.1 In the 
next phase of Anglo-French friction in Bengal, which succeeded 
the return of the French possessions in 1785, the Company came 
close to formulating a doctrine of sovereignty for its power in 
the are a.
1
Secret letter from Bengal, 15 March 1774, French in India« 
vol#iy, p*26.
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CHAPTER 4: ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS IN BENGAL 1785-1793
i , WAR AND PEACE: THE AFTERMATH OF THE AMERICAN WAR
Chandemagore was captured without any great difficulty 
in July 1778, but the French capital in India withheld a siege for 
over two months before capitulating on 18 October- For the 
greater part of the American War the French government was so 
absorbed in the American struggle that it was unable to despatch 
an expeditionary force to India until December 1781, by which time 
the imposing coalition of Hyder Ali, the Nizam, and the Marathas, 
which had been formed to destroy the British power, had dissolved.1 
Suffren’ s squadron, arriving at the Cape in June 1781, contested 
five actions with the East Indian fleet under Admiral Sir Edward 
Hughes. In August 1782 Suffren also succeeded in capturing 
Trincomalee from the English after they had taken it from the 
Dutch- The Madras army was hard pressed before Cuddalore by the 
combined forces of Tipu Sultan and Bussy, newly arrived from the 
Islands, when news reached India of the conclusion of peace
See chapter 5, PP*229-38.
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preliminaries in Europe.1
Negotiations for these preliminaries began in the spring
of 1782 when Fox, the Foreign Secretary, appointed Thomas Grenville
to commence discussions with Vergennes, In his recent and highly
intricate study of the negotiations, Vincent Harlow has lucidly
described the nature of French ambitions for the overthrow of the
2
Company’ s power in India- It is indisputable that French policy
under Choiseul and Vergennes was directed to the reversal of the
galling terms of the Peace of Paris, and Vergennes now expected
substantial territorial gains in the East, To Grenville’ s offer
of a settlement that would recognise the independence of the
American colonies for a ’general and reciprocal restitution’ of
territories on the basis of the 1763 peace, Vergennes replied
menacingly that
he could not allow the independance (sic) of America 
to be the only cause of war, for that France had found 
and not made America independant;. . .he said we had 
checked and constrained the French in all the quarters 
of the world, that he wished for a treaty of peace more 
just and durable than the l a s t . ,« ,5
In broaching the matter of the East Indies Vergennes
1
The campaigns of Suffren and Bussy have been most recently exam­
ined in Sen, The French in India , chap'ters 9-13*
2
Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, v o l .I , 
pp .313-19, 361-84.
3
Grenville to Fox, 10 May 1782, F .O , 27/2 , p .60,
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’ asked why we should not content ourselves with Bengal’ . He said
it was a great and rich province, that our arms were 
grown too long for our body, that the French had 
experienced from us in India every sort of indignity, 
and that chiefly owing to the terms of the last peace, 
that for his part he could not read the last peace 
without shuddering, (sans fremir) and that in making 
a new treaty they must be relieved from every circum­
stance in which their dignity had been hurt.1
The French Minister realised that the securing of ’very extensive 
surrenders of commerce and territory in the East Indies' was 
contingent upon military successes in India, and during these 
negotiations he hoped for nev/s of Bussy’ s expected victories in 
the Carnatic. If  the French campaign had been successful in 
extirpating the British from the South, there is every evidence 
that the French government would have insisted on the retention 
of vast territories in the Circars, Orissa and the Coromandel. 
However, since there were no spectacular victories and since there 
appeared little likelihood of dislodging the British from their 
superior position, the French Minister strove to establish for 
his countrymen a position of wealth and power comparable to that 
of the East India Company without incurring any of the responsi­
bilities of territorial sovereignty. Ironically, it had long been 
a French criticism of the Company that its servants had confused 
their roles as traders and rulers. As the administration of these 
territories devolved more and more on the British, the Company’ s
Grenville to Fox, 10 May 1782, F .O . 27/2 , p ,62 .
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expenses increased out of all proportion to the profits derived 
from the Indian trade. And the sympathies of their Indian 
subjects were alienated by the efforts to impose on them foreign 
systems of government and law. The French would show a still more 
excellent way. 'C 'est  par la clémence, la justice, la moderation 
et la bonne discipline que nous devons chercher \  les subjuger et
V A  /
a leur faire connaitre la difference entre notre gouvernement et 
celui que les anglais exercent avec tant de tyrannie’ . 1 Though 
the French avowed that they were only interested in extending 
their trade, this did not inhibit Vergennes from eventually 
demanding the revenues of large territories in the Carnatic and 
the Four Circars to defray the military and administrative 
expenses of French establishments in India,
Chevalier, who had returned to France soon after the
capture of Chandernagore, submitted a mémoire to the Ministry
on 26 May 1780, in which he advocated the cession to France of
large districts adjoining Pondicherry, Karikal and Masulipatam,
The Pondicherry districts were calculated to produce a revenue
of 30 lakhs annually, and the territories surrounding Masulipatam
2
and Yanam 200,000 rupees a year,
1
’Plan d'attaque dans l 'In d e ’ sent by Chevalier, 15 March 1769, 
Françaises Nouvelles Acquisitions, v o l ,9366, p#17#
2 ^ 3
Memoire pour servir au traite de paix, 26 Mai 1780, Correspondance
Politique, Angleterre, vol*533, p#121#
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Chevalier, de Lauriston, Picot de Motte, Moracin and 
Bussy, all of v/hom had spent long sojourns in India, exerted 
considerable influence on the policies of the French government 
during the war and at the negotiations, and not unexpectedly, 
their ideas and ambitions were coloured by their experience of 
the East India Company's rule# They were convinced that the French 
could only hold their own in the East if they were given parity 
of wealth and influence with the Company# In his memoire Chevalier 
insisted upon a complete restitution of French trading rights in 
Bengal; the French merchants were to have a fair choice and 
selection of silks and cloths from the weavers; French vessels 
and agents would have a free and uninterrupted access to the 
Ganges and all parts of the English territories; the jurisdiction 
of French courts over French nationals was to be recognised and 
permitted throughout Bengal; and they were to be free to establish 
factories and agencies wherever they chose. Moreover, French 
territorial claims along the Orissa Coast were to be recognised, 
while French merchants were to enjoy a freedom to trade in the 
articles of salt, saltpetre, opium, arrack and tobacco, without 
the imposition of any quotas. Finally, the British would make 
amends for the Chandernagore ditch affair, which was still  regarded 
by Chevalier as the crowning insult inflicted on the French name 
and honour in Bengal#
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After the fall of Rockingham's Ministry and the resig­
nation of Grenville in July 1782, Alleyne Fitzherbert was trans­
ferred from Brussels to Paris to carry through the negotiations. 
In the first weeks of August Fitzherbert gained an impression of 
what the French claims would be, although he believed the French 
government would temporize until 'they shall be acquainted with 
the issue of the campaign of the last Spring in the East Indies, 
a campaign from which it seems they have formed the most sanguine 
expectations',1 Fitzherbert was convinced that the French would
demand the restitution of Chandernagore with an 
acknowledgement of their right to fortify that settle­
ment as they shall think fit , and of Pondicherry, with 
a considerable addition to its Territory, as also both 
in Bengal and the Carnatick, such new arrangements in 
regard to trade, as shall put the two nations in that 
respect upon a footing of perfect equality.2
I f  anything, Fitzherbert had underrated the extent of the French
demands.
As the discussions progressed, Vergennes was gradually 
forced to yield on the issue of large territorial cessions in the 
Carnatic and the Northern Circars. While Gerard de Rayneval, 
Vergennes' special envoy who twice visited London at critical 
periods during the negotiations, assured Shelburne, the Prime
1
Fitzherbert to Grantham, from Brussels, 31 July 1782, F .O . 27/3 , 
p*47#
2
Fitzherbert to Grantham, from Paris, 17 August 1782, F .O . 27/3f 
p#68«
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Minister, that France 'ne pretend pas acquérir des territoires 
dans l 'Inde ; Elle demande seulement un arrondissement qui puisse 
assurer la Tranquilite de ses comptoirs et fournir a leurs 
despenses', he still insisted (with considerable insouciance it 
would appear) that French possessions in the East be restored 'sur 
le pied de 1754 ', when the influence of Dupleix in the Carnatic 
and Bussy in the Deccan had reached its zenith,1 In response to 
these claims the Foreign Secretary, Grantham, stressed the absol­
ute necessity of 'abiding by the Treaty of Paris on the Subject 
of Bengal'. Opposed to the 'Admission of fortifying Chandernagore' 
and Masulipatam, he contended that the freedom of trade and 
security given to the French 'must not be that Safety which results 
from Fortification on their Side, but from good Policy, Regulation 
and Justice on ours'. And he also informed Fitzherbert that 
'the French Proposal of naming a past Period as a model for a 
future Arrangement is quite inaplicable (sic) to the present State 
of India, and the Tenure upon which our Possessions there are now 
h e l d ',2
By mid-November Vergennes had, with the greatest 
reluctance, abandoned his earlier claim to the ' full possession
1
Note Confidentielle remise aux Ministres anglais par M, Gerard de 
Rayneval, 16 Septembre 1782, Correspondance Politique. Angleterre, 
voL.538, p .197#
2
Grantham to Fitzherbert, 23 September 1782, F .O . 27/3* pp#160-2.
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of the Northern Circars and Masulipatam' upon the footing of 1754.
Consequently the issues had narrowed down to the definition of the
freedom and safety the French were to enjoy in India and the
amounts of territory to be ceded around Pondicherry and Karikal.
Rayneval, who after his first visit to London had become convinced
of the value of an early settlement with Shelburne, managed to
persuade Vergennes to forgo his claim for the fortification of
the French possessions in Bengal. He argued that since 1 le
soubah et l'Empereur ne sont plus que des phantomes1 and 'la
souverainete est entre les mains des Anglais1, a small garrison
would be no protection against the might of the Company.1
Fortifications would merely provoke the English to commit further
acts of oppression. The French were eventually conceded the
right 'd'entourer Chandernagore d'un Fossé" pour l'écoulement des
Eaux', and to a 'commerce sur, libre et independant, tel que l 'a
fait l'ancienne Compagnie Françoise des Indes Orientales, soit
2
qu 'ils  le fassent individuellement ou en corps de Compagnie'.
Early in January 1783 Vergennes finally renounced French 
claims to a privileged position at Masulipatam and to half the 
province of Arcot, and agreed on 5 January to a territorial
Observations sur la reponse de la Cour de Londres du 21 Octobre 
1782, Correspondance Politique. Angleterre. vol«538, p#319.
2
Project of Preliminaries betweèn Great Britain and France,
1 January 1783, F .O . 27 /5 , p#69#
157
readjustment by which Pondicherry with 80 villages, 'the Two 
Districts of Valanour and Bahour', and Karikal with 81 villages, 
'the Four contiguous Magans', would be given to the French,1 The 
preliminary articles of peace were signed on 20 January 1783, and 
on 3 September the definitive treaty of peace with France was 
concluded at Versailles#
Detailed instructions concerning the implementation of 
the preliminaries were despatched to the Indian presidencies on 
6 March 1783. The French factories were to be restored immediately 
after the ratification of the definitive treaty in Europe# It was 
also explained that the permission given to the French to surround 
Chandernagore 'by a Ditch' did not alter their status in Bengal 
since they were still forbidden to erect fortifications and to 
introduce arms and military forces into the provinces# In the 
Carnatic, the Fort St George Council was urged to use its 'good 
offices to procure' the cession of the districts of Villenour and 
Bahour from Mohammad Ali, the Nawab of the Carnatic, and the four
Fitzherbert to Grantham, 5 January 1783, F .O . 27/5, p»328# The 
Secret Committee of the Court of Directors was frequently consulted 
by the Ministry after October 1782, and on 23 December it reluct­
antly consented to the 'engagement that the East India Company shall 
employ their best offices with the Nabob of Arcot, to cede to France 
the eighty Villages possessed by the French near Pondicherry in 
1754- And likewise with the Rajah of Tanjore to obtain a cession 
of the eighty one villages possessed by the French at the same 
period near Carrical'# (F .O . 27/15, P#55#)
The Committee, however, insisted that France withdraw 'her 
assistance from all other native Princes' who were at war with the 
Company, and Fitzherbert finally succeeded in reducing the provision­
al armistice in India from twelve to four months on 9 January# 
(Fitzherbert to Grantham, 9 January 1783, F .O . 27 /5 , p-347.)
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magans around Karikal from the King of Tanjore. A further import­
ant task entrusted to the councils in India was the pacification 
of the Carnatic, for both England and Prance had bound themselves 
to disengage their forces from all native alliances and to use 
their influence to end the war between Hyder Ali, Mohammad Ali 
and the King of Tanjore, In fact, the English had insisted at the 
peace negotiations that the withdrawal of French troops from the 
service of Hyder Ali be a necessary condition for the restoration 
of the French Indian settlements#1
These instructions were supplemented with further orders
after the conclusion of the definitive peace treaty in Europe*
The British government demanded that since 'the capture of
Trincomalay by the French was not known in Europe at the time of
signing the Preliminary Articles' the French should restore the
harbour to the British representatives before its final restoration
2
to the Dutch* This stipulation became another sine qua non for 
the restitution of the French comptoirs with the result that 
Bussy's refusal to surrender Trincomalee to the British delayed 
the return of the French factories and territories until February 
1785# After Bussy's sudden death at Pondicherry on 7 January 1785
1
Secret Committee of the Court of Directors to Fort William Council, 
6 March 1783* Secret Despatches from the Secret Committee. Series 
A (1778-1786).
2
Copy of Instructions relative to the Definitive Treaty of Peace
with France, 3 October 1783, F«0» 27/7 , p .336.
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the administration passed to Brigadier-General Coutenceau des 
Algrins until the Vicomte de Souillac assumed the government of 
French India in May,
Recent changes affecting the governments of both the 
French and British establishments in the East were to exert a 
considerable influence on the pattern of Anglo-French relations 
during this decade. As has already been indicated, the powers 
of the Supreme Government at Fort William over the subordinate 
presidencies had been enlarged and clearly enumerated in P itt 's  
India Act, which further strengthened the powers of the Governor 
General over his Council. 'The entire diplomatic relations of the 
Company in India as also the finance necessary to support them 
were thus specifically entrusted to the Supreme Government at 
Fort William in Bengal' whose sanction was now necessary for any 
treaties concluded with the country powers.1 The edict of May 
1785 produced a similar centralisation in the government of 
French India, Overall co-ordination of policy was in the hands of 
the Governor General at the lie de France, while the subordinate 
administrations were centred on Pondicherry and the lie de Bourbon* 
For the first time it was possible to regulate affairs between the 
two nations by a general agreement made in the East. In the
1
Misra, The Central Administration of the East India Company« 
p# 31#
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twenty years before, when fractious councils vied with one 
another for power and influence, a general settlement of grievances 
negotiated by French and British governors in India was out of the 
question. But the consolidation of Fort William's control over 
the Indian settlements also implied that the metropolitan govern­
ments would attempt a more direct supervision of the affairs of 
their servants. The India Act provided such machinery in the 
form of the Board of Control, and during the 1780*s British 
ministries tried with greater success than before to control the 
policies of their Governor General at Calcutta#
On 1 February 1785 Pondicherry was given up to the 
French and soon after they received Villenour and Bahour along 
with Karikal and the four magans.1 The Fort William Council was 
informed by de Souillac on 27 June of the appointment of 
Monsieur Dangereux as the French commissary to reclaim the French 
establishments in Bengal and the Council appointed John Wilton to 
p
treat with him# A minor dispute occurred in July over the 
possession of the house and lands at Ghyretty, originally built 
by Dupleix but greatly improved by Chevalier, which Sir Eyre Coote 
had acquired in 1779# It was agreed on 27 July that the French
1
Fort William Council to the Court of Directors, 31 March 1785, Fort 
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might occupy Ghyretty until the matter was settled in Europe.
On the same day Chandernagore was restored to Dangereux.
From September 1785, however, there arose a succession
of disputes with the French in Bengal which effectively tested
the provisions of the peace treaty. Most of these disagreements
were concerned with the definition of the 'safe , free and
independent Trade' the French were to be afforded in India.
Warren Hastings, who remained in Bengal until February 1785, was
inclined to distrust any claims that the French based on ancient
custom. The real question, according to his analysis, was not
one of usage or prescription
but by what regulations our Government can ensure the 
regular Collection of the usual Customs,. . .without 
subjecting the Representatives of the Foreign Companies 
to Conditions to which their respective states will 
not Consent, and which to enforce might be Contrary 
to the Prosperity of these Provinces, and the General 
Interests of the British Empire.1
As the territorial sovereign of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Hastings
felt that the Company should be quite free to determine all
regulations governing trade.
On 5 September Dangereux called on John Macpherson, who 
since Hastings' departure had been the acting Governor General, 
and protested about the obstructions imposed by the Company's
1
Extract of the Governor General's minute of October 1784, French 
in India« vol.YI, pp. 113-14.
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agents on the import of salt into the country. While once more 
affirming the right of the East India Company to the exclusive 
importation of salt, Macpherson conceded the French permission to 
import 'two lacks of Maunds' annually. The provisional arrange­
ments made to regulate the trade with the foreign companies were 
soon disowned by Dangereux, who claimed that these regulations 
were innovations 'which directly strike at that Treaty, which 
assures us Liberty and Independance ( s i c ) ' .  He asserted that the 
French were never before required 'to give Manifests of their 
Ships' Cargoes at their Arrival' and that they 'never wanted 
Rowannahs to assist in bringing in .. .o u r  Merchandise from the 
different Factories, nor to send them down the R iv e r '.’1' Rather, 
the dustucks issued by the chief at Chandernagore had always been 
adequate as a security for their goods.
These conflicts came to a head over the issue of 
'visiting  and examining Foreign Ships as they pass the Fort of 
Budge Budge'. As we have seen, this particular issue first arose 
in the 1770's and was unresolved at the time of the capture of 
the French possessions. As ever, the French persisted in claiming 
that the navigation of the Hooghly was free and open to Chander­
nagore. In order, therefore, to avoid provoking any further
1
Dangereux to Wilton, 13 September 1785, Bengal Foreign Branch. 
Foreign Proceedings. 27 September 1785.
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embarrassing incidents the Bengal Council resolved on 27 September
that the officer at Budge Budge
be directed to permit the French Ship now below that 
place to pass on v/ithout being searched or without 
his insisting on the Privilege of searching her, 
provided the Commander has reported her Name and given 
even a verbal Account of the place from whence she 
came and of her Cargoe,!
The Council also appealed to the Court for clear instructions
in the matter.
On 20 November 1785 Lieutenant Exshaw, the officer in
charge of the station immediately below Budge Budge, ordered that
a French ship, the Auguste Victor, be fired on when she attempted
'to pass the Batteries' without having been searched, Exshaw and
the other officers believed that the ship was carrying contraband
salt and their suspicions seemed confirmed by the French commander's
refusal to allow a search party aboard and by his determination
not to provide an account of her cargo. Nevertheless, when
Vansittart, the comptroller of the Salt Department, searched the
3
ship on 22 November he could find no salt* Dangereux, of course, 
protested with great vehemence about these proceedings, but the
1
Bengal Foreign Branch. Foreign Proceedings. 27 September 1785,
2
Fort William Council to the Court of Directors, 25 October 1785, 
French in India, v o l.IX , p p .241-2,
3
Fort William Council (Foreign Department) to the Court, 9 January
1786, Fort William - India House Correspondence, vol.XV, pp.580-2,
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Council continued unabashedly to claim as a right of government 
the power to search merchant vessels suspected of carrying 
forbidden goods.
Another incident similar to this occurred at Budge Budge 
on 4 December when the garrison fired on the corvette, the 
Esperance, after she failed to hove to. Again Dangereux remonst­
rated with the Calcutta authorities and renewed the French claims 
for 'a  Free, Certain, & Independant (sic) Entrance of French Ships' 
into the Hooghly and the free import and export 'o f all the 
Merchandize of Europe and of In d ia '.^
Since the return of the French possessions the agents of 
the two powers had found themselves constantly at loggerheads 
over conflicting views of the thirteenth article of the peace 
treaty. The situation was analogous to that which had confronted 
Chevalier in the 1760's and the 1770 's and in his arguments 
Dangereux relied heavily on the bitter legacy of Anglo-French 
tensions in Bengal, Within the space of six months a stalemate 
had been reached* The Council's claim to search foreign ships was 
strenuously resisted by the French with the result that Macpherson 
and his Council were convinced that the Esperance affair had been 
deliberately engineered by the French to embarrass the British,
1
Fort William Council to the Court of Directors, 9 January 1786,
Fort William - India House Correspondence. vol.XV, p .588#
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if  not to precipitate hostilities. It was at this time that
Macpherson first heard of French moves in Cochin China and Ava,
and of Dutch efforts to strengthen their hold over the Malacca
Straits area.*1' He was also alarmed by the size of the combined
French and Dutch fleets in the Eastern Seas and he strongly urged
the British government to reinforce the East Indian squadron as
2
soon as possible# However, to assuage Dangereux he agreed on 
24 December to replace the ship and ’ defray any expenses that
3
might have been occasioned by her Loss’ ,
But the French agent had also refused to comply with the 
regulations established by the Government Customs House, claiming 
the right to send private merchants with dustucks wherever he 
chose. Furthermore, he denied the jurisdiction of the country 
courts over French nationals and the servants employed by the 
Compagnie. V/hile the numbers of disputes and disagreements with 
the French were mounting, there seemed little hope of resolving 
these tensions on the spot. Dangereux’ s powers were limited and 
uncertain. Indeed, Cossigny, the recently appointed Governor at 
Pondicherry, denied the Bengal agent’s authority to conclude a
1
See chapter 6, pp#279-91 for a more detailed treatment of these 
schemes and their effect on the Fort William Council*
2
Macpherson to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors,
26 January 1786, French in India. vol#VI, pp#25-6,
3
Bengal Foreign Branch. Foreign Proceedings. 24 December 1785#
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provisional agreement and had disavowed those arrangements which 
he had earlier made with the Bengal Council for the conduct of 
the salt and saltpetre trade# On the instructions of de Souillac, 
Dangereux was now busy denouncing the Company's monopoly of the 
salt, saltpetre and opium trade«'*'
In order to settle these vexed questions, which had
been the cause of great bitterness for so long, the Supreme
Government at Fort William appointed Lieutenant Colonel Charles
Cathcart in January 1786 to conclude a general agreement with the
French Governor General at the lie de France, Macpherson was
careful to choose someone who was 'personally known' to the French
2
Governor General, and 'highly esteemed'by him# His appointee 
had distinguished himself during the battle of Cuddalore, and was 
now a member of the House of Commons# The commission he received 
from the Council on 31 January 1786 empowered him to adjust with
1
Souillac instructed Dangereux to demand a 'free , certain and 
independent exportation of Saltpetre from Patna to Chandernagore, 
and from Chandernagore to France', and 'the free, certain and 
independent, Importation of Salt from the Coast of Coromandel and 
Orixa not only at Chandernagore, but even to all the Factories on 
the Ganges, where we have a right to hoist the Flag of his Majesty, 
without our being limited, as to quantity, that ought only to 
depend on the manner in which we would employ it'#  Evidently the 
salt monopoly and the searching of French ships were the two major 
obstacles to an Anglo-French agreement# (Foreign Department to 
Court, 9 January 1786, Fort William - India House Correspondence* 
vol.XV, p#588#)
2
Macpherson to Souillac, 26 January 1786, French in India* vol*VI, 
p*59«
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the French Governor General whatever differences had arisen 
’ relative to the interpretation and execution of the 13th article 
of the definitive Treaty',"**
i i ,  THE CATHCART-SOUILLAC NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR FATE
Before leaving Calcutta Cathcart received detailed 
instructions. First, he was required to inform the Governor 
General and the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the 
outcome of the negotiations immediately on their completion* He 
was also instructed to obviate the confusion which had arisen 
over the restitution of the French factories by inviting 
de Souillac to present 'a  definitive and particular Demand of all 
the Establishments, whether Factories or Residencies, which he 
judges his Nation entitled to*. However, French jurisdiction was 
not to be extended indiscriminately throughout the provinces.
Only in cases where the French held territory 'in  Property' would 
their 'Factorial Rights' be recognised and respected. Cathcart 
was to agree to the French claim for an alternate site for the 
factory at Jugdea, and they were to be permitted a saluting battery 
at Chandernagore. Further, Cathcart was recommended to treat with 
sympathy the French request 'to establish Residencies for Commercial 
Agents in Places where none have hitherto been established', though
1
Fort William Council to the Honble. Lieut, Colonel Charles 
Cathcart, 31 January 1786, French in India. vo l,V I, p»37»
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any concessions made at the Mauritius would require the ratifica­
tion of the Directors in London* For the time being the Fort 
William Council was prepared to grant these demands if  they were 
insisted upon by the French, convinced as it was that 'Public 
Advantage is connected with the Extension of Foreign Commerce in 
Bengal'«
Anticipating that the French would remain satisfied 
with the latest regulations issued to the officers at Budge Budge 
'with Respect to the Visiting and Searching French Ships entering 
the Ganges', the Council instructed Cathcart to insist that the 
'Search in case of Information of Contrabands is conformable to 
the Custom and Law of all Nations, and cannot be dispensed with'* 
He was not to tolerate any relaxation of the duty of 2-J- per cent 
'upon all Merchandize exported from Chandernagore, or upon Goods 
imported from the Provinces into i t ' ;  but as a compensation the 
French factories were to be given the right to issue their own 
dustucks and rowannahs* The Council was convinced that the chief 
difficulties in the negotiation would arise over the question of 
the Company's monopolies of salt, saltpetre and opium, and so it 
ordered Cathcart to maintain these 'on the Ground of ancient 
Custom'* The Council's obduracy in this matter resulted from its 
conviction that the revenue produced by these monopolies was 
essential for the Company's trade* Macpherson stressed that
169
nothing could induce the Council to give up its salt monopoly 
fbut the most positive Instructions from Europe, nor could these 
even be complied with, until New Arrangements were taken to 
replace the large proportion of Revenue that would expire with i t ' # 
Finally, Cathcart was directed to explain the firing on the 
corvette as an accident and 'to disclaim in the fullest Manner 
any Intention on our Part of insulting the Flag of His Most 
Christian Majesty'
These instructions were devised at a time when the 
Bengal Council believed that a commercial agreement was being 
arranged in Europe between the Company's Court of Directors and 
the new Compagnie des Indes under the aegis of the Comptroller- 
General of Finances, Calonne« The negotiations, initiated by 
certain French bankers and private merchants in London soon after 
the conclusion of the peace, had acquired a considerable momentum 
by 1785* As they progressed it became apparent that there was a 
conflict between Calonne and the Paris bankers on the one hand, 
who wanted to divorce the Compagnie from all political functions 
and establish an informal commercial 'entente' with the East India 
Company, and the other ministers led by the marquis de Castries 
on the other, who supported the idea of a monopolistic Compagnie
1
Fort William Council to the Honble* Lieut* Colbnel Charles 
Cathcart, 31 January 1786, French in India, vol#VI, p p ,37-47*
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which would conduct its own political and commercial dealings with
the Indian states# Towards the end of 1785 Calonne came in on
the side of Vergennes and de Castries, subscribing to the view
that the subordination of the Compagnie to the East India Company
would imply a recognition by the French government of British
sovereignty in India and also render the French trade ’ precaire,
limite et soumis aux volontes de la Compagnie Anglaise’ #^ Hence
the discussions in Europe fell through# Macpherson, however, was
not to know of these transactions until much later and, unlike
Hastings, he considered that a liberal accommodation with the
French in India would encourage them to surrender any political
ambitions they might still  have harboured for the overthrow of
British rule# He continued to believe that the interests of the
two powers were not ’ independent of, or incompatable (s ic ) ’ with
each other# ’ It is our Duty’ , he argued, 'in  every Respect to
encourage the Prosecution of a Commerce which is a tie upon the
Military Ambition of France a n d  which above all other Obligations
2
promises Permanency to the Peace of India ’ # Such a policy of 
liberalisation would eventually benefit the English trade because
1
For a detailed treatment of these attempts to form a commercial 
company which would be subordinate to the East India Company, and 
their failure see F .L . Nussbaum, ’ The Formation of the New East 
India Company of Calonne’ , American Historical Review. vol«XXXVIII 
(1933), pp.475-98, Furber, John Company at V/ork. pp*32-8, and 
Dermigny, La Chine et L ’Occident. vol#I I I ,  pp»1072-80#
2
Bengal Foreign Branch. Foreign Proceedings. 9 March 1786#
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of the overwhelming dependence of the French on the credit,
shipping and insurance facilities of the East India Company# ^
Optimistically, Macpherson noted in a despatch that
all Nations were becoming more enlightened on the 
subject of Commerce and the more the Subject was 
examined the more it became understood that Freedom 
was the Life of Commerce, and that Monopolies were 
destructive to the very Interests which maintained 
them#2
Cathcart concluded the convention with Souillac at 
Port Louis on 30 April 1786 and before his departure for England 
despatched his secretary, Lieutenant Young, with a copy of the 
convention to Calcutta, where he arrived towards the end of June# 
Immediately he presented the Council with a lengthy report on the 
outcome of the negotiations. According to this memorandum the 
main benefits secured for the Company were the preservation of 
the 'Municipal Duties' and 'the usual General Duties in Bengal'} 
the maintenance of 'the Monopolies of Salt, Saltpetre and Opium'; 
and the French agreement to prohibit 'Salt, Arms and Military
3
Stores' as contraband-
The right of hailing and visiting 'French Ships of War'
1
Furber has examined the complex and multifarious interactions be­
tween the commercial operations of the two companies# In partic­
ular see pp#39-51# See also C. Northcote Parkinson, The Trade 
Winds ; A Study of British Overseas Trade during the French Wars 
1793-1815 (London. 1948).
2
Bengal Foreign Branch. Foreign Proceedings. 5 July 1786#
3
Bengal Foreign Branch. Foreign Proceedings. 5 July 1786#
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and merchant vessels was relinquished by Cathcart with the proviso 
that this right could be exercised by the officer at Budge Budge 
i f  'Information upon Oath' were given that a French ship was 
carrying contraband. As an indulgence the French were allowed to 
import 200,000 maunds of salt for purchase by the Bengal govern­
ment at the price of 120 rupees per hundred maunds, and they were 
entitled to 18,000 maunds of saltpetre and 200 chests of opium 
annually at prices fixed before the American War. They were also 
permitted to issue dustucks though the passports were to state 
clearly the *quantity and quality' of the goods and were to be 
accompanied by an invoice. Moreover, French jurisdiction was 
recognised over French nationals and their native servants through­
out Bengal.'*' Cathcart insisted that these provisions 'distinctly 
defined' the rights the French were to possess in their 'Factories 
and Houses of Commerce'. He continued,
the Protection of Natives pursued and claimed by 
Government on account of Crimes, Misdemeanours or 
Debts, is formally relinquished; and a Reference 
to the Country Courts of Justice is acquiesced in, 
in cases where Frenchmen are aggrieved by Natives;
1
'Convention settled provisionally betwixt Mr. le Vicomte de 
Souillac Governor General of the French Establishments in the East 
Indies and Lieut. Colonel Cathcart Plenipotentiary of the Govern­
ment General for the English Company in the East Indies in 
Explanation of the 13th, 14th and 15th Articles of the Treaty of 
Peace between their Britannick and Most Christian Majesties con­
cluded at Versailles the 3rd. September 1783, which provisional 
Convention shall have Effect until the Decision of our respective 
Courts', French in India. vol#VI, p p .191-242. See Appendix B for 
the full text of the convention*
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These Tribunals were never before formally acknow­
ledged by the French in Bengal#1
However, the Board of Control and the Court of Directors were to
adopt a far less lenient view of these concessions when Cathcart
arrived in London.
On learning of the vexed Esperance incident and the 
Fort William Council's intention to conclude a general convention 
at the Mauritius, the Board of Control made certain overtures, 
through the Foreign Minister, to the French court to discover its 
reactions to the disputes in India* From the tenor of Vergennes' 
answer the Board was assured 'that the disputes which have taken 
place in India, did not arise from any preconcerted plan or
Instruction from Europe, to create difficulties in the execution
2
of the Treaty'« The Board was concerned lest the plenipotentiary 
appointed by the Supreme Government in India should 'by concess­
ions**. weaken any ground' that the British government intended to 
maintain in their imminent negotiations with the French Foreign 
Minister* The Board also criticised the Bengal Council for its 
acquiescence in the French demand for a replacement for their
1
Bengal Foreign Branch. Foreign Proceedings, 5 July 1786*
2 ' ..... ~
Board to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 19 July 
1786, French in India. vo l.V I, p*71* After the passing of the 
India Act all despatches from the newly instituted Board of Control 
to the presidencies in India passed through the Secret Committee 
of the Court of Directors#
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factory at Jugdea, and it insisted firmly and unequivocally that 
if  ’ the French or any other Europeans exorcise any jurisdiction 
it must certainly be confined to the limits of their own 
Factories’ * Although the Board was prepared to concede the 
French the right to travel ’ in the Districts’ and navigate the 
Hooghly, it stressed that these agents must ’ be subject to the 
authority of the Courts of Justice established by the Subadar and 
Dewan of the Provinces’ ,'*'
When at last the Court of Directors and the India Board
received copies of the provisional convention in August 1786 they
strongly disapproved of the settlement Cathcart had concluded,
fearing that the Fort William Council had overstepped its authority
in vesting him with such extensive powers. Their reactions,
however, were somewhat muted because negotiations had begun with
2
the French to conclude a commercial treaty. William Eden had 
taken charge of these discussions in April 1786, and during 
September he received instructions to take up with the French 
government the matter of the East Indian trade and the Cathcart- 
Souillac convention. He was told, nevertheless, ’wholly to disavow
1
Board to the Secret Committee, 19 July 1786, French in India. 
vol*VI, pp ,69-82,
2
For a recent and masterly treatment of the commercial negotiations 
which succeeded the peace of 1783 see J , Ehrman, The British Govern­
ment and Commercial Negotiations with Europe 1783-1793 (Cambridge. 
1962).
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that Convention as unauthorized and improper',1 while the Fort 
William Council was admonished for its presumption.
Although Eden was authorised to convey the British
government's intention to grant France 'a  liberal and fair
participation of the Commerce of In d ia ', he was instructed to
maintain ' against every attempt to encroach, the Government of
2
our Indian Possessions exclusively in our own hands'#
Carmarthen, the Foreign Secretary, drew a distinction between the 
French interests in India, which were 'purely and simply commerc­
i a l ' ,  and those of Britain, which because of 'her territorial 
rights' were also 'objects of political concern'. To all those 
French claims based on ancient custom and right, Eden was to 
assert
that as we are partly by Treaty, and partly by Conquest, 
now in possession of the Government & Substantial 
Right of Sovereignty of the Provinces of Bengal, Bahar, 
and Orissa, together with our other Territories on the 
Coast of Coromandel and Malabar, the Rights so acquired 
by us, could not be fettered by antiquated Grants, 
whose authority we were under no obligation to ack- 
nowledge,4
Carmarthen to Harris, 7 September 1787, F .O . 37 /l8 .
2
Draught of Instructions proposed to be sent to Mr# Eden, for 
negotiating upon the Provisional Articles concluded by Colonel 
Cathcart with the French Governor General at the Mauritius the 
30th April 1786. Board's Drafts of Secret Despatches to Bengal, 
v o l .I ,  (1786-88), p .74.
3
Carmarthen to Hailes, 4 August 1786, (Add.Mss. 34422, fl3). I 
am indebted to Professor G. C. Bolton for this reference.
4
Draft of Eden's instructions, Board's Drafts of Secret Despatches 
to Bengal. v o l .I , (1786-88), p#76.
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The French could hardly be expected to accept these views partic­
ularly when the British contended that both the treaties of Paris 
and Versailles implicitly recognised the Company as the de facto 
sovereign of Bengal# Vergennes jested with the British pleni­
potentiary about the fSpecies of Sovereignty* the Company exer­
cised in India, 'whether delegated or de jure, or permissory, or 
merely possessory', but he assured Eden that the French would not 
be too 'punctilious' in defining the matter provided that their 
interests were promoted by the treaty*1
By December 1786 Eden had received a great mass of 
material on Anglo-French commercial dealings in Bengal, including 
a copy of the provisional convention with a copious gloss on each 
of its provisions. The Board was inclined to adopt a much less 
conciliatory attitude to the French in India largely, it seems, 
because it feared a resurgence of French political ambitions.
The Board was also of the opinion that, in spite of its good 
intentions, the Supreme Government at Calcutta had usurped powers 
which it did not legally possess in authorising such an agreement; 
Eden was informed that the Board knew 'of no Power which warrants 
the Government of Bengal to name Plenipotentiaries for negotiating 
or concluding Treaties with any European Powers, relative to the
1
Eden to Carmarthen, Fontainebleau, 20 October 1786, F .O , 27/20, 
pp# 274-5-
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National Rights in India1, 1 Dissatisfied with the provisions 
governing the inspection of French ships, the Board instructed 
Eden not to recognise any distinctions between ships of war and 
merchant ships since the French were prevented ’ by positive 
T r e a t y .fr o m  having any Military Force within the Provinces of 
Bengal’ # The British plenipotentiary was to argue the proposition 
that
it is inherent in the Nature of Government, and the 
Rights to Duties, such as admittedly belong to us, to 
make Regulations to render the Collection of those 
Duties effectual; and therefore if  the Government 
Customs are to be continued, or if  the Importation 
of Salt, or any other Article is to be prohibited, 
there is no pretence on the part of the French Nation, 
to object to an examination of their Ships at a 
convenient place of the River#
A memoire, presumably written by Dundas and located in the
Melville Papers, reveals how determined was the chief member of
1
Board’ s Drafts of Secret Despatches to Bengal, v o l .I , (1786-88), 
P-79#
On 20 September 1786 the Secret Committee of the Court of 
Directors wrote to the Governor General and Council at Fort 
William informing them that the Cathcart-Souillac agreement was 
invalid ’except as far as they (the articles) may be admitted 
into a New Treaty with the Court of France, by Negotiation in 
Europe'#
The Council was chided for its agreeing to replace the 
Esperance corvette, and compensate the family of the lost Indian 
servant* The Secret Committee could not conclude their letter 
without expressing their expectation that the Company's servants 
would be 'strictly  careful in future not to commit yourselves by 
Treaties with European Powers, on subjects materially affecting 
the relative situation, and the Political rights, of the British 
and other Nations'# (Extract of letter from the Secret Committee 
to the Governor General and Council, 20 September 1786, French in 
India, vol#VI, p#25l)*
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the Board in this matter of hailing and searching French ships,
'But for this and this, as far as the French are concerned, we 
must assume the Character of the Governing power - without it we 
shall be subject to proper Embarrassments and Inconsistencies'.1 
It also suggests how fervent a supporter the British government 
had become of the Company's rights in India,
Although the Board was satisfied with the articles in 
the convention relative to the import of salt and the export of 
saltpetre and opium, it was tenaciously opposed to the extension 
of French jurisdiction beyond 'those old established Factories' 
which the French possessed before the war. It was convinced that 
the establishment of a legal authority independent of the Company's 
would be ' irreconcileable to every idea of regular Government' 
and as an inducement to persuade the French to abjure their claims 
for a separate jurisdiction the Board was prepared to give up the 
government customs altogether. Evidently the Board feared that the 
newly established factories and outposts of the French might 
become 'an Asylum for those who may offend against the Laws and 
Authority of the Government', and that these outlaws would be 
protected by French law, Dundas considered that the 'Claim of 
the French to send Agents everywhere is hurtful to the peace of
1
From a microfilm of the Melville Papers (Mss.1060) in the 
National Archives of India*
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the Country, and Conduct of Government, and in the Event of a War 
dangerous*. 1 Therefore Eden was empowered only to recognise the 
jurisdiction of the French courts 'in  disputes between their own 
European Subjects' and in cases 'arising within the limits of 
their Factories',
These negotiations, although protracted by Vergennes'
death in February 1787, eventually resulted in the agreement
2
signed by Eden and Montmorin on 31 August 1787# This treaty 
differed significantly from the earlier Cathcart-Souillac convent­
ion in that the contentious provisions concerning French legal and 
national rights were entirely omitted. In fact, Carmarthen avowed 
that
the whole Tenour of the present Convention amounts to 
a stronger Acknowledgement than has ever before been 
made of the Rights of this Country in I n d i a , I t  con­
cedes no Point by which Our Revenues in India can be 
affected to any considerable Amount. It preserves 
Intire the Jurisidction of the Country (from which the 
French formerly pretended to be exempted) in every 
Instance.#.And in general it maintains all the Rights 
incident to Sovereign Authority..#3
1
From the Melville Papers (Mss,1060) in the National Library of 
Scotland. These extracts were taken from the microfilm in the 
National Archives of India. A further paragraph claimed that the 
' Convention is dangerous Wrong originally & having been annulled 
by the French themselves we should resort to the State we were in 
before. No concession in any of the principal points should be 
allowed'.
2
The Convention between his Britannick Majesty and the Most 
Christian King, signed at Versailles on 31 August 1787, is in­
cluded in Appendix C.
Carmarthen to Harris, 7 September 1787, F»0« 37 /l8 .
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By its terms the French tacitly recognised the British claim to 
search their ships whereas the British only accepted the exercise 
of French 1 Civil or Criminal Jurisdiction over the persons,
Native or European, resident within their Factories, and on 
account of transactions originating within their factories'. 
Elsewhere in Bengal the French were to be afforded 'the same 
Judicatures and the same rules' as applied to 'British Subjects 
in In d ia ',
Hence the issues that had for so long soured relations 
between the English and the French in Bengal were resolved, though 
this was not the achievement of the officials and merchants in 
the East, Governments in Europe negotiated on behalf of their 
servants, and it is perhaps the willingness of the British 
ministry of the day to endorse and support the Company's new found 
power in India which is the most significant development revealed 
by the diplomatic manoeuvres. We have earlier noted the partner­
ship between the Company and the ministry that first emerged in 
the turmoils of the American War, During the peace negotiations 
Shelburne expended much time and energy on reducing the extent 
of French demands in India and he naturally met with the approval 
and support of the Company, But in this, the latest set of
1
Board of Control to Secret Committee of the Court of Directors,
2 November 1787, French in India, vol#VI, p«290#
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negotiations, the Board of Control had energetically pressed 
demands which the Calcutta Council had been prepared to forgo. 
Anglo-French tensions were simmering once more in Europe and the 
East over the fate of the Dutch possessions so that Pitt and 
Dundas favoured a more cautious policy towards the French«1 
With the advantage of hindsight, it may seem that Macpherson's 
policy of conciliation was wiser and more enlightened and that 
the commercial treaty concluded by Eden heralded the dawn of a 
new age in Anglo-French relations# Even in this period, however, 
it was considered a wildly idiosyncratic development, and with 
the Dutch crisis and the French Revolution there was a return to 
the more usual condition of distrust and antipathy. Trade and 
politics could not be separated as easily as this, for Frenchmen 
and Englishmen alike were too strongly cast in the mould of the 
past#
The India Act had wedded the might and authority of a 
European state with the calculating acquisitiveness of a commerc­
ial enterprise# In spite of their constitutional aversion to 
'schemes of conquest and extension of dominion', the ministry and 
the Board of Control were inexorably drawn into the maze of Indian 
politics. One way by which it was hoped to curb the expansionist 
policies of the Company and to assert the supremacy of the
1 *
See chapter 7, pp*324-33#
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Imperial parliament over the mercenary concerns of its employees 
was to appoint as Governor General a man who combined the public 
views and morality of the political nation with a large experience 
of the colonies# Such a man was the second Earl Cornwallis, the 
scion of a Suffolk family established at Brome Hall in the 
fourteenth century.1 A loyal and trusted servant of George I I I ,  
Cornwallis saw military service in the American colonies. In 
1778 he was appointed second in command to Sir Henry Clinton, and 
during 1780 he was in charge of the British army in the southern 
states# On 19 October 1781, however, Cornwallis was forced to 
capitulate at Yorktown# In spite of this humiliating defeat, which 
to all intents and purposes ended the American War, he was still 
remarkably popular at home. Twice he was offered the Governor 
Generalship of India and twice he refused, but owing to the 
importunities of Pitt and Dundas he reluctantly accepted the 
position on 23 February 1786.
i i i .  CORNWALLIS AND THE FRENCH 1786-1793
Cornwallis, the first Governor General appointed under 
the terms of the India Act, arrived in the East in September 1786. 
Before leaving England he had been urged to promote a policy of
1
'Cornwallis, Charles', in The Dictionary of National Biography, 
vol.XV,(London, 1950), p p .1159-66.
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financial retrenchment and administrative reform,1 and to eschew 
expensive entanglements with the native powers. Vigilance, not 
expansion, was to be the hallmark of his administration. In 
matters of external policy he was instructed never to depart from 
'one universal Principle«..either in the present condition of the 
native Powers, or in any future revolutions amongst them ,...that 
we are completely satisfied with the Possessions we already have,
2
and will engage in no War for the purpose of further acquisitions'. 
However, this proviso was qualified by succeeding instructions 
which enjoined the Governor General 'to unite our Indian Possess­
ions by an acquisition of Cuttack, if  any favorable moment should 
arise for obtaining it by Négociation', and to 'keep a constant 
watch upon the conduct of all European rivals, particularly the 
French', Because the French 'cannot possibly interfere in the 
disputes of any of the native Princes, without ultimately intend­
ing prejudice to u s ',  the Board of Control insisted 'that if  any 
one of them shall accept of European aid, we shall feel ourselves 
warranted to throw the aid of our force into the opposite scale '. 
Here again we detect the influence of the fear of the French in 
provoking the government to support intervention# Of course
1
For a discussion of the administrative reforms and their back­
ground see G .D . Bearce, British Attitudes towards India 1784-1858 
(Oxford, 1961), pp#43-6, and E. Stokes, The English Utilitarians 
and India (Oxford, 1959), pp#3-7, 25-6.
2
Board of Control to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 
19 July 1786, Secret Despatches from the Secret Committee, Series A 
(1778-1786).
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expansion was not willed or wanted, but it was necessary if  French 
intrigue were to be countered. 'It  ought to be inculcated in 
every transaction with them that the acceptance of any such aid 
can only be with the risk of having our whole Force immediately 
employed to crush the effects of it '»
Soon after his arrival the bluff Cornwallis, who was 
also Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in the East, presen­
ted a lengthy report on the present state of the French in Bengal* 
His attitude clearly differed from Macpherson's since he strongly 
believed that the political and commercial benefits given to the 
French by the liberalisation of trade were harmful to the Company's 
power and prestige* According to the new Governor General, it was 
evident
that a foreign Commerce, which is carried on, at our 
expence, supported by Funds supplied by British subjects, 
which tends to lessen the consumption of our native 
Manufactures, without increasing that of the Manufact­
ures of this Country and which diminishes the profits 
of the Company upon the Sales of Indian Goods in Europe, 
must be essentially detrimental to the Company and to 
the State .1
But Cornwallis had even graver misgivings about the 
Cathcart-Souillac convention and Macpherson's attempts to placate 
the French* He wrote home;
1
Cornwallis to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 
16 November 1786, Bengal Secret Letters, First Series, v o l .I , 
(1778-1794).
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The French Nation has long seen with Jealous 
impatience, the extensive Power and Influence which 
we possess in this part of the World, and their 
attempts to subvert it , have been manifest in a 
variety of Secret Machinations, and unavowed Intrigues 
directed to the accomplishment of this object* At 
this time they have Agents at the Courts of several 
of the native Princes, a Measure which cannot promote 
any commercial Advantage, and they have a considerable 
Establishment of Troops in I n d i a * . , . I f  Trade alone 
were their object, these political Intrigues and 
Military Establishments, must be deem'd unnecessary 
and productive of a heavy and useless Expence since 
the English have undertaken to secure to them the 
Safety, Freedom and Independancy (sic) of their 
Commerce as far as they possessed it before. Their 
Views of Hostility may be remote, but the existence 
of them seems probable*1
In any future conflict with the French in India Cornwallis 
felt certain that French trade would be ruthlessly exploited by 
the French government for military and political ends. He mention­
ed that even now their commercial privileges afforded them 
’ unsuspected opportunities of sending to India, ample Supplies of 
Troops and Military Stores and at the least expence to their 
Government’ , and he concluded with the reflection
that whatever success the native Powers have obtained 
in War against the Company, must be principally 
attributed to Europeans, who have taught them their 
Discipline, served in their Armies, furnished them 
with Arms and Ammunition, and have by their informa­
tion led them into the secrets of our Policy*
Consequently all foreign companies should be depressed and dis­
couraged from extending their trade, or so ran the plain inference
1
Cornwallis to Secret Committee, 16 November 1786#
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of Cornwallis' argument*
At the basis of the Company's dealings with the French 
was the constitutional issue of its status in Bengal, Cornwallis 
appreciated the complexities of the situation: whereas sover­
eignty was vested in the East India Company, its servants still 
recognised the Moghul's vague suzerainty and continued to suffer 
the Naib Nazim with the criminal jurisdiction of the provinces, 
'From this complicated System founded on Grants conferred, and 
Powers assumed, of Sovereignty exercised though not avowed, many 
difficulties arise in all negotiations with Foreign Nations, and 
must ever exist whilst the same system continues'. In spite of 
the lack of a formal acknowledgement by the French government of 
these powers, Cornwallis insisted that the Fort William Council 
should regulate the trade of the French in Bengal,
In the light of these views it is hardly surprising 
that the Governor General should have been so disparaging of the 
terms of the provisional convention. He asserted the Company's 
sole right to the manufacture of saltpetre, salt and opium in 
Bengal, while expressing his extreme disapproval of the legal 
rights extended to the French, which, in his view, would create 
an 'Imperium in Imperio', By these terms 'the French are in fact 
admitted to a participation of the Sovereign Power of the Country, 
whilst the Government wherever it may exist, has not the means of
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affording redress to it 's  own Subjects, and Submits to the
Indignity of sending them for Justice to a foreign Tribunal1*
Cornwallis categorically denied the legality of such rights and
used the arguments earlier propounded by Hastings and his Council
in the 1770 's. His peroration was dramatic and lucid#
When we consider the relative situation of ourselves 
and the French in this Country, there appears a 
manifest inconsistency in admitting the free and un­
restricted operation of these suspected Firmauns# By 
a series of fortunate Events and successful struggles 
we now in reality possess the Sovereignty of the 
Country* In this Capacity we must either frame 
Regulations for the Government and Commerce of it , 
or suffer it to degenerate into Anarchy and confusion##* 
nor is it reasonable to expect that we should admit the 
operation of claims founded on an authority doubtfull 
in itself and which has long ceased to exist, to the 
subversion of our own Rights and Priviledges (sic) 
acquired and maintained at an immense Expence#1
Perhaps it was because the veteran general had fought 
the 'perfidious' French in two global wars, in Germany during the 
Seven Years' War and later in North America, or perhaps it was 
because the mind of the marquess was attuned to the imperial 
policies of Pitt and Dundas, but for whatever the reason Cornwallis 
soundly distrusted the French in Bengal and throughout the East* 
Trade could be their only legitimate end, and the Governor General 
was anxiously concerned to so hedge round their commercial 
privileges that they would never again embarrass British power in
1
Cornwallis to the Secret Committee, 16 November 1786#
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this part of the world. Although Macpherson's policy of 
gratuitous concessions was probably based on a more realistic 
appraisal of French power in the region, it was quite unacceptable 
to a ministry intent on driving a hard bargain with the French» 
Cornwallis' proposal, to allow a foreign jurisdiction only within 
the tiny French enclave of Chandernagore, was acceptable to the 
Company and the government. For over a century the Portuguese, 
the Dutch and the French had occupied small pockets of Indian 
territory both by right and by grace, and the British were now 
prepared to tolerate the fiction of a Portuguese or French India 
provided that these miniature colonies did not interfere with 
their own colossal activities as empire-builders.
At first, however, the Governor General endorsed the
action of the Council in challenging the right of the French to
hoist their national flag at Malda, Chittagong 'and places where
it is not proved that the French did rightfully hoist a Flag
before the late War'#1 The Council
thought it necessary to resolve that the Flag of his 
most Christian Majesty should be hoisted only at the 
five original Factories belonging to the French, at 
Chandernagore, Dacca, Patna, Cossimbuzar, and Ballasore, 
and at that Factory which they have been permitted to 
Establish in lieu of Jugdea,2
1
Bengal Foreign Branch. Foreign Proceedings, 12 July 1786.
2
Fort William Council to the Court of Directors, 11 November 1786,
Fort William - India House Correspondence, vol.XV, p*762ff.
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and with this decision Cornwallis naturally concurred, Dangereux
vigorously contested these assertions throughout 1786 and 1787
until Cornwallis informed him in May 1787 that the Council was no
longer bound to abide by the Cathcart-Souillac agreement.1 At
Malda a bitter quarrel ensued between Charles Grant and the French
agent who purchased from the weavers there large quantities of
cloth already commissioned and purchased by the Company# In July
1787 the Council promulgated the 'Regulations for Weavers', which
made any person who clandestinely bought cloth already commissioned
2
by the Company liable to prosecution. This was a clear assertion 
of the primacy of the Company's rights over those of the French 
and private merchants.
In November 1787 Dangereux was relieved of his duties 
and the Sieur Mottet arrived as the new chief at Chandernagore#
His administration was marked by occasional wrangles with the 
Calcutta Council over the matter of the inspection of French ships 
and French inland jurisdiction# Mottet was succeeded by Montigny, 
an able diplomat recently stationed at the court of the Peshwa, 
early in 1789#
In his zeal to reform the wasteful administration of the
1
Bengal Foreign Branch, Foreign Proceedings, 9 May 1787#
2
Bengal Foreign Branch. Foreign Proceedings, 27 July 1787# For 
further details about this dispute see A .T. Embree, Charles Grant 
and British Rule in India (London, 1962), pp*.80-2#
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Chandernagore Council, Montigny succeeded in alienating the 
support of most of the senior French officials. As the protege 
of the Comte de Conway, Govornor at Pondicherry and after 1789 
Governor General at the lie de France, Montigny was also assoc-
✓
iated with the privileged and aristocratic ancien regime. Con­
sequently when the glorious news of the outbreak of revolution 
reached Bengal in February 1790, the Governor's authority was 
generally resisted, another vivid demonstration of the problem of 
control in the far-flung outposts of empire. For a season 
Montigny attempted to work with the newly constituted General 
Assembly, but on 13 May he fled to the Dutch settlement at 
Chinsurah, Throughout the next few months Montigny feverishly 
intrigued with Cornwallis in the hope of re-establishing his power 
at Chandernagore, In September, however, Conway dismissed him 
and Montigny gave himself up to the revolutionaries. In all like­
lihood he was preserved from an unsavoury end by the intervention
of Cornwallis, who was naturally more sympathetic to the old
1
order. The diarist, William Hickey, has amusingly described 
these events.
The French revolutionary mania extended its baneful 
influence even to the banks of the Ganges, A set of 
vagabond scoundrels, consisting principally of cooks, 
hair-dressers, and fellows who had been menial servants, 
headed and encouraged by a man of extraordinary 
talents whose name was Richemont, who filled the
See Sen, The French in India . pp»455-64*
1
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elevated situation of Chief Judge in the Court at 
Chandernagore, took it into their heads to suppose 
that the Chevalier de Montigny,, . . from his near 
alliance to one of the first families of Prance, 
must consequently be unfit to preside over a respec­
table body of sans culotte Republicans- They 
therefore seized and deposed him, and but for the 
speedy interference of the English would in all pro­
bability have put him to death, A party of British 
soldiers, however, rescued him, and he was safely 
conducted to Calcutta* The desperate v illains , upon 
the chief thus being carried off, usurped the Govern­
ment, voting each other into the different public 
posts and offices, and taking possession of the 
treasury,1
The revolutionary situation continued through 1791 and
1792, for the inhabitants of Chandernagore refused to subject
themselves to any of the recognised authorities. Missions were
sent from Pondicherry and Port Louis, but even they failed to
pacify the intractable citizens. During this time Cornwallis and
his government adopted a stance of strict neutrality in their
dealings with the French, even though they must have been secretly
pleased at tho divisions in the enemy's ranks. Cornwallis, in
fact, left Calcutta late in 1790 to take command of the British
troops in the South against Tipu Sultan and he did not return to
the Bengal Presidency until after the conclusion of a treaty with
2
the ruler of Mysore in February 1792, Finally, on 11 June 1793
1
A, Spencer (e d ,) ,  Memoirs of William Hickey (London, 1925), 
vo l.IV , p .50.
2
Fòr a further glance at these events in the South see chapter 5, 
pp .240-3.
192
Chandernagore was taken by the British after they had received 
news of the outbreak of hostilities in Europe.
Thus after 1793 the French were eliminated from Bengal, 
but this is not to say that the French threat disappeared alto­
gether from the region. The entertaining Hickey could s t ill  recall 
that
after the return of Commodore Mitchell's squadron to 
Bengal (in 1796), the French privateers renewed their 
depredations against our trade, doing much mischief.
So daring and impudent were they, that a dirty little 
pariah sloop with only three small guns came to the 
mouth of the river Hooghley, there capturing two of 
the Company's pilot schooners which had considered 
themselves out of all danger.1
It is perhaps worth remembering that the French retained control
of their Indian Ocean bases until 1810,
In the thirty years between the conclusion of the Peace 
of Paris and the renewal of hostilities in 1793 British power and 
influence in Bengal grew both in extent of territory and splendour. 
Calcutta had become the metropolis of British India, a magnificent 
city of Georgian palaces surrounded by a rich and verdant land­
scape. The docks which extended along the Hooghly below the new 
fortifications bustled with activity, while on some days the 
river seemed crammed with sail. But this enormous expansion of 
trade and political influence had been consistently challenged by
1
Memoirs of V/illiam Hickey, vol.IV , p. 129.
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the French merchants and officials at Chandernagore and the lesser 
comptoirs, who remained at least a serious commercial threat to 
the profits of the Company Bahadur. Their commercial and 
political activities were strenuously controlled by the Fort 
William Council, not a little suspicious of the vaulting ambitions 
of their national rivals. And although it would be too much to 
claim that the French posed a serious military threat to the 
Company's control of Bengal after the various reforms of Hastings 
and Cornwallis, it would bo equally foolish to under-rate the 
nuisance value of the French in other areas indirectly under the 
control of the Fort William Government. The subordinate presi­
dencies of Madras and Bombay as well as the new settlement at 
Penang were now explicitly subject to Bengal in all matters of 
war, revenue and diplomacy, and the need to assist and defend 
these lesser governments against the machinations of the French 
or their native allies would be a sufficient motive to entangle 
the Supreme Government in further Indian adventures. Paradoxically, 
just when the local French threat was removed from Bengal, the 
Fort William Government was required to take up the struggle 
elsewhere.
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CHAPTER 5: ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY IN SOUTH INDIA 1765-1793
As we have already seen, the French were restored in 
1765 all the settlements and factories that they held in India 
"before the outbreak of the Seven Years' War* These comprised, 
of course, Pondicherry, the capital of the French establishments 
in India and their principal settlement on the Coromandel coast, 
Chandernagore, situated some twenty miles north of Calcutta,
Mahe with smaller subordinate factories at Calicut and Surat on 
the western coast, Karikal in Tanjore, together with the comptoirs 
at Yanam and Masulipatam, ports of the Northern Circars* After 
the return of the French, disputes and disagreements between the 
two companies flourished, especially in Bengal and the Carnatic, 
for such commercial rivalry was largely unavoidable* Chandernagore 
and Pondicherry were situated in close proximity to the two most 
important presidencies of the East India Company, Fort William 
and Fort St George#1 Indeed, such was the degree of animosity 
between the English and the French that French officials seriously 
considered establishing their Indian capital on the Malabar coast,
1
Pondicherry is situated 104 miles from Madras by road, Chander­
nagore 21 miles from Calcutta*
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away from the ubiquitous and intimidating British influence in 
southern India.
But while the day-to-day relations between the English 
and the French were concerned with matters of trade, the sparring 
for profits and commercial advantage, the English were unable and 
unwilling to forget that the French had earlier been their major 
political rivals in the Carnatic and Bengal, and might well be so 
again. Our examination of the Chandernagore incident has reveal­
ed that the French were still  feared as a grave military threat 
to the newly-won dominance of the British in Bengal. In order to 
better appreciate the local nature and significance of this 
French threat and its effect on British policy, there is need to 
examine the pattern of Anglo-French relations in the South, 
particularly in the Carnatic, While there are obvious similari­
ties between rivalry in the South and in Bengal, there are also 
impressive differences. In both cases the final outcome was 
determined by military strength and diplomatic influence, but in 
the South the resources of the two contenders were more even.
Like the French, the British had no basis of territorial power or 
revenue there, and they were confronted with a much more complex 
military situation than their contemporaries faced in Bengal* 
Although the Pondicherry garrison never amounted to more than
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2,000 troops,1 the highly unstable political situation in the 
South afforded French mercenary-agents with many more opportunities 
for intrigue and expansion.
Apart from the considerable nuisance value provided by
these condottieri, we have already noticed that the councils in
India were often alarmed at the prospect of an invasion from the
French Islands in the Indian Ocean# In the eyes of the English
the lie de France and the lie de Bourbon were being used by the
French ’ as Seminaries for keeping, training and inuring to the
Climate, a number of men from whence they may easily be transport-
2
ed to India1• Because of the secrecy of such operations, the 
English tended to overrate the strength of the French at these 
islands. Nonetheless, it was this very element of surprise and 
terror which heightened the suspicions of the Madras Council, 
whose roadstead lay exposed and vulnerable to enemy raids. And 
even when the French were deprived of their bases on the sub­
continent, as in 1773 and in 1793, control of these islands still  
enabled them to wage a highly successful filibustering campaign 
against British merchantmen in war time.
1
Usually the garrison was composed of 4-500 European troops of the 
Regiment of Pondicherry and 400 sepoys, but the exigencies of a war 
with England forced Bellecombe, the Governor, to increase the 
number of European troops to 988 and the sepoys to 1,153 in July 
1778, Sen, The French in India , pp.73-5.
2
Despatch to the Court of Directors, 14 October 1765, Home
Miscellaneous Series, v o l .99, p#282#
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Since, therefore, this chapter will be focussed on the 
influence which the fear of the French exerted on the policies of 
the Madras Council during the last thirty years of the eighteenth 
century, of necessity it will be concerned with the administrative 
difficulties of the southern presidency. Throughout this period 
numerous attempts were made by both the ministry and the Court of 
Directors in London, and the Bengal Presidency in India, to bring 
the policies of the Madras Council under some sort of control#
In the light of this development, were the policies of the Madras 
Council a matter of unco-ordinated and pragmatic responses to 
local situations as they cropped up, or were they affected by 
wider Indian and European considerations? How did the relation­
ship between the Madras Council, the Bengal Presidency and the 
metropolitan authorities evolve during this period? And what 
effect, if  any, did these administrative changes have on the 
perception and significance of the French threat in the Carnatic, 
Mysore and the Deccan?
i„ THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE SOUTH AND THE FIRST MSP RE WAR 
1765-1772
At first glance the situation of the English and the 
French in South India was least changed by the Peace of Paris, 
which attempted to turn the clock back to conditions as they had 
been in 1749 before the upheaval of the Carnatic wars. Renouncing
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all the conquests they had earlier made in the Carnatic and the 
Northern Circars, the French government agreed to recognise 
Mohammad Ali as the Nawab of the Carnatic or Arcot and Salabat 
Jang as the Nizam of the Deccan (or Hyderabad)*1 Jean Law de 
Lauriston, recently appointed Governor of the French settlements 
in India, returned to the oppressive, tropical heat of the 
Coromandel early in 1765 and was placed in possession of the 
former French capital in April# In spite of the provisions of 
the peace treaty, great changes had intervened in the last four 
years and de Lauriston was compelled to recognise that the halycon 
days of Dupleix and Bussy were now gone for ever#
All of the fortifications and many of the public build­
ings and private homes of the once opulent Pondicherry had been 
razed by the English during their occupation of the city. Hence 
the most pressing task before the new governor was the re-building 
of the capital with its defences, and the re-establishment of a 
measure of French influence in the flat, lush green countryside 
extending around the settlement# This latter objective would be 
a particularly difficult one to achieve since the Nawab was 
firmly aligned with the Madras Government* In fact, it was not 
until 1768 that de Lauriston felt his position secure enough to
1
By this time, however, Salabat Jang had been deposed and murdered 
by his brother, Nizam Ali. The Cambridge History of India, vol#V, 
p . 274#
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embark on independent policies of his own, and by this time the 
Madras Council with their roi faineant, the Nawab of Arcot, had 
alienated most of the important Indian states in the area#
The Madras Council, unlike their colleagues on the 
Bengal Council, did not attempt to establish a direct political 
control over their client state in the South, the Carnatic# After 
the victory over Lally ’ s forces at V/andewash in January 1760 and 
the capture of Pondicherry one year later, the Company turned most 
of its attention to the wealthier and more fertile province of 
Bengal, Here, in the north-east, the battles of Plassey and 
Buxar, along with the acquisition of the diwani, established the 
Company as the paramount power and revenue collector of Bengal, 
Bihar and Orissa# And in its ungodly haste to extract the maximum 
returns from this new arrangement the Bengal Council embroiled 
itself further and further in the administration and foreign 
policy of Bengal* The Carnatic, by contrast, remained of only 
secondary importance to the Company after 1765 because its revenues 
were not a sufficiently enticing proposition to induce the Madras 
Council into assuming the hazardous role of revenue collector# 
Moreover, the Nawab himself was never the positive inconvenience 
to the Madras Council that his contemporary, Mir Kasim, proved to 
be in Bengal# He was certainly capable of duplicity and devious­
ness in the promotion of his own private interests, but he rarely
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opposed the Council in a headstrong manner. Consequently the 
revenue and judicial administration remained in his hands and the 
hands of his successor until the turn of the century. Such was 
his reward.
In other ways, too, he soon became indispensable to many
of the Madras Councillors. The Company's servants discovered
that they could make a comfortable living by lending him large
sums of money at the customary high rates of interest.
At Madras, the Company's servants had early discovered 
how to turn the military necessities of Indian princes 
to their own advantage. Usurious interest was an est­
ablished feature of Indian economic life . Nothing was 
simpler than to provide European military equipment at 
prices which Indian rulers could not pay, thereby est­
ablishing debts which v/ere seldom, if  ever, liquidated.1
It was an ironical fact, then, that the Nawab's borrowing, which
increased substantially throughout his reign, assured him of a
greater degree of independence and control than his wealthier
counterparts possessed in the North. Since most of his creditors
were represented on the Council, the Nawab was enabled thereby to
exert a real measure of influence over the foreign policies of
the southern presidency 'and was sure of a following even when the
2
Company or the governor was positively opposed to his designs'.
1
Purber, John Company at Work, p*21.
The Cambridge History of India . vol*V, p .273.
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As far as he was able to, the Nawab tried to promote 
his own schemes during the next quarter of the century, but this 
outside influence was only one of several pressures that contrib­
uted to great confusion in the dealings of the Council with its 
neighbouring Indian states. The constitution of the Madras 
Presidency had altered little since the early eighteenth century 
and it was scarcely an efficient or reliable instrument for 
deciding on a consistent set of policies. In size, the Madras 
Council varied from ten to sixteen members, while nothing could 
be determined except by a majority of votes. Any member could 
move a resolution but the Governor had no powers to override his 
Council*1 He was truly primus inter pares. Factious, divided 
and cumbersome, the Madras Council provided an excellent field of 
opportunity for private adventurers wanting to feather their own 
nests. And the French, together with the other enemies of the 
Company, did not fail to exploit these many weaknesses of govern­
ment.
Furthermore, the Council's traditional autonomy was 
being eroded by other pressures, this process being especially 
noticeable in time of war, The Council became increasingly 
dependent on financial remittances and military aid from Bengal,
1
B, Sheik Ali, British Relations with Haidar Ali (1760-1782) 
(Mysore, 1963), p p .6-7#
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the new and dynamic centre of the Company's power in India and 
the East, Such assistance enabled the Madras Council to sustain 
its various wars against Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan, since it was 
during the 1760's that the formidable and expansionist power of 
Mysore emerged to threaten the southern settlements of the 
English and the French, In 1773 the Bengal Council's supervisory 
powers over the lesser presidencies were strengthened by the 
Regulating Act, as has already been noted, though the ambiguous 
and largely ineffective provisions of the Act were constantly 
disputed by the rival government at Madras#
Finally, it was during this period that the British 
ministry itself attempted to intervene in the affairs of the 
Madras Council# John Macpherson's mission to London in 1767 as 
the agent of the Nawab was the first of several efforts made by 
the Nawab's powerful creditors to influence the policy of the 
Imperial parliament.1 Almost simultaneously, the ministry sent a 
special plenipotentiary to India with powers to deal with the 
native powers, but such early efforts at metropolitan control were
1
Macpherson, who was employed by the Nawab as an agent to the 
Court of St James in 1767, appears to have exerted pressure on 
Viscount V/eymouth to have Sir John Lindsay's powers extended to 
include relations between the Nawab and the Madras Council# See 
'A Short Memorial of Services rendered to his Highness the Nabab 
of the Carnatick, Waulaujah etc. etc ., by John Macpherson whom he 
sent upon a Secret Commission to His Majesty's first Minister of 
State in 1767 ', Home Miscellaneous Series. vol#110, pp#503-ll#
Also p . 215'- below.
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inept and uncertain# Owing to all these diverse and conflicting 
pressures the Council found it impossible to pursue a coherent 
policy at a time when it was particularly necessary to do so#
The territories of the Nawab of the Carnatic extended 
in a narrow belt along the coastal plain of the Coromandel, en­
circling the possessions of both the English and the French# 
Accordingly, the Carnatic was vulnerable to attack from one or a 
coalition of the three large powers to the west and north-west - 
Mysore, the Maratha Confederacy and Hyderabad. With the slow 
disintegration of Moghul power in central India during the early 
eighteenth century, the Marathas had emerged as the likeliest 
successors to the great Moghul emperors until the disastrous 
defeat inflicted on them by the Afghans at Panipat in 1761#1 
Henceforth an uneasy equilibrium was established between the 
Confederacy and the other competing powers, now augmented by a 
bellicose Mysore and a quarrelsome government at Madras intent 
on a policy of 'divide and rule '.
Mohammad Ali, resentful of the ability and pretensions 
of the upstart ruler of Mysore, sought to poison relations between 
the Madras Council and Mysore# Technically the Nawab of the
1
For a recent account of the vicissitudes of these Indian states in 
the eighteenth century see Chapter X XIII, 'Rivalries in India' by 
C.C. Davies, in The New Cambridge Modern History (vol#VII,
Cambridge, 1963), pp#541-65#
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Carnatic was also a feudatory of Hyderabad, the large kingdom in 
the Deccan which had grown powerful and independent of the 
Moghuls under Nizam-ul-Mulk, although Clive had secured the 
Nawab's release from these obligations in a firman from Shah Alam 
in 1765# The present ruler of Hyderabad, Nizam Ali, who was in 
the eyes of the English as unscrupulous as the Nawab of the 
Carnatic, fomented divisions between the other powers and the 
Madras authorities, hoping thereby to profit from any protracted 
territorial conflict. In such a situation war was clearly un­
avoidable#
Yet the Madras Council was drawn into the First Mysore
War to secure and preserve the territories of the Nawab, and not
to extend them* Initially  the French threat had relatively little
impact on the Council's policies, although Basalat Jang, the
brother of the Nizam and the ruler of the Guntur Circar, had a
number of French officers in his service who were willing to come
to the Nizam's defence. For the most part, however, the French
remained passive spectators of this conflict despite their efforts
1
to act as intermediaries in the latter stages of the war. The 
strength of the French at the Islands also remained an unknown
1
See the letter from Madras, 23 July 1769, in French in India, 
vol#IV, for the British allegations about French complicity in 
Hyder's schemes. There are numerous references to the war in de 
Lauriston's correspondence, Françaises Nouvelles Acquisitions, 
vol*9365.
205
factor and caused the Council alarm at critical phases of the 
campaign#
The origins of the first war against Hyder Ali are to 
be discovered in the various attempts made by the Madras Council 
on behalf of their protege, the Nawab of the Carnatic, to gain 
control over the Northern Circars, strategically situated between 
the Company*s territories in Bengal and the southern presidency.
In 1765 Clive acquired from Shah Alam II  a firman conferring on 
the Company possession of these Circars, which the Nizam had 
earlier ceded to de Bussy at the height of French influence in the 
Deccan. At first Nizam Ali resisted any change involving his 
territories, but in a treaty concluded with John Cailliaud on 
12 November 1766 he agreed to give the Company five of the Circars 
in return for an annual rent of nine lakhs. The Madras Council 
also pledged itself to provide the Nizam with troops if  ever he 
should need them, the tribute being remitted every year he might 
call on such assistance. To propitiate the Nizam, the Council 
also agreed to leave Basalat Jang in possession of the Guntur 
Circar, In spite of these polite formalities there seems little 
doubt that the Nizam, envious of his parvenu cousin of Mysore, 
planned to use this offensive and defensive alliance against 
Hyder Ali.
Hyder Ali, after extending his influence westwards to the
206
the Malabar coast, hoped to expand northwards, but his efforts in
this direction were blocked by the Nizam and the Marathas, who
had recently joined the Nizam’ s coalition* The Madras Council
quite reasonably suspected the intrigues of the Nizam and so as
to dissuade the Indian states from attacking the Carnatic the
Council resolved to throw their weight behind Nizam Ali. Thus
the decision to send Colonel Joseph Smith with a detachment to
Hyderabad was intended to prevent the formation of an alliance
dominated by Mysore and directed against the Nawab of Arcot’ s
domains* But there is also evidence to suggest that the Nawab and
the Council were seeking - rather prematurely perhaps - to
establish a preponderant influence over the politics of the South
and the Deccan by waging a victorious war against Mysore and the
Marathas* The Board’ s reasoning on 16 November 1767 was that
#**the grand point we ought to aim at is to have the 
Carnatic, Mysore country and the Deccan so much under 
our influence that no disputes or jealousies may arise 
between the several governing powers, and that we may 
be able by this system to lay the foundation of 
internal tranquility in these countries by which means 
alone the Marathas can be kept in bounds#1
In fact, it was this need to ensure stability on the frontiers of
their existing possessions and their client states that was
increasingly to determine the British response to the complex and
changing pattern of Indian alliances*
Quoted in Sheik Ali, British Relations with Haidar A li« pp#95-6#
1
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Nevertheless, the Council was also concerned about the 
possibilities which a successful and expansionist Mysore would 
provide for French political ambitions in the region. They in­
formed the Court of Directors on 21 September 1767 that the 
reduction of Hyder Ali was
the only means of giving Peace to the Carnatic and 
Stability to the Company’ s Possessions, for it is not 
only his troublesome disposition and ambitious Views 
now that we have to apprehend, but that he may at a 
favorable (sic) opportunity or in some future War, 
take the French by the hand to re-establish their 
Affairs, which cannot fa il being productive of the 
worst of Consequences for your possessions on this 
Coast, he has money to pay them, and they can spare 
and assemble Troops at the Island and it is reported 
that he has already made proposals for dispatches to 
the French King or Company in Europe*1
The Maratha forces were first to engage Hyder Ali in 
battle, but after some minor skirmishes they concluded a peace 
with Mysore, In April 1767, the Nizam, assisted by Colonel Smith 
and the Company's forces, invaded Mysore, advancing within sight 
of Bangalore. However, the Nizam then proceeded to defect to the 
side of Hyder Ali* The ensuing conflict between the Madras 
Council and Mysore was a protracted and indecisive affair and 
while Smith won some impressive victories he was unable to con­
solidate them because of a defective commissaTiat, the major
1
Extract of the letter from President and Council of Fort St George 
to the Court of Directors, 21 September 1767, Home Miscellaneous 
Series, vol*99, p#34«
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obstacle in waging war in the hill country of the South. And so 
the war continued desultorily enough until December 1768, when 
Hyder's force entered the fertile, low plain of the Carnatic 
’ burning and destroying the Face of the whole Country, and 
plundering and murthering the Inhabitants’ *1 The fear of a French 
invasion now reached serious dimensions, for throughout 1768 the 
Council had received reports of a massing of French forces at the 
Mauritius« 'We have lately learned by Private Advices', they 
wrote,
that the French are now actually collecting a Body of 
Troops at the Islands, which it is said to consist of 
30 Companies of 100 Men each,«,«This Force it is 
imagined is to be kept in readiness to proceed to 
India, on the first News of a Rupture, and there is 
little reason to doubt but that they will immediately 
attach themselves to some of the Country Powers and 
none can more favor (sic) their Purpose than Hyder Ally, 
who, from his Situation Riches and former Connection 
is best able, and in all appearance well inclined to
afford their Assistance . 2
Such fears seemed further corroborated by the news that 'the 
Islands were taken Possession of by the French King in June 1767' 
and that 'the Ships from Europe brought about 300 regular Troops,«,# 
and 'twas common talk, they wou'd this season be reinforced to
3
compleat the number of 3 ,000 '«  Evidently the French threat was
1
Letter from Madras, 23 July 1769* French in India, vol,IV .
2
Extract from Company's Separate General Letter from the President 
and Council at Fort St George dated 11 May 1768, Home Miscellaneous 
Series, vol«99, p*194#
3
Account of the State of the French Islands of Bourbon and France 
received from Captain Steward of the Neptune. 1768, Home Miscell­
aneous Series, vol«99, p , 319#
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not simply a product of the turbulent circumstances of Indian 
politics; as we have already noted, the threat posed by the 
French in the late 1760's was also derived from their naval and 
military strength at the Islands and the belligerence of Choiseulfs 
diplomacy in Europe*
In March 1769 Hyder Ali appeared on the outskirts of 
Madras and proceeded to dictate terms to the Council* As a last 
desperate measure the Council concluded a defensive alliance with 
him in April 1769.
V/hen nev/s reached London of Hyder A l i ’ s devastation of 
the Carnatic and the growing concentration of French forces at 
the Islands in May 1769, the East India Company found itself in 
dire financial straits. Its ’ stock promptly fell from 273 to 250 
and by the middle of June was down to 2 3 9 Alarmed by the 
lamentable state of the war, the Court of Directors decided to 
appoint a commission with all the powers and authority of the 
Court to investigate the Company’ s affairs in India. The three 
commissioners, Henry Vansittart, Luke Scrafton and Francis Forde, 
were empowered to ’ Superintend direct controul conduct manage and 
Transact All the Business and Affairs’ of the Company ’ in and 
thro’ all parts of India ’ , including, of course, relations between
1
L .S . Sutherland, The East India Company in Eighteenth-Century 
Politics (Oxford, 1952) > p. 191*
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the individual presidencies and the Indian states*1 It is clear
from the detailed instructions that they received from the Court
that some satisfactory settlement of the war with Hyder Ali,
together with the prevention of a war with France, were major
considerations behind the appointment of a commission. If  the
war were still in progress when they reached Madras, they were to
ensure that an attack was launched against Hyder's capital.
Otherwise they were instructed to restore peace in India 'upon a
solid and permanent Basis1 and were to inform the Indian powers
that it is by no means the Intention of the Company, 
to encroach upon their Neighbours, or to acquire an 
extension of Dominion by Conquest; and that it is 
their determined Resolution, always to adhere to, and 
keep inviolable, the Faith of Treaties, and to confine 
their views to the Revenues of Bengal and their 
present Possessions.
In other words, the commissioners were expected to curb the 
acquisitive and unruly instincts of the Madras 'nabobs', who were 
supposed only to be interested in shaking the pagoda tree, and 
impose order on the foreign policy of that recalcitrant presi­
dency. These instructions expressed a spirit of cautious withdrawal 
from the embarrassing and expensive entanglements of Indian 
alliances and wars, and as far as the Court was concerned the only 
legitimate objectives of the Madras Council were 'the Protection
1
The three commissioners were appointed on 14 June 1769. A copy of 
the amended commission, which they received from the Court of 
Directors on 28 July 1769, is to be found in Home Miscellaneous 
Series, vo1«100, pp*347-53*
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of the Carnatic, and the possession of the Circars, free from all 
Engagements', and the support of 'the Subah of the Deckan,»**.even 
without the Circars, preserving only Interest enough over any 
Country Pov/er, who may hold them, to keep the French from settling 
in them'*1
Furthermore, the notorious scandal of the Nawab of 
Arcot's debts was to be investigated by the commissioners, who 
were told 'for the future to prevent all Abuses and injustice in 
Transactions of this Sort1* Finally, they were to assess the 
French forces in the East and speedily transmit home full and 
accurate accounts of the strength and disposition of French forces 
at the Islands and in India* After putting into the Cape, however, 
the three commissioners, who sailed in October 1769, were lost at 
sea»
As Lucy S* Sutherland has shown in her study of the East 
India Company in British politics, the background to this commission 
was somewhat confused by the desire of the Chatham Ministry to 
intervene directly in the Company's affairs in India* The need 
for some form of parliamentary supervision had been felt since
1
The detailed instructions from the Court are in Home Miscellaneous 
Series, vol#100, pp*399-433- The despatch continues: 'I f  we pass 
these bounds we shall be led on from one Acquisition to another 
't i l l  we shall find no security, but in the subjection of the whole, 
which by dividing your Force, might lose us the whole, and end in 
our extirpation from Hindostán'# (p#403)*
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Clive’ s acquisition of the div/ani, but the opportunity for further
intervention was now afforded by the Company’ s desire for greater
naval assistance*1 When on 17 March 1769 the Chairman and Deputy
Chairman of the Court of Directors requested from the government
further naval support in the East, they instanced the extent of
piracy in the Persian Gulf and the military preparations of the
French at Mauritius as evidence of the menace to the Company’ s
possessions# From the numerous and various reports they received
from their servants they were led to believe that the French
intended ’ to strike some important Blow in India ’ , and the fear
which transcended everything else was the conjunction of a French
2
naval attack with a full-scale war against the country powers* 
Their appeals were renewed on 25 May and 9 June* ’Yet, My Lord, 
it is our Duty to declare, that We feel Ourselves at all Times in 
danger from the French, who must behold with an Eye of Jealousy &
3
Mortification the general Situation of our Affairs in India’ .
1
Believing that the Company had derived enormous v/ealth from the 
Bengal revenues, the state indirectly intervened in the Company’ s 
business in the hope of securing relief for its increased financial 
liabilities# In 1767 the Company agreed to give the state annually 
the sum of £400,000 in return for the continuation of its charter 
until January 1769 when a similar arrangement assured the Company 
of an independent existence for a further five years* See 
Sutherland, The East India Company, chapter V II , and Harlow, The 
Founding of the Second British Empire, vo1*11, pp*41-68*
2
Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the East India Company to 
Lord Weymouth, 17 March 1769, C .O* 77 /21.
3
Chairman and Deputy Chairman to Weymouth, 25 May 1769} C«0. 77 /21.
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Lord Weymouth, the Secretary of State for the Southern
Department and a man generally distrustful of the Company’ s
foreign policy, hoped to exploit the Company’ s fears in order to
establish the Crownfs ascendancy over the Company in the delicate
1
matters of foreign policy and relations with the Indian states#.
His distrust of the Company’ s agents was strengthened by the
French ambassador’ s submission of a m/moire in June 1769 which
2
complained of British oppression in Bengal# It urged the Ministry 
to intervene in the affairs of the merchants and ensure that 
justice would be done to the French in India» By July Weymouth 
was ready to appoint Sir John Lindsay as the Commander in Chief 
of the naval forces in the East, but he insisted that the Company 
recognise and endorse those powers which the Crown claimed for 
Lindsay* Weymouth’ s ploy, therefore, was to get Lindsay appointed
1
As we have already seen, in another context, there was a tradition 
of distrust between the Crown and the Company’ s officials# Shel­
burne had strongly disapproved of the concessions which the Bengal 
Council had given to the French at Chandernagore# In November 
1768, Weymouth disapproved of the Company's dilatoriness in inform­
ing him of their decision to establish an entrepot at Balambangan* 
(See chapter 6, pp,260-5). The Secretary of State was concerned 
lest their support for Dalrymple’ s scheme might involve the 
British government in disputes with the Spanish#
Later, in July 1769, Weymouth requested the Court of Directors 
to provide him with all the information it had received concerning 
the French, He suspected that it had been concealing intelligence 
from him#
2 „
The memo ire, dated 8 June 1769, was received from Chatelet in 
London on 16 June 1769. The French complained of great difficulties 
in collecting the cloths from the districts, of attacks against 
their settlement, particularly Patna, and of the Calcutta Council's 
obstructions to the building of a ditch around Chandernagore. 
s.P . 78/278, pp.153-62.
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as one of the reforming commissioners but when this failed he
required that Lindsay be given powers to treat with Hyder Ali, the
Marathas and other Indian maritime states, provided that such
powers did 'not interfere with the Commission,. « -or v/ith the
Governors and Councils of the Four Presidencies, if the Commission
does not take Effect1. 1 In spite of Weymouth's dogged persistence,
however, the Company was only prepared to concede Lindsay a
commission to treat with the Indian powers in the Persian Gulf
and enjoined 'that his Character as their Plenipotentiary must
cease after he has finished the Object of his Business in the
2
Persian Gulph'. The Directors categorically refused to invest 
Lindsay with ministerial powers even if these powers still left 
him subject to their servants in India. Weymouth countered their 
arguments with the assertion that the King could not in 'Dignity 
and Justice .. . .  trust the Execution of his Engagements with other 
Crowned Heads in any Hands but his own*, a reference doubtless .to
3
relations with the French and the Spaniards in the East. More­
over, he claimed that, since the King had acknowledged 'the Legal 
Title of certain Princes in India to their respective Dominions’ , 
diplomatic relations v/ith the Nawab of Arcot and the other states
1
R. Wood to Secret Committee, 11 July 1769, C .O . 77/21#
2
R. Wood to Chairman and Deputy Chairman, 26 July 1769, C»0» 77/21.
3
Weymouth to the Court, 15 August 1769, Home Miscellaneous Series« 
vo1*100, p#487#
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v/ere really within the prerogative of the Crown#1 The Secretary 
of State firmly insisted that the admiral share in the delibera­
tions and resolutions of the Council ’with regard to the two 
Objects of Peace and War, where His Majesty's Forces are employed1# 
But the East India Company and especially its servants in the 
East proved almost as stubborn in their defence of chartered 
and ’ constitutional’ liberties as the American colonists were 
proving to be#.
These issues remained unsettled# Consequently Lindsay
took with him public instructions from the Company and the Crown,
and private ones from Weymouth# It is hardly surprising that
there were substantial discrepancies between these private
instructions and those approved by the Company# The Company’ s
commission, issued on 5 August, limited his diplomatic r3le to
the countries surrounding the Persian Gulf, though he was to be
recognised as the Commander-in-Chief of the Company’ s naval forces
2
’ through all parts of India ’ » On the other hand, the commission 
he received from the Crown authorised him ’ to enquire how far the 
Eleventh Article of the Definitive Treaty of Peace1 had been 
complied with by the French and the Spanish, and further 'to treat
1
Weymouth to Chairman and Deputy Chairman, 10 August, Home 
Miscellaneous Series, vol#100, p#447. At this juncture in the 
negotiations, Macpherson warmly recommended to Lindsay, 'the 
support of the Nabob'# Home Miscellaneous Series, vol#110, 
pp#503-11#
2
Lindsay’s commission from the Company, Home Miscellaneous Series, 
vo1#100, pp#431-3.
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v/ith any of the Princes or Powers in India, to whom the above 
Eleventh Article may r e la t e '.1 However, these public instructions 
were merely the thin edge of the wedge, for Lindsay received 
extensive secret instructions from Weymouth which directed him to 
investigate the state of French fortifications and troops at 
Chandernagore to determine whether they involved an infraction of 
the peace treaty or not; and to examine the many arbitrary pro­
ceedings of which the French so vociferously complained in Bengal,
alleviating their hardships if they were oppressed by the Company's
2
servants* He was also authorised to enquire into the causes of
the war with Hyder Ali and the conduct of the Madras Council
towards the Nawab of the Carnatic. Weymouth, swayed perhaps by
the importunities of the Nawab's agent in London, declared that
there was great reason to fear that
the Nabob of Arcot has been treated in a Manner by no 
means correspondent to the friendly Stipulations, which 
His Majesty procured in his favour at the Company's 
Request; and that the Company’ s Servants, from selfish 
and unjustifiable Motives inconsistent with good Faith, 
repugnant to the true Interests of the Company, and 
contrary to the Engagements of the Crown, have kindled 
that War, which has involved both the affairs of the 
Nabob and the Company in their present Difficulties .^
1
Lindsay's commission from the King, 7 September 1769, Home 
Miscellaneous Series, v o l .101, pp .53-6.
2
On 11 June 1770, Lindsay was actually deputed as the plenipotent­
iary to treat with Law de Lauriston over the Chandernagore ditch 
affair. Weymouth to Chairman and Deputy Chairman, 11 June 1770, 
Home Miscellaneous Series, v o l .102, p .331#
3
Lindsay's Secret Instructions, 13 September 1769, Home Miscell­
aneous Series, v o l.101, p p .101-31#
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Thus Lindsay was instructed to ’make the strictest Inquiry into 
their Conduct tov/ards the Nabob of Arcot, since the late Peace, in 
order to judge, how far it has co-incided with His Majesty’ s 
friendly Declarations, and with the Eleventh Article of the last 
Treaty’ . If  the Madras Council remained obdurate in their refusal 
to provide Lindsay with the relevant information, he v/as to appeal 
directly to the Nawab for assistance. Apart from making a full 
enquiry into the details of the Balambangan venture, he was to 
assess as carefully as possible ’ the State of the French Forces 
at the Mauritius, and in other Parts of India ’ , He was to try and 
find out 'how far the French have promoted the present Disturban­
ces in India, by encouraging Hyder Ally, and supplying him with 
Money, Arms, or officers; all which is disclaimed by them at 
home’ , Lindsay was informed:
The great Strength of the French in India is , no doubt, 
at the Mauritius; tho’ they have repaired, in a great 
measure, the Fortifications of Pondicherry, and have a 
Garrison there, it is in that Island they are provided 
with Stores to equip the Company’ s large Ships for War; 
and the Difficulty of Access to it , from the necessity 
of warning into the Port, makes it easy for them to 
conceal what they are doing* As the French King has 
sometime ago taken that Island out of the Hands of their 
Company. . . i t  becomes highly proper to pay the strictest 
attention to the next Steps, which the French will take 
with regard to that Place of Strength and Magazine for 
Military Stores,
Although it was scarcely necessary, the Secretary of 
State emphasised that the object of Lindsay's commission was of
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'the utmost National Importance' since 'the Servants of the 
Company, both at home and abroad, are too much taken up with 
partial and selfish Schemes, to admit the liberal and enlarged 
Consideration of Indian Affairs which includes the Good of the 
Whole'#1
From the Cape Lindsay sent home intelligence about the
state of the French forces at the Islands* Their numbers, accord-
2
m g  to his informants, ranged from 3,500 to 4 ,500  men# In April 
1770 the admiral arrived at the western Presidency of Bombay, 
where almost immediately he encountered opposition from a resent­
ful Council* The Councillors strongly objected to Lindsay's 
interference with their external policies, for Lindsay soon came 
to espouse an alliance with the Marathas against Hyder Ali, who 
he considered to be the gravest threat to the Company's possessions 
in the South and the West, In fact, Lindsay spent the greater 
part of his time in the Persian Gulf and in efforts to conclude 
an alliance with the Marathas, While at Bombay Lindsay wrote to 
the Madras Council, expressing his disapproval of their recently 
concluded treaty with Mysore, 'Everyone agrees', he declared,
3
’ that the French assisted Hyder Ally with Arms and Ammunition'#
1
Secret Instructions, Home Miscellaneous Series, v o l .101, pp#127-8,
Lindsay's despatch from the Cape, 27 December 1769, C«0, 77 /53, 
p#14#
3
C.o . 77 /53 , p. 13.
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To his consternation, on reaching Madras in August 1770,
the Council refused 'to pay him any honours as the King's
Plenipotentiary, not having had any Intimation of those Powers
from the Directors’ , 1 The Council also declined to attend the
Nawab’ s reception of the King’ s letters and presents, ’excusing
Themselves on the Degradation it would be to Them in the Eyes of
2
the Country Powers’ . Such pointed gestures were intended to 
convey to the admiral that his plenipotentiary powers would not 
be recognised by the Councillors because they believed that such 
wide and unprecedented powers ’would diminish their Consequence 
and make it be thought by the People of the Country, that They were 
to be crushed like the French Company’ , As they refused to 
provide Lindsay with papers of their dealings v/ith the Nawab, the 
royal plenipotentiary turned to the Nawab himself, who 'after 
some Fluctuation in his Behaviour, from fear of the Resentment of 
the Governor and Council, at last entered into a very full and
4
confidential Communication of all His Grievances'. Indeed, it 
seems more than probable that the Nawab exercised a considerable 
influence over Lindsay from this time on, particularly over the 
matters of intervention in Tanjore and the Mysore alliance,
1
C.O. 77 /53 , P .19. 
2 
C.O . 77 /53 . p . 20. 
3 
C .O . 77 /53 , p .20.
4 ' '
C .O . 77 /53 , P .22.
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However, Lindsay's powers were revoked early in 1771, 
when the new Secretary of State, Lord Rochford, decided to appoint 
Admiral Sir Robert Harland as Lindsay's successor,1 The instruct­
ions which Harland received on 15 March 1771 were considerably 
more moderate in tone than Lindsay's had been, and this was seen
in some quarters as a triumphant vindication of the Company's
2
autonomy« Nonetheless, Harland still met with strong resistance 
from the members of the Madras Council when he arrived in India* 
Unanimous for once, the Councillors denounced his powers as 
'unconstitutional', a charge which the admiral interpreted as 
'directly pointed at the royal Authority, and the undoubted rights 
of the Crown’ , Harland naturally wanted to promote his own 
policies with the Indian states, though his views on Indian
1
Rochford to Lindsay, 1 February 1771, Home Miscellaneous Series, 
vol#103, p ,116, Earlier, on 10 October 1770, Lindsay had appealed 
to Weymouth for permission to return home for reasons of health# 
Lindsay to Weymouth, 10 October 1770, Home Miscellaneous Series, 
vol,103 , p .125#
2
'Lord Rochford directs Sir Robert, in the King's Name, to use his 
utmost Endeavour to reconcile The Nabob, and the Company's Servants, 
recommending to the Latter the most Conciliating Behaviour towards 
that Prince'# C .0 , 77 /53 , p*38#I
3
From Harland, 25 December 1771, C .0 . 77 /22 , Harland declared his 
stand in the following terms: ' I  acknowledge I am still  of opinion 
that the reserve of Sovereignty in all charters, establishes a 
right in the Crown, to send Ministers to India, as well as to any 
other foreign Power? and that the Royal Assent is Absolutely 
necessary to distinguish the Publick Treaty which binds the 
Nation, from the private agreement, which is obligatory on 
individuals only'# Harland to the Madras Council, 4 January 1772,
C .0 . 77 /22,
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diplomacy were also influenced by his friendly association with 
the Nawab. Like his predecessor, he strongly favoured an alliance 
with the Marathas and endorsed the Nawab's attack against Tanjore. 
But though the Council protested ’unfeigned allegiance and 
inviolable attachment to His Majesty's most sacred person and 
Government', they defiantly asserted that they were not authorised 
to divulge secrets to His Majesty's plenipotentiary,1
Thus the first attempt by the Crown to exercise its 
powers of supervision over the Indian presidencies was stubbornly 
resisted by the entrenched interests at Madras, the arguments they 
employed in defence of their 'constitutional' rights being 
analogous in many ways to those so ardently propounded by the 
American colonists. Colonial pressures and interests were in 
conflict with the centralising plans of the Imperial parliament, 
and in this, the first round, the peripheral pressures dominated.
While Lindsay and Harland achieved surprisingly little 
in India, their appointment marked the first serious and sustained 
attempt by the Crown to influence directly the external affairs 
of the Company* It was in large measure the fear of the French 
that had impelled the Ministry to act and which made the Company 
at home, if  not in India, more amenable to its wishes. The threat
1
Madras Council to Sir Robert Harland, 23 December 1771, C .O* 77 /22 .
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apprehended by the Court of Directors and the British government 
was a product of the marshalling of French forces at the Islands 
and the tumultuous war in the South on the one hand, and the 
revanche diplomacy of Choiseul on the other. However, the 
failure of the two admirals to direct or curb the policies of the 
Madras Council witnessed the zenith of that Presidency's independ­
ence. Its foreign policy was not moulded by the French at this 
stage, despite v/hat its members might claim or fear, but by the 
kaleidoscopic quality of Indian politics* And the powerful 
influence of the Nawab and his creditors was immeasurably more 
effective in determining these policies than the puny efforts of 
the Crown's officials* Expansion, if we can so call it , was 
unplanned and unwanted, the fruit of selfish and grasping instincts 
at the edge of empire. Conveniently the French remained a 
potential, though not at this time an actual, threat, providing 
their traditional rivals with the perfect justification for an 
adventurous game#
ii* THE FRENCH THREAT IN THE SOUTH TO 1785
During the 1760's and the 1770 's the administrators and 
officials of French India at Pondicherry, particularly the Governors 
Law de Lauriston and the Marechal de Bellecombe, sustained a 
voluminous correspondence with the metropolitan authorities* the 
Ministries of Marine and Foreign Affairs. Apart from providing
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a critical and shrewd examination of the policies of the Bengal 
and Madras Councils, these despatches presented the home author­
ities with a number of elaborate plans which the French government 
was urged to accept as the basis of its diplomacy in the East.
As we have seen in the context of Bengal, the French advocated 
the stirring up of native revolutions against the British. They 
were led to believe that the ills of British rule, stemming from 
the mistake of assuming territorial sovereignty, were sufficiently 
grave as to provide the French with a superb opportunity to act 
as liberators. ’Notre rupture avec les anglais est inevitable 
d ’ ici à deux ou trois ans’ , wrote one memorialist,
a moins de se résoudre à abandonner entièrement le 
Commerce de l ’ Asie, et de supporter patiemment les 
insultes qu’ ils ont déjà fait à notre pavillon et qui 
se multiplieront chaque jour* Si le gouvernement est 
determine à soutenir ce commerce il  n ’ y a pas un instant 
a perdre pour preparer les Moyens de s ’opposer avec ^ 
succès a l'abus que les anglais font de leur puissance.
This writer then proceeded to describe the strategy by which the
French would subvert the Company's power in the East Indies. The
essence of his plan was the strengthening of the forces at the
Ile de France and Pondicherry, a measure repeatedly advocated by
Memoire sur la situation Respective des français et des Anglais, 
aux Indes Orientales, contenant le Tableau exact de la politique 
actuelle, des forces, et des Ressources des princes de l'Indoustan, 
et un plan d'offensive à Executer dans cette partie, dated Paris
4 February 1770, Colonies 2 54 . p .131#
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de Lauriston and Chevalier.1
De Lauriston, impressed by the wealth and influence 
that the British had gained from the conquest of Bengal, argued 
that the French should concentrate their major assault against this 
northern province, and for a time he seriously thought of estab­
lishing Chandernagore as the capital of the French establishments.
For him, Bengal was the trunk of the tree v/hereas Madras and
2
Bombay were only the branches# He therefore endorsed with 
enthusiasm the schemes of his junior at Chandernagore until 1767, 
when he turned to the idea of forming alliances with the Marathas 
and Mysore, In all such schemes of native diplomacy de Lauriston 
emphasised the transitory and unstable nature of the Indian 
balance of power* As far as he could see the chances for defeat­
ing the British in the Carnatic would depend on the speedy 
despatch from France of a large expeditionary force to the Islands# 
For success in this enterprise supremacy at sea would be an
1
The writer recommended, too, that, on the first news of the out­
break of hostilities in Europe, the administration at Mauritius 
should be instructed to send an expedition of 3,000 men to attack 
Calcutta. 'Calcutta une fois pris tout le Bengale est a nous, 
Suja-Daulah et les autres princes du Nord, pressant les Anglais 
d'un cote tandis que nous les presserons de l'autre, ils seront 
bientôt réduits dans cette partie ', (p .136*)
2
The phrase was Chevalier's. 'C 'est  (i*e* Bengale) le tronc de 
l 'arbre , une fois qu'on le tient, l'on  est bieniiot maitre de 
toutes ses branches'. Chevalier to Praslin, 10 January 1769, 
Françaises Nouvelles Acquisitions, vol#9366, p,7#
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indispensable requirement if  the French were to land a large 
force in the South and intercept British reinforcements sent from 
Bengal to Madras*1 In spite of his early support for an attack 
against Bengal, de Lauriston came to believe that the French 
force would be more wisely employed in operations against Madras, 
Masulipatam or Bombay.
The consolidation of French naval and military strength
at the Islands was one important outcome of this policy. After
the Crown's assumption of the administration of the lie de Bourbon
and the lie de France in 1767 their defences were strengthened and
the military force increased to something like 5 ,000  men, if  the
2
contemporary English accounts are to be relied upon* By 1774 the
population of the two small, mountainous islands had increased to
6,386 whites, of whom 955 were soldiers (though almost all men
over the age of 21 were subject to some form of military training),
3
and 25,154 slaves, mainly imported from Madagascar and Africa, 
Visiting English sailors invariably commented on the impressive 
fortifications at Port Louis,
1
For a more elaborate treatment of de Lauriston's schemes see Sen,
The French in India, pp .154-72*
2
See, for example, Chamier's report from Paris, 23 March 1769, Home 
Miscellaneous Series. vol#100, pp*81-3j further letter dated 27 
March 1769, pp*87-9; and Report of Captain Lockhart Russell to the 
Court of Directors, 24 July 1772, Home Miscellaneous Series, v o l ,106, 
pp*191-249*
H.C.M. Austen, Sea Fights and Corsairs of the Indian Ocean (Port 
Louis, 1935), p .35-
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In order that the task of resisting and obstructing the 
English might be co-ordinated and simplified the metropolitan 
government was advised by its servants in India to re-organise and 
centralise the administration of the various settlements east of 
the Cape* The reforms of 1773 which brought the administration 
of French India in line with France’ s other colonial possessions 
were to some extent a response to these recommendations, but it 
was not until the return of the French to India in 1785 that all 
the settlements were brought under a Governor General at the 
Ile de France*
Despite their considerable and ambitious political 
designs, the establishments of the French in India remained in a 
parlous state for most of the inter-war period, from 1765 until 
1778* The French government under Louis XV was reluctant, i f  not 
positively unwilling, to fortify Pondicherry and provide it with 
the necessary military force. In fact, during this period there 
were never more than 1 ,000 soldiers at Pondicherry and usually 
there were far fewer, while the sepoy regiments counted for 
no more than another 1 ,000  soldiers* Against these
227
meagre resources.. . , the English had 3 5 ,OOO sepoys 
in Bengal, 20,000 on the Coromandel and Orissa Coasts, 
and 15,000 on the Malabar Coast. They had about
10,000 European troops in all, 4 ,000 in Bengal, about 
the same number on the Coromandel and Orissa Coasts, 
and 2,000 on the Malabar Coast#1
The English were also, of course, possessed of the Bengal revenues,
which proved to be an enormous advantage in the wars against the
princes and the French# In 1778, on hearing of the outbreak of
war between England and France in Europe, the English swiftly
captured all the French settlements, though the French put up
a fight at Pondicherry.
And yet even when they had subdued all resistance in the 
French settlements the British were not entirely liberated from 
their apprehensions about the French. The devious intrigues of 
French mercenaries and agents provocateurs in the 'mofussil1 still  
constituted a very real menace to the British position in the 
South and in the West. Invasion fears also haunted the minds of 
the Company's servants, who could not forget the ease with which 
Madras fell to the assault of Dupleix by land, and la Bourdonnais 
by sea, in 1746.
In Europe, the accession of Louis XVI in 1775 entailed 
a change in the conduct of French foreign policy. The pusillanimous 
and ineffectual d'Aiguillon was succeeded by Vergennes, a seasoned
Sen, The French in India. p#l61#
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diplomat cast in the mould of Choiseul, and the Naval Ministry 
was taken into the capable and energetic hands of de Sartine. 
Interest was again revived in the schemes of de Lauriston and 
Chevalier, and embassies were sent to some of the principal states 
of the sub-continent# French ambitions reached their apogee in 
1780 with the emergence of a daunting coalition aimed at destroy­
ing the British power in India# However, the development of this 
united Indian front was not simply a tribute to the guiles and 
brilliance of French diplomacy, though the British tended to look 
upon it in this light* It arose primarily from the grievances 
which each of the powers believed it had suffered by the rise of 
the Company - grievances exacerbated by the ambiguous and con­
tradictory policies pursued by the individual presidencies*
We have already seen that the Madras Council was 
incapable of adhering to a consistent set of policies because it 
was riven by dissension* Lindsay and Harland succeeded only in 
antagonising the Council, but Lord Pigot, whose policies were 
extremely unpopular, was deposed and arrested by his Council in 
1776* His feckless attempt to restore the Rajah of Tanjore to 
his territories, although supported by the Court of Directors, 
had alienated the Nawab and his influential creditors#1
The Cambridge History of India, vol«V, pp#279-80*
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Such turmoil did little to reassure the Indian states 
that the Council’ s intentions were pacific# Consequently Hyder 
Ali encountered no difficulty in forming an alliance with the 
other powers against the English and their Nawab. Earlier the 
Council's refusal to assist him with arms and men in his war against 
the Marathas caused him to lose faith in the professions of the 
English, since they had been formally allied with him by the 
treaty of 1769# A number of border incidents also occurred between 
Hyder Ali and the Nawab of Arcot, thus worsening relations between 
the two powers* Misunderstanding was further fostered by the 
belief, commonly held by the Madras Council, that Hyder Ali was 
especially sympathetic to the French. In point of fact Hyder Ali 
was intent on his own private aggrandisement and only marginally 
concerned with aiding and abetting the French#
Besides antagonising the ruler of Mysore, the Madras 
Council had also outraged the Nizam by its repeated efforts to 
take over the Guntur Circar, which had been given to the Nizam's 
brother for life in 1768. Their justification for this was simply 
that Basalat Jang had openly encouraged the French by entertaining 
a large number of them in his service. After the capture of 
Pondicherry in October 1778, President Rumbold negotiated a settle­
ment with Basalat Jang by which the Circar passed under the 
influence of the Nawab of the Carnatic# Incensed by this action
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and more particularly by the Council's refusal to pay the annual 
rent for the Northern Circars, the Nizam resolved to teach the 
English a lesson* He concluded an alliance with Hyder Ali and 
the Marathas* The Marathas were to attack Bombay, Berar would 
attack Bengal, the Nizam would seize the Circars and Hyder Ali 
would once more invade the Carnatic*1
The rapid formation of this grand coalition, designed 
of course finally to expel the British from India, is evidence of 
the growing tensions between the various centres of British power 
and their neighbouring Indian states* For the Bombay Council in 
the north-west had also embroiled itself in the tortuous intrica­
cies of native diplomacy. Intent on acquiring the outposts flank­
ing Bombay Harbour, Bassein fort and the islands of Salsette, 
Kenery, Hog, Elephanta and Karanja, which were held by the 
Marathas, the Council had sided with Raghunath Rao, a contender 
for the hereditary Peshwaship at Poona* Through their agent at 
Poona, Thomas Mostyn, the Bombay Council promised Raghunath Rao 
military assistance if he would cede them the coveted islands* 
Fearing a resurgence of Portuguese power in the area, the Council 
resolved on 28 November 1773 to obtain possession of Salsette for 
the Company, and by the end of 1774 the British had reduced all
Sheik Ali, British Relations with Haidar A l i , p#200*
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opposition on the island* On 7 March 1775 the Treaty of Surat 
was concluded with Raghunath Rao by which the Bombay Council 
agreed to provide him with a force of 2,500 men in return for 
Salsette, Bassein and the islands in the vicinity of Bombay^
However, the issue was further complicated by the attempts 
of Hastings and the Fort William Council to enforce the provisions 
of the Regulating Act. They soon stepped in and ordered a stop 
to the war in which the Bombay Council was involved after February 
1775« The appointment of Lieutenant Colonel Upton by the Bengal 
Government as a plenipotentiary to treat with Poona resulted in 
the Treaty of Purandhar of 1 March 1776 and a precarious peace 
with the Maratha ministers. But the Bombay Council was bitterly 
dissatisfied with the terms of this treaty and they continued to 
support the cause of Raghunath Rao,
The intrigues of the Poona ministers took on a more 
sinister light when an accredited ambassador from the French court 
arrived at Chaul on 16 March 1777# Pallebot de Saint-Lubin, an 
adventurer who had earlier ingratiated himself with the Madras 
Council during that Presidency's struggle against Hyder Ali,
1
For a recent study of the events leading up to the Treaty of Surat 
see S.N . Sen, Anglo-Maratha Relations during the Administration of 
Warren Hastings# 1772-1785 (Calcutta. 1961)V p p .1-40» and for 
Franco-Maratha relations generally V .G . Hatalkar, Relations between 
the French and the Marathas (1668-1815) (Bombay, 1958). ~
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succeeded in persuading the Minister for Marine, de Sartine, of 
the many advantages to be derived from an alliance with the 
Mar at has*
France was to send a body of troops to the assistance 
of the Poona Government, and in return she was to 
secure a port on the western coast, preferably Chaul, 
complete freedom of trade in the Maratha dominions 
and assurance of Maratha protection of her settlements 
in India against English attacks*
On his arrival in western India he was welcomed with great pomp 
and circumstance by the Peshwa's chief ministers, Nana Farnavis 
and Sakharam Bapu, and his intricate diplomacy was jealously 
watched by Mostyn, the Bombay Council's representative at the 
Peshwa's durbar* Mostyn's reports of the formation of an alliance 
between the Marathas and the French persuaded the Bengal Govern­
ment to take a firmer line with the Peshwa and to despatch a force 
overland to strengthen the forces of the Bombay Council* 'We 
cannot help being exceedingly alarmed', the Fort William Council 
confided to the Court of Directors, 'at the steps which are taking 
by the French to obtain a settlement on the Malabar Coast, so near 
to Bombay, and to establish a political influence in the Mahratta 
State, the immediate object of which must be the overthrow of your 
p
settlement#*' Hastings avowed that 'a ll  the public advices from
1
Sen, The French in India« p#182#
2
Fort William Council to Court of Directors, January 1778, from 
G.W. Forrest, Selections from the Letters, Despatches« and other 
State Papers preserved in the Foreign Department' of the Government 
of India 1772-1785 (3 vols. Calcutta, 189Q1). v o l .2. p .591.
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Bombay and Poona, corroborated by intelligence through other
channels, prove beyond a doubt that the French have already formed
a close and intimate connection with the ruling administration of
the Mahratta State1, and that their acquisition of Chaul was 'but
a door for the introduction of arms and troops into the Mahratta
country'« The Governor General also considered that it was
incontrovertible, that if  a detachment of much less than
1,000 Europeans, with arms for disciplining a body of 
Native troops in the European manner, shall have once 
obtained a footing in the Mahratta Country, as the 
allies of that Government, all the native powers of 
Indostan united will lie at their mercy, and even the 
Provinces of Bengal be exposed to their depredations*^
From his correspondence with the lesser councils it is plain that
Hastings took French intrigue very seriously indeed* Though he
did not believe that Bengal was directly threatened, he certainly
believed that the French could profit greatly from the many
embarrassments of the Madras and Bombay Councils,
Meanwhile the over-ambitious Bombay Council had embarked 
on a disastrous war policy, which resulted in the humiliating 
Convention of Wadgaon in January 1779, Virtually all the territorial 
gains made over the last six years were returned to the 
Marathas* Hastings automatically disowned the treaty and sent
1
Hastings' minute, Secret Department, Fort William, 23 February
1778, from Forrest, Selections, vol.2 , pp*592-3*
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Colonel Goddard with a large force to cross the Deccan to relieve 
the Bombay Presidency, provocative actions which cemented the 
coalition of the Marathas, Mysore, the Nizam and Berar directed 
against the Company. Hence in 1780 the southern and western 
presidencies found themselves with their backs to the sea, fight­
ing for their very lives.
It was during this critical period that the Governor 
General for the first time imposed on the subordinate Indian 
councils a co-ordinated strategy of resistance. Naturally 
Hastings met with the usual opposition from his fellow Councillors, 
especially Philip Francis who considered that the Fort William 
Council should interest itself only in the immediate affairs and 
problems of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. By contrast, Hastings 
confidently asserted, on hearing of Burgoyne’ s surrender at 
Saratoga, that
if it be really true that the British arms and influence 
have suffered so severe a check in the Western World, 
it is the more incumbent on those who are charged with 
the interest of Great Britain in the East to exert 
themselves for the retrieval of the national loss#
Not that we should act upon the defensive and 
wait t ill  the designs of our enemies are ripe, and 
they have chosen their own time to carry them into 
execution, but that we should provide for the safety 
of Bengal by obviating the impending dangers, and by 
rendering their attempts abortive before the time 
destined for their birth . 1
1
Hastings’ minute, Secret Department, Fort William, 22 June 1778, 
from Forrest, Selections« vol#2, p ,632#
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Other historians have examined the means by which 
Hastings averted disaster in the grim years of the American War, 1 
and it is not necessary here to re-capitulate these successes* 
Suffice it to say that the Governor General bought off hostile 
powers wherever he could, despatched money and men to Madras and 
Bombay, and forced his Council to take an active interest in the 
predicament of the other settlements. By the time the Trench 
government was ready to send an expeditionary force to India the 
Marathas were negotiating a separate peace with Hastings’ envoy* 
The Treaty of Salbai, which finally secured Bassein and Salsette 
Island for the Bombay Presidency, followed in May 1782.
In July 1780, however, Hyder A li ’ s cavalry swept through 
the Carnatic, and Hastings was forced to take up the problems of 
the Madras Council. Immediately he despatched the Commander-in- 
Chief, Sir Eyre Coote, to assume command of the armies in the 
South. The ensuing campaign was involved and indecisive, being 
further complicated by the re-appearance of the French as a naval 
and military power. It was at this point that the wider ramifi­
cations of the American and European struggle impinged on the 
conflict in India. We have already examined the interest shown by 
the North Ministry in a scheme to attack the Dutch and Spanish 
settlements in the East Indies, and we have also seen how this
1
See in particular K. Feiling, Warren Hastings (London, 1966), 
chapters XVI-XX.
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project was transformed into an expedition to take the Cape after 
the Dutch entry into the war. 1 Suffren, of course, beat the 
English squadron to the Cape and then proceeded to the Indian 
Ocean, eventually capturing Trincomalee in August 1782.
On receiving news of the failure of the Johnstone-
Medows expedition in October 1781, the Secret Committee of the
Court of Directors again pressed on the government the need to
capture the Cape, or to find some other provisioning base suitable
for their convoys of merchantmen. Moreover, in that same month
the Court of Directors were informed that the French government
had commissioned the marquis de Bussy to return to India with a
2
substantial naval and military force*
During 1781 Bussy had been approached by the Ministry,
now determined to strike some decisive blow against Britain in the
eastern sphere of her empire# The veteran general outlined the
chief merits of a French expedition to India:
The most powerful Princes offer to join us against the 
common enemy as soon as they see us appear in force; and, 
i f  the revolution were such as one could expect were 
suitable measures adopted, it would, by depriving the 
British of a part of those establishments from which 
they derive their chief resources, certainly compel the
1
See chapter 2, pp#67-9#
2
Laurence Sulivan and William James to the Earl of Hillsborough,
31 October 1781, Home Miscellaneous Series, vol*154, p*287#
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Court of London to ask for peace. 1
Bussy insisted that the proposed expedition should 
consist of 8,400 regular troops and ten ships of the line, and he 
believed that 10,000 sepoys could be quickly raised in India once 
the force had landed. Leaving France in February of the next 
year (1782), Bussy planned that the force would reach the H e  de 
France in July. From this island base the French would be well 
placed to launch an attack against Bombay, fa port where your 
Majesty's squadron would find security and the means to refit in 
case of accidents due to weather or war, without having to return 
to the Isle de France', or Surat, ’ a rich town with every sort of 
commodity, should it be found that Bombay can only be captured by 
regular s i e g e T h e n  the French would assist the general of the 
Moghul Emperor, 'who only awaits this reinforcement to attack the 
English in the Upper Ganges', and induce Hyder Ali 'by a similar 
operation to invade the Provence (sic) of Arcate and to advance 
on Madras, the squadron attacking the place at the same time from 
the s e a ',^
The instructions which Bussy eventually received stressed 
the liberating role that the French were to assume in India# The
1
De Bussy's Appreciation of the Projected Expedition to India in 
1781, Appendix I I  of H. Richmond, The Navy in India 1763-1785 
(London, 1931), p#389#
2
Richmond, The Navy in India. p#391.
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preamble, for instance, stated that the French, ’ having succeeded 
in redressing the wrongs suffered by the American Colonies from 
the King of England, and delivered them from the tyranny and 
oppression to which they had been subjected1, had decided to 
effect ’ the compleat re-establishment of the ancient government 
and free independence of the Indians ’ #1 The very wording echoed 
the despatches of Chevalier and Lav/ de Lauriston#
Since the details of Bussy’ s expedition and campaign
have been described elsewhere in the works of Colonel G.B. Malleson,
2
Admiral Sir H# Richmond and most recently S .P . Sen, there is no 
need here to narrate the details* The war against Mysore dragged 
on until Bussy arrived at Cuddalore in April 1783# But before he 
could accomplish anything news reached India of the conclusion of 
peace preliminaries in Europe* Eventually a peace treaty was 
signed with Tipu Sultan, the successor to Hyder Ali, in March 1784, 
which restored the territories of the Nawab of the Carnatic and 
Tipu to the ante be Hum status quo#
1
Copy of a Project given by the Sieur de Bussy, and making no# 6 
of his Dispatches, Minutes of 14 August 1783, Minutes of the Secret 
Committee 1782-1806, p*224# See also the Instructions given to 
the Sieur de Bussy, Minute of 16 August 1783, Ib id ., pp#234-47* 
and the Orders in explanation of Instructions delivered to the 
Sieur de Bussy, Minute of 16 September 1783, Ibid# pp#253-66#
2
G.B. Malleson, Final French Struggles in India and on the Indian 
Seas 1778-1816 (London, 1878); H. Richmond. The Navy in India 
1763-1783 (London, 1931); and S .P . Sen, The French in India, 
especially chapters 9-13#
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Thus the conjunction of a global war with a series of 
localised wars in India had seriously jeopardised the security of 
the Company's possessions in the East and especially in the 
Carnatic. Once more the spectre of a French invasion began to 
torment the minds of the usually unruffled servants of the 
Company, and this time there was some substance to the threat* 
This crisis forced the Supreme Government in Bengal to take the 
dominant r£le in directing operations against the French and 
their country allies. From Calcutta came the armies and the 
resources which repulsed and turned back the enemy, and from the 
Governor General emanated precise and detailed instructions on 
subjects that had once been the exclusive concern of the Madras 
Council* Conflicts between Bengal and Madras, thinly disguised 
throughout the war, erupted after the peace. Hastings ordered 
that the assignment of the Carnatic revenues which the Nawab had 
temporarily transferred to the Madras Government for the better 
conduct of the war be returned to the Nawab. Lord Macartney, the 
Governor of Madras, refused to do this and later resigned when the 
Court of Directors confirmed Hastings' direction. Although the 
situation was still complex, the traditional independence of the 
Madras Council was gradually being supplanted by the Supreme 
Government at Fort William, and this tendency was accelerated in 
the last decades of the eighteenth century*
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i i i ,  THE FINAL PHASE
We have seen already in the preceding chapter that the 
restitution of territories to the French was delayed until February 
1785 because of certain difficulties over the return of Trincomalee 
to the Dutch* 1 Bussy died a disappointed and bitter man eaily in 
1785 and the government was administered by Coutenceau des Algrins 
until the vicomte de Souillac arrived from the lie de France in 
May 1785- Soon after he returned to the Islands to take up his 
appointment as Governor General, Pondicherry being left in the 
hands of Charpentier de Cossigny-
Gradually the French state was succumbing to the lethal 
effects of national bankruptcy exacerbated by its expensive inter­
vention in the American War, and while Vergennes showed a passing 
interest in the exploration of the coasts of Asia and the new
lands in the Pacific he was disinclined to spend money on the
2
defenceless settlements of the French in India# Indeed, the 
legislation of May 1785 which further centralised their administ­
ration in the East implied the shifting of the capital from 
Pondicherry to Port Louis, and this had its eventual sequel 'in  
the withdrawal of all European troops, munitions and other military
1
Chapter 4 , P P #157-8.
2
For his patronage of scientific expeditions see chapter 6 , 
pp*281-3-
stores to the Isle of Prance1*1 Henceforth rigorous economies 
were practised by the governors to reduce the expenditure of the 
town, but these measures only succeeded in antagonising its 
merchant inhabitants*
Therefore, when Pondicherry learnt of the outbreak of 
revolution and the toppling of the ancien regime in France, a 
comic opera situation soon developed. On 25 February 1790 the 
aggrieved citizens established their own replica of the National 
Assembly, opposing any further attempts to reduce the Pondicherry 
garrison and clamouring for the formation of a citizen militia# 
Governor de Fresne, the Mirabeau of the piece, tactfully agreed 
to their wishes and attempted to humour the more permanent body, 
the Committee of 65 Representatives, The revolutionaries sent 
two delegates to present their case before the august National 
Assembly itself«
The revolution in India reached its crescendo with the 
convening of a Colonial Assembly, representative of the citizens 
of Pondicherry, Chandernagore, Karikal, Yanam and Mahe', for 
6 July 1791, However, the fraternal spirit of the revolutionaries 
was riven by sectional considerations and the Chandernagore
241
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enrag/s disowned their more timid cousins at Pondicherry# By 1793 
the revolution was appropriately threatened by counter-revolution­
aries, the English, who after a three weeks' siege took charge 
of the town on 23 August 1793#1
In spite of the eager reception of Burke's Reflections 
2
by the British in India, it is difficult to see how they could 
have been greatly disturbed by these dramatic events. However, 
the fear of France, whether royalist or revolutionary, was still
closely related to the political situation in South India, since
i
French agents and soldiers continued their association with the 
courts of the Nizam, Tipu and the Peshwa. ' I  look upon a rupture 
with Tipu as a certain and immediate consequence of a war with 
France', wrote Cornwallis in March 1788, 'and in that event a 
vigorous co-operation of the Marathas would certainly be of the
3
utmost importance to our interests in this country'# In that 
year Tipu Sultan sent the first of his embassies to France in the 
fond hope of extracting naval and military assistance from her. 
Later, with the coming of the revolution, Tipu fervently planted
1
See Sen, pp#435-51*
2
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the tree of liberty in his capital, welcoming assistance from the 
lie de France and from the Directory in Paris.
During this decade two further wars were waged against 
the 'lion of Mysore', the first being conducted by Cornwallis 
himself after 1790« The peace of February 1792 resulted in the 
cession of half Tipu's territories to the Nizam and the English, 
the first substantial acquisition of territory to the British since 
Clive’ s conquest of Bengal« Lord Mornington, who succeeded to 
the Governor Generalship in the grim days of 1798 when Napoleon 
was preparing for his assault on Egypt, was alarmed by the open 
consorting of Tipu with the French at Port Louis« In order to 
vanquish the power of Tipu once and for all he embarked on the 
Fourth Mysore War in 1799« Seringapatam was besieged and Tipu 
Sultan killed*
But Mornington had also resorted to the Subsidiary 
Alliance system as a means to eliminate French influence from the 
sub-continent* In September 1798 his envoys were successful in 
negotiating a treaty with the Nizam by which the Nizam promised 
to give up Colonel Raymond and his French officers in return for 
military assistance from the Company* While gaining a greater 
measure of security by this measure, the Nizam lost control of 
foreign relations*
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The Governor General's close involvement in the wars 
against Mysore implied a further and more effective subordination 
of the southern presidency to the demands of the Supreme Govern­
ment« In fact, it was not until Mornington took the affairs of 
the Madras Council firmly in hand that the complicated problem 
of the Nawab's debts was finally resolved. On the death of the 
Nawab, a son of Mohammad A li, in July 1801, the Governor General 
used the evidence of his complicity in Tipu's schemes to assume 
the charge of the government of the Carnatic, The new Nawab was 
paid a fifth  of its revenue as a pension,
V/ he re as many wars were fought in the South over this 
thirty year period, it was only at the end of the century that the 
Company began to acquire direct political control over extensive 
territories as Clive had done during the 1760 's in Bengal, The 
four great wars waged by the Madras Council were struggles for 
survival rather than efforts at empire-building. Indeed, the 
accession of new territories came as an unwanted and largely 
unforeseen consequence# All of these struggles involved the 
menacing power of Mysore and all in varying degrees were intended 
to eradicate French influence in the South# Although we have seen 
that the fear of the French was usually excessive, based more on 
the unknown factor of French strength at the Islands than on a 
realistic assessment of French resources at Pondicherry, nonetheless,
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it did exert a considerable influence on the policies of the 
Madras Council* Perhaps the most significant result of these 
wars, apart from the extension of British influence throughout 
the southern peninsula, was the establishment of firm control by 
the Supreme Government and the Governor General over the wayward 
and incorrigible Madras Council. The selfish interests and 
schemes of the Nawab and his creditors needed to be curbed if 
the Madras Presidency were to play a satisfactory râle in the 
establishment of Wellesley's paramountcy over the Indian states*
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CHAPTER 6 : ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE 
EASTERN SEAS 1763-1793: SOME REPERCUSSIONS
The overwhelming majority of disputes and disagreements 
between the English and the French in the East in the latter half 
of the eighteenth century occurred in India, where the interests 
of the European trading companies were most soundly established.
We have seen already how in Bengal, the cockpit of the East India 
Company’ s power and influence in Asia, the French discovered them­
selves a much persecuted minority, and we have seen the outcome 
of the acrimonious wrangles which proliferated there* In the 
South, on the other hand, the French attempted in a more enthus­
iastic fashion to re-establish their political influence, but 
they only succeeded in forcing the presidencies at Madras and 
Calcutta to assume greater responsibility in Indian affairs* In 
spite of the concentration of earlier chapters on commercial and 
political developments in Bengal and the South, it is worth 
remembering that the trading activities of these two European 
powers extended throughout the region of the Indian Ocean and the 
Eastern Seas - from the Cape to Canton - and that the ramifications
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of Anglo-French global rivalry were felt in these exotic areas as 
well# For with the beginnings of a territorial empire in Asia, 
the Company and the British government, whose partnership was 
consolidated by the pressures of war and the legislation of Pitt, 
became acutely concerned to secure the trade routes to India and 
China# In an attempt to forestall their most persistent rivals 
from annexing strategically located islands and harbours on the 
way to the 'gorgeous E ast ', the British acquired a network of 
island bases and naval stations around the littoral of the Indian 
Ocean# Such moves paralleled earlier British intervention in the 
politics of the Coromandel since it was the fear of the machin­
ations of a rival power that precipitated involvement in both 
cases#
In turning now from questions of native diplomacy and 
armed strength to those of maritime expansion and sea-power, it 
must be recognised that there v/as no hard and fast distinction 
between the two in the eighteenth century# The trading contacts 
that the European merchants established throughout this wider 
region, no matter how superficial or transitory, usually involved 
some attempt to penetrate the indigenous political structure# It 
was only in the case of the British in India, however, that such 
involvement led to the wholesale acquisition of territories, 
though it should be remembered that the Dutch too were gradually
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extending their authority over the island of Java*
From their two bases in the Indian Ocean the French 
in war time could harry and destroy British trade with India and 
China, and during this period the French government consolidated 
its strength at Port Louis« The ministry also considered found­
ing settlements at other islands which were closer to the Indian 
mainland, notably the Seychelles and Diego Garcia, and small 
establishments were formed there in the 1770fs and the 1780's*
At the same time the French also showed a considerable, if 
intermittent, interest in countries to the west of India, missions 
being sent to Muscat, Baghdad, Basra and the other native states 
which bordered the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf* In fact, 
numerous memoires were devised and submitted to the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry advocating the establishment of trade links with 
the East through Suez and the Red Sea* British naval power in 
the Indian Ocean would be outflanked by such means, and in 1785 
a secret trade agreement was signed with the Mameluke Beys of 
Egypt. In 1788 Volney lucidly expressed the strategic rationale 
behind this new interest in Egypt, Muscat and Persia: 'Par
/  y /
l'Egypte, nous toucherons a l 'Inde , nous rétablirons l'ancienne 
circulation par Suez et nous ferons deserter la route du Cap de 
Bonne-Esperance' «1 With the advent of Napoleon this desultory
1
Quoted in H* Prentout, 'Un Neutre d'Asie pendant la Revolution et 
Les Guerres Napoléoniennes', Revue de L'Histoire des Colonies 
Françaises, V (1917), p*203*
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interest in colonising Egypt and constructing a canal at Suez 
merged into a coherent strategy aimed at undermining the British 
power in India#
But French interest also grew eastwards from India to 
embrace various states on the way to China# Under the vigorous 
direction of the marquis de Castries the Ministry of Marine made 
a concerted effort after the American War to increase its know­
ledge of the East, and it found willing allies in the missionary
/  /  *  \  
orders. The interest of the Societe des Missions Etrangeres 
extended from Tonkin and parts of southern China to Annam and 
Cochin China in the centre and south of present-day Vietnam, and 
such religious and cultural ties as it established were streng­
thened and diversified by the dealings of French country traders 
based on the lie de France and Pondicherry,
Although for most of the century the European companies 
had an offioial monopoly of the trade between Europe and Asia, 
they were prepared to indulge their employees in the lucrative 
and clandestine trade which flourished between the Indian, African 
and Asian ports# This inter-Asian carrying trade, or the country 
trade as it was termed, involved both Arab and Indian merchants* 
the original controllers of the trade, and Europeans of all 
nationalities# It was, in fact, the handsome private gains from 
this trade that usually drew young men to the East since their
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official salaries were so meagre. In the earlier part of the 
century the country trade was mainly concentrated between the 
west Indian ports, Bombay and Surat, and the Persian Gulf,
Muscat, Arabia and Zanzibar, whereas after 1750 the trade rapidly 
expanded eastwards via Malaya and the East Indian archipelago to 
China, 1 The companies were prepared to cast a blind eye at this 
breach of their monopoly privilege because the regional Asian 
trade alleviated the drain of specie from Europe to the East.
For traditionally the major obstacle to oriental commerce had 
been the extreme difficulty of finding European goods which the 
Indians and Chinese were prepared to accept in return for silk , 
cotton piecegoods, tea, drugs, saltpetre, pepper and porcelain.
Of necessity the companies were forced to export massive quantit­
ies of specie to finance their trade, a deplorable development in 
a mercantilist age, Louis Dermigny has estimated that in the 
period 1719-1762 specie comprised 68,58 per cent of all European
2
exports to India, and 86,33  per cent of European exports to China,
1
For a thorough treatment of the country trade in the eighteenth 
century see Furber, John Company at Work, especially chapter V.
2
Of all the bullion exported to the East, China received 81,41 per 
cent in the period 1766-1792, and 62,25 per cent in the period 
1793-1801, These figures are taken from Louis Dermigny's masterly 
study of the China trade - La Chine et L'Occidentr Le Commerce a 
Canton au XVIII e Si^cle 1719-1833 (3 v o ls ,, Paris, 1964) , vol, 2t~ 
p ,734 . There are a number of excellent graphs and diagrams, indi­
cating the major changes in the eastern trade, in the 'album'. 
Detailed statistics are provided in the appendices of E .H , Pritchard, 
Anglo-Chinese Relations during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries, University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences» 
vo1 ,XVII, nos. 1-2 (Urbana, 1929),
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After the Peace of Paris the problem was further 
exacerbated by the rapid expansion of the Canton trade in response 
to the growing demand for tea in Europe, especially in England* 
Largely as a result of P itt 's  Commutation Act of 1784, which 
reduced the duties on tea from 119 to 12|- per cent, there was an 
astronomic increase in the East India Company's tea sales in 
England, By substantially reducing the price of tea the Act 
undermined the clandestine trade of the continental companies, 
who relied on smuggling vast quantities of tea into England via 
Cornwall, the Isle of Man and Ireland* The English, in this 
process, acquired a national taste for the beverage# After 1785 
the Company's trade with China flourished as never before, while 
that of her continental rivals seriously declined# The Company's 
tonnage, which stood at 9,239 in 1780, reached 18,144 by 1789, and 
the number of the Company's ships engaged in the trade rose from 
12 to 21 in the same period* Of the 17 ,419 ,906  pounds of tea 
exported from Canton in 1779 the Company's sales in England amount­
ed to 6 ,733 ,202  pounds, while in 1791 the Company purchased 
17 ,262 ,258  pounds of the 19 ,480 ,307  pounds sold at Canton#1 Apart
from the official trade, the private and unofficial country trade
2
expanded enormously, but yet the balance of payments problem still
1
These figures are taken from the tables in Pritchard, Anglo-Chinese 
Relations, p p .155-76#
2
'English "country" tonnage, which stood at 4 ,000 in 1780, had 
reached 25,000 by 1790, and every contemporary observer testified 
to the phenomenal increase in the number of English 'country' ships 
in the China Seas in the mid-1780's', Furber, p*r74*
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remained extremely acute* To some extent the problem was eased 
by Clive's victories in Bengal, which enabled the East India 
Company to exploit the Indian revenues and Indian trade to pay 
for its Canton investment, though the problem was not finally 
solved until the turn of the century with the large-scale export­
ation of Bengal opium and Bombay cotton to Canton#
The growth of British interest and activity in areas to 
the east of the Bay of Bengal during the latter half of the 
eighteenth century has been most often explained as a response to 
these economic difficulties* 1 The drain of specie from Europe 
and India to Canton rendered necessary the establishment of a 
commercial emporium to the east of India, which would attract 
Chinese products, notably tea, in exchange for Indian textiles, 
saltpetre, opium and cotton, and spices from the Malay archipel­
ago, And it would also free the trade from the vexatious customs 
and restrictions which applied increasingly at Canton after 1757# 
Yet it is the central argument of this chapter that the rival 
interests and activities of Frenchmen in areas outside of India
1
See, for example, K .C , Tregonning, The British in Malaya : The 
First Forty Years 1786-1826 (Tucson, 1965), which argues on p«5 
that 'the trade in tea,###was the basic impulse that led to the 
expansion of British power in the Far East, and as a corollary, 
in Southeast Asia as well'# See also D.K. Bassett, 'British 
Commercial and Strategic Interest in the Malay Peninsula During the 
Late Eighteenth Century', in Malayan and Indonesian Studies, ed*
J .S . Bastin and R. Roolvink (London, 1 9 6 4 ) , pp#1 2 2 - 4 0 ;and 
Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, vol*H , pp*329-65«
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provided as important an inducement for intervention as the 
economic pressures per se« Such an explanation as this - which 
sees the French as important 'précipitants1 of action - seems a 
more satisfying one than the current orthodoxy of economic 
motivation, because while the economic problem remained constant 
throughout the period under consideration, British officials 
only acted when there was some reasonable evidence of a threat to 
their possessions or interests* Nevertheless, this is not to 
dispute or to distort the significance of commercial pressures as 
long-term causes of expansion. Rather it is the attempt to place 
them in a political and strategic context neglected by other 
historians,
i« THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH AND THE SWING TO THE EAST 1763-1778
Since their first appearance in the East during the 
seventeenth century the French had been interested in the various 
states of Southeast Asia, although with the British their trading
establishments were more or less restricted to India* However,
/ / / \ 
the Société des Missions Etrangères, founded at Paris by letters
patent from Louis XIV in 1663, was entrusted with the task of
propagating the Catholic faith in Thailand (or Siam), Cochin China,
Annam, Tonkin and southern China* 1 Together with other missionary
1
G. Taboulét, La Geste Française en Indochine : Histoire par les
textes de la France en Indochine des origines a 1914 (2 v o ls ./  
Paris, 1955), vol*I, p*24* '
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orders - the Jesuits, Dominicans and the Franciscans - the French 
priests established contact with the ruling houses of these 
polities, in spite of periods of savage persecution* Except for 
the abortive intervention of Louis XIV in the domestic affairs 
of Thailand in the 1 6 8 0 's ,1 however, the French failed to concern 
themselves directly with the political vicissitudes of these 
states.
From the early eighteenth century French missionary 
ardour began to flag, and French associations with the region 
became more commercial in nature. The voyages and writings of 
Pierre Poivre shed valuable light on the new interest of the 
French, and also foreshadow the arguments and schemes of his 
English counterpart, Alexander Dalrymple, Poivre, a Lyonnais
✓ X
attached to the Missions Etrangeres, left France for the East in 
1740 with the intention of becoming a missionary and learning 
Chinese, After a term in Cochin China (1742-43), he relinquished 
his ties with the missionary order and proceeded to Canton, where
1
For details of the intrigues of Constant Phaulkon and the French 
in Thailand sée D*G*E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (London, 
1955)> p p ,304-14* and E.V/* Hutchinson, Adventurers in Siam in the 
Seventeenth Century (London, 1940),
2 ' “  ’ "  ............
Poivre's own account of these events has been edited and published 
by Henri Cordier under the title , 'Voyages de Pierre Poivre, 1748- 
1757'} in Revue de 1 'Histoire des Colonies Françaises, VI (1918), 
pp ,5-88, See also Charles B,~ Maybon« Histoire fioderne du Pays 
d'Annam (1592-1820) (Paris, 1919), p p ,156-67*
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he remained for a year. In 1746 he was wounded in a naval 
engagement with Commander Barnett's squadron, and spent the next 
few years acquiring an extensive and detailed knowledge of the 
country trade with Canton, Cochin China, Thailand, Mergui and the 
Malay archipelago* While at Batavia he learnt much about the 
spice trade, deciding at last that the French could best overcome 
the Dutch spice monopoly by acquiring an entrepot port in Cochin 
China and also by the cultivation 'des plants et des graines 
fraiches des deux epiceries' at their islands in the Indian Ocean, 
On his arrival at the lie de France in 1746, he persuaded Governor 
David to support his plans, David then recommended these schemes 
to the French government, and in 1748 Poivre himself returned to 
France, where he proposed to the syndics of the Compagnie and the 
Naval Minister both 'l'ouverture d'une nouvelle branche de commerce 
a la Cochin Chine et l'etablissement d'un comptoir dans ce Royaume',
✓
and ' 1 ' acquisition des plants d'epiceries fines pour les trans­
porter dans nos lies de France et de Bourbon' , 1
Duly impressed by the wealth of his knowledge and the 
logic of his argument, the Compagnie commissioned Poivre to 
occupy some 'point d'appui' in the China Seas, which would attract 
trade from the neighbouring islands and states, and facilitate 
the growth of French trade with Canton, When he reached
Cordier, 'Voyages de Pierre Poivre', p ,16#
1
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Pondicherry, however, he was informed of Dupleix’ s own consider­
able activities in Pegu and Cochin China, It appears that 
Dupleix intended to exploit the civil war which had flared up in 
Burma between Alaungpaya and the Mons in order to form settlements 
at Bassein, Syriam, Martaban and Mergui*1 Valuable teak supplies, 
used in the construction of country ships, were the major
inducement for French and British interest in this region, though
2
strategic considerations were also important. But Dupleix, an 
adventurous and successful country trader as well as an able 
diplomat, was eager to establish comptoirs further eastwards in
3
Cochin China as an adjunct to the Canton trade. In spite of his 
antipathy for Poivre, therefore, the Governor provided him with a 
ship of 600 tons, the Machault, for his expedition to Cochin 
China,
Poivre encountered a sympathetic reception at Faifo
1
An able short account of the inter-action between French and 
British moves in Burma in the 1740's and 1?50’ s is in D .G .E . Hall’ s 
introduction to Symes' Journal of his Second Embassy to the Court 
of Ava in 1802 (London, 1955) t pp,XIX-XXV, See also P, Preschez', 
’ Les relations franco-birmanes aux XVIIIe et XIXe Siecles’ , in 
Fran ce-Asie, Printemps-Ete 1967> p* 288 ff,
2
Dupleix’ s letters and instructions to the French envoy sent to 
Syriam in 1751> which reveal the motives for his involvement, are 
located in the Colonies’ 21 collection, pp ,1-18, at the Archives 
Nat ion ales*
3
For Dupleix’ s dealings with Cochin China see Taboulet, La Geste 
Française en Indochine, v o l ,I ,  p p ,118-23; 134-38,
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(Hoi-nan) in 1749, and the prince - presumably Vo-Vuong1 - pressed 
Poivre to stay at his court, promising that all the commercial 
privileges he desired would be granted in the following year when 
the monsoon abated* But because of monetary difficulties and the 
political disorders endemic within the Nguyen lands, Poivre chose 
to return to Port Louis. He arrived there in April 1750 with a 
valuable cargo of sugar, silks, gold, silver, wax, pepper, indigo, 
various drugs, ivory and teak. In other hazardous voyages Poivre 
visited Sambuangan (Zamboanga) in the Philippines, the Celebes 
and Timor, where he fulfilled  the major part of his commission by 
collecting a great number of spices. His simple and clear form­
ulation of a solution to the economic problems which confronted 
the Compagnie was his lasting achievement; and the influence of 
these ideas gathered momentum during the latter half of the 
century as more serious efforts were made to break into the 
eastern trade and establish footholds in Southeast Asia.
Por it was at this time that French interest in areas 
to the east of India was profoundly affected by the very same
1
Though Cochin China and Tonkin were linked in nominal allegiance 
to the l£ dynasty, effective power was exercised by the Trinh 
family in the north and the Nguyen in the south. In fact, the 
Nguyen took the title of vuong, or 1 prince^ during the early 
eighteenth century. Almost certainly Poivre negotiated v/ith the 
officials of Vo-Vuong, who ruled in the south (usually referred 
to in contemporary reports as Cochin China) from 1738 to 1765*
L§ Th^nh KKoi, Le Viet-Nam : Histoire et Civilisation (Paris,
1955), p p .242-73.
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economic pressures which moulded the British 'swing to the East'* 
Vincent Harlow, of course, has seen in the dramatic growth of the 
China trade one of the salient features of the age, and while 
some doubts have been raised as to the overall importance of this 
material change, few historians would question the new enthusiasm 
for an informal empire in the East, As Peter Marshall has 
v/ritten,
there can be no doubt that although Eastern trade 
remained subordinate to that of the North Atlantic,
British political interests in the East showed a 
remarkable power of expansion, which is particularly 
evident if attention is directed not to the Pacific, 
a region reserved at this time for navigators and 
dreamers, but to the altogether more formidable 
political and economic forces established in India* 1
And it is significant to note that these expansive forces derived
from the Indian presidencies themselves and not from some remote
imperial authority or statesman. The mission of John Pybus to
the King of Kandy in 1762 was authorised by the Madras Council,
alarmed by the strength of French naval power in the Indian Ocean
and desirous to participate in the restricted cinnamon trade of
Ceylon. Pybus1 efforts to acquire the harbour of Trincomalee and
an entry into the closely guarded spice monopoly of the Dutch
2
foundered on the question of military aid to the King, but the
1
P, Marshall, 'The First and Second British Empires : A Question 
of Demarcation', in History, XLIX (1964), p#15*
2
L.A . M ills, Ceylon under British Rule 1795-1932 (London, 1964), 
pp#l-3#
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expedition marked the genesis of a new and confident interest by 
the Indian governments in hitherto unknown areas and states. After 
the declaration of war against Spain the East India Company 
planned to supplant the Spanish and penetrate the China trade by 
way of a permanent establishment at Mindanao; and the capture of 
Manila by Draper in 1762 was clearly a product of such a strategy, 
even though the Madras Council was, it seems, as interested in 
pillage as in matters of grand strategy*1
On the other hand, the French were perfectly capable of
playing the same game as was shown by d 'Estaing's capture of the
British settlements in western Sumatra in 1760« This action,
however, does not appear to have been conditioned by any wider
geo-political considerations; instead it was characteristic of the
filibustering campaigns that the corsairs, based on the French
Islands, waged against British trade and shipping in the Eastern
Seas# S t ill , it is interesting to note that d'Estaing earlier
compiled a number of schemes advocating the foundation of a
permanent establishment at Tourane in Cochin China which reveal
that he was aware of the commercial and strategic benefits France
2
would gain from eastwards expansion#
1
See Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, vol«I, 
pp*75-7.
2
For further details about d ’Estaing's schemes to colonise Cochin 
China, advocated as early as 1758, see Taboulet, vol#I , pp*145-51«
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D'Estaing strongly urged that the lie de France be 
developed as 'I*entrepot general et le point de reunion de toutes 
les branches du commerce1, 1 an emphasis which we find echoed 
again and again in the arguments of Law de Lauriston and 
Chevalier. In particular he stressed the strategic advantages 
which the Islands gained from their proximity to the Cape, India 
and the East Indies, and recommended the prompt fortification of 
Port Louis# We have already noticed the efforts made by Choiseul 
and Poivre in this direction# The number of troops at the lie de 
France increased as did the capacity of the two islands to support 
them, although the islands were never entirely self-sufficient#
At any rate they continued to provide a standing threat to British 
power in India, and a spring-board for further French activity in 
the East#
Perhaps the only comparable English theoretician and 
strategist to emerge at this time was Alexander Dalrymple# As a 
writer at Madras from 1752 he had discovered, on looking through 
the Company's records, how diverse and extensive the trading 
associations of the Company had been in the early seventeenth 
century before the English had been forced 'by the intrigues of the 
Dutch and the pusillanimity of our own Court' to turn to the
'Idees sur le commerce des Indes et des Iles de France', by the 
còmte d'Estaing, Françaises Nouvelles Acquisitions« vol«9365, 
p . 60. 5
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Indian trade. From 1759 he was active in exploring the eastern
islands and in cultivating a friendship with the Sultan of Sulu,
anxious to enlist the support of the East India Company in his
struggle against the Spaniards*1 Dalrymple returned to Madras in
1762, and was given command of a small vessel, the London, to
open up the trade with Sulu. Though Dalrymple inveigled the
Sultan into ceding the northern part of Borneo and the adjacent
islands to the Company in 1764, the expedition was not entirely
successful. In 1765, therefore, he returned to England with the
hope of persuading the Directors to sanction his schemes for a
settlement in the Eastern Seas# His arguments for an establishment
at Balambangan, an island in the Sulu archipelago between the
Philippines and Borneo, were that such an emporium would
draw the produce of these valuable countries, in exchange 
for European and Indian commodities,• « . procure, by 
cultivation and commerce, a share in the spice-trade, . . .  
extend the scene of traffick into the unfrequented 
extremities of A sia ,. . . direct the Chinese trade into a 
more advantageous channel
and
form a colony, by encouraging people of that industrious 
nation to settle with us, and by every other means; which 
colony would be enabled to export of its own produce, 
cargoes of pepper, cinnamon, sugar etc. and would 
consume large quantities of manufactures from Europe and 
India . 2
1
See Harlow, v o l .I , pp .70-5#
2
A, Dalrymple, A Plan for Extending the Commerce of this Kingdom 
and of the East India Company (London, 1769). p .9. This was one of 
the several pamphlets privately published by Dalrymple in the 1760's.
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Evidently the Court of Directors was impressed by this 
chain of reasoning since when the Court informed Viscount Weymouth 
of its intention to take possession of the ’ small, uninhabited 
Island of Balambangan1 it virtually repeated the arguments of 
Dalrymple« This settlement would, the Court wrote, ’ divert the 
Chinese Trade into this Channel, by procuring a Resort of Chinese 
to settle at Balambangan, and engaging the China Junks to visit 
and dispose of their Cargoes there’ ; ’ extend the sale of the 
Manufactures of Great Britain to Cochin China and the Northern 
Provinces of China and receive from thence many of those Commod­
ities , which can now only be obtained from Canton at very high 
Prices '; ’ open a Market for the Consumption of the Manufactures 
of Bengal, and by adding to the Balance of Trade in favor of 
Bengal,**♦encrease the circulating Specie in the Bengal Provinces’ ; 
’ and fin ally ,, , extend the Company’ s Trade into the unfrequented 
parts of Asia ’ «1
Weymouth was concerned lest the intended settlement 
involve the government in difficulties with Spain over the Treaty 
of Munster, This treaty, signed by the Dutch and the Spanish in
1
Court of Directors to Weymouth, 2S October 1768, China, and Japan 
Factory Records, vol. 19, The letter from the Court of Directors 
authorising an establishment at Balambangan was dated 11 November 
1768, and was sent to the Fort St George Council, Home Miscellan­
eous Series, v o l .101, p .95* The Presidency of Bombay was instructed 
'immediately to send one of their Cruisers to take possession' of 
Balamb angan.
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1648, had confirmed the territorial status quo of the Dutch and
Spanish empires in the East, Accordingly the Spaniards claimed
that the islands of Sulu, Balambangan and Palawan fell within
their orbit of influence, whereas Dalrymple argued that the treaty
only applied to the possessions they held in 1648#
If  the Spaniards are not by the Treaty of Munster 
excluded from any claim on Sooloo, or extension towards 
Borneo, they are free to extend themselves to all parts 
of India, for there are no particular limits settled 
in that Treaty# The general sense of Europe has 
uniformly agreed that the Treaty of Munster confines 
the Spaniards to their then possessions and navigation 
and the Spaniards themselves will not presume to 
contradict this established construction#1
However, the Secretary of State was seriously alarmed
by the Company's authorisation of the venture without the sanction
of the cabinet, particularly at this time of severe strain in
Anglo-Bourbon relations# 'But considering it in a Political
Light ', Weymouth reproved the Chairman and Deputy Chairman on 24
November 1768,
I must not conceal from you, that His Majesty is 
extremely surprized to find the East India Company 
desire his Protection to a Measure, upon which He has 
never been consulted, and to hear, for the first time, 
that They have ordered their Servants to take possess­
ion of an Island, without the least Information of any 
other Right upon v/hich that Measure is founded, except 
that of Utility , nor any Account, by which His Majesty 
might judge, whether it can interfere with the subsist-
1
A. Dalrymple, A Full and Clear Proof that the Spaniards can have no 
claim to Balambangan (London. 1774)« P*31#Dalrym ple used the same 
arguments in a letter to Weymouth of 1 May 1769, Home Miscellaneous 
Series. vol#100, p#177#
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ing treaties with other states, or give Umbrage to 
these Powers, with which He is upon Terms of Amity 
and Friendship#1
The Company was instructed not to attempt to remove the Spanish
by force if they were established at the island of Palawan,
while the Ministry expressed its disapproval of any attempts to
assist the Sultan if he were engaged in a war with the Spanish-
The government feared that the Company, through some reckless
and ill-considered action, might provide the Bourbon powers with
a casus belli# As a palliative measure the Court of Directors
apologised on 16 December for the delay and provided the Minister
2
with all the relevant documents.
Thus the question of a settlement at Balambangan 
ultimately involved the matter of imperial direction and control, 
an issue which became of increasing importance in the late 1760’ s 
as successive ministries led by Grenville, Chatham and Grafton 
sought to curb the growing power of the East India Company. We 
have already examined the development of this crisis in other 
situations, in Bengal and in the Carnatic, and the commissioners 
whom the Company appointed in June 1769 were also instructed to 
examine carefully the proposed establishment at Balambangan,
1
Weymouth to Chairman and'Deputy Chairman, 24 November 1768, Home 
Miscellaneous Series, v o l ,99, pp#204-5*
2
Court of Directors to Weymouth, 16 December 1768, Home Miscellan­
eous Series, vol.99, pp#253-6,
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which, the Court hoped, would he ’ a very important benefit to
the Company in their present circumstances’ * 1 Sir John Lindsay,
who soon followed the commissioners with extensive private
instructions from the Crown, was to ensure that the undertaking
did not 'interfere with the Rights of any other Power’ before
2
authorising the enterprise.
On receiving the instructions of the Court of Directors, 
the Bombay Council commissioned Captain Savage Trotter to compile 
a detailed survey of the island and investigate its resources# 
Although his report was enthusiastic, the venture was delayed 
until June 1771, when the Court of Directors despatched a small 
force to establish a factory at Balambangan. Towards the end of 
1773 the Britannic arrived at the island, but the establishment 
was abandoned after it was attacked by the Suluans in February 
1775 .3
Apart from these moves by the Company, the French and
11
Court of Directors to Fort St George, 30 June 1769, Home Miscell­
aneous Series, v o l .101, p . 97# This letter informed the Presidency 
of the appointment of the commissioners and the extent of their 
powers,
2
R. Wood to Michell, 1 September 1769, Home Miscellaneous Series, 
v o l .101, p .l .  At this stage of the negotiations between the Sec­
retary of State and the Court, Weymouth was attempting to secure 
the Company's formal recognition of Lindsay's powers. See chapter 
5 , pp#213-15.
3
See Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, vol#l, 
p p .90-7#
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the Spanish were also interested in making contact with the native
rulers of these islands# On 22 February 1772 a French snow
arrived at Sulu from Sambuangan (Zamboanga), and the commanding
officer delivered a letter to the Sultan from Louis XV and the
Naval Minister, Choiseul-Praslin, conveying the offer of a military
alliance in exchange for commercial concessions and a share in the
spice trade, 1 It appears that Poivre was a leading influence
behind this attempt to embarrass the East India Company* However,
'the young Sultan and all the Chiefs were against taking any
2
notice of this Letter', At the same time as these intrigues and 
counter-intrigues were proceeding, efforts were made by Edward 
Monckton and Charles Des Voeux, both appointed by the Madras
3
Council, to form settlements at Kedah and Acheh respectively, 
while French missions also appeared at Acheh and the Maldives*
French administrators at the lie de France and in India 
deluged the ministry in Paris with plans for the foundation of
1
Extract of Bombay General Consultations, 26 December 1772, Home 
Miscellaneous Series, v o l ,108, p,137# The King's letter to the 
Sultan of Sulu requesting facilities for French trade and dated 
14 December 1770 is found in Home Miscellaneous Series, vol#107, 
p . 29»
2
Intelligence from Xolo Balambangan etc# received 16 October 1772,
Home Miscellaneous Series, vo1*107, p#33*
3
See Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, vol#IX, pp# 
334-9, and Bassett, 'British Commercial and Strategic Interest in 
the Malay Peninsula During the Late Eighteenth Century', in Malayan 
and Indonesian Studies, p p .124-30# The reports of both these missions 
are located in the Sumatra Factory Records, vol#15*
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entrepot-bases in the Eastern Seas during these decades. Law de
Lauriston argued that the French had to contend with genuine
liabilities in their Asiatic trade because they had no adequate
source of revenue in India to remedy the drain of bullion from
Europe to pay for their investment. Whereas the English were in
the fortunate position of being able to draw on the Bengal
revenues and the Dutch had their lucrative spice trade, ’ les
Francois, portugais, Danois et Suédois sont aujourd'hui les seules
nations Europeenes qui exportent de l'argent pour le commerce des
Indes’ «1 Consequently de Lauriston advocated the conversion of
Mauritius into the principal commercial emporium of the Indian
Ocean and stressed once more the pressing need to fortify Port
Louis and render it impregnable to naval attack*
L ’ île de France est un centre qui permet l ’ exécution 
des plus grandes enterprises sur lH n d e , sur Batavia, 
sur le^Cap de Bonne-Esperance et meme sur le Brésil,
Cette ile par sa situation, ses ports, sa fertilite 
et la salubrité de son climat doit devenir l'entrepôt 
des Indes françaises, 2
Yet the favourite project of de Lauriston and Chevalier 
entailed a sweeping commercial agreement with Spain, which would 
enable the Compagnie to exploit the China and the Spanish Amerioan 
trade through a base in the Philippines« The annual treasure
’Manière de commercer des compagnies Europeenes aux Indes ', 1768, 
Françaises Nouvelles Acquisitions, v o l ,9365, p*139«
2 5
Françaises Nouvelles Acquisitions, vol* 9365, p .140«
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ship from Acapulco would provide the French with the bullion so 
essential for the trade with Canton* Such a scheme, moreover, 
appeared to be the natural outcome of the Pacte Famille and the 
problems common to the French and the Spanish in the East, where 
they were both faced with the quite staggering growth of British 
trade. (During the last half of the eighteenth century British 
exports to the East trebled in value and imports from the East 
enjoyed a five-fold increase. ) 1 In spite of these attractions, 
the Spanish at Manila stubbornly refused an alliance with the 
French mainly because they wanted to preserve their monopoly 
intact and, if  possible, mollify the British,
During 1768 and 1769 de Lauriston suggested that the 
French government authorise an establishment in Cochin China or 
Cambodia, and in proposing this scheme de Lauriston resorted to 
the earlier arguments elaborated by Dupleix and Poivre, He was 
informed by some Portuguese traders who had recently visited 
Cochin China that the ruling prince was favourably disposed 
towards the French, He also remarked on the presence of a bishop 
and priests of the Missions Etrangères, who, because of their 
detailed and close acquaintance with Cambodia, would be of assist­
ance in any French attempts to penetrate the trade of Cochin China#
1
See Phyllis Deane and W.A, Cole, British Economic Growth 1688-1959 
(Cambridge, 1962), p ,87 , and E .B . Schumpeter, English Overseas 
Trade Statistics« 1697-1808 (Oxford, I960 ), p p ,15-18,
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In conclusion he recommended that an experienced and enterprising 
trader should be left at the court of the King for a year to 
gather further information, 1
Choiseul-Praslin, the cousin of the duc de Choiseul,
noted these views and began a correspondence with Poivre about an
expedition to Cochin China in 1768. While Poivre, now Intendant
at the Ile de France, appreciated well enough the strategic and
commercial merits of such a mission, he considered that a large
measure of financial and military assistance from the government
would be necessary to render it successful against the depreda-
2
tions of the King or his rebellious and unruly subjects.
The idea was temporarily dropped after the fall of
Choiseul until de Rothe" put forward his proposals in 1775» A
/
former merchant at Canton, de Rothe argued that the China trade
could be best promoted from bases in Cochin China? that Cochin
China would provide the French with ample naval stores and wood
for the building of ships; and that the French from Cochin China
'en temps de guerre.. . intercepteroient tous les vaisseaux anglais 
\  f  \  3
a 1 'entree, ou a la sortie de Canton1. The strength and prestige
1
De Lauriston to Choiseul, 10 February 1769, Françaises Nouvelles 
Acquisitions, v o l ,9365, p p .184-5#
2
Taboulét, pp.151-4*
5 ,
’Reflexions Politiques et Secrettes sur les Royaumes de Cochin 
Chine et de Camboge’ , September 1775, Colonies1 3. p .141«
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that would accrue from the establishment of a French 'sphere of 
influence' in this region would show the country powers that 
there was still some fight left in the French state, and would 
also 'persuade1 the English to be less rapacious in their demands 
on French trade in India* Finally, and almost as an afterthought, 
de Rothe/ emphasised the opportunities which such political in­
fluence v/ould provide for the conversion of souls. In his 
project, de Rothe^ mentioned the activities of the English in the 
eastern islands, at Sulu and Balambangan, and stressed the trans­
cendent need to pre-empt their claims in Cochin China*
Il semble q u 'il  ne reste plus que la Cochinchine qui 
ait échappé jusqu'ici a la vigilance des Anglais, mais 
peut-on se flatter qu 'ils  tarderont a y porter leurs 
vues? S 'ils  s ’ y décident avant nous, nous en serons 
exclus pour jamais; nous aurons perdu un point d ’ appui 
important dans cette partie de l ’ Asie qui nous rendroit 
les maîtres d ’ intercepter aux Anglais, en temps de 
guerre, leur commerce en Chine, en protégeant le 
n£tre par toute l ’ Inde, et les tiendroit dans une 
continuelle inquietude. Si les Anglais enfin s ’ y 
établissent, ils nous regarderont comme leurs 
tributaires sur toutes les cotes de l ’ Asie, et ils 
nous traiteront en consequence. 1
These observations were presented to Vergennes and 
de Sartine, v/ho were initially  well disposed to a scheme which 
would compensate for French weakness in India. The Ministry 
instructed de Roth/ to prepare the expedition as a private venture 
so as not to antagonise the English. However, in 1776, the
Colonies ’ 3« p .143«
1
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Ministry, fearful of antagonising the Spanish and British govern­
ments, dissociated itself from the scheme and insisted that 
de Rothe himself should take full responsibility for the venture. 
Not unexpectedly, de Rothefs enthusiasm abated at this point*1
For over a decade Chevalier had shown a sustained 
interest in the prospect of establishing fortified factories at 
Pegu, the Andamans, Mergui, the Philippines and Cochin China#
When, therefore, in February 1778 some mandarins from Cochin China 
together with a Portuguese Jesuit inadvertently arrived at 
Calcutta, he attempted to persuade the French governor at 
Pondicherry to assist the prince of Cochin China in his struggle 
against the Tayson and his traditional rivals in the north, the 
Trinh# Several years before a serious revolt erupted in the 
domains of Dinh-vuong. Rebels from the mountainous central-west 
assaulted the power of the Nguyen family, based since the eclipse 
of the L& empire in the seventeenth century on Hue ,^ while Trinh 
forces from Tonkin invaded the Nguyen territory and took Hue in 
1774* Forced to retreat into their strongholds in the south, the 
Nguyen surrendered Saigon to the Tayson brothers in 1776, and 
again in 1777, when most of the Nguyen family were slain# Nguyen- 
Phuoc-Anh, a nephew of the prince and the sole survivor of this 
massacre, managed to escape to an island with the aid of a French
Taboulet, p*15.5> Maybon, pp* 171-3#
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missionary-bishop, Pigneau de Behaine. 1
The venerable mandarins, one of whom was * a first
Cousin of the King of Cochin China* and the other a man ’of
considerable Rank’ , were brought to Calcutta in an English ship,
the Rumbold, and Hastings eagerly provided them with a house and
2
’ a Suitable Establishment during their Residence in Calcutta’ * 
Meanwhile Chevalier learnt from the Portuguese missionary, Father 
Loureiro, who was ’ de plus intimement lie avec le Prince et tous
y /  /
les Seigneurs de Sa cour ou il etoit distingue par le grade de 
Mandarin’ , of the splendid opportunities for intervention in the 
civil war# ’ C’est alors, Monsieur,’ confided Chevalier to
Bellecombe, ’que vous pourriez opérer de grandes choses et dans
, s , 3
l ’ indoustan et dans les différents pays de l 'A s ie '*  According
to Chevalier's enthusiastic report, ’ 150 Européens et 200 Sipoyes
réunis aux forces impériales seraient beaucoup plus qu’ il  ne faut
pour détruire l ’ ennemi raffermir le prince sur le trône et ramener
/
la paix et la tranquilite' .  He feared that the English were 
contemplating similar measures, and insisted categorically that 
Bellecombe act to forestall them# His alarms were perfectly
1
Le Thành Khoi, Le Viêt-Nam« pp .296-9. See also D .G .E . Hall, A 
History of South East Asia, p p .363-6*
2 ‘  " " ... ...... ............
Extract of Bengal General Consultations, 12 February 1778, Home 
Miscellaneous Series, vo1*219, p*719#
3
Chevalier to Bellecombe, 12 February 1778, Colonies ’ 3, p#168*
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justified.
In his next letter to Bellecombe of 30 April 1778,
Chevalier recommended the services of the Portuguese priest, who
was proceeding to Pondicherry to act as an interpreter for the
expedition, Chevalier’ s ideas were somewhat more crystallised and
he proposed the speedy conclusion of a defensive and offensive
alliance with the Nguyen# In return for military assistance,
this prince would be persuaded to grant the French a commercial
base at Faifo, and the exclusive right to trade throughout his
lands# And from such a foothold Chevalier believed that the
French would be able to extend their influence to Thailand, Tonkin
1
and even to southern China.
For it was the lure of the almost inaccessible Middle 
Kingdom, with its enormous resources and its untapped markets, 
that beckoned Englishmen and Frenchmen alike# It was this same 
goal that had inspired Hastings’ early interest in Tibet and in 
the various h ill  states bordering the northern frontier of Bengal, 
an enterprise that had received the full endorsement of the Court
1
Chevalier to Bellecombe, 30 April 1778, Colonies ’ 3 « pp#161-7# 
Father Loureiro travelled on the ship to Pondicherry which bore 
this letter. In the appendix to Chapman’ s report, which is found 
in the China and Japan Factory Records, v o l .18, there are further 
details of Chevalier’ s attempts to organise a French expedition 
to assist the King.
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of Directors#1 'We desire you will obtain the best intelligence
you can whether tradev can be opened with Nepaul, and whether
cloth and other European commodities may not find their way thence
2
to Thibet, Lhassa and the western parts of China1# George Bogle's 
mission to the Tashi Lama during 1774-75 did indeed establish the 
basis of good relations between Tibet and the Company, but the 
mountainous terrain of that country prohibited any further 
commercial or diplomatic contact# Cochin China, on the other 
hand, appeared a more likely prospect and Hastings accordingly 
authorised a small expedition to take the mandarins back to their 
country# Charles Chapman, the leader of this expedition, was 
instructed to make a thorough examination of the economic pros­
pects of the region#
At the Council meeting Hastings proceeded to outline
the great advantages 'that may be reaped from a Commercial
Intercourse with Cochin China', A factory at Tourane would fulfil
the same objectives as the 'proposed settlement at Balambangan'
in attracting the China trade#
Cochin China is peculiarly happy in its Situation for 
Commerce, Possessing a large extent of Coast of its 
own; it is v/ithin five days sail of Canton, has the
1
See Alastair Lamb, Britain and Chinese Central Asia : The Road 
to Lhasa 1767 to 1905 (London, I960 ), pp#1-19# ~ —
2
Court of Directors to Bengal Council, 16 February 1768, Home
Miscellaneous Series, vol.219, f#325* Quoted in Lamb, p*7*
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Philippines laying opposite to it , the great Island 
of Borneo, the Molucca and Bunda Islands a few degrees 
to the South East, with Siam and Malacca to the 
Westward. 1
Chapman left Calcutta on 9 April 1778. He was authorised
to attempt and negotiate a commercial alliance with the prince.
In supporting the mission, Hastings revealed his concern about
Chevalier’ s overtures to the Jesuit and the mandarins and the
more extensive operations of French missionaries and merchants in
Cochin China. Chapman echoed these fears in the report which he
presented to the Fort William Council in September 1779 after
his return. The main emphasis of his report lay on the strategic
advantages of a connection with Cochin China. He wrote:
Great as the commercial advantages are, the political 
ones resulting from a settlement in Cochin China would 
be scarce inferior, Turon Bay would not only afford a 
secure retreat to our Indiamen in case of losing their 
passage to China, but from thence we might also 
intercept the fleets of any hostile power either going 
to or returning from that country. We should become 
formidable neighbours to the Dutch and to the Spaniards 
and, in the event of war with either of them, attack 
with advantage their most valuable settlements, 2
Nonetheless, the Calcutta Council was not encouraged to found a
settlement there at this stage. The commercial incentives remained
1
Extract of Bengal General Consultations, 30 March 1778, Home 
Miscellaneous Series, v o l ,219, p#725#
2
A. Lamb, ’British Missions to Cochin China : 1778-18221,
Journal, Malayan Branch. Royal Asiatic Society, vol.XXXIV, Parts 3
& 4 (nos .195 & 196), p ,75* Chapman's narrative and report is 
printed in its entirety in this publication, pp*26-76,
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as strong as ever, but Cochin China was ravaged by civil war and 
the French threat was temporarily removed with the capture of 
their Indian settlements in 1778*
ii„ FRENCH ACTIVITY IN COCHIN CHINA AND THE BRITISH AT PENANG 
1783-1789
In the preceding chapters an attempt has been made to 
assess the nature and importance of French attempts to re-establish 
their influence in India during the War of American Independence, 
the only open and global conflict between English and French 
forces in the period under consideration, and we have noted the 
considerable disparity between French ambitions and their per­
formance in the South. In spite of this, the concatenation of a 
French war with a series of Indian wars did unnerve the Company 
and seriously embarrass their governments in the East* Moreover, 
in Chapter 2 we noted the fundamental importance of the American 
War in exposing the geo-political designs of the French, which 
in turn provoked the British to develop their own imperial 
strategy. 1 The alarming activities of de Suffren finally demon­
strated the need for a naval base to the east of the Bay of Bengal 
to defend the eastern trade with China and protect the settlements 
in Bengal and along the Coromandel from a surprise naval attack.
Chapter 2, pp*59-74#
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There can be no doubt that the Dutch entry into the war
had a profound effect on these developments too* During 1782 the
oceanic and trading links between Britain and India were almost
completely severed by the French occupation of the Cape and
Trincomalee, and by Dutch mastery of the Malacca and Sunda
Straits. British ships damaged in war were forced to refit at
Bombay, the only natural harbour the Company possessed in the
East, while the East Indies fleet v/as also forced to resort to
Bombay during the winter monsoon, thus leaving the Coromandel and
Bengal Presidencies precariously exposed to attack from the lie
de France, Trincomalee, or the Dutch bases in the East Indies.
According to one contemporary writer;
The daring activity of Suffrein at this juncture made 
a striking impression# No change of Monsoon induced 
him to quit the Bay (of Bengal), and during the absence 
of the British Fleet he swept the Sea, destroyed our 
Trade and intercepted the Supplies from Bengal to the 
other Presidencies# A Ship of the line and 2 Frigates, 
which he stationed off the Sand-heads or entrance into 
the Hooghlyf at one time nearly shut up the Port of 
Bengal; and at another time they made valuable Cap­
tures, carrying back an ample Supply of all Sorts of 
Provisions & Stores, which neither his own resources 
nor those of his allies could have furnished*1
The extremely lucrative country trade with China and the eastern
islands was imperilled through the lack of a naval base in eastern
waters, and a heightened awareness of these strategic weaknesses
1
From !A Memoir on Prince of V/ales Island considered Politically 
and Commercially', Straits Settlements Records, v o l ,I .
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reinforced the efforts of the British to obtain a commercial 
emporium and a naval base on the way to Canton,
Alfred Thayer Mahan, in his study of the elements of 
sea-power, argued that mastery of the ocean lanes depended not 
only on a strong mercantile marine and armed navy, but also on 
the possession of ’ stations along the road, like the Cape of Good 
Hope, St. Helena, and Mauritius, not primarily for trade, but for 
defence and war’ . However this may be, in areas like the Malay 
archipelago the acquisition of factories and bases inevitably 
involved the maritime power in the question of territorial ex­
pansion* In fact, it had been precisely this fear of uncontrolled 
expansion that had made the ministry and the Court of Directors 
so wary of the schemes of Dalrymple, After the American War, 
however, the Company was more inclined to intervene in the 
politics of indigenous Asian states, when its interests appeared 
threatened and when there seemed a reasonable prospect of securing 
the concessions it desired from the native ruler. Captain Thomas 
Forrest's abortive embassy to the Celebes in April 1782, author­
ised by Hastings 'to excite the King of Celebes, the Sultan of 
Mindanao and other Chiefs against their antient oppressors the 
Dutch and to endeavour to deprive them of their possessions in
1
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 
1660-1783 (London, 1965), p . 28.
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those Countries1, 1 was soon followed by other missions of a
quasi-diplomatic character. Henry Botham was despatched on an
2
embassy to the King of Acheh in August 1782, and Forrest once 
more led a deputation to the King of Riau in July 1784# Forrest, 
who was to attempt 'to open a free intercourse of Trade not only 
with the Inhabitants of Rhio, but of all the neighbouring Islands1, 
was to be vigilant in keeping ’ a watchful eye on the designs of 
the' Dutch# Clearly the Calcutta Council was alarmed by the 
attempts of the Dutch after 1783 to re-assert their influence in 
the Malacca Straits area, though the Council was reluctant openly 
to challenge the Dutch spice monopoly. It is not surprising, 
then, that Forrest was forestalled at Riau by van Braam and his 
imposing squadron.
Not to be outmanoeuvred by their rivals, the French also 
sent a number of expeditions to investigate the commercial and 
strategic merits of establishments further eastwards. In September
1
Letters and Advices from the Governor General and Bengal Council,
7 March 1782, Home Miscellaneous Series, v o l ,169, p ,130, For 
further details about Forrest's embassy see Harlow, v o l ,I , p p ,141-3, 
and D.K. Bassett, 'Thomas Forrest, An Eighteenth Century Mariner', 
Journal, Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, vol,XXXIV, Part 2 
(l961 ), pp .113-15.
2
Botham's embassy, apart from considerations of trade, was 
conditioned by the need to establish a base in Sumatra which would 
be less vulnerable to attack from Batavia than Bencoolen# See Harlow, 
vo1 ,11 , p p ,340-2, and Home Miscellaneous Series, vol#219, pp*577-612#
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1783 Suffren commissioned Geslin to spend some time in Pegu and
thereby acquire information about Burmese politics and trade.
At this time Bussy and de Suffren, dissatisfied with Pondicherry
as the capital of French India because of its close proximity to
Madras, were considering alternate sites for their chef-lieu»
Syriam in Pegu appeared a likely choice and Geslin was to discern
the Burmese King's reactions to such a suggestion. Of course
the French were also drawn to the area because of its renowned
teak supplies»
La Pegou fournit les trois quarts des vaisseaux qui 
naviguent dans l'Inde qui sont contruits et mâtes de 
theq. Il est facile de s 'y  en procurer toute la 
quantité qu*on en peut desirer, soit pour la con­
struction et pour la mature des Vaisseaux, pour 
l 'artillerie  de placer et de campagner, soit enfin 
pour les bâtisses qu'on aura à construire, lorsque 
nous rentrerons dans nos possessions au Bengale et 
sur la C$te de Coromandel* On trouveroit d iffic ile ­
ment ailleurs ces articles en aussi grande abondance 
et d'aussi bonne qualité*1
The councils in India were soon made aware of French 
activities in this quarter. A memorandum sent to Andrew Ross at 
Madras in 1784* which in all probability was composed by that 
ubiquitous country trader, Francis Light, claimed that Geslin,
' a Lieutenant in the grand Marine1, had been sent to Pegu to
'Memoire pour procurer des boix de mature de construction et 
autres pour les vaisseaux du Roi dans l 'In d e ',  1782, Colonies '2 1 « 
p .74» The orders and instructions given to Geslin by Suffren 
on 9 September 1783, are located in Colonies '2 1 , pp*79-84#
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investigate the resources for a provisioning base, ’By the 
Instructions he left, when he went for Ava, it appeared that Rice 
and Boats, Timbers and Planks with some large masts, were what 
he came for ’ *1 Although the French were ’not esteemed’ by the 
Burmese, the memorialist believed that ’ the indefatigable attention 
Geslin paid to his Business cannot fail of great success’ . He 
considered ’ that the French must very soon plant some Colony for 
the accommodation of the very encreasing population of the Islands 
of Mauritius and Bourbon’ and he strongly suspected that it would 
be at ’ some of the Islands on the Tennassary Coast, where they 
get supplied with all the necessaries of life from Pegu’ . To 
counter any probable French move the Madras Council was encouraged 
to authorise a settlement at Junk Ceylon*
The French also renewed their interest in certain 
strategically located islands in the Indian Ocean, especially 
Diego Garcia. Souillac’ s action in sending the Normand to that 
island in May 1784 eventually provoked a counter-expedition from
the British, and the ramifications of these moves were felt as far
2
away as Paris and London* In fact, after the American War the
1
'Memorandum relative to the viev/s of the French in cultivating an 
intercourse with Pegu and forming an establishment at the Island 
on the Coast of Tannassary', addressed to Andrew Ross, Fort St George 
Council, 18 March 1784, Straits Settlements Records, v o l .I , pp*55-7*
2
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Ministry of Marine showed a quite remarkable interest in eastern 
waters and several expeditions of discovery were commissioned to 
survey the coastline of Asia from Suez to Korea, Rosily Mesrof 
was authorised in July 1784 to examine Madagascar and Mozambique, 
the Persian Gulf and the coast from Arabia to Suez; de Richery, 
after evacuating the French troops from Trincomalee, was instruct­
ed to chart the coasts of Tonkin, Cochin China, Siam, Malacca, 
Kedah, the Nicobars and the Andamans; 1 while La Perouse's 
expedition, which left Brest in May 1785, was to make the fullest 
examination of the coast of China from Canton to Korea, Cossigny, 
the Governor at Pondicherry, believed that fces trois voyages
reunis, donneront une connaissance complete de toutes les cotes
2
de l 'A s ie ',  Other voyages were undertaken by Kergariou-Loemaria
1
See Françaises Nouvelles Acquisitions, v o l ,9434, pp*111-12, for 
Rosily Metrof's instructions; and Françaises Nouvelles Acquisitions, 
v o l ,9434, pp, 112-14, for de Richery's instructions* Further instruc­
tions which de Richery received in India are in Colonies *4, pp,10-13..
2
Cossigny to the Minister of Marine, 19 July 1787, Françaises Nouvel­
les Acquisitions, vol*9373, p ,104, Curiously enough the same des­
patch mentioned rumours of a British settlement at New Holland, and 
urged the sending of a French expedition there under de Richery*
The French authorities, both in India and in Europe, were convinced 
that this new settlement was part of a global maritime strategy to 
protect and foster British trade and influence eastwards. This, 
however, remains a controversial matter in Australian history, and 
for a recent discussion of the motives behind the founding of settle­
ments in Australia see K*M. Dallas, 'The First Settlement in 
Australia considered in Relation to Sea-power in World Politics ', 
Tasmanian Historical Research Association. Papers and Proceedings, 
1952, N o ,3 (published in September 1968 as 'Commercial Influences on 
the First Settlements in Australia ', T .H .R ,A ., vol,16 , no*2, p p .36- 
49) and G. Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance (Melbourne, 1966), 
p p ,18-46, The 'orthodox' view, that Port Jackson was intended 
primarily as a dumping ground for convicts, is presented in 
E . O 'Brien, The Foundation of Australia (1786-1800); A Study in 
English Criminal Practice and Penal Colonization in the Eighteenth 
Century, second ed« (Sydney, 1950),*
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to the coast of Muscat and the Indian littoral from Surat to 
Mangalore, and by Kersauzon and Pre'ville* ^  Most of these expedit­
ions were closely supervised by Admiral d'Entre caste aux, the 
commander of the Indian station of the French navy, who himself 
visited Canton in February 1787# Each of the commanders was 
instructed to note the strength of British naval power in the 
regions they visited* and all were surprised at the ubiquity of 
British country traders# D'Entrecasteaux, for instance, wrote 
to the Minister: 'Plus on navigue dans ces mers, Monseigneur, et
plus on est etonne de l'snorme puissance des anglais dans ces
s 2
vastes et riches contrees'#
Furthermore, v/ith the conclusion of the Franco-Dutch 
treaty at Fontainebleau in November 1785, the influence of the 
French government increased substantially in the United Provinces 
and the French were more than a little optimistic of gaining 
exclusive access to the Dutch bases at the Cape, Trincomalee and
3
the East Indies* The British naturally enough were alarmed by
1
See Françaises Nouvelles Acquisitions« vol#9434, pp#115-19, for 
the instructions given to Kergariou-Loemaria, 15 August 1736*
2
D'Entrecasteaux to the Minister of Marine, May 1787, Françaises 
Nouvelles Acquisitions, vol*9373, p#87. D'Entrecasteaux's visit to 
Canton was intended to ameliorate the conditions of French trade 
at Canton, and although in this respect it was a failure, it in­
fluenced the British governments' decision to send an embassy to 
China in 1787#
3
See chapter 7, PP*3 2 4-38, for a detailed treatment of the European 
aspects of this crisis#
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such a hostile combination, fearing that in a future war they 
might be squeezed out of the China trade altogether*
At this critical juncture French attention turned once 
more to Cochin China, where the French bishop had involved himself 
in the elaborate intricacies of that civil war which was raging 
between the Tayson, the Trinh forces from the north, and the 
weakened Nguyen party in the south. By 1783 the prince, Nguyen 
Anh, was in desperate straits, so desperate in fact that he 
appealed through the bishop, Pierre-Joseph-Georges Pigneau de
Behaine, for French military assistance. Arriving at Hatien as a
/  x  j
missionary with the Missions Etrangères in 1767, Pigneau de Behaine
was consecrated Bishop of Adran and Apostolic Vicar of Cochin 
China in 1774# His responsibilities and powers in Cochin China 
were further increased after the dissolution of the Jesuit order 
in 1773* During his long and turbulent sojourn in Cochin China, 
interrupted by persecutions and the exigencies of civil war, he 
acquired a thorough and intimate acquaintance with the ruling 
dynasties and politics of Cochin China, Tonkin and Thailand, And 
throughout these vicissitudes he was sustained by the vision of a 
Catholic empire in the Far East, closely allied with France, He 
witnessed the many misfortunes of Dinh-vuong, who, as we have seen, 
was forced to flee from the traditional capital of Hué in 1775 
before abdicating in favour of his nephew, Nguyen Anh* From 1776
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the bishop was in close contact with the Nguyen family, and 
Nguyen Anh, for the most part restricted to some off-shore islands 
and a part of the Mekong delta, entrusted him with the protection 
and education of the four year old Prince Canh in 1783*^ At this 
time, when his position was most precarious and uncertain, Nguyen 
Anh also accepted the bishop's offer of a French alliance, but 
this only happened after Nguyen Anh had made an unsuccessful 
attempt to form an alliance with the Thais* The bishop optimist­
ically promised that the French government would provide the King 
with 1,500 men, an artillery company and the vessels in which to 
transport them and their munitions to Cochin China# In return 
Nguyen Anh agreed to cede the French King 'en pleine et entière
souverainete^, l 'île  qui forme le port principal de toute la
/  ✓  ,2
Cochinchine, appele par les Européens le port de Touron*# '« The
French were to be given joint control with the Cochin Chinese of 
Hoi-nan, which commanded Tourane Harbour, and they were to be 
accorded a free and exclusive trade throughout the kingdom# The 
bishop was also authorised to offer the French government the 
island of Pulo Condore#
Accompanied by the young prince, the bishop arrived at
1
Le Thành Khoi, Le Viêt-Nam. pp*300-2; Maybon, pp#198-213* See 
also A. Launay, Histoire de la Mission de Cochin Chine 1658-1823 
(3 vols*, Paris, 1923), vols*2-3* ~ —
2 .  ,
^Deliberation du Conseil Royal de la Cochinchine1, 18 August 1782, 
Mémoires et Documents. Asie . vol#19, p,102*
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Pondicherry in February 1785, soon after the return of the French
settlements. But he failed to persuade the acting governor,
Coutenceau des Algrins, to intervene in Cochin China. Exasperated,
Pigneau turned to the Portuguese at Macao and Goa, who were
equally disobliging, 1 and in July 1786 he sailed with the prince
2
for France to negotiate a treaty there with Louis XVI.
In the meantime Francis Light arrived at Calcutta in 
early January 1786, bearing the Sultan of Kedah’ s offer of Penang 
to the East India Company, The Sultan appears to have been anxious 
to enlist the services of the Company against his belligerent 
neighbours, particularly Thailand and Burma, both of whom claimed 
tribute from Kedah, Light informed the Governor General, 
Macpherson, that he had acquired Penang from the Sultan because 
'i t  was the wish of this Government to obtain some useful and 
convenient Port for the protection of the Merchants who trade to
1
Launay, Histoire de la Mission de Cochin Chine. vol*3, p .155#
2
On 20 June 1786, however, Cossigny and d'Entrecasteaux, who were 
initially  more sympathetic to the bishop's schemes than des Algrins 
had been, instructed de Richery to proceed to Thailand and Cochin 
China to locate Nguyen Anh, De Richery, who had visited Cochin 
China in 1785, took with him a Father Paul Nghi and some Cochin 
Chinese pilots and sailors, (They had arrived in the preceding year 
with the bishop)* The voyage was intended primarily as a reconnais­
sance to investigate the resources, trade and ports of Cochin 
China, and de Richery was to inform the King of the bishop's depart­
ure for France. If  his position proved impossible, de Richery was 
to escort Nguyen Anh to Pondicherry* 'Instructions pour M, de 
Richery, Enseigne de Vau? Commandant la flutte du Roy Le Marquis 
de Casties’ , 20 June 1786, Colonies ’ 4 « pp*10-13*
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China, and for the service of His Majesty*s Fleet in the time of
War in either monsoon1* 1 After carefully describing the commercial
and strategic merits of the island, Light expressed concern at
the tightening of the Dutch hold over the Malacca Straits, and
the extent of French involvement in Cochin China* Both powers
were now united in an alliance, and Light feared that the French
in Cochin China, aided and abetted by their Dutch friends, might
exclude the Company from the eastern country trade and the even
more important trade at Canton. ’ The French’ , he wrote,
by the Interest of a missionary Bishop, have obtained 
permission to establish a Settlement in Cochin Chinaf 
and last August they sent two Frigates and a Store Ship 
with 500 Troops, Artillery, etc*, to take possession; 
they are to be followed by two more Vessels from the 
Islands or Pondicherry; the French are to assist the 
Cochin Chinese against the Siamese, with whom (by the 
blessed endeavours of the pious Bishop) they are at War,
The Bishop, before he went to Pondicherry visited 
Siam, and is particularly acquainted with the charact­
ers, dispositions and views of that Court, He had 
laid the Plan of a Rebellion which is now actually 
begun, and no doubt during the contention he means 
to seize the bone himself* The history of his works 
are too long for this Letter, but they are not 
inferior to any which have been attempted in the 
Eastern Stage for a Century past,2
In this important despatch Light explained that he had 
learnt of the bishop’ s tortuous schemes at Junk Ceylon, near which
1
Light to Macpherson, 23 January 1786, Straits Settlement Records, 
vo1*1*
2
Light to Macpherson, 23 January 1786, Straits Settlements Records, 
vol* I*
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place a priest and two officers sent by Pigneau had died. He had 
procured the ’ Letters and Musters’ of the expedition and claimed 
that ’ they were meant to prepare the way for what the Bishop is 
now putting in execution’ . Certainly there is a note of unreality 
and panic in Light's account of the intrigues in Cochin China, 
but this distortion was probably due to the rather garbled verbal 
reports he picked up at Junk Ceylon and his not unreasonable 
assumption that the French at Pondicherry or at the lie de France 
would immediately act on the agreement concluded between the 
bishop and Nguyen Anh*
It is significant, too, that Light was anxious to force 
the hand of the Supreme Government at Calcutta, for he had his own 
substantial interests as a country trader to protect and foster. 1 
In 1771 he had tried unsuccessfully to interest the Madras firm 
of Jourdain, Sulivan and de Souza in the prospect of intervening 
in Kedah to secure a foothold at Penang. And later in 1777 and
1779, Light and James Scott, a trading partner, urged the Bengal
2
Government to found bases at Mergui and Junk Ceylon respectively*
Light’ s role as an intermediary between the Sultan and the Company 
is a controversial one and it is quite clear that Light secured his 
own interests as a country trader by the settlement at Penang* See 
R. Bonney, ’Francis Light and Penang’ , in J .M ,B .R .A .S , , vol*XXXVIII, 
pt. I (1965), pp .135-54* Although this article tends to over­
estimate the importance of the initiatives taken by the Sultan, it 
does reveal how remote political events on the Southeast Asian main­
land could have a considerable impact on the policies of the 
European companies.
2
H .P . Clodd, Malaya’ s First British Pioneer : The Life of Francis 
Light (London, 1948), pp*7-30*
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While it is true, as Light's biographer has conceded, that there
was precious little altruism in these proposals, there is no
reason to doubt the patriotism of these men, traders though they
were. As Scott wryly observed to Warren Hastings;
You may perhaps ask who this James Scott is, I will 
here, in part, anticipate the answer. He is a Scotsman 
struggling to pay off some incumbrances incurred 
during the war, formerly a trading master and owner, 
otherwise but little known, but v/ill be happy should 
his misfortunes turn out eventually of use to his 
country. It has become too common to consider the 
attainment of a huge quantity of the precious metals 
as the chief object of existence. 1
Both Scott and Light were genuinely apprehensive of a French coup
2
in an area they had come to look on as their own. Light himself
3
had spent some time in 1783 as a prisoner of de Suffren.
Light, moreover, reported the activities of the French 
at Ava, to which place he believed they had sent an embassy in 
July 1785. ’ It is not improbable’ , he argued, '. .t h a t  the French 
having failed, in junction with their former Allies, have embraced
4
a new scheme, and not a weak one '. On 15 February Light indicated
1
James Scott to Hastings, 28 October 1784# Quoted in Clodd, p p .35-6.
2
Note, for instance, Light's statement that 'I  look upon a part 
of this Island to be my property, it was granted (me) by their own 
free w ill, the ground cleared at my own expense, and tho! unjustly 
drove off I think myself at liberty to resume it whenever I have 
power', Clodd, p .31#
3
Clodd, p p .33-4* See Memoirs of William Hickey, v o l*III , p .50.
4
Light to Macpherson, 23 January 1786, Straits Settlements Records, 
v o l .I .
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the probable consequences for the Company if the French were
successful in Burma and Cochin China.
...should the French be able to Negotiate an Alliance 
with the Court of Ava and attain so much influence 
as to direct the Counsels and Armys of that haughty 
imperious Nation, They will then become a more 
formidable Enemy than when joined with Hyder or his 
Successor Tippoo, as it is well known the Country of 
Pegue can furnish Provisions, Timber and in short 
every thing requisite for the supply of their Fleets.
Add to this the Acquirement of Cochin China a rich 
Country, the People Brave intelligent and faithful, 
capable of being made excellent soldiers and sailors, 
with such allies the enterprising Spirit of the French 
is certainly more to be feared than when connected 
only with their Old friends on the Coast of Coromandel*
And to reinforce his point, he mentioned that the Dutch were
striving to re-establish their influence at Riau and Selangor*
Evidently Macpherson and the Council were impressed by 
these arguments, for in Macpherson1s letter to the Secret Committ­
ee of the Court of Directors, where he first made mention of 
Francis Light*s offer of Penang and Junk Ceylon, he confided:
I have long had my Eye to the Movements of the French at 
Pegu and Cochin China. I shall propose Possession to be 
taken of the Ports and Islands offered to us by the King 
of Cudda, and especially of Junk Ceylon, which is 
occupied by a separate People to the Number of 50,000.
These have offered Captain Light, the Sovereign Command 
among them.^
1
Light to Governor General and Council, 15 February 1786, Straits 
Settlements Records, vol.2, pp#44-5.
2
Postscript to the Governor General's letter to the Secret Committee 
of the Court of Directors, 26 January 1786, Straits Settlements 
Records, vol#I.
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In this, the earliest reference to Light's project, Macpherson 
suggests that the Council hoped to establish twin settlements at 
Penang and Junk Ceylon* Scott had earlier advocated the formation 
of an entrepSt at Junk Ceylon, and his version of the French 
bishop's departure for Pondicherry 'to sollicit the assistance 
of the French against Siam and the Mountaineers' differed in no 
way from Light's account»1 Scott also informed the Council that 
the local ruler of the island was anxiously inviting the help of 
foreign powers against an anticipated Burmese invasion and that, 
unless the Company intervened, the French or the Dutch would 
almost certainly form an alliance with this ruler. However, by 
early March 1786 the Council had decided to concentrate its main 
attention on Penang*
V/hen it is remembered that Sultan Abdullah of Kedah 
stipulated that the Company should defend him in any future war, 
whether it be against dissident subjects, hostile Malay or Bugis 
forces, or the Thais and the Burmese, it is indeed remarkable 
that Light should have succeeded in his mission. Of course, the 
Calcutta Council and the Court of Directors prevaricated in their 
attitude to the question of political involvement, but nonetheless 
the formation of an outpost of the Company in the Malacca Straits 
was a significant step and would sooner or later involve the
1
Enclosure in Scott's letter of 28 October 1785, Bengal Council 
Proceedings, 2 March 1786, Straits Settlements Records. -701*2, p#6#
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Company in the domestic and external problems of the Sultan« For 
the success of this venture a large measure of credit must go to 
the man on the spot, the assiduous country trader, Francis Light, 
but there can be no doubt that the French menace was useful in 
goading the Company into action. Long after Light landed and took 
formal possession of Prince of V/ales Island on 11 August 1786, the 
Superintendent of Penang continued to note French and Dutch acti­
vities. In September of that year he wrote to Calcutta: ’There is 
no doubt that on your leaving this, the Dutch or French would 
possess themselves of it, and then you would be entirely cut out 
from procuring any Cargoes for China*• 1
Hence, strategic pressures - born of the historic
1
Light to Fort William Council, 12 September 1786, Straits Settle­
ments Records, vol#I, Throughout 1786 and 1787 the Bengal Council 
continued to receive reports from Canton and Penang of French act­
ivity in Cochin China and the Malay peninsula# On 11 January 1787 
the factors of Canton wrote that 'the French have now made 3 Settle­
ments in Cochin China, are planning one on the Island of Formosa, 
so that in a future War they will put an entire stop to the English 
China Trade, because not a Ship can come either through the China 
Sea or the Eastern Passage which they may not intercept, I do 
assure you these new Settlements must soon create jealousy and bring 
on new disturbances. The English here are much alarmed at the 
enterprising Spirit of their Gallic friends1. French in India, 
vol*XIII. In March 1787 Light communicated some curious details 
about the voyage of de Richery* He sailed into Penang on 25 March, 
but refused to answer Light’ s questions. Light believed that he 
had come to investigate the Company's latest possession, and he 
received further menacing reports from Malacca. ’Two frigates the 
Venus and the Precieuse v/ere at Cochin China... »The Marquis de 
Castries went to Siam where the pretended heir to Cochin China 
resides a kind of State prisoner, He promised the French if they 
would put him in possession of his Country a Factory near the 
Sea '. Straits Settlements Records, vol#2, p#497#
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struggle with the French - were as significant in the Council's
decision to authorise and uphold the settlement at Penang as the
purely commercial factor, the desire to open an entrepot in the
Eastern Seas, And whereas it is true that enterprising country
traders like Scott and Light were furthering their own interests
when they advocated such establishments, it is also evident that
they genuinely feared a resurgence of French and Dutch influence
in the Eastern Seas and Southeast Asia, In this instance profits
and power were one and the same. Though the Calcutta Council was
eager to anticipate any hostile French moves, it was now under
the necessity of justifying its policy to an increasingly vigilant
Board of Control in London, The Board, intent on carrying through
a policy of retrenchment in India, was naturally reluctant to
embroil the state and the Company in further schemes of conquest
and expansion. In spite of this, it was persuaded of the need
for an establishment at Pulo Penang by the cogency of Macpherson’s
arguments. ’We certainly wish to avoid any unnecessary Expence,'
the Board wrote, but
at the same time we must confess, that we always felt 
the importance of every measure which tended to facilitate 
our Commerce in the Eastern Seas, and thereby promote 
a more certain intercourse of Commerce with China* As 
it seems the object of other Nations, particularly the 
Dutch, to impede that pursuit, it must of course be 
our business, by any means to counteract their attempts.^
1
Board of Control to Secret Committee, 28 July 1787, Board1s 
Drafts of Secret Letters to India (21 May 1781 - 8 November 1795).
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In all subsequent appraisals of the role and significance 
of Penang the need to forestall a French or a Franco-Dutch threat 
to the country trade was implicitly or explicitly recognised.
The author of A Memoir on Prince of V/ales Island claimed that had 
the Company ’held Penang in the last War (i .e . 1778-83) in good 
force, the French Fleet would not have appeared a second time in 
the Bay of Bengal because it is a windward station with respect to 
the Coast of Choromandel’ The writer still urged the Indian 
presidencies to be wary and ’guard against the insidious designs’ 
of the French. Elisha Trapaud, another defender of Penang, 
emphasised the strategic importance of the new settlement, 
’particularly if the French continue their footing at Trincomalay’ . 
Penang would afford ’ shelter for our East-India-men’ , and its large 
trees would enable men-of-war to winter and refit at the harbour. 
There were also strong inducements of a commercial kind for staying 
there. The ’whole money arising from the sales’ of opium in the 
eastern islands ’would be paid into the Company's treasury for bills
3
on the Court of Directors’ .
Thus this inconsiderable spot, ,*may now,,, .become a 
place of considerable advantage to our trade, by 
affording shelter and protection at all times to our
1
’A Memoir on Prince of Wales Island considered Politically and 
Commercially’ , Straits Settlements Records. vol#I,
2
E. Trapaud, A Short Account of Prince of Wales’ s Island or Pulo 
Peenang. in the East Indies (Singapore, 1962» introd. by J. Bastin), 
p. 21, First published London, 1788,
3
Trapaud, p .29*
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East-India ships, and a source of equal annoyance to 
our enemies, in case of a rupture with any of the 
powers who possess influence or actual dominion in 
the east.^-
These fears for the future were not unjustified since the French 
had not entirely relinquished their oriental ambitions.
When the Bishop of Adran and the young Prince Canh
arrived in France in January 1787, the details of this embassy
to the court of Louis XVI were meticulously noted by the British
ambassador in Paris, the Duke of Dorset. On 22 March 1787 Dorset
informed the Foreign Secretary, Carmarthen, of the presentation
at Versailles of ’ the Son of the King of Cochinchine’♦ ’He is
brought hither1, the ambassador averred, 1 at the Request of His
Father by a French Missionary to solicit the Assistance of His
Most Christian Majesty in the Recovery of His Kingdom, from which
2
He has been driven’ # Dorset believed that the French might form 
an establishment in Cochin China and that ’such an Undertaking### 
might eventually affect our China Trade’# These reports were 
speedily conveyed to the Board of Control and they must have con­
firmed the apprehensions about French activity earlier communicated 
to the Company by Francis Light, Carmarthen soon after instructed 
Dorset to inform the ministry of any ’ further Particulars as to
1
Trapaud, p«34«
2
Dorset to Carmarthen, 22 March 1787, F .Q . 27/21,
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any Designs of forming an Establishment in their Country*.
However, the Stadholderate crisis intervened before the French
2
government was prepared to conclude a treaty with the bishop.
Throughout 1787 the bishop ardently pressed his plans 
on the French government and in a plethora of lucidly argued 
projects and mémoires he enumerated the many commercial and 
strategic advantages accruing from a French sphere of influence 
in Cochin China, Above all he stressed the importance of checking 
the expansive power of the British, If successful, intervention 
would enable the French to counterbalance * la grande influence de 
la nation Anglaise dans tous les Gouvernements de l'Inde, en y 
paraissant avec des ressources plus assurées et des secours moins 
éloignés que ceux qu'on attend d'Europe'; to dominate trade 'dans 
les mers de Chine et dans tout son Archipel'; to establish bases 
for the refitting and revictualling of their ships, 'et même en 
construire de nouveaux'; and finally, ’moyen efficace d'arrêter
les Anglais dans les projets qu'ils ont de nous chasser de l'Inde
y '  A 3
et d'etendre leurs Etablissements dans toute la cote de l 'E st ',
Carmarthen to Dorset, 6 April 1787, F«0. 27/21, On 20 December 
1787 Dorset informed the Foreign Secretary that two frigates were 
ready to leave L ’Orient, ’ and it is supposed that the young King of 
Cochinchine will return home in one of them. These Ships it cannot 
be doubted will convey all Sorts of useful Stores to the Possessions 
of His Most Christian Majesty in that Part of the World'. French in 
India, vol,XIII„
2
See chapter 7, pp#333-36,
3 ✓ x
^Avantages d'un Etablissement a la Cochin chine', September 1787,
Memoires et Documents, Asie, vol,19, pp#103-4#
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Pigneau even suggested that from their new strongholds in Cochin 
China the French would be able to assault the chief source of 
British power in Asia - Bengal*
The French ministry eventually yielded to these argu­
ments but only after the conclusion of the Dutch crisis. The 
intervention of the Prussians and the restoration of the Orange 
party had, of course, the effect of eliminating French influence 
from the Dutch bases in the East, Moreover, Montmorin was also 
influenced by news of the British acquisition of Penang, a move 
which seemed further to undermine French influence in the region«
Déjà les Anglais en ont forme*" un (établissement) à 
pinam, dans le détroit de Malaca leur exemple meme 
semble nous avertir de la necessite" de nous placer 
plus avantageuse encore, puisque des circonstances 
heureuses nous en facilitent la possibilité^ et le 
succès*!
Consequently a defensive and offensive treaty was drawn up and 
signed by Montmorin, the Foreign Minister, and Pigneau, who acted 
as Nguyen Anh’ s plenipotentiary, on 28 November 1787, Incorporat­
ing the provisions of the draft treaty which the bishop brought 
from Nguyen Anh, the French government bound itself to provide 
’ le Roi de la Cochinchine1 with four frigates, a corps of 1,200 
infantry, 200 artillery and 250 caffres in return for the eventual 
cession of Hoi-nan and the island of Pulo Condore, and the right
’Memoire pour le Roi. Expedition en Cochinchine1, 25 November
1787, Colonies *4, p*71#
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to a complete and exclusive trade throughout the kingdom.1 
Nevertheless, the Minister was cautious in the instructions he 
transmitted to d 'Entrecaste aux and Conway, the Governor at Pondi­
cherry who was given the final say in the matter of an expedition 
to assist the Nguyen* Conway was to take into account the reports 
of de Richery, believed to have just returned from a survey of 
southern Cochin China, and if another European power intervened 
in the civil war, Conway was ordered to desist from the enterprise. 
The Foreign Minister was careful to describe the change in policy 
that had resulted from the collapse of the francophile Patriots 
in the States General*
La revolution qui vient de se faire en Hollande change 
considérablement nos combinaisons politiques dans 
l'Inde, et ne nous permet plus guhre de regarder le 
Cap de Bonne-Esperance, ou l'^le de Ceylon, comme un 
point d'appui, ou de refuge. Cette consideration fait 
pencher le Gouvernement vers le parti de porter ses 
principales forces, ses moyens et son attention sur 
l'île  de France et sur un Etablissement nouveau qui 
mette plus de distance entre le siege de la puissance 
Anglaise et nous. Mais la Cochinchine pourra-t-elle 
remplir ce but? Voila, Monsieur, ce que le Roi commet 
à votre Jugement et a vos connaissances.
By the time the bishop had returned to Pondicherry both 
d 'Entre caste aux and Conway had lost their enthusiasm for the
1
The treaty is included in Conway's letter to Montmorin, 18 June
1788, Colonies *4, pp.166-73« It is also published in Taboulet, 
vol,I, pp .186-88; and Maybon, pp.409-11* See Appendix D,
2 ^
'Copie de la lettre ecrite a M« de Cte. de Conway1, 2 December 
1787, Colonies *4« p#84#
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Cochin Chinese venture, D'Entrecasteaux, who now resided at Port 
Louis, considered that it would be difficult to raise the men, 
stores and ships for the expedition, and feared that such an 
enterprise might further endanger the precarious position of the 
French in India and at the lie de France. He stressed the enormous 
distance that separated Cochin China from the other French 
possessions, and argued that the British and the Dutch could 
easily encircle and destroy any establishments formed there. At 
Pondicherry, on the other hand, a lengthy and heated correspondence 
ensued between Conway, the bishop, impatient to embark on the 
expedition, and the authorities in France. Conway tenaciously 
resisted the bishop's importunities because he was sceptical of 
the value of the enterprise. The deposed King, 'qui n 'a  rien, ne 
peut rien, dont le se'jour est inconnu, et dont 1®existence meme 
est doutable',  was in no position to win back his lost dominion, 
or to cede to the French Pulo Condore and Hoi-nan. These islands, 
or so he had been informed, were infertile and deserted, while the 
surrounding countryside had been devastated by civil war. Besides, 
Pondicherry v/as quite unable to provide the bishop with the four 
frigates promised by the treaty, and the expedition was accordingly 
postponed for a year.1 In August 1788 Conway despatched Kersaint 
to make a detailed survey of the coast of Cochin China, and 
especially the two islands of Hoi-nan and Pulo Condore* Kersaint*s
1
Conway to Montmorin, 18 June 1788, Colonies '4 , pp«166-73.
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report confirmed Conway's low estimate of the commercial potential 
of the islands with the result that Conway finally dropped the 
expedition*
The bishop, therefore, was forced to rely on voluntary 
assistance from Pondicherry, the French Islands and the Portuguese 
settlements at Goa and Macao* Despite this, the volunteers he 
brought with him to Saigon, Philippe Vannier and Jean Baptiste 
Chaigneau among them, were of considerable value to Nguyen Anh in 
his struggle against the Tayson forces, now established as the 
ruling power in Tonkin, Annam and much of Cochin China* When the 
bishop died in 1799 Nguyen Anh had taken Qui-nhon and was preparing 
his assault against the old imperial capital of Hue^ , By 1802 his 
power was established over Hue and most of Tonkin as well, and in 
that year he proclaimed himself Gia Long, emperor of Vietnam,, 
Earlier, in 1790 an a.ttempt was made to interest the National 
Assembly in supporting the Nguyen cause but the Assembly was pre­
occupied with domestic matters# Throughout, the British remained 
curious about these moves, and the Cathcart and Macartney embassies, 
though primarily devised to facilitate and expand the China trade, 
were not uninfluenced by d'Entrecasteaux's earlier mission to 
Canton and the flurry of French activity in Cochin China,1
1
Macartney was authorised by Dundas to visit Cochin China on his 
famous mission to China in 1793* See Lamb, 'British Missions to 
Cochin China1, pp#87-95*
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Francis Light also remained anxious about the French 
during the early days of Penang, and after the outbreak of the 
Revolutionary War he anticipated a French attack. Although this 
was the intention of Rear-Admiral Sercey, who sailed from Port 
Louis in June 1796, his squadron was engaged by two British ships 
near Acheh whereupon Sercey hastily returned to Mergui and 
Batavia* 1
This examination of the motives behind the establishment 
of Penang has shown the importance of political and strategic 
considerations* It was the need for security as well as for 
profits that impelled the Fort William Council to support the 
distant efforts of the man on the spot* Having sanctioned Light's 
proposals, the Council was obliged to justify its policy to the 
Board of Control and the Court of Directors# Apart from appealing 
to the now traditional arguments of opening up the eastern trade 
to China, the Council emphasised the menacing actions of the 
French in Cochin China and Thailand* Clearly the Council was 
alarmed by the reports of Light and Scott, and to a considerable 
extent such alarms were warranted by French plans, which aimed at 
thwarting, if not destroying, the Company’ s essential trade with 
China* With the bishop's embassy to France and the negotiation 
of an official treaty with the French government, the worst fears 
of the Company seemed on the verge of realisation- Thus, the
Clodd, pp*122-31»
1
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activities and presence of the French in Southeast Asia acted as 
both an immediate pretext and vindication for the acquisition of 
Pulo Penang#
Moreover, the basic strategy behind the Penang venture 
could be applied again and again to different situations and in 
this sense the contretemps of 1786 presents in miniature the 
forces of European expansion in Asia# Trincomalee was rapidly 
taken in August 1795 to forestall the French and to ensure British 
dominance of the Bay of Bengal area# Similarly, Malacca was 
carried in the same year#
In yet another sense the occupation of Penang provides 
us with a microcosm of these expansive pressures, for it is a 
classic instance of the man on the spot initiating the process* 
Without the ambitious and imperturbable Francis Light, a man 
familiar with Malay customs and esteemed by the Sultan of Kedah 
and the other Malay chiefs, the enterprise would probably have 
floundered like so many before it# His voyages and dealings as a 
country trader, extending over a period of thirty years, gave him 
a thorough acquaintance with the palm-fringed coasts of the Malay 
peninsula and the islands of the archipelago# And his knowledge 
was not merely restricted to matters of commerce and geography. 
Light admitted, with his typical candour, to having 'co-habited1
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with Martina Rozells, probably a Eurasian, from 1772,1 and it
would appear that Light felt a strong personal attachment to the
colourful and exotic life of the East. His attitude to Penang
was almost feudal# V/hatever his motives, there can be no doubt
that there was a patriotic element in his character, though this
was strangely mixed with his love of the eastern world. His
counter-part, the Bishop of Adran, provides an interesting
contrast. Pigneau was no less adept in the matter of native
diplomacy and no less committed to his missionary charge. But
the dream which sustained him during his bitter trials was the
building of a Catholic empire in Cochin China. As a French
Catholic he sought to buttress his religious endeavours with the
power and authority of the French state. Indeed, it is a tribute
to this vision that successive British governments in India
remained concerned about French activity in Cochin China at least
2
until the Congress of Vienna»
1
Clodd, pp.26-7.
2
See Lamb, ’British Missions to Cochin China*, chapters 5-9, for 
a discussion of the two missions by Roberts in 1803 and 1804, and 
the Crawfurd Mission of 1822*
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CHAPTER 7: THE FORMATION OF POLICIES
So far the core of the thesis has been concerned with 
the emergence and resolution of Anglo-French tensions at the local 
Asian level, although passing glances have been directed here and 
there at the wider ramifications of the contest. We have examined 
the pattern of relations between the English and the French in 
three different situations which emerged in the period from 1763 
to 1793# Traditionally, of course, most historians have discounted 
the French after the Peace of Paris, claiming that the French 
gave up their overseas ambitions to allow the British an open hand 
in the task of imperial expansion. There has been no serious 
effort to discern the elements of continuity in French policy 
between the Seven Years' War and the Napoleonic empire, and there 
has been even less concern with discovering how this activity 
affected the growth of British policies in India, Asia and the 
Pacific, In this matter, it seems that English language historians 
of the ’Empire* school have been the most neglectful. By contrast, 
we have discovered that the French in the East continued to 
harbour designs to overthrow, or substantially to diminish, British 
trade and power in the region. The schemes so enthusiastically
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devised and advocated by Chevalier, de Lauriston, de Bussy,
Pigneau de Behaine and others provided the prototypes for the 
oriental plans of Napoleon, Nevertheless, it would be very 
short-sighted indeed to deny that there was a tragic disparity 
between French dreams of an eastern empire and French activities 
there# For what after all were the permanent visible results of 
such fantasies and obsessions?
Some historians have argued that the associations which 
France established at Madagascar, in Vietnam and in the Indian 
and Pacific Oceans during the ancien regime provided the basis 
for her more dramatic imperial role in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries* Such is the view expressed in the 
monumental Histoire des Colonies Françaises, published between 
1929 and 1933«1 Other historians would keenly dispute this 
proposition« They would argue that there was little connection 
between the colonial activities of the French in the two periods, 
and that such ventures, whether in the seventeenth, eighteenth or 
nineteenth centuries, were hardly more than a romp in the peri­
pheral world* According to A .J ,P , Taylor, for instance, 'France 
and Germany were essentially continental Powers; colonial ventures 
were for them a diversion of energy, as the French turned to
1
G. Hanotaux and A. Martineau (ed#) , Histoire des Colonies Franç­
aises et de l fExpansion de la France dans le Monde ¿6 vois«.
Paris, 1929-33)•
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colonies only when they could do nothing else1. 1 However this 
may be, there is at least one substantial legacy of the French 
which the preceding four chapters have shown, and that is the 
considerable impact these adventures had on the steady consolida­
tion of British power in India and Further India during the latter 
half of the eighteenth century*
By concentrating only on the economic facets of this
prodigious growth, too many historians have neglected the political
and strategic elements behind the accumulation of new territories*
These historians forget that in the year after Hastings’ capture
of the French settlements in India, Vergennes and Florida Blanca
mounted a full scale invasion force at Brest to cross the Channel
2
and take Portsmouth and Plymouth, They also forget that in the 
next year the indomitable Suffren left France with orders to 
capture the Cape, and should he succeed in that then to proceed 
with all despatch to the Coromandel and there to land troops to 
aid Hyder Ali* Throughout this period, from the early struggles 
with Dupleix in the Carnatic until the final extinction of French
1
A .J .P . Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 
(Oxford, I960), p*294# Taylor's remarks here are mainly restricted 
to French colonial policies during the Third Republic, though they 
have, perhaps, a wider application*
2
The invasion attempt of 1779 is examined in A. Temple Patterson,
The Other Armada : The Franco-Spanish Attempt to invade Britain in 
1779 (Manchester. I960)« Napoleon drew on these plans for his 
famous invasion attempt of 1803-5*
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influence at the lie de France in 1810 and at Java in 1811, a 
spectre haunted Englishmen in the East, the spectre of the French* 
Whether the fears were generated by the dispositions of the French 
in the East Indies, or whether such alarms arose from a global 
and geo-political threat - as they certainly did in the Napoleonic 
period - they were a crucial factor in persuading reluctant 
British ministries to endorse and support a vast imperial pro­
gramme.
The perception by the British of the challenge to their 
interests depended, as we have seen, on the local situation in 
which the two powers were established, usually side by side* For 
most of the period, therefore, the British responses to the 
rival activities of the French were of a regional kind.
After Clive's conquest of Bengal and the conferring of 
the diwani on the Company, the north-east of India, comprising the 
provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, was securely lodged in the 
hands of the British. Furthermore, by the eleventh article of the 
Peace of Paris the French were effectively eliminated from the 
area as a military threat, and they remained only as traders. Yet 
with leaders as enterprising as Chevalier the French did not 
supinely acquiesce in defeat, and during the 1770's and the 1780's 
French officials fought hard to retain their special trading and 
legal immunities. The Fort William Council was chagrined by this
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graceless performance, and succeeded in curbing the grosser 
pretensions of their commercial rivals. However, the political 
situation in the north-west, where the Marathas were once more 
asserting their sway, was not healthy and seemed to invite 
French intervention. Suspicious of the designs of Chevalier and 
de Lauriston, the Council stepped in to order the demolition of 
the questionable ditch at Chandernagore, fearing that the French 
might hold up large forces in a siege while the Marathas, Shah 
Alam and the Nawab of Oudh descended from the north. With the 
passing and implementation of the Regulating Act, the Council 
became responsible for the other presidencies. Further evidences 
of Gallican perfidy were provided by the Madras and Bombay Councils, 
and the inevitable consequence was that the French were 
distrusted and jealously watched whereas the Dutch and the Danes, 
trading competitors but national allies, were largely left alone.
In the other parts of India where the Company was 
established, the Carnatic and the west, we have noticed that the 
French remained a more active political element in the situation. 
Trade was also a less important component of the rivalry. The 
embassies of Saint Lubin and Montigny to Poona, of Modave to 
Hyderabad, together with the missions sent by Tipu Sultan to 
Versailles, suggested a more tangible threat to the precarious 
footholds of the British. There can be no doubt that without the
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French presence the Madras and Bombay Councils would still have 
been forced to fight in the internecine and seemingly interminable 
wars of the Indian states if they wished to maintain their 
independent position, though it is still true that Frenchmen, 
skilled at diplomatic manoeuvering and training sepoy armies, 
convinced the councils of the utter necessity of intervention and 
victory« In fact, Wellesley's subsidiary alliance system was 
devised primarily to eliminate the threat from French mercenaries 
and agents in the South*
It is important to remember that the defeats of the 
Seven Years’ War and the peace which followed had a searing 
effect on French government circles, and that Choiseul and his 
cousin strove incessantly to re-habilitate French naval strength* 
By the time of his dismissal from office the navy had grown from 
some forty ships of all types in 1763 to sixty-four of the line 
and fifty frigates*1 In keeping with this spirit the French 
ministry evinced real interest in those schemes aimed at establish­
ing French influence in areas of only marginal interest to the 
English* The defences of Port Louis were greatly strengthened, 
while that typical eighteenth century adventurer, the comte de
Temple Patterson, p-21,
1
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Benyowski, was assisted in his efforts to colonise Madagascar,1 
Later, with the arrival of Suffren'i’ squadron in the Bay of 
Bengal, the French renewed their interest in Burma, Sumatra and 
Cochin China, Partly, then, as a response to the growing menace 
of French sea-power the Supreme Government at Fort William chose 
to form a refitting base and an entrepot at Penang, Light's 
timely reporting of the French bishop's intrigues in Cochin China 
and Thailand clinched the argument.
These three regional studies have clearly revealed that 
the initiatives in this battle of wits were taken on the spot by 
men eager to make their fortune and reputation. Although the 
amount of effective control exerted by European governments over 
their settlements and nationals in the East gradually increased 
during the late eighteenth contury, much discretionary power was 
still left vested in the governors and councils. The sheer factor 
of distance was crucial, for it meant that at best despatches 
from London or P^ris took six months to reach India while personal
1
Maurice Benyowski (1741-1786) was a soldier of fortune of Hungarian 
birth. After serving in the Austrian army during the Seven Years' 
War, he fought with the Poles against the Russians. Eventually 
captured, he was exiled to Kamtchatka in Siberia, but he managed to 
escape to China and Japan, From Canton he sailed to Paris, and in 
1772 obtained the ministry's support to form a settlement at 
Madagascar, 'une colonie vaste et ample, aussi riche que formid­
able, plus encore, un bouclier contre nos ennemis aux Indes', He 
established Louisbourg in the north-east of the island (1773-6), 
though he left soon after to join the American revolutionary armies. 
He was killed in Madagascar in 1786 at the hands of an expedition 
sent from the Ile de France,
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correspondence, if it arrived at all, took from two to three years. 
In this situation of 'salutary neglect* the English and the French 
were free to put their pet schemes to the test without necessarily 
committing their respective governments to any one line of action* 
His Majesty’ s Secretary of State often chided the Company for the 
audacious and presumptuous exploits of its agents in the East 
Indies# The Fort William Council's compliance with de Lauriston’s 
request for a small force at Chandernagore was one such case 
(though here the endeavours of the Council were devoted temporar­
ily to conciliating the French, and not to repelling or anticipat­
ing them), and Dalrymple's Balambangan venture another. Choiseul 
and Vergennes were almost as distrustful of their own traders in 
the East, their attitude exemplifying the aristocrat's contempt 
for the merchant. In practice, however, the English were usually 
able to exploit their stronger position in India and the Eastern 
Seas to overawe and intimidate the French and their allies. Six 
months was more than enough time in which to present the home 
government with a fait accompli#
In India relations between the English and the French 
were almost invariably conducted through the administrative agencies 
of the companies# Each of the East India Company's presidencies 
determined its own foreign policy through its council meeting as 
a select or secret committee# The governors and their councillors
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were appointed from the ranks of the Company’ s servants by the 
Court of Directors, meeting far away in Leadenhall Street in 
London, The Court was also responsible for formulating matters 
of general policy, but such was the state of administrative 
confusion in the 1760’s and such the intractable problem of 
distance that the councils were able politely to disregard the 
directives of the Court with impunity. On the other hand, the 
French Governor at Pondicherry was held directly responsible to 
the Ministry of Marine for the conduct of foreign and political 
matters, the Compagnie des Indes having been suppressed in 1770*
There is a significant contrast in the attitudes of the 
French and British governments towards the appointment of pleni­
potentiaries to settle the disputes which had arisen in India 
since the peace and which culminated in the Chandernagore ditch 
a ffair .1 While Choiseul was content to delegate these powers to 
Law de Lauriston, the Governor of the French possessions in India, 
Weymouth was obviously reluctant to vest such powers in the East 
India Company* Since no news had been received from the commiss­
ioners who had left England in October 1769 to reform the Company's 
administration in India, Weymouth declined the French ambassador's 
proposal that the commissioners be empowered by the Crown to 
treat with de Lauriston*
See chapter 3, pp«97-116, and chapter 5, pp.211-18*
1
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These differences over the appointment and powers of the 
plenipotentiaries largely reflected the differing relationships 
between the companies and their respective governments in Europe* 
The 'exclusif' was abolished in August 1769, and after April 1770 
the Compagnie was dissolved and its administration was taken over 
by the Crown. Tensions between French merchants and officials in 
India and the metropolitan authority were thus reduced to a 
minimum. The French government hoped for a general settlement in 
India which would establish for their individual merchants the 
'free and unmolested trade' they had previously claimed for the 
Compagnie,
In England the United East India Company remained a 
powerful, wealthy and relatively independent corporation, though 
increasingly through the 1760's it was subject to criticism at 
home. It was generally believed that the Company's acquisition 
of the Bengal revenues, together with the excesses of its un­
principled servants, threatened the safety of the British 
Constitution itself* Admiral Sir John Lindsay's appointment with 
special plenipotentiary powers in 1769 resulted from the Grafton 
Ministry's distrust and ignorance of the Company's policies, which 
appeared to be adverse to the 'national interest'. One of the 
more important tasks assigned to Lindsay was the examination of the 
Company’s dealings with the surrounding Indian states. The Madras
314
Council had recently involved itself in a disastrous war with 
Hyder Ali, and a French invasion of the sub-continent was con­
sidered imminent. Moreover, it seemed that all three councils 
in their dealings with the other European powers in India were 
arrogating to themselves unconstitutional powers* Weymouth's 
attempts to persuade the Court of Directors to invest Lindsay 
with wide plenipotentiary powers were obstinately resisted by the 
Company, who feared for their chartered rights and privileges# 
While the missions of Lindsay and his successor, Sir Robert 
Harland, failed because of opposition from the councils in India, 
they are important as the first serious attempt by the British 
government to interfere directly in the foreign policy of the East 
India Company, John Macpherson's arrival in London as the leader 
of a deputation from the Nawab of Arcot also witnessed the attempt 
of certain Anglo-Indian interests to influence the policies of the 
Imperial parliament#
Although North's Regulating Act of 1773 was intended to 
solve the problem of the Company's ramshackle administration - at 
home by stabilising the powers and membership of the Court of 
Directors, and in India by increasing the supervisory role of the 
Fort William Council over the lesser settlements - its Indian 
provisions were largely nullified by dissensions within the Fort 
William Council, Whereas the Governor General had no powers to
315
override his fellow Councillors, he did have a casting vote in 
case of an equal division of votes. Pitt's India Act increased 
and strengthened both the powers of the Governor General over his 
Council, and the powers of the Supreme Government over the other 
presidencies. We have also seen that the consolidation and 
centralisation of control at Fort William was paralleled in the 
administration of the French settlements by the edict of May 1785 
which united all the French possessions east of the Cape of Good 
Hope into a single government centred on the lie de France*
These new conditions had a considerable impact on the 
pattern of Anglo-French relations in India after the return of 
the French settlements in 1785* The centralising of authority 
at Fort William and Port Louis implied that it was now feasible 
for the French and British governments in India to conclude a 
general settlement of outstanding disputes and differences#. The 
despatch of Colonel Charles Cathcart to conclude such a general 
settlement with the French at Port Louis bears comparison with the 
earlier missions of Lindsay and Harland.1 Various incidents in 
Bengal, culminating in the firing on the Esperance below Budge 
Budge, provoked the Supreme Government at Fort William to appoint 
Cathcart as their envoy, and he was instructed to settle provis­
ionally the differences which had arisen 'respecting the
See chapter 4, pp*166-81*
1
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Interpretation and Execution of the last Treaty of Peace1, 1 
Lindsay’ s appointment was also sparked off by local disturbances, 
and after news of the Chandernagore affair reached Europe he was 
directed to arbitrate between the English and the French in India. 
Nevertheless, Lindsay and Harland were commissioned by the Crown 
in London and because of their extensive but secret powers, fre­
quently found themselves at loggerheads with the councils, 
Cathcart, by contrast, received his powers from the Governor 
General - in - Council at Calcutta, and when he arrived in England 
with the convention the Board of Control and the Pitt Ministry 
disapproved strongly of the settlement he had concluded, Pitt 
and Dundas considered that the convention was not only illegal,
but ’ derogatory to those Rights of Sovereignty in which this
2
Country could suffer no Encroachment to be made’ . Consequently 
the Fort William Council was once more reproved while William 
Eden, who began negotiations with the French on the matter of the 
East Indies in September 1786, was instructed ’wholly to disavow
3
that Convention as unauthorized and improper’ .
With the arrival of Cornwallis in Bengal and the
1
Governor General and Council to Cathcart, 31 January 1786, French 
in India, vol,VI, p .37»
2
Carmarthen to Harris, 7 September 1787, F ,0 ♦ 37/l8,
3
According to Carmarthen’s letter of 7 September (F«0« 37/l8) these 
instructions were transmitted to Eden in February 1787#
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implementation of the India Act, power was securely placed in the 
hands of the Governor General at Calcutta. In ideas and attitudes 
the new Governor General was supposed to embody the cautious 
wisdom of the government at home and thereby act as a restraint 
on the impatient and avaricious servants of the Company in India, 
Even Cornwallis, however, was drawn into a war policy against the 
ferocious Tipu Sultan, and when the chief executive office was 
occupied by such an imperialist as Wellesley, fired with the 
vision of creating a British paramountcy over the weak and 
fragmented Indian states and thwarting the global designs of 
Napoleon, all caution was thrown to the winds. Administrative 
reorganisation thus facilitated conquest and empire.
Our three studies of Anglo-French rivalry have so far 
tended to treat the conflict as simply another of those innumer­
able struggles which proliferated between warring polities and 
states in eighteenth century India and Southeast Asia* But it 
was, of course, derived from European experience and history, and 
while local Indian and Asian factors unavoidably determined the 
way in which the conflict developed, it continued throughout the 
period under study to be profoundly affected by European conditions# 
Invariably the serious crises in Anglo-French relations in India 
occurred when there was a conjunction of European tensions with 
disputes, troubles and grievances in India# This suggests again 
that the rivalry was still fundamentally related to the European
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context even in spite of the formidable delay in communications. 
Individual incidents in India, trivial in themselves, tended to 
merge into a generalised crisis, which was often unconscionably 
protracted by its association with European crisis periods. And 
the common fear, entertained by the British in the East, that a 
French fleet off the Madras or the Balasore roads might be the 
first indication of the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, added 
a panic element to the reactions of the Company’s servants.
It was more than fortuitous circumstance, then, that the 
first major crisis in the East which reached its apogee with the 
Chandernagore affair coincided with a more generalised war scare 
of 1770. After 1763, as has already been noted, the French govern­
ment turned its attention to the colonial and commercial rivalry 
with the English, and guided by the indefatigable Choiseul France 
freed herself from distracting entanglements in central and 
eastern Europe to pursue with greater vigour and persistence the 
struggle against the maritime and global predominance of the 
English, Choiseul was convinced that ’ la guerre aux colonies est 
la veritable affaire', and despite the real losses inflicted on 
the French colonial empire by the Peace of Paris, the French were 
a more serious threat to the security of English trade and possess­
ions after 1763 than earlier in the century, when French foreign 
policy was hamstrung by traditional continental alliances and the
319
secret du roi. The navy was re-habilitated and its administration 
streamlined*
And yet Choiseul was not prepared for war in 1770, and 
though he categorically denied the allegations of the Fort William 
Council, asserting that such accusations were a screen to conceal 
the more sinister activities of the East India Company, he care­
fully retreated at the critical moment* The firm refusal of the 
Spanish Foreign Minister, Grimaldi, to support France over the 
ditch contretemps was a tangible factor in Choiseul's decision, 
but the failure of the Turks, the quondam ally of the French, to 
withstand a Russian naval attack also made him genuinely reluctant 
to involve his country in hostilities with Britain. Besides, his 
position at court was by no means secure and his attempts to 
weaken Spanish demands during the Falkland Islands' crisis were 
intended in part to win back the support of Louis XV. However, 
most governments - the British, French and the Spanish - expected 
war throughout 1770 and early 1771 with the inevitable by-product 
that the Indian settlements were urged to prepare for it*
The appointment of Sir John Lindsay as a plenipotentiary 
to treat with Law de Lauriston was a sop given to the French to 
placate their bitter criticisms. But the French remained thoroughly 
sceptical of the efforts of British ministries to control and 
discipline the servants of the Company. To the continental powers
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with interests in the East, the French, the Dutch and the Spanish, 
the growing power of the British constituted the greatest menace 
to the security and peace of Asia, and they prayed for its speedy 
demise. The French were convinced that one result of the oppress­
ive and despotic regime of the Company, especially in Bengal, 
would be a revolution of the princes, which, they optimistically 
predicted, would unseat the British from their pre-eminent posi­
tion. Until that glorious time they were forced into the role 
of an armchair critic, and their eloquent and impassioned protests 
swelled the opposition to the 'nabobs1, already vocal in England» 
Dire accounts of the terrible famine which ravaged Bengal during 
1769 and 1770 slowly percolated through to London, while the 
recently published works of Alexander Dow and William Bolts further 
discredited the Company's servants,1 The Abbe Raynal published 
his voluminous and curious tomes in the 1770's and though deplor­
ing the corruption and avidity of the English in Bengal, he 
emphasised the immense gains which might accrue to the French if 
they exploited the situation to their advantage and renounced any 
pretensions to territorial sovereignty. He particularly stressed 
the 'necessary and mutual connection' between the lie de France 
and Pondicherry, urging the speedy fortification of these two
1
Alexander Dow, History of Hindustan (London, 1768). The second 
edition of this work was published in 1770. William Bolts, Con­
siderations on Indian Affairs, particularly respecting the Present 
State of Bengal and its Dependencies (London, 1 7 7 2 ) . — —  —
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important bases. He also espoused a military alliance with the
Marathas, a martial nation, so that;
At the sight of their standards, all these oppressed 
sovereigns would take the field; and the rulers of 
India, surrounded with enemies, and attacked at one on 
the north and on the south, by sea and by land, would 
infallibly be overpowered.
Then the French, considered as the deliverers of 
Indostan, would emerge from that state of humiliation 
into which their own misconduct hath plunged them.
They would become the idols of the princes and people 
of Asia, provided the revolution they brought about 
proved to them a lesson of moderation* Their trade 
would be extensive and flourishing, so long as they 
knew how to be just. But this prosperity would end 
in some fatal catastrophe, should an inordinate 
ambition prompt them to plunder, ravage and oppress*^
Such in outline were the intentions of the French govern­
ment during the American War, the second and most serious crisis 
in Anglo-French relations during this period* In Chapter 2 an 
examination was made of the strategies pursued by the French and 
the English in the East, and we have seen that the policies 
adopted by Vergennes in the Americas and the East Indies were the 
fulfilment of Choiseul's 'revanche* diplomacy* Suffren success­
fully occupied the Cape and Trincomalee, and whereas Bussy was not 
entirely welcomed as a messianic deliverer, he was able to hold up 
large British forces at Cuddalore, thus preventing them from push­
ing the war into Tipu's territories. In the face of these
Abbe* Raynal, A Philosophical and Political History of the Settle­
ments and Trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies 
(London, 1777) ,  vo l.2, book 4> p*156. The original French edition 
was first published at Amsterdam in 1770.
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exigencies a close liaison was established between the Secret 
Committee of the Court of Directors and the North Ministry, The 
elaborate negotiations that transpired between these two bodies 
have been dealt with in the second chapter, and the Secret Committ 
ee continued to be consulted by Shelburne and Grantham during the 
peace discussions of 1782 and 1783* This relationship was forma­
lised in the India Act, which unequivocally brought the Company 
under the control of the state. Thereafter the Secret Committee 
became the major channel through which secret despatches passed 
between the Board of Control and the governments in India#
Consisting as it did of the Chairman and the Deputy 
Chairman and one other, usually the senior Director, 
it became the ’ cabinet council’ of the Company and 
enjoyed the privilege of frequent consultation on all 
important India business with the President of the 
Board and the Ministers*^
The years immediately following the Peace of Versailles 
saw some easing of tensions between the English and the French in 
Europe and India, Perhaps outright conflict had cleared the air 
of bitterness for a season, or perhaps the French hoped to use the 
somewhat vague terms of the treaty to extract a better modus 
vivendi in the East. At any rate the definitive peace treaty 
provided for the nomination of commissioners to reach new commerc­
ial arrangements with Britain, and during 1785 negotiations were
1
C.H. Philips, The East India Company 1784-1834 (Manchester, 196l) 
p. 11«
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begun to conclude a commercial treaty with the French on the basis 
of 'mutual convenience'. French financiers, too, showed consider­
able interest in the idea of a commercial rapprochement with the 
East India Company, although the Court of Directors were of the 
opinion that it was not ' for the present adviseable to enter into 
any commercial arrangement' with them.1 For a time, therefore, 
the British believed that the French might be content simply with 
a commercial role, and Macpherson, who was usually more sympathetic 
to the French than either Hastings or Cornwallis, argued that a 
relaxation of trading regulations would inspire the French to 
abandon their tiresome political ambitions.
But such was not to be. For the French the interests of 
commercial profit and 'la  gloire’ were one and indivisible. 
Vergennes and de Castries were implacably opposed to any weakening 
of the Compagnie’s political role because of the traditional 
mercantilist premise that private trade should subserve political 
ends. Consequently the administrators at Port Louis, Pondicherry 
and Chandernagore continued to hold their offices from the Crown 
and the Ministry of Marine, and to indulge in intrigue with the 
rulers and states of India and Southeast Asia.
The gradual deterioration in Anglo-French relations after
1
Motion of the Secret Court of Directors, 24 August 1785, P»R>0.
30/8, 353, p .59.
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the peace was not only due to local disturbances and antagonisms 
in the East (though these were instrumental in the decision to 
found a settlement at Penang), but also to the basic tensions of 
Anglo-French diplomacy in Europe, Some considerable attention 
has already been given to the wider repercussions of Indian crises 
on the policies of the French and British governments in Europe,
A European crisis which had significant effects on the development 
of Anglo-French relations in India and the Eastern Seas during the 
1780's will now be analysed in order to demonstrate the close-knit 
relationship between European and Indian events* It is also hoped 
that it will shed some light on the matter of East Indian policy, 
its formulation and execution, in the late eighteenth century*
i. A EUROPEAN CRISIS AND ITS EASTERN RAMIFICATIONS: THE PROBLEM 
OF THE DUTCH 1785-1788
After 1780 and especially after 1785 the security of 
the British possessions in India was related directly to the 
future of the enfeebled Dutch power in the East*1 The Dutch entry 
into the American War on the side of the Bourbon powers had 
demonstrated finally and irrefutably the strategic importance of the
1
For a recent treatment of the state of Dutch society and commerce 
in the late eighteenth century see C.R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne 
Empire 1600-1800 (London, 1965), chapter 10, and for a close analysis 
of the negotiations between 1783 and 1793 see N. Tarling, Anglo- 
Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World 1780-1824 (Brisbane, 1962), 
chapters 1-2, and V.T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British 
Empire. vol#I I ,  pp,365-418,
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Cape and Trincomalee as the outer defences of India, and for the 
next decade the Dutch government was sedulously courted by Prance 
and Britain*
During the peace negotiations the French and British
ministers evinced a keen interest in the fate of Trincomalee and
Ceylon, A memorandum, prepared on the Dutch eastern settlements
for the British plenipotentiary, stressed the urgent need to
retain control of Trincomalee#
Shoud (sic) this Settlement be retained by us, here a 
Fleet in all Monsoons will find a Safe retreat, and 
woud afford a Constant Protection to all our Settlements 
in India, it being situated#.within three weeks Sail 
of Bombay, a weeks to Bengal, and only 30 to 40 Hours 
Sail of Madrass in the Sth,West Monsoon: It is only 
from the French Islands, or from Batavia, a three 
weeks run. In Time of War, no Enemy’s Fleet could 
approach the Coast of Coromandell, and if they did 
pass the Gulph of Bengal unobserved, or to Bombay, 
they woud soon be followed by our Fleet, always clean, 
and in good order, 1
The French, on the other hand, were dissatisfied with 
Pondicherry as the capital of French India because of its vulner­
ability to attack from Madras, and were anxiously searching for a 
new site* The splendid harbour of Trincomalee, dominating the 
ocean approaches to the Bay of Bengal, appeared a likely choice,
1
'A Short Description of the Dutch Possessions In the East Indies 
lately captured by the English Arms, from which their great Con­
sequence to the Dutch, and their Importance to England, in the 
Event of their Restoration to the former, or retention by the 
later, may be deduced’ , F .O . 27/3, p,175#
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and in their correspondence and discussions with the Dutch the 
French Minister nicely emphasised the many interests that they 
shared,1
However, the statesmen drafting the peace preliminaries
believed that British forces were still in control of Trincomalee
until late in March 1783, when news reached Europe of Suffren's
capture of the naval station - another excellent illustration of
the time lag and its strange effects, Grantham, the Foreign
Minister, insisted that if a general restitution of captured
Dutch possessions took place 'the Port of Trincomali must not be
2
restored*. But Vergennes persisted in demanding the restoration
of all possessions,
and particularly Trincomali, a settlement which he 
seemed to understand the great value and importance 
of, and consequently how necessary for France to 
wrest it out of our hands, from regard to her own 
Interests, even independantly (sic) of her connexions
with Holland. 5
Direct negotiations with the Dutch envoys began in 
December 1782, Grantham hoped to re-establish the old relationship
1
See, for instance, 'Memoire sur les principaux objets dont on 
doit s'occuper dans les Négociations pour la Paix', Mai 1782, 
Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, vol,537, p,125, for a 
statement of French aims vis-à-vis Trincomalee.
2
Grantham to Fitzherbert, 23 September 1782, F ,0 . 27/3, p .163#
3
Fitzherbert to Grantham, 3 October 1782, F .O . 27/3» p*200*
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of amity with the Dutch, who had been traditional allies in war 
and peace since the Glorious Revolution but if the Dutch failed 
to respond to the British overtures, the Foreign Secretary stress­
ed that ’Our Situation in India certainly renders the Port of 
Trincomale not only desireable but almost necessary to u s , , ' 1 
Fitzherbert was also instructed to contest any claims made by the 
Dutch to an exclusive ’Navigation of the Eastern Seas’ . ’ It will 
therefore be necessary that the Liberty of navigating those Seas
should be asked for, and granted, more especially if they are
2
allowed any Privileges in carrying on their Neutral Trade,*’
But above all the British plenipotentiary was to prevent France 
from ’obtaining that important Post (of Trincomalee), as She has, 
by the Possession of the Cape, and of Demarary, and Essequebo, 
the Means of forcing i t ’*
In spite of many blandishments, the Dutch envoys remain­
ed unmoved on the issue of Trincomalee, for they were convinced 
v/ith Vergennes that the possession of this naval station would 
enable the British to dominate the entire eastern trade, their own 
spice trade not excepted* Once established at Trincomalee, the 
British would ally themselves with the King of Kandy and subvert 
Dutch rule elsewhere on the island and deprive them of their 
profitable cinnamon trade*
Grantham to Fitzherbert, 18 December 1782, F«0. 27/3, p»442#
2r .O . 27/3. P .442.
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In an effort to break the deadlock between the English
and the Dutch, Vergennes suggested on 5 January 1783 that the
Dutch cede Negapatam to the English in place of Trincomalee,
With great reluctance Grantham permitted Fitzherbert on 9 January
to yield on the matter of Trincomalee provided that the English
could retain possession of Negapatam - an essential condition -
and, if possible, Demerary and Essequebo, Dutch settlements now
held by the French in Guiana, The British also hoped to procure
from the Dutch 'an unequivocal declaration of the Company's right
to a free navigation of the Eastern Seas, and to an uncontrouled
Trade to any of the Islands situated in those Seas, not possessed
by the Dutch',1 but in this and the matter of Dutch Guiana they
were not entirely successful. The Dutch promised only that they
would not obstruct the navigation of British subjects in the
Eastern Seas* The peace preliminaries, concluded with the French
on 18 January, did not receive the approval of the Dutch until
September* Moreover, the prevaricating Dutch were unwilling to
admit the British claims to Negapatam and to a liberty to trade
throughout the Eastern Seas, vainly insisting on the exclusion of
British subjects 'from all intercourse with the Spice Islands or
Moluccas: terms so general as to comprehend all the Islands in
2
the Eastern Seas',
1
Secret Committee of the Court of Directors to Grantham, 12 Feb­
ruary 1783, F .O . 27/15, p,89.
Chairman and Deputy Chairman to Fox, 30 July 1783, F«0, 27/6, p,743*
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By the definitive treaty, concluded on 20 May 1784, 
Holland retained control of Trincomalee and the Cape while Britain 
was given Negapatam, Provision was made in the treaty for terri­
torial readjustments if and when the two parties could come to 
some other acceptable arrangement. Naturally the British were 
still hopeful of acquiring Trincomalee, and they would have been 
prepared to concede the Dutch Negapatam, Bencoolen and their 
other settlements in western Sumatra, together with substantial 
trading concessions in Bengal, in return for Trincomalee and 
various privileges in the Riau archipelago. By contrast the Dutch 
stubbornly refused to yield up Trincomalee, even though they were 
willing to give Britain their own Sumatran factories for the 
return of Negapatam,
Conversely, Vergennes hoped that the Dutch would side 
with the French in this three-cornered tussle, believing that an 
alliance with the States General would be of more lasting value 
to France than the traditional Bourbon compact with Spain, Rumours 
of a Franco-Dutch alliance, rife after mid-1784, were in fact 
realised in the secret military alliance ratified at Fontainebleau 
in November 1785, The veteran French Minister clearly perceived 
the advantages that Britain would draw from Dutch support, and
sought to prevent such a state of affairs from developing. He
A '
also realised the critical role that the Dutch possessions might
play in any future conflict in undermining British power in the
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East* De Castries, the truculent and spirited Minister of Marine, 
argued that the vaulting ambitions of the British could be checked 
throughout the world by a successful Franco-Dutch assault on 
their eastern empire.
The establishment of a joint administration for the 
French and Dutch East India Companies was proposed and the 
appointment of a Frenchman, Mr de Bouille7, as the ’Directeur 
militaire des colonies hollandaises1 in Africa and the East and 
V/est Indies, was urged on the Ministry#1 De Bouille/ himself later 
recalled:
At this moment (1784) I was preparing to depart for 
Russia I received an order from Government immediately 
to return. On my arrival I was acquainted by the Mini­
sters with a project relative to the East Indies* The 
object of this was to unite the French and the Dutch 
forces in an attack upon the English Possessions to 
restore to the Princes of the Country the Provinces 
conquered from them by the English, and to obtain and 
secure for the two Nations, Factories and commercial 
Establishments which were to be free to the whole 
world* ^
The promised army was to number 18,000 men, and some 20 millions 
of livres in specie were to be taken to the East* ’Trincomalee
’Memoire sur les projets que la france et la hollande peuvent 
former relativement a l ’Asie et sur les motifs qui doivent engager 
ces deux puissances a l ’unir pour y operer une revolution1, 
Mémoires et Documents, Asie, vol«7, p*220*
2 ^
These extracts from Bouille’s memoir are included in ’ A Memorial 
for Mr. Dundas on the French Threats of Conquest in India’ , which 
in turn is located in Item 46 of the Hamilton-Bruce Collection, 
Scottish Record Office (microfilm in National Archives of India)#
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in the Island of Ceylon was the place destined for the rendez vous 
of the troops and the repository of the military magazines1« The 
Dutch, according to this report, agreed to furnish one third of 
the men and stores, while de Bouille, who was popular with the 
Dutch, was to be given control with a military committee appointed 
by the States General, By such measures as these the Dutch would 
be attracted into the path of French influence. Furthermore, the 
joint administration would facilitate a common defence policy and 
greater economy and efficiency, 'On ajoutera seulement que par là 
les colonies hollandaises et la hollande meme deviendraient presque 
de provinces françaises',1
As a quid pro quo for their admission to the Cape and
Trincomalee, the French offered to contribute handsomely to the
defence costs of these establishments. They also desired to use
Batavia as a base from which to disrupt the East India Company's
trade with China, 'S i l'on établit des croisieres dans les
détroits de Malaca, de la Sonde, de Bali et de Macassar, le commerce
/ 2
des Anglais avec la Chine sera interruptee',  To accomplish these 
not inconsiderable ends, France was to exploit the political 
divisions between the Patriot and Stadholderate parties in the 
States General,
1
Asie, vo1 ,7 , p,52.
Asie. vol,7, p*63.
2
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La France a un interet trop capital a ce que les 
Provinces-Unies conservent leurs Colonies, pour ne 
pas employer toute son influence en hollande, a fin 
d'y opérer le plutôt possible une revolution qui 
permettre de donner a ces établissements une forme
/  ^
nouvelle plus analogue aux interets de la cause 
commune*1
A great many schemes were submitted to the Ministries of
Marine and Foreign Affairs, advocating amongst other things the
tactics to be adopted in an Indian war and a commercial alliance
with Holland and the Republic of Venice to open up the Suez route
2
to India# This Franco-Dutch alliance and the idea of the commer­
cial and political penetration of Egypt indicated a resurgence of 
French interest in expansion further eastwards, and this new 
interest was reflected - as we have already noticed - in the con­
clusion of a trade agreement with the Beys and the sending of a 
number of scientific and exploratory expeditions to Asia and the
3
Pacific in the post-war period#
1
Asie, vo1*7, p#49#
2
See, for example, Suffren's memoir of 1783 which stressed the 
merits of a Franco-Dutch alliance (Asie, vol*7, p#143ff.)| 'Plan 
sur le commerce de l'Inde, et des Caravannes de l'Asie et de 
l'Afrique', advocating the commercial penetration of the Mediter­
ranean and Asia by means of an alliance with Holland and Venice, 
and the construction of a canal between the Red Sea and the 
Mediterranean (Asie, vol*7, pp#160-8); 'Demandes \  former aux 
deputes de la Compagnie des Indes de Hollande' (Asie, vol*7, 
pp#259-6l); and 'Projet d'association entre la France et la 
Compagnie d'hollande relativement a la partie de l'Inde' (Asie, 
vol.7, pp .263-70)#
3
See chapter 6, pp*281-3#
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The limited successes of the Patriots in the spring of
1787 marked the zenith of French influence in the United Provinces,
yet even after the death of the cautious Vergennes early in 1787
the French government was reluctant to embroil itself too openly
in the vicissitudes of the Patriot party.1 Nevertheless, the
confused and diffident moves of the French were closely watched
by the British ambassador at the Hague, Sir James Harris, Pitt’s
Ministry was alarmed by reports that ’ the Dutch Stations of Ceylon
and on the Coromandel Coast were to be resorted to by the French’ ,
already assembling an army to invade India and assist Tipu Sultan,
and the Ministry considered it more than a fortuitous circumstance
that ’ at the very time when the French Party were endeavouring to
produce a Revolution in Holland, by the expulsion of the Stad-
holder, the Ambassadors of Tippoo Saib (as they were termed)
2
arrived at Paris’ , Doubtless Pitt and Carmarthen were also 
concerned, and with less exotic reasons, at the massing of French 
troops at Givet on the frontier with the Austrian Netherlands,
Sir James Harris, briefed to re-establish British in­
fluence at the Hague, tried throughout 1786 and 1787 to assist and
1
For a detailed discussion of the diplomatic manoeuvres see 
A. Cobban, Ambassadors and Secret Agents : The Diplomacy of the 
First Earl of Malmesbury at the Hague (London«1954),
2
This quotation, taken from Perron’ s L ’ Inde en Rapport avec 
L*Europe (2 vols, Hamburg, 1798), is located in Item 46 of the 
Hamilton-Bruce collection in the Scottish Record Office (microfilm 
in National Archives of India),
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strengthen the conservative Stadholder faction# Underlying all
the British efforts to induce Holland to enter into an alliance
with her was the faith that a mutual accommodation of interests
could be arranged#
The two Countries have each one original great object 
in view, and which do not clash in the smallest 
degree: That of Great Britain is to maintain and 
preserve the Empire which she has acquired, in com­
parison of which even trade is a subordinate or 
collateral consideration.
The great object of Holland is, in the first 
instance, to secure to herself the monopoly of the 
Spice Islands; and secondly, to extend her general 
trade by every means in her power,
Since, according to the British view, there was no real conflict 
between these two policies, it was hoped that Holland would be 
'disposed to assist and promote our political interests, if she 
desires any additional security to her own possessions, or add­
itional advantage to her Trade', The Ministry, which was in close 
touch through Dundas and the Board of Control with the Court of 
Directors, was evidently mindful of the dangers implicit in a 
Franco-Dutch alliance* It is significant that by the time of 
this crisis government and Company policy were identical, 'The 
nature of our Empire in India is so very singular that it cannot be 
guarded with too much caution, it is scarcely vulnerable from the
1
'Considerations on the Subject of a Treaty between Great Britain 
and Holland, relative to their Interests in India ', P ,R .O> 30/8, 
360 part I I , p«179*
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attack of any single European Power, but it may be endangered from 
that of Prance and Holland united1*1 Thus Pitt and Dundas wished 
to detach Holland from France and cement the historic Anglo-Dutch 
alliance*
As the political situation in Holland worsened during
June and July 1787, the Pitt Ministry became acutely concerned
about the possible fate of the Dutch possessions and they were
forced to concur in Harris' judgement that 'the great point is,
who shall be the first to occupy them and to leave the Right of
2
possession to be discussed hereafter'. In fact, Pitt wrote to 
Cornwallis urging his government in India to make preparations for
3
a likely conflict with the French and the Dutch, Furthermore, 
the Ministry was also persuaded to endorse the new settlement at 
Penang in the Malacca Straits because of the uncertainty of the 
Dutch as allies and their uncompromising claim 'to the sole exclus-
4
ive possession of..the Straits of Malacca and Sunda'* The reports
'Considerations on the Subject of a Treaty', P .R .O* 30/8, 360 part
2, p .180*
2
Harris to Carmarthen, 12 June 1787, F.O. 37/14.
3
Pitt to Cornwallis, 2 August 1787 ('Private' P» R»0. 30/8/l02), 
Extract of this despatch quoted in Harlow, vol#IX, p*383- J
4
Orders from the Court of Directors to Lord Cornwallis, relating to 
the Strait of Malacca, 27 June 1786, Straits Settlements Records, 
vol#I. The Court also emphasised 'the great importance of the China 
trade,«..as well as the good policy of awing the Dutch to prevent a 
rupture with them, or in case of its taking place, to be able to 
avail ourselves of it advantageously, to break effectually their 
spice monopoly'.
336
too of the presentation of the 'Son of the King of Cochinchine'
at Versailles confirmed British alarms about French intrigue in
the East Indies*1 Macpherson felt that 'Paris may soon become
2
the Center of Eastern politics and Asiatic intrigues', for the 
British were quick to perceive a threat to their China trade*
And yet the French attitude to the Dutch crisis remained 
ambivalent and uncertain. Montmorin hesitated to provoke a war 
with both England and Prussia* Consequently, when at last 
Frederick William II intervened to protect his sister, the 
Stadholder's wife, from the insults of the Patriot party, France 
backed down and refused to support the Patriots with any further 
financial or military aid*
From September 1787 the British renewed their efforts 
to negotiate a general settlement with the Dutch on 'an amicable 
footing'* By this phrase Dundas meant, of course, 'a  complete 
enjoyment of the advantages of the Cape and Trincomale and the 
arsenals of Batavia in time of war', and in concluding his despatch 
to Grenville Dundas stressed those interests which the two powers 
had in common*
1
Dorset to Carmarthen, 22 March 1787, F .O . 27/21* See chapter 6, 
pp* 295-7*
2
Macpherson to Dundas, 4 February 1788, P .R .O , 30/8, 362 part I, 
p* 91«
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I do not see how there is any inconsistency between 
their having the exclusive spice trade, and yet our 
having Trincomal^ as a safe asylum for our fleets, 
and our having a free navigation in the Eastern Seas 
for the purposes of our China trade, and likewise 
for the purpose of opening new markets both for our 
Indian and European manufactures.#.1
The Dutch unfortunately could not agree with these 
propositions; and although the British were prepared to return 
Negapatam to the Dutch, respect their spice monopoly in the East­
ern Seas, and secure them a privileged position in Bengal with 
regard to the payment of inland and port duties, the Dutch were 
quite unwilling to give the British Trincomalee, Riau, or various 
concessions at the Cape« Instead the Dutch concluded an alliance 
with Britain and Prussia in April 1788, but vacillated over an 
eastern settlement# Negotiations were resumed with Lord Auckland 
in 1790, but they were no more successful than the earlier attempts 
of 1784 and 1787*^ With the flight of the Prince of Orange to 
England in 1795, the British government declared war on the pro- 
French Batavian Republic and soon after seized the Cape and 
Trincomalee#
1
Dundas to Grenville, 2 September 1787* Quoted in V. Harlow and
F. Madden, British Colonial Developments 1774-1834 : Select Docu­
ments (0xford, 1953;, P*15« Grenville had been sent to Holland at 
the height of the crisis to investigate the situation independently 
of Harris#
2
Auckland’ s mission is discussed in Tarling, Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, 
pp# 36-46#
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One important outcome of the dissolution of the Franco- 
Dutch entente in 1787 was the renewal of interest by the French 
government in schemes of political and military intervention in 
areas of strategic value in Southeast Asia. For a cardinal 
feature of French foreign policy since the peace had been the 
attempt to gain access to the Dutch possessions. When these bases 
were rendered inaccessible to the French by the Anglo-Dutch 
rapprochement, the Ministry began to consider seriously Pigneau 
de Behaine's proposals. They v/ere clearly impressed by the 
strategic arguments and the imperative need to establish bases for 
the country trade with China, and in November 1787 the government 
of Louis XVI committed itself in a secret treaty to support the 
cause of the Nguyen. The Ministry, however, was able to do 
precious little to assist the bishop's enterprise.
This examination of the wider repercussions of a Euro­
pean problem has strongly suggested the close interrelationship 
between European and Indian tensions. The gradual deterioration 
in Anglo-French relations in the East after 1786 was in large
measure a product of the constitutional crisis in Holland. Natur-
/
ally the stakes in this struggle were high - possession of the 
Dutch establishments in India and the East Indies, or at least
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access to the more important harbours and ports* And while the 
British supported the successful Prussian intervention in September, 
thus ensuring the defeat of French ambitions, the Dutch proved 
unwilling to grant any concessions in the East to the Company#
In fact, they resented the Company's new establishment at Penang 
as an unwarranted intrusion on their monopoly of the navigation 
of the Eastern Seas*
Fears about the French, arising from both their acti­
vities in the East and in Europe, provoked the English to act so 
as to forestall French intervention in areas of strategic import­
ance* By and large the councils were prepared to act if they 
believed that their material interests would be jeopardised by 
delay* Probably the French were more aware than the English of 
the liabilities which accrued from hesitancy and indecision, since 
theirs had been such a galling experience. As early as 1749 
Dupleix had described the predicament of the European powers 
caught up in the process of political change and decay in Asia:
What often seems to be the principal Motive to determine 
a Company to take advantage of such Circumstances is a 
firm persuasion that some Rival Nation would avail 
itself of their Refusal and this is what never fails 
to happen as we have more than once experienced by our 
own mismanagement from the English*.*.
So that any European Company that by an 
impolitick indifference or on account of real weakness 
shall refuse to take Concern in a War in India, will 
not only lose the benefit which it 's  more enterprising
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Neighbour must derive from that War, but will also 
sustain a loss in its Trade in proportion to the 
improvement which that of it ’ s neighbour makes.^
In deploring the French failure to exploit the many 
opportunities that arose in the East for commercial and political 
expansion, French officials continued to complain of the cumber­
some bureaucracy, which prevented the exercise of responsibility 
and discretion at the colonial level* Chevalier, for one, lament­
ed that individuals rarely grasped the initiative at the periphery 
of control because of their dread of offending the metropolitan 
authorities, and he contrasted this state of affairs with the 
more flexible system of the British*
Mais où sont nos moyens, Monsieur, pour payer les 
dépenses qu’entraînerait nécessairement une affaire 
de cette nature? Et quand bien meme les fonds ne 
manqueraient pas, ne seriez-vous pas retenu par la 
crainte d’ etre blame d ’ avoir agi sans ordre de la 
Cour? Ce sont ces entraves qui empecheront éterne­
llement les Gouverneurs de l ’ Inde de rien operer de 
grand et d’utile. Les Anglais,^au contraire, ont 
toujours les pouvoirs les plus etendus pour executer 
tout ce qui peut tendre a augmenter leur puissance 
et le commerce de leur nation«,.* ,2
Although the French administration in the East was probably more
centralised and tightly-knit than that of the East India Company,
the failure of the French to form permanent establishments in
1
Extracts from Mr Dupleix’ s Memoirs relating to the donations to 
them by the Country powers in India, 1749-1753, French in India« 
vol*I.
2
Chevalier to Bellecombe, 12 February 1778, Colonies ’ 3« p#l68*
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Cochin China and elsewhere was not entirely or primarily due to 
administrative inflexibility and impoverishment. Fundamentally 
it reflected the preoccupation of French diplomacy with contin­
ental affairs, and the absence of French naval power in the 
Eastern Seas.
Their national rivals and global competitors, however,
had committed themselves irrevocably to the Indian adventure, at
least by the time of the wars against Revolutionary and Imperial
France, And as a corollary, successive British governments also
found themselves committed during the late eighteenth century to
a world-wide maritime strategy based on the securing of the sea
routes to the East, To Dundas and Pitt it appeared axiomatic
that Britain's strength and prestige as a global power depended
substantially on her empire of trade and dominion in the East*
While some historians may doubt the final economic importance of
the eighteenth century eastern trade, there can be no doubt that
the acquisition of a great territorial empire in Asia gave an
enormous boost of confidence to Britain, recently humbled in a
colonial war. As one memorialist expressed it in 1789:
The Government in India is so interwoven in the general 
System of the British Empire, and the Advantages 
derived from it so important, that it may not be rash 
to hazard the Assertion, that the Downfall of our 
Empire in the East will inevitably deprive Great Britain 
of that commercial and political ascendancy, which it 
now maintains in the general System of Europe. In 
the Formation therefore of our India System, we should
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not forget, that permanent Possession of our Sover­
eignty is the principal Point to which we should 
direct our Attention, and upon which all the Benefits 
derived to this Country absolutely depend; for the 
Moment our Empire ceases in Bengal, the commercial 
Connection with that Country will cease also,3-
In spite of the British parliament’ s disclaimers that 
’ schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India, are 
measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy of this 
p
nation’ , the Ministry and the Board of Control found it necessary 
to sanction the forward policies of the proconsuls at the frontier# 
For statesmen had commenced to believe that India and the British 
Isles were the two great pillars of Britain's wealth and power in 
the world as a whole# The Age of Imperialism had dawned#
1
'A Plan for altering the System of the British Government in 
India ', 15 July 1789, P .R .O . 30/8, 355, part I , p#51*
2
From Article XXXIV of Pitt's  India Act, 1784#
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EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION
Although this study closes with the capture of the
French Indian possessions in 1793 on the outbreak of the
Revolutionary Wars, the French threat, no matter how hypothetical,
remained to influence British policies in India and the East, at
least until the defeat of Napoleon, The two missions of Roberts
in 1803-4 and the mission of Crawfurd in 1822 to Cochin China,
together with Symes1 mission to Ava in 1802, were in part
provoked by British fears of French designs and intrigue. For as
Dr* Lamb cogently argues, ’A French dominated Cochin China at
this date#.*.was a far more formidable prospect, united as it now
was under Nguyen Anh, than ever was the war torn country which
Chapman and Macartney had v i s i t e d * M o r e o v e r ,  Professor Graham
s
has recently described the effects of French activity at Reunion 
and Madagascar on British maritime strategy and enterprise in the 
Indian Ocean during the first half of the nineteenth century, and 
his conclusions suggest that Anglo-French distrust and rivalry
1
A. Lamb, 'British Missions to Cochin China: 1778-1822', pp.100-1, 
For details of these three missions see pp.99-227- For Symes' 
mission see D.G.E. Hall (ed .), Michael Symes, Journal of his 
Second Embassy to the Court Ava 1802 (Lon'don# 1955)»
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continued well into the nineteenth century*. Other historians 
have also stressed the role played by the French in 'promoting1 
the British colonisation of New Zealand and the Pacific, and the
3
extension of British outposts around the Australian littoral.
And yet 1793 does provide us with a landmark in both 
European and Indian history. In France, it marked the greatest 
triumph of the revolutionaries, the destruction of the last 
surviving remnants of the feudal order, and the declaration of 
war a out ranee against the old order in Europe, V/ith the 
exception of Napoleon's desultory interest in schemes of eastern 
conquest, the French were to remain preoccupied with continental 
affairs for the next twenty years. In India, however, these same 
years witnessed the emergence of the British as the paramount 
power and the residuary legatee of the Moghul empire. While 
Wellesley's policies were closely related to local Indian 
politics, they were affected, too, by wider geo-political 
considerations and by events in Europe. The Governor General's 
alarms about a French invasion coincided with Napoleon's Egyptian
1
G.S. Graham, Great Britain in the Indian Ocean: A Study of 
Maritime Enterprise 1810-50 (Oxford! 1967)•
3
For a recent discussion of this question see L.R. Marchant, 'The 
French Discovery and Settlement of New Zealand, 1769-1846: A 
Bibliographical Essay on Naval Records in Paris', Historical 
Studies, Australia and New Zealand, vol,10, no,40 (1963)» pp«511- 
18, For the impact of the French threat on early Australian 
Settlements see G. Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance (Melbourne, 
1966), pp,70-98,
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campaign on the one hand, and the conclusion of a treaty of 
alliance between Tipu Sultan and Malartic on the other* Hence 
the rapid growth of British political and military dominance in 
India was overshadowed by the even more extraordinary rise of the 
French Emperor, It is hardly surprising, then, to find that 
Wellesley regarded his Indian policy as part of the titanic 
struggle his countrymen were waging against France,
Clearly there is need for a new and more thorough
treatment of Wellesley's diplomacy and its relationship with
European events. Although G.S. Misra has written an able general
summary of British Foreign Policy in India during the period
1783-1815, he has almost entirely ignored the French sources and
has failed to examine in any depth the repercussions of Wellesley's
system on the Indian states,1 The interesting works of
K.A. Ballhatchet and T.H. Beaglehole concentrate on matters of
government and revenue administration, and are not greatly
2
concerned with war and diplomacy. Even so, they demonstrate how 
important these decades v/ere for the development of British 
policy in India, A diplomatic study of the rise of the British
1
G.S. Misra, British Foreign Policy and Indian Affairs 1783-1815 
(New York, 1963)*
2
K.A. Ballhatchet, Social Policy and Social Change in Western 
India 1817-1830 (London/ 196l).
T.H. Beaglehole, Thomas Munro and the Development of Administrative 
Policy in Madras 1792-1818: The Origins of 'The Munro System' 
(Cambridge, 1966),
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power in India at this time, which makes ample use of the Indian, 
British and French sources, would be the obvious complement to 
this thesis.
The successful conclusion of the wars which Wellesley 
undertook against Mysore and the Marathas, together with the 
establishment of direct British control over the Carnatic and 
Oudh, eliminated the possibility of French sponsored wars in 
India, at least for the immediate future. However, the French 
still retained possession of their two bases in the Indian Ocean, 
and Napoleon exploited the interlude of the Peace of Amiens to 
send General Decaen in command of 1,300 troops and a naval 
squadron to assume charge of the government at Port Louis.
With the resumption of hostilities in May 1803» French 
privateers once more scourged the Indian Ocean and the Eastern 
Seas. Merchants in Calcutta pressed the government to despatch 
a naval expedition to capture the islands, but it was generally 
believed that the fortifications at the lie de France were 
impregnable. Besides, British officials were alarmed by the 
prospect of another invasion, this time a concerted Franco-Russian 
attack on their Indian possessions from the north-west.
In 1807 Persia turned to France for assistance after 
she had been humbled in a recent war with Russia, Napoleon was 
eager to conclude an alliance with a power that could assist him
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in wars against either Russia or Britain, and on 4 May 1807 the 
Treaty of Finkenstein was signed by the Shah and Monsieur Johanni, 
Napoleon's envoy. In return for French military aid and a 
guarantee of Persian territorial integrity, the Shah of Persia 
engaged to break off diplomatic relations with the English and 
join forces with the French should they send an army to attack 
the British in India,^ After the Treaty of Tilsit, v/hich 
converted Russia from an enemy into an ally of France, Napoleon 
fostered the idea of a joint expedition through Turkey and Persia 
against British India, General Gardane was promptly despatched 
to Teheran to prepare the ground for this project.
Lord Minto, Wellesley's successor, appreciated the
magnitude of the new danger. In 1808 he wrote home;
As long as France might be engaged in continental wars 
in Europe, the project of directing her arms towards 
this quarter must be considered impracticable; but if 
her armies have been liberated by a pacification with 
Russia, and by the continued submission of the powers 
in Europe, the advance of a considerable force of 
French troops into Persia under the acquiescence of 
the Turkish, Russian, and Persian powers, cannot be 
deemed an undertaking beyond the scope of that energy 
and perseverance which distinguish the present ruler 
of F r a n c e . . , T h e  ascendancy of France being once 
established in the territories of Persia it may justly 
be expected that they may be enabled gradually to 
extend their influence towards the region of Hindostán, 
and ultimately open a passage for their troops into 
the dominion of the Company.^
1
Misra, p .68.
2
Quoted from Ramsay Muir, The Making of British India 1756-1858 
(Manchester, 1923), pp .252-3»
348
In order to obstruct Gardanefs mission, Minto lost no time in 
sending Colonel Malcolm to the Shah's court with instructions to 
form a defensive alliance with Persia* Malcolm's mission was 
successful and by 1809 the French had departed from the region.
On 12 March of that year the Shah declared all previous treaties 
with European powers invalid, and he promised explicitly that he 
would not assist the French in any further attempts they might 
make to attack their national rivals»
In 1810 the war in the East entered its final phase 
v/ith the launching of expeditions against the French Islands and 
Java, By 1811 all traces of French influence had been removed 
from Asia, leaving the British undisputed masters of India and 
the trade routes to the East,
At home the East India Company's charter was renewed 
in 1813» although the Company was deprived of its monopoly of the 
trade between India and Europe. In spite of the British 
government's claims to the 'undoubted sovereignty' of the Company's 
territorial possessions, the actual administration was left with 
the Company, Most statesmen were convinced that Pitt's India Act 
had successfully curbed the abuses and inefficiencies of an earlier 
age, and they were reluctant to interfere further with a powerful 
vested interest. In the following year, 'British Sovereignty on
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the Continent of India* was recognised for the first time by- 
other European nations,1 The British Indian empire was now an 
accomplished fact#
Sir John Seeley based his explanation of the rise of 
the British power in India on the reality and ubiquity of Anglo- 
French conflict in the eighteenth century. He argued that the 
fears roused by the activities of the French, along v/ith the need 
to forestall them in areas of strategic importance, provided the 
raison d’etre for British political and military intrusion in 
India and Southeast Asia# While there can be no doubt that the 
ambitious policies of Dupleix precipitated the Company's first 
intervention in the complexities of Carnatic and Bengal politics, 
historians have usually dismissed the French in India after the 
Seven Years' War and the Peace of Paris, The obvious weakness 
and ineptitude of French governments in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century has given further weight to this view, since 
metropolitan France was scarcely ever in a position to implement 
the many paper schemes so enthusiastically devised by her servants 
in the East*
1
The phrase comes from Article XII of the First Treaty of Paris, 
signed 30 May 1814# See Dodwell, The Cambridge History of India, 
vol.V, pp.595-6,
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Recent studies of French diplomacy have shown, however, 
that the French government under a Choiseul or a Vergennes was by 
no means devoid of initiative, ability and influence. And although 
the French state of the ancien regime might seem a ramshackle 
affair by the more exacting standards of a later age, its 
achievements could be favourably compared with most other European 
governments of the time. It should be remembered that the 
reforming ministry of the younger Pitt was confronted with 
administrative anomalies no less formidable than those which faced 
the French state, British statesmen in the eighteenth century 
had always feared France because of its potential advantages in 
land-space, wealth and population, and when these resources were 
harnessed by a new and centralised government organised on 
rational lines, such alarms were seen to be perfectly justified.
Moreover, our three regional studies of Anglo-French 
relations in the East have indicated that the French continued to 
exert a powerful influence on British policy there, and that the 
French threat was intimately related to the local situations in 
which the two European powers found themselves. The French, of 
course, felt their subordinate status and vulnerability most 
acutely in Bengal where the Company acquired effective control of 
the revenues in 1765# French defiance of the British was largely 
a product of their fears that the English were ’ squeezing1 their
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trade with the ultimate object of eliminating them as commercial 
competitors from the country. They saw the Nawab's government 
as a convenient screen for the East India Company's extortion of 
unwarranted duties and payments from them. In order to preserve 
their influence, protect their trade, and check the encroachments 
of the Company, the French appealed to their firmans, which were 
intended to ascertain and guarantee their immunities and rights.
The active resistance by the French to the Company's authority 
ensured that their activities were constantly scrutinised by the 
Fort William Council; and it also forced the Council to define 
its powers more clearly, thus facilitating the emergence of the 
doctrine of British sovereignty in India. Above all, the 
existence of a potential fifth column clandestinely intriguing 
with hostile powers to the north-west and in the South meant that 
the British governments in India continued to be preoccupied with 
the problem of external security. Such fears and alarms as were 
aroused by the prospect of a French invasion in conjunction with 
a series of native wars predisposed the British to interfere in 
the troubled waters of native diplomacy. Thus, paradoxically, 
the desire to preserve and safeguard the frontiers of the Company's 
possessions entailed in time the conquest of the entire sub­
continent, and in this train of events the French v/ere a not 
insignificant factor.
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This classic process is clearly exemplified in the 
South- Initially, the British were extremely reluctant to assume 
the revenues and administration of the Carnatic, but because of 
the threats from neighbouring Indian states, whose armies were 
trained and officered by Frenchmen, the Madras Council was 
forced to assume a dominant rile in South Indian politics. While 
it is highly probable that these developments would have occurred 
without the presence of the French, it is doubtful whether the 
acquisition of territories would have been quite so rapid or as 
extensive. Nor is it certain that the ministries at home would 
have so readily concurred in arrangements made by the men on the 
spot. It was the concatenation of European and Indian fears 
about a French invasion that persuaded the government to support 
the Company even during the 1760*s and the 1770's when the Company 
was subject to bitter and protracted criticism at home.
Fortunately for the Company, the local wars its servants waged 
in India took place against the background of a century-long 
struggle against the French.
Geo-political considerations, born of the struggle with 
France during the American War, also affected the spread of 
British power beyond India. The loss of the Cape and Trincomalee 
demonstrated to the Company and the British government the need 
for a co-ordinated maritime strategy, and henceforth the securing
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of the ocean routes to the East was to become a cardinal feature 
of British foreign and imperial policy. Our third study has 
established that the 'swing to the East' was not simply determined 
by economic considerations - the desire to participate more fully 
in the China trade and redress the adverse balance of payments. 
Pigneau de Behaine’ s open canvassing of support for the 
dispossessed ruler of Cochin China, Nguyen Anh, was an important 
immediate cause of the East India Company's acquisition of Penang 
in 1786. The activities of Frenchmen like this bishop, no less 
than the activities of Francis Light, James Scott and Thomas 
Forrest, contributed to the growth of an Anglo-Indian empire in 
Asia - Further India.
Was this Indian empire acquired as part of a deliberate 
British policy, or was it conquered 'in a fit of absence of 
mind', as Seeley claimed? Our three detailed case studies have 
exposed the insurmountable difficulties encountered by European 
governments in their attempts to impose controls on their 
nationals in the East. In the sense that the metropolitan 
authorities had little direct impact on the policies devised in 
India, that they could only watch what was happening in the East 
from the side lines, as it were, it is true that the growth of 
the British power was not part of a conscious imperial design but 
essentially the work of pragmatists on the spot. It would also
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be a gross oversimplification of the political situation in India 
to see this development as the unravelling of some master plan 
concocted either in Whitehall or Calcutta* In fact, the three 
different types of situation we have examined over the period 
1763-1793 reveal how slow, tentative and uncertain this process 
could be* Nevertheless, the individuals caught up in this 
movement were conscious of their own interests at least, and they 
saw that these could be fostered by European political intervention* 
If we consider the extension of European control over great 
tracts of Asia in the eighteenth century as a piecemeal and 
incomplete process, then it was in part the conscious design and 
creation of Robert Clive, Warren Hastings, Francis Light and 
Lord Wellesley*
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APPENDIX A
This copy of the instructions proposed to be sent to 
Law de Lauriston is found in the letter of 19 February 1770 
from the duc de Praslin to the duc de Choiseul. (S .P . 78/280, 
pp .119-20),
LAW DE LAURISTON’S COMMISSION
Louis par la Grâce de Dieu Roi de France et de Navarre, 
\  tous ceux qui ces présentes Lettres verront Salut. Ayant \
r 6  g
nommer un Commissaire pour terminer de concert avec les Com . du 
de
Roi de la G . Bret. les discussions survenues aux Indes orientales
✓
entre les deux Compagnies de france et de ang . depuis le T, de
y r
paix conclu entre les deux Puissances le 10 fev* 1763; prendre
les arrangemens convenables pour assurer la liberte" du Commerce
ie g \ y
de l ’ Asie aux deux Comp . conformément a ce qui est porte par
t e s s
ce T. , éclaircir par les explications nettes et precises les
a t e
articles de ce meme T. qui pouvoient etre une Semence de 
divisions, et enfin faire tel accord juge* efficace pour entretenir 
la paix et l ' amitié entre les deux Nations: nous avons jugé" ne 
pouvoir faire un meilleur choix que de la personne de Law de 
Lauriston, Ch. de notre ordre R. et milit. de S. Louis, 
Brigadier de nos armées, notre Gouverneur actuel des ville et 
forts de Pondichery et Commandant G?1 de tous les ^tablissemens
356
frangois aux Indes Orientales: vu les preuves qu’ il nous a 
donnees de son experience, Capacité^, fidélité et affection a notre 
Service dans les différentes occasions ou nous l ’ avons employe,
✓
et notament dans la reprise de possession des etablissemens 
françois aux Indes a ces causes et autres considérations a ce 
nous mouvant, nous avons le dit S,
Law de Lauriston fait, constitue, ordonne et établi,
/ ro
faisons, constituons, ordonnons et établissons pour notre Comm#
\ /  ro s f  "fc©
a l ’effet de regler et terminer avec les Com* nommes par Sa M.
0
B, les discussions survenues et qui surviendront entre les deux
1 0  S ^ / s
Comp . aux Indes Orientales tant a la Cote de Coromandel, d’Orixa
qu'à celle de Malabar et dans le Royaume de Bengale et autres
\ 1g g /
Lieux des Indes ou les deux Comp # ont des etablissemens, des
Loges de Commerce, ou simplement des opérations de Commerce a
/  *t0 S
executer, de faire et signer les accords, T. et Conventions
/  2.0 g
nécessaire pour assurer aux deux Comp # et aux particuliers des
deux Nations le libre exercice du Commerce dans toutes les parties
de l'Inde; et attendu la distance des Lieux ou il peut 'etre
s re s r
nécessaire que les Comm * se transportent, permettons au S, Law
de dele'guer à sa place telles personnes qu 'il jugera a propos,
auxquelles il donnera les Instructions relatives a ce qu’elles
\ v A
auront a traiter, a la charge par elle de ne rien arreter
définitivement qu'après l'approbation qu 'il aura donnee aux
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Conventions faites par les subd/l/gues; de ce faire nous lui 
avons donne7 et donnons pleinpouvoir; Car tel est notre plaisir» 
Entemoin de quoi nous avons fait mettre notre Scel a ces
✓
presentes.
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APPENDIX B
This copy of the Cathcart-Souillac Convention has been 
taken from the French in India series, vol,VI, pp.191-242. While 
the original spelling and punctuation have been retained, the 
capitalisation has been simplified.
THE CATHCART-SOUILLAC CONVENTION
Convention settled provisionally betwixt Mr Le Vicomte de Souillac 
Governor-General of the French Establishments in the East Indies 
and Lieutenant Colonel Cathcart Plenipotentiary of the Government 
General for the English Company in the East Indies in explanation 
of the 13th 14th and 15th articles of the Treaty of Peace between 
their Britannick and Most Christian Majesties concluded at 
Versailles the 3rd September 1783, which provisional Convention 
shall have effect until the decision of our respective courts.
Article 1 All difficulties v/hich may arise on account of the 
establishments which the King of Great Britain has restored to 
His Most Christian Majesty or of the districts and magans which 
His Britannick Majesty has procured for France, shall be amicably 
adjusted by the representatives of Their Majesties in the East 
Indies,
Article 2 Although it has not been acknowledged that the 
Nabobship of Arcot, the countries of Madura and Tanjore, ought to
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"be included in the engagement contracted by His (Britannick)
Majesty in the 13th article of the last Treaty of Peace, 
nevertheless the English Company shall readily exert every friendly 
mediation with the princes of Arcot and Tanjore, to procure to 
the subjects of France in their territories a safe, free, and 
independent trade, such as was carried on by the former French 
Company, whether they exercise it individually or united in a 
Company,
Article 3 The engagement of His Britannick Majesty concerning 
the safety, freedom and independence of the French trade shall 
have full effect in the provinces of Bengal, Bahar and Orixa, as 
also in the provinces on the coast of Orixa usually called 
Northern Circars; and in general in all the possessions of the 
English Company on the coasts of Orixa, of Coromandel and of 
Malabar#
Article 4 French trading vessels carrying on traffick in the 
English establishments, and English trading vessels carrying on 
traffick in the French establishments shall be subject reciprocally 
to the municipal duties of the said establishments*
Article 5 All French ships of war, frigates, sloops, armed 
ships, and in general all vessels carrying the marks which 
distinguish King’ s ships from those of commerce, shall pass freely 
up and down the river Ganges, without being hailed, or subjected 
to any visit whatever.
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Article 6 All French trading vessels whether belonging to 
individuals or to the Company, shall equally pass up and down 
the river Ganges without being hailed or visited; except in cases 
where information upon oath, in writing and under a known 
signature, shall be given to the officers of the Government of 
Bengal, that such vessels are loaded with articles prohibited 
by the present convention; viz. salt, in greater quantities than 
that which it is agreed shall be imported as shall be hereafter 
mentioned, and arms and military stores exclusive of those 
afterwards specified*
Article 7 A post composed of natives only, shall be established 
by the Government of Bengal, on the banks of the Ganges, below 
Budge Budge, which alone shall have a right to hail, stop and 
visit such French trading vessels only as shall have been informed 
against upon oath, conformable to what has been mentioned in the 
6th article, as being loaded with articles prohibited by the 
present convention* The persons at the said post appointed to 
hail and visit, shall be officers of the Nabob, with a particular 
commission for that purpose, and a chop as a distinguishing mark*
Article 8 Should the French trading ships, whether belonging 
to individuals or to the Company, refuse to stop upon being 
summoned, the officers of the said post may claim assistance at 
Budge Budge, and other forts belonging to the English Company*
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Article 9 When a French trading ship shall be stopped, 
information shall be given of it to the agent of the said nation, 
who shall send immediately a person commissioned by him and in 
whose presence the said vessel shall be searched* The articles 
found fraudulent shall be confiscated to the use of the Government 
of Bengal, which shall dispose of them as it may think proper; 
after which the vessel shall be delivered over to the agent of 
the French nation, who shall determine on the punishment to 
inflicted on the captain#
If the information should prove false, the informer 
shall pay a fine proportioned to the loss occasioned by the 
detention of the vessel, and in default of means on the part of 
the informer, he shall be subject to exemplary punishment*
Article 10 The French trade shall import annually into Bengal 
two hundred thousand maunds of salt, which shall be unloaded at 
the place of deposit fixed by the Government of Bengal, and 
delivered to the officers of the said Government appointed for 
this purpose, at the price agreed on, of one hundred and twenty 
rupees per hundred maunds*
Article 11 There shall not be imported into Bengal by the French 
trade, any arms or military stores, except such as are necessary 
for the equipment of the people employed to maintain the police 
in the French establishments*
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Article 12 The French trade shall receive annually upon 
application from the agent of the said nation in Bengal, eighteen 
thousand maunds of salt petre and two hundred chests of ophium, 
at the prices fixed before the last war*
Article 15 All goods that shall be sent from Chandernagore into 
the interior of the country, or that shall come into Chandernagore 
from the interior of the country, shall be subject to a duty of 
two and an half per cent. But no duty shall be imposed by the 
Government of Bengal upon articles imported into or exported from 
Chandernagore in French trading vessels passing up and down the 
Ganges; and of the cargoes of these no manifests shall be 
required.
Article 14 The quantity and quality of the said goods which 
shall pass through the interior of the country, shall be expressed 
in the dustucks or passports, whether of the French nation or of 
the chiefs of the different factories and houses of commerce, all 
of whom shall be entitled to grant them; and invoices in French 
shall accompany the said dustucks. These dustucks shall be 
carried to the custom house at Hoogly, or to any other established 
by the Government of Bengal beyond the territory of Chandernagore, 
The said dustucks shall not be exchanged for buxbunder rowannahs, 
but shall have a full and free currency.
Article 15 The duties to be paid shall be regulated by a talika 
or tarif, settled by what was formerly established by the princes
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of the country, and there shall be a review of the ancient 
talikas, which shall be the rule to follow.
Article 16 An account shall be kept of the duties paid, until 
the decision of our respective courts.
Article 17 Besides the abovementioned articles, the rules shall 
be the 7th, 11th, 12th, 13th and 15th articles of the regulation 
proposed by the English Government General to Mons. Dangereux 
agent of the French nation, on the margins of which the said 
Mr. Dangereux hath made answers, dated 17th October 1785, and 
which said articles shall remain as they were proposed.
Article 18 Agreeable to the proposal of the English Government 
General to the agent of the French nation in Bengal, the factories 
and houses of commerce which Mr. Nicholas or any two members of 
the ancient council at Chandernagore shall specify by name, as 
having been held in property or otherwise by the French nation, 
in the provinces of Bengal, Bahar and Orixa, before the last war 
shall be declared to belong to the French nation, but no e n c r e a s e  
or exchange of factories or houses of commerce shall take place 
without the sanction of the Government of Bengal,
Article 19 All the inhabitants whether Europeans or natives, of 
the French establishments, factories, and houses of commerce, as 
well as of the territory annexed to them, shall be under the 
protection of the French flag, and subject to the French 
jurisdiction.
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Article 20 The chiefs of factories and other French 
establishments shall enjoy the privilege of recovering the debts 
and balances due by the weavers or other manufacturers, as also 
by the delols employed by the French, although they may reside 
beyond the bounds of the said establishments; with this 
restriction however, that if  a delol should have contracts with 
more than one European nation at the same time, he must in that 
case only be proceeded against before the ordinary jurisdiction 
of the country.
Article 21 In whatever French factories of Bengal the Dewans of 
the chiefs may have exercised a jurisdiction over their ryots 
betwixt the years 1765 and 1778, tho' the territories inhabited 
by the said ryots may be beyond the bounds of the said factories, 
the said custom of jurisdiction shall be continued; that is to 
say, there shall be no innovation in this respect.
Article 22 Natives who being pursued by the government of the 
country for crimes, misdemeanours or debts shall take refuge in 
the French factories shall be delivered up by the chiefs of these 
factories, when claimed by the said government# But the said 
chiefs shall have a right to give protection to Europeans in 
similar circumstances.
Article 23 In cases where French subjects shall be accused of 
outrages against natives of the country, they shall be delivered
365
over by the officers of the government to the nearest French chief 
who shall examine the accusation, and proceed according to the 
exigency of the case.
If a French subject should have similar cause of 
complaint against a native of the country, the cause of the said 
native shall be tried in the courts of justice of the said 
country; provided that these cases occur beyond the bounds of 
the French territory*
Article 24 The other customs whether relating to civil or 
criminal matters which have not been mentioned in the preceding 
articles shall be continued in full force, and as they were 
practised before the last war*
Article 25 The peninsula lately become an island situated to 
the east of Yanam extending to that place and formerly covered 
with the wood a part of which is now cleared, shall remain in the 
possession of the French entirely both the parts that are cleared 
and those which remain covered with wood: saving the claims which 
the English Company may have to make relative to the extent and 
limits of the said peninsula*
Article 26 Upon the production of the perwannah obtained by the 
French in 1765, from the Souba Nizam Alii which grants a savaron 
containing twelve candies malka of cultivated land in the district
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of Cotapilly, or an authentic proof being given that the said 
perwannah was obtained, the abovementioned savaron shall be 
delivered up to the French in full property*
Article 27 The dustucks of the chiefs of Yanam, and of the 
French factory at Masulipatam shall have free currency in the 
Northern Circars, and shall secure a free passage exempt from all 
duties whether on exports or imports for goods which shall belong 
to French individuals, or to the French Companies,
Article 28 European goods which shall pass thro1 the hands of 
native inhabitants of Yanam and of the French factory at 
Masulipatam shall circulate thro* the Northern Circars, under 
dustucks of the chiefs of Yanam and of the French factory at 
Masulipatam with entire freedom from duties in all cases where the 
same custom takes place with regard to the native inhabitants of 
the English establishments of Masulipatam and Ingeram,
Article 29 The inhabitants of Yanam shall enjoy the rights of 
fishing and of markets, and all the other privileges they enjoyed 
before the last war without being molested by any person whomsoever
Separate Article Definitively Settled:
It is agreed and settled definitively that a corvette 
nearly such as the Esperance belonging to His Most Christian 
Majesty, which was lost in consequence of several cannot shot,
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fired from the English fort of Budge Budge, by a mist alee of the 
officer commanding the fort, shall be sent by the Governor General 
and Council of Calcutta to Chandernagore, and delivered by an 
English officer to the agent of the French nation to replace the 
said corvette Esperance#
It is further agreed and settled definitively, that the 
relations and friends or cast of the native, attached to the 
service of the said corvette Esperanee, and who perished by one 
of the cannon shot fired at the said corvette, shall be 
indemnified as far as may be for their loss by a pecuniary 
compensation from the English government.
Done at the Isle of France,
30 April 1786 
Souillac 
Cathcart
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APPENDIX C
This copy of the Eden-Montmorin Convention is found in 
the French in India series, vol.VI, pp.275-81,
Convention between his Britannick Ma.iesty and the Most Christian 
King. Signed at Versailles 31 August 1787.
Difficulties having arisen in the East Indies, relative 
to the meaning and extent of the 13th article of the Treaty of 
Peace, signed at Versailles 3 September 1783, His Britannick 
Majesty and His Most Christian Majesty, with a view to remove 
every cause of dispute between their respective subjects in that 
part of the world, have thought proper to make a particular 
convention, which may serve as an explanation of the 13th article 
abovementioned: in this view, their said Majesties have named 
for their respective plenipotentiaries, to wit, on the part of His 
Britannic Majesty, William Eden Esq. Privy Counsellor in Great 
Britain and Ireland, member of the British Parliament, and his 
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to his Most 
Christian Majesty; and on the part of his Most Christian Majesty 
the Sieur Armand Mark Count de Montmorin de St Herem, Marshall 
of his Camps and Forces, Counsellor in all his Councils, Knight 
of his Orders, and of the Golden Fleece, Minister and Secretary 
of State, and of his Commands and Finances, having the Department 
of Foreign Affairs; who after having communicated to each other .
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their respective full powers have agreed upon the following 
articles,
1 His Britannic Majesty ’ again engages to take such measures as 
shall be in his power for securing to the subjects of France a 
safe, free, and independant trade, such as was carried on by the 
French East India Company’ and as is explained in the following 
articles, 'whether they exercise it individually or as a Company', 
as well in the Nabobship of Arcot and the countries of Madura and 
Tanjore, as in the provinces of Bengal, Bahar and Orixa, the 
Northern Circars, and in general in all British possessions on the 
coast of Orixa, Coromandel and Malabar,
2 In order to prevent all abuses and disputes relative to the 
importation of salt, it is agreed that the French shall not import 
annually into Bengal more than two hundred thousand maunds of salt: 
the said salt shall be delivered at a place of deposit appointed 
for that purpose by the Government of Bengal, and to officers of 
the said Government, at the fixed price of one hundred and twenty 
rupees for every hundred maunds,
3 There shall be delivered annually for the French commerce, 
upon the demand of the French agent in Bengal, eighteen thousand
*
maunds of salt petre, and three thousand chests of opium, at the 
price established before the late war.
■&
This is an obvious error: the French were conceded the right to 
300, not 3*000, chests of opium each year.
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4 The six ancient factories, namely, Chandernagore, Cossimbuzar, 
Dacca, Jugdea, Balasore, and Patna, with territories belonging to 
the said factories, shall be under protection of the French flag, 
and subject to the French jurisdiction,
5 France shall also have possession of the ancient houses of 
Soopore, Keerpoy, Carricole, Mohunpore, Serampore, and Chittagong, 
as well as the dependencies on Soopore, viz, Gautjurat, Allende, 
Chintzabad, Patorcha, Monepore and Dolobody; and shall further 
have the faculty of establishing new houses of commerce} but none 
of the said houses shall have any jurisdiction, or any exemption 
from the ordinary justice of the country exercised over British 
subjects,
6 His Britannic Majesty engages to take measures to secure to 
French subjects without the limits of the ancient factories 
abovementioned, an exact and impartial administration of justice, 
in all matters concerning their persons or properties, or the 
carrying on their trade in the same manner and as effectually as 
to his own subjects,
7 All Europeans as well as natives, against whom judicial 
proceedings shall be instituted, within the limits of the ancient 
factories abovementioned, for offences committed or debts contracted 
within the said limits, and who shall take refuge out of the same, 
shall be delivered up to the chiefs of the said factories: and
all Europeans or others whosoever against whom judicial proceedings 
shall be instituted, v/ithout the said limits, and who shall take 
refuge within the same, shall be delivered up by the chiefs of 
the said factories, upon demand being made of them by the 
government of the country,
8 All the subjects of either nations respectively who shall take 
refuge within the factories of the other, shall be delivered up
on each side, upon demand being made of them,
9 The factory of Yanam with its dependencies, having in pursuance 
of the said Treaty of Peace, been delivered up by Mr, Wm, Hamilton, 
on the part of His Britannic Majesty, to Mr, Peter Paul Martin
on the part of His Most Christian Majesty, the restitution thereof 
is confirmed by the present convention, in terms of the instrument 
bearing date the 7 March 1785, and signed by Messrs. Hamilton and 
Martin,
10 The present convention shall be ratified and confirmed in the 
space of three months, or sooner if it can be done, after the 
exchange of signature between the plenipotentiaries.
In witness whereof, we Ministers Plenipotentiary, have
signed the present convention, and have caused the seals of our
arms to be affixed thereto.
Done at Versailles, 31 August 1787#
William Eden (L*S«)
L© C*e de Montmorin (L.S*)
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APPENDIX D
This copy of the treaty concluded by Montmorin and 
Pigneau de Behaine on 28 November 1787 is taken from Taboulet,
La Geste Française en Indochine, vol,I , pp.186-88, Articles 3 
and 4, which are somewhat abbreviated in Taboulet's version, have 
been supplemented from the copy of the articles in Conway's letter 
to Montmorin of 18 June 1788, (Colonies^« pp*166-73),
TRAITE^ D'ALLIANCE OFFENSIVE ET DEFENSIVE
Nguyen-Anh, Roi de la Cochinchine, ayant e t e '  dépouille’" 
de ses Etats, et se trouvant dans la nécessite^ d'employer la force 
des armes pour les retrouver, a envoye^en France le Sieur 
Pierre-Joseph-Georges Pigneau de Behaine, Eveque d'Adran, dans 
la vue de reclamer le secours et l'assistance de Sa Majesté* le 
Roi Très Chrétien* Sa dite Majesté", convaincue de la justice de 
la cause de ce prince, et voulant lui donner une marque signalée 
de son amitié*  ^comme de son amour pour la justice, s'est déterminée 
à accueillir favorablement la demande faite en son nom. En 
conséquenoe, elle a autorisé^ le sieur Comte Emile de Montmorin, 
Maréchal de ses camps et armées, Chevalier de ses Ordres et de la 
Toison d'Or, son Conseiller en tous ses conseils, Ministre et 
Secrétaire d'Etat de ses commandements et finances, ayant le 
Département des Affaires Etrangères, à discuter et a arreter, avec 
le dit Sieur Evoque d'Adran, la nature, l'étendue et les conditions
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des secours a fournir. Et les deux Plénipotentiaires, après 
s'e^tre légitimés, savoir: le Comte de Montmorin en communiquant 
son plein pouvoir, et l'Evêque d'Adran en produisant le grand 
sceau du Royaume de la Cochinchine ainsi qu'une délibération du 
Grand Conseil du dit Royaume, sont convenus des points et articles 
suivants:
Article 1
Le Roi Très Chretien promet et s'engage de seconder de 
la manière la plus efficace les efforts que le Roi de la 
Cochinchine est résolu de faire pour rentrer dans la possession 
et jouissance de ses Etats#
Article 2
Pour cet effet, Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne enverra 
incessamment sur les cotes de la Cochinchine, a ses frais, quatre 
frégates avec un corps de troupe de douze cents hommes d'infanterie, 
deux cents hommes d'artillerie, et deux cent cinquante Cafres.
Ces troupes seront munies de tout leur attirail de guerre, et 
nommément d'une artillerie compétente de campagne#
Article 3
Le Roi de la Cochinchine, dans l'attente du service 
important que le Roi Très Chrétien est disposé a lui rendre, lui 
cède éventuellement, ainsi qu'à la Couronne de France, la 
propriété^ absolue et la souveraineté de l 'ile  formant le port
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principal de la Cochinchine appelée Hoi-nan et par les Européens 
Touron et cette propriété et souveraineté seront inconmutablement 
acquises dès l'instant où les Français auront occupé l'ile  
sub-mentionnée *
Article 4
Il est convenu en outre que le Roi Tres Chrétien aura, 
concurremment avec celui de la Cochinchine, la propriété du port 
susdit, et que les Français pourront faire sur le continent tous 
les établissements tant pour leur navigation ou leur commerce que 
pour garder et car&ner leurs vaisseaux, et pour en construire 
quand a la police du port elle sera réglée sur les lieux par une 
convention particulière.
Article 5
Le Roi Très Chrétien aura aussi la propriété et la 
souveraine te' de l'île de Poulo-Condore.
Article 6
Les subjets du Roi Très Chrétien jouiront d'une entière 
liberté”' de commerce dans tous les états du Roi de la Cochinchine,
\  l'exclusion de toutes les autres nations européennes. Ils 
pourront, pour cet effet, aller, venir et séjourner librement, 
sans obstacle et sans payer aucun droit quelconque pour leurs 
personnes, a condition toutefois qu'ils seront munis d'un passeport 
du Commandant de l'île  de Hoi-nan. Ils pourront importer toutes
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les marchandises d'Europe et des autres parties du monde, a 
l'exception de celles qui seront defendues par les lois du pays#
Ils pourront également exporter toutes les denrees et marchandises 
du pays et des pays voisins sans aucune exception; ils ne paieront 
d'autres droits d'entree et de sortie que ceux qu'acquittent 
actuellement les naturels du pays, et ces droits ne pourront etre 
haussées en aucun cas, et sous quelque dénomination que ce puisse 
être. Il est convenu, de plus, qu'aucun bâtiment étranger, soit 
marchand, soit de guerre, ne sera admis dans les Etats du Roi de 
la Cochinchine que sous pavillon français et avec un passeport 
français*
Article 7
Le Gouvernement Cochinchinois accordera aux sujets du 
Roi Très Chretien la protection la plus efficace pour la liberte
A y
et la surete tant de leurs personnes que de leurs effets, et, en 
cas de difficulté* ou de contestation, il leur fera rendre la 
justice la plus exacte et la plus prompte.
Article 8
Dans le cas où le Roi Très Chretien serait attaque" ou 
menace' par quelque puissance que ce puisse e*tre, relativement 'a 
la jouissance des iles de Hoi-nan et de Poulo-Condore« et dans le 
cas où Sa Majeste' Très Chrétienne serait en guerre avec quelque 
puissance, soit européenne, soit asiatique, le Roi de la 
Cochinchine s'engage à lui donner des secours en soldats, matelots,
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vivres, vaisseaux et galères. Ces secours seront fournis trois 
mois après la réquisition, mais ils ne pourront pas 'etre employés 
au delà des îles Moluques et de la Sonde et du détroit de Malacca# 
Quant à leur entretien, il sera a la charge du souverain qui les 
fournira.
Article 9
Le Roi Très Chrétien s'oblige d'assister le Roi de la 
Cochinchine lorsqu'il sera trouble" dans la possession de ses états. 
Ces secours seront proportionnés à la nécessité* des circonstances; 
cependant, ils ne pourront en aucun cas exceder ceux énonces dans 
l'article deuxième du présent traité^.
Article 10
Le présent traite^ sera ratifié* par les deux souverains 
contractants, et les ratifications seront échangeas dans l'espace 
d'un an, ou plus tôt si faire se peut* En foi de quoi, nous 
Plénipotentiaires avons signé*" le présent traite et y avons fait 
apposer le cachet de nos armes*
Fait à Versailles, le 28 novembre 1787#
Le Comte de Montmorin 
P,-J.-G#, Eveque d'Adran.
Article séparé"
Dans la vue de prévenir toutes difficultés et mésentendus 
relativement aux établissements que le Roi Très Chrétien est
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autorise^ à faire sur le continent pour l'utilité" de la navigation 
et du commerce, il est convenu avec le Roi de la Cochinchine que 
ces metoes établissements seront et appartiendront en toute 
propriété" à Sa Majesté*" Très Chrétienne, et que la juridiction, la 
police et la garde, et tous les actes d'autorité* sans exception 
s 'y  exerceront privativement en son nom. Pour prévenir les abus 
auxquels les établissements mentionnes ci-dessus pourraient donner 
lieu, il est convenu que l'on n 'y recevra aucun Cochinchinois 
poursuivi pour crime; et que ceux qui pourraient s'y'etre 
introduits seront extradées à la première réquisition du 
Gouvernement. Il est convenu également que tous les Frangais 
transfuges seront extradés à la première réquisition du commandant 
Hoï-nan ou de celui de Poulo-Condore. ».
Fait \  Versailles, le 28 novembre 1787*
Le Comte de Montmorin.
P.-J.-G,, Evêque d'Adran.
Déclaration de 1 'Eveque d'Adran
Quoique dans la convention signée ce jourd'hui, il ne 
soit fait aucune mention des frais qu'occassionneront les 
établissements que Sa Majesté* Très Chrétienne pourra former soit 
dans le îles de Hoï-nan et Poulo-Condor, soit sur le continent du 
Royaume de Cochinchine, le Soussigné/ en vertu de l'autorisation 
dont il est muni, déclare que le Roi de la Cochinchine prendra à 
sa charge, soit par fournitures en nature, soit en argent, d'après
a
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les evaluations qui en seront faites, les premiers frais de 
l 1établissement a former pour la surete et la protection, tels que
A /\
fortifications, casernes, hôpitaux, magasins, bâtiments militaires 
et logement du Commandant# En foi de quoi j 'a i  signe le presente 
Declaration et y ai appose le cachet de mes armes, avec promesse 
d’ en procurer la ratification de la part du Roi de la Cochinchine#
Versailles, 28 novembre 1787#
P#-J#-G#, Eveque d'Adran#
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